• Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 and 12–24 as obvious over Szrek and Llach, and claim 11 as obvious over Szrek, Llach, and Gilmore.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–14).9 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Pet. 2–3). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’451 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. 9 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084 (Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11)), and IPR2023- 01235 (see IPR2023-01235, Paper 34 at 12–13). Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We need not construe “transaction processor” expressly because its meaning is not in dispute and its construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 11,488,451 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,488,451
• PLR Worldwide Sales Ltd. v. Flip Phone Games, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00209 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 and 13–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Ho and Aoki; claims 12 and 20 were not shown unpatentable over Jiau and Aoki or Jiau and Kim.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues for a slightly different level of ordinary skill in the art: “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with one to two years of experience developing or programming video games or video game systems, or similar types of computer systems.” PO Resp. 2 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 29). Patent Owner further argues that the person having ordinary skill in the art “may have additional education that might substitute for some of the experience, and additional experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” Id. (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 29). According to Patent Owner, Petitioner’s proposal does not require experience in programming video games. Id. at 3. However, Patent Owner states, “[t]his difference does not materially affect the analysis presented below.” Id. We see very little difference between the parties’ respective proposals. We adopt Patent Owner’s marginally more specific proposal. Additionally, because we would reach the same conclusions under Petitioner’s proposal, we agree with Patent Owner that this does not affect our analysis.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of “downloading” excludes “real-time fetching of data by a client from a server system.” PO Resp. 34; see also PO Sur-reply 16–17; Tr. 32:22–34:7. Because we need not expressly construe any claim terms, we do not construe any terms of the ’662 patent. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “date of the ’662 patent, Ho is not a “printed publication” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). PO Resp. 30–33; PO Sur-reply 15–16. The Federal Circuit has rejected this argument, holding that: a published patent application is, by its literal terms, a “printed publication.” So, when § 311(b) permits IPR challenges based upon “prior art . . . printed publications,” it includes within its literal scope challenges based upon a published patent application. And, by virtue of § 102(e)(1), a published patent application—this specific type of “printed publication”—is deemed prior art as of its filing date. Therefore, the plain language of §§ 311(b) and 102(e)(1) permits IPR challenges based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Thus, Petitioner asserts permissible grounds of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) by arguing that claims 1–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) on the basis of Ho, which is a prior art printed publication, and either Aoki or Kim.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “A person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Aoki’s teaching of using user-identification information as part of the request for an advertisement with Ho’s system, which also teaches a client device sending information to a server to request hot spot information, such as advertisements. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–107, 111, 114, 117. Because both Ho and Aoki are directed to improvements in game design and monetization from using advertisements (id. ¶ 106; Ex. 1004, 1:26–28; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6–8), a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked at both Ho and Aoki and combined the relevant features with a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103, 106, 117). A person having ordinary skill in the art would have appreciated that using Aoki’s teaching of sending user-identification information with Ho, which includes sending information with a request for information relating to interactive information elements (hot spots), allows for targeted advertisements, which was a known advantage in advertising. Id. ¶ 117; Ex. 10089 ¶¶ 54–55 (describing advantages of targeted advertising).” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 9,427,662 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,427,662
• Vizio, Inc. v. Polaris Powerled Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00073 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 are unpatentable: Zane anticipates claims 1–4, 11, 12, 14, 17, and 22; other claims are held unpatentable on the stated obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Upon consideration of the evidence and argument presented, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to categorically discount the weight of Dr. Zane’s testimony. First, that testimony concerns what is already disclosed in 3 US 7,948,468 B2 (“the Zane patent”), which issued on May 24, 2011 to Regan A. Zane and Montu Doshi and was assigned to the Regents of the University of Colorado. Ex. 2005. perspective of a POSITA.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 32. Patent Owner cites no evidence to suggest otherwise.4 PO Resp. 29–40; PO Sur-Reply 20–26. Second, the Zane patent is assigned to the University of Colorado, and Dr. Zane testifies that he does not currently receive remuneration for that patent and does not believe he ever received remuneration for that patent. Ex. 2004, 64:12–17, 69:9–22. Third, for the reasons explained below, we find Patent Owner’s reliance on Glaxo and Medtronic inapposite given the facts presented here.” slip op. at 13

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied

    “We need not resolve this dispute and dismiss Petitioner’s Motion to Strike as moot for the following reason. One of the issues disputed by the parties was whether all shift registers require a clock to shift bits. See Pet. 34 (“All shift registers must have a clock connected to them for shifting the bits.”); PO Resp. 20 (“[S]hift registers without clocks are not only possible, but a well-understood electronic circuit with a variety of uses.”). We using a clock to shift the bits corresponding to PWM signal E through a shift register because a clock would be needed to ensure signal E was periodic with period 40 as disclosed by Thomas. That is, we resolved the parties dispute without reference to the dictionary definition of “strobe” Patent Owner introduced during Dr. Zane’s deposition. Accordingly, we dismiss Petitioner’s motion to strike as moot.” slip op. at 58

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “of the invention as someone that would have had “a bachelor’s degree in physics, electrical engineering, or a related field, and approximately two years of experience in the fields of LED technology, backlights, LED devices and control thereof, or other related fields.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–35). Petitioner further contends that “advanced education in the fields of physics, electrical engineering, or a related field can compensate for lesser work experience in the relevant fields” and that the merits of the Petition “do[] not turn on this specific definition of the level of ordinary skill.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this definition. PO Resp. 4–5. In our Institution Decision, we found Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art to be reasonable and commensurate with the problems and solutions disclosed in the prior art and, omitting the open-ended phrase 2 Applicant Admitted Prior Art continue to do so here.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, a claim is construed “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. However, “[t]he Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner contends “no claim terms need to be expressly construed to resolve the invalidity issues in this Petition.” Pet. 16. Patent Owner agrees. PO Resp. 5. In our Institution Decision, we declined to construe any claim term because we found no term required express construction. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375. We maintain that finding here.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 7,843,148 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,843,148
• Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01235 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 were not shown unpatentable under either obviousness ground because Szrek did not disclose a pre-printed lottery ticket without lottery numbers associated at customer purchase.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “real party in interest. Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 32–34. In the Institution Decision, we stated: To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party of interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial. Inst. Dec. 11. In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner did not raise the issue of challenging Petitioner’s identified real party in interest. See generally PO Resp. Thus, we need not address this issue further because we find that Patent Owner has waived any challenge to Petitioner’s identification of the real parties in interest in this proceeding. See Paper 12 (Scheduling Order), 9 (“Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived.”).” slip op. at 5

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13).5 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19. 5 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’135 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

    “Following the block quote from Yacenda, the applicant then stated, “[b]ased on the foregoing, Yacenda’s system is directly opposite of the instant claims, as the instant claims require a ‘pre-printed lottery ticket’ which has no lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.’” Ex. 1002, 76. This statement is clear and unmistakable. It (1) specifically states that “the instant claims require” and (2) then states what the claims require—a “‘pre-printed lottery ticket’ which has no lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.” We fail to see how the applicant could have been more clear in stating a requirement of the Challenged Claims. And, by doing so, the applicant narrowed the scope of what would otherwise be encompassed in the meaning of “pre-printed lottery ticket” and therefore what would otherwise be encompassed in the scope of the Challenged Claims—a lottery ticket which has lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.” slip op. at 27

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We do not find Mr. Hutton’s testimony particularly helpful. First, we have addressed the points raised by his testimony in our discussion above because they are largely the same as the arguments raised in Petitioner’s Reply. Second, we find his testimony entitled to very little weight because he applies an incorrect understanding of the caselaw, which mirrors Petitioner’s incorrect and arguably misleading quotations of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Quest. In particular, in paragraph 5, Mr. Hutton states the following as his understanding of the law as it applies to prosecution disclaimer: “I also understand that in order to disclaim embodiments within the specification, the statements should have some indication that the applicant intended to surrender embodiments from the specification.” Ex. 1038 ¶ 5 (emphasis added). This then leads Mr. Hutton to state: “[t]hus, in my opinion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not view applicant’s statements as a disclaimer, because the applicant never stated that they intended to surrender multiple embodiments described in the specification.” Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added). As we explained above in responding to a similar argument by Petitioner, the caselaw does not require an applicant to expressly state whether a disclaimer excludes particular embodiments of the subject specification when disclaiming claim scope during prosecution. See Quest, 924 F.3d at 1229. And, as noted above, counsel for Petitioner agreed that such a statement explicitly disclaiming particular embodiments is not required. Tr. 12:18–13:17. Third, although we have considered Mr. Hutton’s testimony, we find it “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of” “pre-printed lottery ticket.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. In particular, we are cognizant of the Federal Circuit’s guidance that we “should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by . . . the prosecution history.” Id. at 1318 (internal quotation omitted). In this instance, for the reasons explained above, we find that Mr. Hutton’s testimony is clearly at odds with the applicant’s arguments during prosecution and that his testimony is based on a misunderstanding of what is required by the governing caselaw for prosecution history disclaimer.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 9,865,135 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,865,135
• Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 22, 2024 · IPR2020-00558 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Remand

  The majority determined claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable over Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst; the dissent would have found them obvious.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We determine Patent Owner’s reading of the claim limitation is the better one. The limitation begins with the verb “locating,” and it therefore makes sense that the clause would recite what is located (i.e., encryption information) and where it is located (i.e., within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video). In other words, it is reasonable that the second and third clauses of the limitation both modify the first clause (for example, as could perhaps be expressed through the use of commas as “locating encryption information, that identifies encrypted portions of frames of video, within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video”).10 On the other hand, Petitioner’s reading of the limitation, 10 In general, we recognize that the use of commas to set off phrases in claim drafting is not consistent. We included commas above to illustrate Patent Owner’s understanding of the claim limitation. allowing only the second clause to modify the first, while not unreasonable, makes less sense. That is, the encrypted information identifies the encrypted portions of frames, which in turn are within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video. Reading the claim in its entirety, the encrypted portions of frames would be understood to be located within the requested portions of the stream; it does not seem necessary for the claim to expressly recite that aspect. For example, the very next limitation— limitation [m] of claim 1—refers to “each encrypted portion of the frames of video” but does not expressly recite “within the requested portions of the selected stream.” Ex. 1001, 27:58–60. Thus, when limitation [l] recites “within the requested portions of the selected stream,” it seems more likely that the clause refers to where that encrypted information is located rather than simply to indicate the obvious location of the encrypted portion of the frames of video. We therefore view Patent Owner’s reading of the claim language as the better one.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundMixed

    “I am persuaded that the Petition demonstrates that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to combine Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst, as asserted by Petitioner. As the Federal Circuit found, the Petition pointed to and relied upon the portions in Chen describing pre-Chen art, without scalability or FEC features that were part of what Chen describes as aspects of its own inventive system. Netflix, slip op. at 9–10 (citing Pet. 17– 19, 69–70). I agree with Petitioner that “Chen-924 teaches several embodiments that adaptively stream alternative representations of a video using partially encrypted container files.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1010, 14:41– 15:60). I determine that Chen-924 provides support for the rationale provided in the Petition, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Chen and Lindahl in view of the disclosure of Chen-924. As discussed above, the Petition does not rely solely on privacy concerns and improvements to efficiency as its motivation to combine the references. See Pet. 18–19 (specifying piracy concerns, improvements to the efficiency of adaptive streaming, optimization of the balance between bitrate and bandwidth, and improvements to the end-user experience with fast startup and seek). With respect to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have” slip op. at 52

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

    “I agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s Remand Brief, specifically pages 1–7, attempt to address aspects of claim 1 for the first time on remand. I also agree that Patent Owner’s arguments attempt to recharacterize limitations [j] and [k] to raise issues that Patent Owner did not raise previously, in contravention of our Order that issues raised needed support from “where those issues were raised in previous briefings by the parties.” Paper 56, 2. I have addressed whether scalability and FEC are integral to how Chen operates above, as well as whether the Petition relies on those aspects, supra. The questions about how Chen operates and what portions of Chen are asserted in the ground of unpatentability were previously raised, but now are being considered or reconsidered, based on the Federal Circuit’s decision. In Patent Owner’s Remand Brief, pages 1–7, the citations to argument previously raised do not support the arguments now presented by Patent Owner on remand. As such, I determine Patent Owner’s new arguments fall outside the scope of remand, and I dismiss these arguments seeking to distinguish limitations [j] and [k] from the cited prior art combination.24” slip op. at 62

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMixed

    “7 Patent Owner’s Brief on Remand recognizes that there are two arguments Patent Owner raised in its Patent Owner Response that were not addressed in the Final Written Decision. See PO Remand Br. 1 (citing PO Resp. 24–37 (the construction of “locating encrypted information . . . within requested portions”), 38–58 (referring to Patent Owner’s “common keys” argument)). 8 The Final Decision also addressed Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 42). See Final Dec. 28–37 (granting-in-part, denying-in-part, and dismissing-in-part Petitioner’s Motion). Our determinations on that Motion were part of Petitioner’s appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Paper 52. Because the Federal Circuit did not address this aspect of the Final Written Decision and the Federal Circuit’s decision does not impact our previous rulings on the Motion, we maintain those rulings here. Additionally, on remand, Petitioner requested authorization to file a motion for sanctions, which we held in abeyance until the parties’ briefing on remand was complete. See Ex. 3003, 1. Petitioner requests sanctions because of the impropriety of Patent Owner’s remand brief, including new claim construction arguments for limitations [1j] and [1k], and prejudice to Petitioner. Id. at 3, 5. Although we reserved further consideration of Petitioner’s request, we expanded both the time and pages allowed for Petitioner’s responsive brief, and also allowed Petitioner to address any related issues in its responsive brief. Id. at 1. Having considered the parties’ briefing on remand, and given that we do not reach the claim construction arguments that Petitioner objected to in its request for authorization to file a motion for sanctions, we deny Petitioner’s request.” slip op. at 5

  Patent outcomesUS 10,225,588 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,225,588
• Analog Devices, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc. And Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 20, 2022 · IPR2020-01606 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–18, and 20–22 and proposed substitute claims 23–38 are unpatentable; substitute claim 39 is not shown unpatentable and is allowed by the motion to amend.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “regular practice at the time to publish preliminary data sheets on our website, as set forth above with respect to the September 2000 Data Sheets. By contrast, data sheets marked ‘Advanced’ were kept for internal use.” Ex. 1023 ¶ 21; see also Ex. 1023 ¶ 15 (“It was Lucent’s regular practice to publish data sheets on its website, including preliminary data sheets, within a month of the date that appears on the data sheet. I was responsible for ensuring that the September 2000 Data Sheet was published to the website.”). Mr. Britton’s testimony, discussed above, shows that ORT8850 was a “preliminary” data sheet published on Lucent’s customer-facing web pages and that customers expected this document to be available. See Valve, 8 F.4th at 1374 (“We have previously held that where a publication’s purpose is ‘dialogue with the intended audience,’ that purpose indicates public accessibility.”). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we deny Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 1008 and Exhibit E and paragraph 15 (identifying Exhibit E) of the Britton declaration as hearsay or for lack of authentication.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther

    “For the foregoing reasons, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s” slip op. at 25

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “3. Claim 1 Independent claim 1, which is directed to “[a] high-speed receiver,” includes substantially the same subject matter as claim 15 and recites two additional limitations: “a receiver analog front-end biased in accordance with the common mode reference, wherein the receiver analog front-end is 16 Because we find that HFAN describes the “receiver termination network” recited in the preamble of claim 15, we need not decide whether the preamble is limiting. See PO Resp. 26 (arguing that the preamble of claim 15 is limiting). amplified high-speed data” and “a data recovery module operably coupled to recover data from the amplified high-speed data.” Petitioner explains how HFAN describes this subject matter. Pet. 36– 44. Petitioner argues that HFAN discloses “a receiver used in ‘high-speed communication systems,’” thereby describing the “high-speed receiver” of the preamble. Pet. 36–37 (quoting Ex. 1005, 1). For the “receiver analog front-end,” Petitioner argues that the LVPECL (low-voltage PECL) receiver receives and amplifies high-speed data. Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1005, 8, Figs. 11, 16(a); Ex. 1003 ¶ 85). For the “data recovery module,” Petitioner argues that HFAN discloses using a MAX3675 chip as an LVPECL receiver, and Petitioner relies on the disclosure of a D flip-flop in DS_MAX3675 (which describes the MAX3675 chip) to show the “data recovery module.” Pet. 42–44 (citing Ex. 1005, 2, 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 87–88; Ex. 1018, Fig. 1). Petitioner argues that reliance on DS_MAX3675 is appropriate in the anticipation analysis to show the details of the LVPECL receiver disclosed in HFAN. Pet. 42–43 (citing In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Other than its argument that the “receiver termination network” must be “on-chip,” which we address in the preceding section, Patent Owner does not set forth any additional arguments against Petitioner’s contentions that HFAN anticipated claim 1. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions for claim 1, including its reliance on DS_MAX3675. Anticipation is established when “one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the prior art reference’s teaching that every claim [limitation] was disclosed in that single reference.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1192–93 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Dayco” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. Independent Claim 9 Independent claim 9 is directed to “[a] multi-gigabit transceiver” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 7,280,590 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,280,590
• Analog Devices, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc. And Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 1, 2022 · IPR2020-01531 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 7–9, 13–17, and 19 are unpatentable as anticipated by Xia; claims 12 and 18 were not shown unpatentable over Xia or Iwata.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “the time of the invention as someone who would have had “the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and four or more years of experience in analog circuit design.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 23). In our Institution Decision, we identified a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as someone with “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or its equivalent, and four years of experience in analog 1 Petitioner also relies upon the Declarations of Un-Ku Moon, Ph.D. (Exs. 1003, 1031) and Sylvia Hall-Ellis, Ph.D. (Ex. 1022). Patent Owner relies on the Declaration of Dr. Marwan Hassoun (Ex. 2008). we maintain here. See PO Resp. 8; Pet. Reply 2–28.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Owner, we maintain our preliminary construction of the connection limitation. Claims 1 and 8 require a programmable interconnect circuit coupled between an I/O port and a plurality of ADCs that enables a connection of the ADCs to the I/O port. Ex. 1001, 14:21–26, 14:51–53, 14:57–62. Figure 9 of the ’071 patent illustrates such “a programmable interconnect circuit.” Id. at 9:20–21, Fig. 9. It can be “implemented as an ADC interface, or more particularly, the routing network 704 or 804.” Id. at 9:22–24. In Figure 10, routing network 804 “enables the coupling of the analog input signal at input/output port 604 to each of 8 ADC circuits 602.” Id. at 10:3–8, Fig. 10. In Figure 11, routing network 804 together with sampler 1102 “enable[s] t[he] routing of a sample of the analog input signal periodically change the routing of the sampled signal to a different ADC.” Id.at 10:60–11:2, Fig. 11. Thus, the programmable interconnect circuit or routing network 804 enables both direct and continuous connections between the I/O port and ADC circuits as shown in Figure 10, and indirect and periodic connections as shown in Figure 11. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we find the connection limitation has its plain and ordinary meaning, which includes enabling both a direct and continuous connection of the I/O port to the plurality of ADCs and an indirect and periodic connection.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We agree with Patent Owner. First, as discussed above, claims 12 and 18 are directed to the embodiment of Figure 10 of the ’071 patent, while claims 13 and 19 are directed to the embodiment of Figure 11. The Specification makes this clear by using language similar to that in claims 12 and 18 to describe the Figure 10 embodiment, and using language similar to that in claims 13 and 19 to describe the Figure 11 embodiment. For example, the Specification contrasts “coupling the analog input signal to each analog-to-digital converter circuit of the plurality of analog-to-digital converter circuits” (the same language used in claim 18) with the “alternative[]” embodiment of “periodically coupling a sample of the analog input signal to an analog-to-digital converter circuit of the plurality of analog-to-digital converter circuits” (the same language used in claim 19). Ex. 1001, 2:50–59. Similarly, the Specification contrasts “rout[ing] the analog input signal to each of the ADC circuits 602 of a group of ADC circuits” (similar to the language of claim 12) as shown in Figure 10 with input signal to a selected ADC circuit 606” (similar to the language of claim 13) as shown in Figure 11. Id. at 10:56–66. Based on these disclosures, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the language of claims 12 and 18 to require routing the analog input signal received at the input/output port to each analog-to-digital converter without the use of a sampler, as shown in the Figure 10 embodiment. The use of a sampler is covered by claims 13 and 19, which cover the alternative Figure 11 embodiment.” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

    “E. Obviousness over Iwata and Hsueh Petitioner argues claim 2, which depends from claim 1, would have been obvious over the combination of Iwata and Hsueh. See Pet. 100–102. Patent Owner disagrees. See PO Resp. 53. As discussed in § II.C.4, supra, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claim 2 is anticipated by Xia. Therefore, we need not consider whether Petitioner has also demonstrated that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Iwata and Hsueh. See Beloit, 742 F.2d at 1423.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 8,548,071 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,548,071
• Veeam Software Corp. v. Hybir Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2021 · IPR2020-01038 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 30, 32, 33, 35, and 37–40 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 31, 34, and 36 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “E. Level of Skill in the Art To determine the level of an ordinarily skilled artisan, various factors” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “claim terms for construction at that stage of the proceeding, and we did not construe any claim terms expressly as none of the terms were in dispute. Inst. Dec. 22. In the briefing following institution, Patent Owner proposed a construction for the term “inventory,” see, e.g., PO Resp. 21–28, and it became clear that the parties dispute the meaning of the term. Accordingly, we address the parties’ proposed constructions for “inventory” and the arguments they present for those constructions.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “As set forth above, we resolved those disputed issues in favor of Petitioner. For the portions of the preamble and limitations of claim 35 that are not recited in claim 30, we have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for claim 35 and are persuaded that Field teaches or suggests the preamble and claim limitations. Pet. 25–28 (and the exhibits cited therein). Thus, we find that Field teaches or suggests all limitations of claim 35. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has proven that claim 35 would have been obvious over Field.” slip op. at 55

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “metadata into its signature generating algorithm to create a more robust signature. Ex. 1005 ¶ 46. An ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to use such an augmented signature generating algorithm in Field’s environment. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 138–139; Ex. 1004 ¶ 40. Thus, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified Field’s cryptographic signature generating algorithm so it would compute a file’s signature using a file’s metadata. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 138–139; Ex. 1004 ¶ 40. Accordingly, Field and Anderson disclose that “the cryptographic signature is also computed with the metadata.” Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 138–139; Ex. 1004 ¶ 40.” slip op. at 76

  Patent outcomesUS 8,051,043 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,051,043
• Veeam Software Corp. v. Hybir Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2021 · IPR2020-01037 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–15, 18, 19, 21–29, and 34 are unpatentable as obvious over Field and Anderson; claims 3, 4, 7, 16, 17, and 20 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, and Petitioner does not address our preliminary finding in its Reply. Accordingly, we see no reason to disturb that finding, and, therefore, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least three to five years of academic or industry experience in the fields of data storage, data backup, data restoration, data replication and deduplication, and/or data synchronization.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, we find that the record does not support construing” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “away and (2) whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to not transmit an inventory with multiple signatures due to a concern with backup efficiency. With respect to whether Field teaches away, Patent Owner’s argument is premised, in part, on a requirement derived from its proposed construction of “inventory”—that the claimed “inventory” must include additional data, such as filenames and directories. As discussed above, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s construction. Similar to Patent Owner’s earlier argument of a teaching away, Patent Owner fails to identify anything in Field that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages one of ordinary skill in the art from creating an inventory, as properly construed. Accordingly, we do not find that Field teaches away from using or creating an inventory.” slip op. at 81

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “144, 202; Pet. Reply 20–21; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 59–62. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not proven that claims 3 and 16 would have been obvious over Field and Anderson. Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 129–130.” slip op. at 101

  Patent outcomesUS 8,051,043 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,051,043
• Walmart Inc. / Z-Shade Co., Ltd. et al. v. Caravan Canopy International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 22, 2021 · IPR2021-00449 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as obvious over Yang and Lynch because the combination teaches the claimed elements and increased headroom supplied a reason to combine with a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “invention of the ’040 patent would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in the mechanical arts, including but not limited to mechanical engineering and industrial design, (2) at least two years of experience in the design or analysis of mechanical devices, fabricated frames, and/or kinematic linkages, and (3) at least a basic understanding of ergonomics. As to part (1), although the parties outline generally similar requirements as to formal schooling, Patent Owner’s proposal provides enhanced clarity as to the identity of the related disciplines, which we view as supported by the record. See, e.g., Klopp Pet. Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. A; Rake Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7–9, 19. As to part (2), the parties again outline similar requirements as to work experience, but Petitioner’s proposal provides added detail on experience in relevant design features, which we view as supported by the record. See Exs. 1004–1007. As to part (3), given the nature of the technology at issue, we view a basic understanding of ergonomics as relevant to one of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:12–49 (discussing operation of the invention by a person); Rake Decl. ¶ 31, cited at PO Resp. 4. This is the same level of ordinary skill adopted in the Decision on Institution. See Dec. Inst. 32–34.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “centrally-disposed, long, slender object.” Pet. 28–32. Patent Owner responds that the District Court rejected this proposal and held that the phrase should be given its “plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 5–6; see also Ex. 1018 at 6–10 (the District Court declining to construe “center pole”). We do not discern a need to construe explicitly this phrase because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “applicant acted as a lexicographer as to the term “stretching.” We determine that the Specification supports an understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning as extending or spreading out rather than as “make taut” or in “tension.” As argued by Petitioner, “[t]here is no description requiring that a roof be made taut or placed under tension” and, “[t]o the contrary, the specification consistently uses the word ‘stretch’ to describe extending or spreading out.” Pet. Reply 11. For example, in the eleven instances the Specification uses some form of the word “stretch” (aside from in claim 1), six instances relate to “stretching” the frame (or some component of the frame), rather than the roof. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:4–6 (discussing how “the collapsible tent frame of this invention is easily and quickly stretchable or collapsible, thus allowing a user to easily and quickly pitch or strike a tent” (emphasis added)), 3:15–19 (“When it is necessary to pitch the tent, the four side poles 10 are pushed outwardly at the same time, thus stretching the tent frame. When the side poles 10 are pushed outwardly as described above, the sliders 70 move upward along the side poles 10 while stretching the two 14 Under the same logic, Patent Owner’s construction of “stretching” as “make taut” should be rejected because it would render superfluous the “sustaining” requirement in that any “center pole” that makes taut a tent’s roof would also sustain it. Cf. PO Sur-reply 5. types of ribs 20 and 30.” (emphasis added)), 3:23–24 (discussing how “the center pole ribs 30 are fully stretched by the support links 40” (emphasis added)), 3:29–30 (discussing “[w]hen the tent is pitched with the frame being fully stretched as described above” (emphasis added)), 4:12–14 (“When the frame is stretched so as to pitch a tent, the center pole is fully moved upwardly along with the center pole ribs.” (emphasis added)). These instances do not align with Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “stretching” as in “tension” or “make taut.” We find particularly supportive of the above-determined construction that in one of those six instances, the Specification directly contrasts—using a disjunctive “or”—“stretchable” with “collapsible.” See Ex. 1001, 3:4–6 (discussing how “the collapsible tent frame of this invention is easily and quickly stretchable or collapsible, thus allowing a user to easily and quickly pitch or strike a tent” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “On the full record developed at trial, we determine that the increased total ceiling height—i.e., “headroom” as used in the Petition—provides adequate “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness” based on the proposed modification. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Here, the unmodified version of Yang is most similar to the middle example in Petitioner’s graphic above, as it has no structure underneath the tent roof (as roof support bars 7 and groove joints 6 are essentially at the height of the canopy itself). Compare Pet. Reply 20, with Ex. 1004, Fig. 4. The modified device—Yang modified with apex portion 50 of Lynch—is most similar to the rightmost example in Petitioner’s graphic, as the height of the canopy has been increased at least somewhat as compared to the middle example. See Pet. Reply 20; see also PO Resp. 24 (acknowledging that the proposed modification would “increase the height of the roof (the ceiling height)”). The record supports that this increased total ceiling height—even if only for certain locations where a person might stand—would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Yang based on Lynch as proposed. This determination is supported by the testimony of Dr. Klopp, who states that “[i]ncreased headroom in some places under a tent is desirable for stationary users, especially for users of above average height.” Klopp Reply Decl. ¶ 113, cited at Pet. Reply 19.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 5,944,040 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 5,944,040

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.