- Apple Inc. v. Apex Beam Technologies LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00895 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted challenges after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had at least [a bachelor’s degree in] electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks. Additional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background. . . . A POSITA would also have familiarity with the 3GPP LTE standards, and would have understood how to search through the available Technical Specifications for implementing RAN technologies. Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50–53). Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this stage, with a proposed modification to insert “a bachelor’s degree in” to Petitioner’s statement. Prelim. Resp. 12–13; id. at 12, n.1. We have inserted this proposed modification in brackets in the above block quotation. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal, as modified by Patent Owner, is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’113 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s skill definition at this stage.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The parties do not propose any claim constructions. See Pet. 11–12; Prelim. Resp. 8. As no terms are in dispute, we determine that no terms require construction at this stage.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IV. CONCLUSION At this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenges as to at least one challenged claim. At this preliminary stage, we have not made a final determination as to the patentability of the challenged claims or any underlying factual and legal issues. V. ORDER It is, therefore, ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’113 patent is instituted with respect to all challenges of unpatentability set forth in the Petition; and FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial commencing on the entry date of this Decision.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“measurement value, as Jover teaches.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 39–40; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). Among other reasons, Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine “to improve the accuracy and reliability of the beam failure determination.” Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). Petitioner further contends that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success because “it would have been straightforward for a POSITA to implement Jover’s triggering condition in Xia’s method.” Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). After considering Patent Owner’s arguments, which we address below, we agree with Petitioner at this stage that the combination of Xia and Jover renders obvious limitation [1e]. Patent Owner first argues that Jover “does not cure the deficiencies of Xia because Jover’s threshold condition for an increase in BER is not used for triggering a transmission of the first and second radio signal.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Just like Xia, Patent Owner contends, Jover discloses no “causality between the threshold being exceeded and transmitting the first and second radio signal.” Id. at 21. This argument does not undermine Petitioner’s showing at this stage because Petitioner relies on Xia, not Jover, for the claimed “triggering the transmission,” or “causality,” as Patent Owner calls it. See Pet. 36–38. That is, Petitioner relies on Jover for the triggering condition and on Xia for the actual triggering. See id. Patent Owner’s argument attacking the references individually is unpersuasive. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of refences.”). Patent Owner next contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have combined Xia and Jover “since Jover is directed to the opposite objective of the ’113 Patent or Xia.” Prelim. Resp. 21. That is, Patent Owner asserts, Jover teaches away from the disclosed methods. Id. at 22. Patent Owner explains, “Jover provides no attempt to improve the beam strength, but rather ignores it through beam sweeping or nullif[ies] it, in contrast to the purpose of the ’113 Patent.” Id. at 22–23. At this stage, Patent Owner’s argument is insufficient to undermine” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,568,113 - Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,488,871 - Fox Factory, Inc. v. Sram, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00492 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 7, 8, and 10–12 are unpatentable over Yi, JP’279, and Nagai; the Board did not reach the Fox-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Based on the full record, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’207 patent and the asserted prior art. PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 48). Our analysis below, however, would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, because it specifies experience in design work related to bicycle suspension technology, instead of the more general design of vehicle components or like technology.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s declarant has a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering with “over 30 years of experience in teaching and directing research related to mechanical engineering and precision machine design.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 4. Based on the full record, we find that his experience “related to mechanical engineering and precision machine design” sufficiently meets or exceeds “experience in design of vehicle components or like technology,” as proposed by Patent Owner (PO Resp. 17). Petitioner’s declarant would, thus, be a person of ordinary skill in the art under either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, we see no reason to give less weight to the opinions of Petitioner’s declarant. See also Tr. 39:21–40:22 (confirming that the argument is about how much weight to give to the testimony).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that “[n]o terms need construction to resolve the controversy in this forum.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). “Patent Owner agrees that the ’207 Patent’s claim terms require no special claim construction.” PO Resp. 16. Based on the full record, we determine that express claim interpretation is not necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“d) Petitioner’s Asserted Reason for Combining Petitioner argues that Yi, JP’279, and Nagai are in the same technical field. Pet. 70 (citing Ex. 1006, code (57), 1:7–8; Ex. 1007, 1; Ex. 1008, 1:10–13). We agree, and find, that Yi, JP’279, and Nagai are in the same field of endeavor. Ex. 1006, code (57), 1:7–8; Ex. 1007, 1; Ex. 1008, 1:10– 13. Patent Owner does not dispute that the references are analogous art. See PO Resp.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 7,147,207 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,147,207 - Fox Factory, Inc. v. Sram, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00491 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14–18, 20, 22, 24, 26–29, 31, 33–38, 40, 42, 44, 46–49, 51, 53, and 56–64 are unpatentable as obvious over Denk and Moechnig, with Schroeder for claims 31, 51, …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Both parties’ proposals require a Bachelor’s degree or a Master’s degree in Mechanical Engineering but differ on the number of years of experience (“1–2 years of experience” versus “three years’ experience”) and from where the experience comes (“design work related to optimal mechanical and structural design” or “design of mechanical elements and structures” versus “vehicle component design and like technology” or “design of vehicle components or like technology”). Pet. 8; PO Resp. 14. Based on the full record, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’993 patent and the asserted prior art. PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 48). Our analysis below, however, would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, because it specifies experience in “optimal mechanical and structural design,” which would be a part of the “design of vehicle components and like technology.”” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s declarant has a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering with “over 30 years of experience in teaching and directing research related to mechanical engineering and precision machine design.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 4. Based on the full record, we find that his experience “related to mechanical engineering and precision machine design” sufficiently meets or exceeds “experience in design of vehicle components or like technology,” as proposed by Patent Owner (PO Resp. 14). Petitioner’s declarant would, thus, be a person of ordinary skill in the art under either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, we see no reason to give less weight to the opinions of Petitioner’s declarant. See also Tr. 39:21–40:22 (confirming that the argument is about how much weight to give to the testimony).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Petitioner states that “[n]o terms need construction to resolve the controversy in this forum.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30). We did not need to interpret expressly any claim term for institution. Inst. Dec. 14. “Patent Owner agrees that the ’993 Patent’s claim terms require no special claim construction for purposes of denying this Petition.” PO Resp. 13. Petitioner states that “a vertical plane of travel of the bicycle” and “a thickness of the wall at any point in the lower section of the body varying as a function of the cross-sectional angle of the point relative to the plane of travel” have been construed in related litigation. Pet. Reply 2–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:8–14, Fig. 1; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 18, 20, 22, 24, 52–53; Ex. 1025, 8, 10; Ex. 2021 ¶ 43). Petitioner, however, contends that “the Board need not expressly construe these terms.” Id. at 2. Based on the full record, we determine that express claim interpretation is not necessary to determine whether Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“(c) Petitioner Shows a Motivation to Combine Because Petitioner cites a portion of Denk that states, “for the same overall strength and rigidity, the weight may be reduced, or for the same weight, the strength and rigidity may be significantly increased in the load direction specified by the design,” we find that Denk provides a motivation to use its tubular component in the bicycle of Moechnig. Pet. 13–14; Ex. 1006, col. 2. We also credit Petitioner’s testimonial evidence regarding the motivation to combine because the record supports it. Ex. 1003 ¶ 57; Ex. 1006, cols. 1–2; Ex. 1007, 1:10–14; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 1, 9, 49; Ex. 1010, 6:22–26. The record shows that lightweight components were desirable. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, col. 1; Ex. 1008 ¶ 1. We also agree with Petitioner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have reduced weight or improved strength relative to Moechnig, because Denk describes reducing weight or increasing strength as “specified by the design,” indicating that it is a matter of ordinary skill in the art to achieve less weight or more strength when applying Denk to Moechnig. Ex. 1006, col. 2. how Denk combined with Moechnig would have reduced weight or increased strength, because Denk itself indicates it would have done so. PO Resp. 24–25; Ex. 1006, col. 2 (“for the same overall strength and rigidity, the weight may be reduced”). We also do not agree with Patent Owner that “Denk provides no indication that it would be more lightweight than a standard steerer tube with equal wall thickness and circular profile,” because Denk provides an indication. PO Resp. 25; Ex. 1006, col. 2. Based on the full record, Petitioner persuades us, and we determine, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Denk and Moechnig.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 10,328,993 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,328,993 - Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 and 12–24 as obvious over Szrek and Llach, and claim 11 as obvious over Szrek, Llach, and Gilmore.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–14).9 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Pet. 2–3). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’451 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. 9 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084 (Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11)), and IPR2023- 01235 (see IPR2023-01235, Paper 34 at 12–13). Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We need not construe “transaction processor” expressly because its meaning is not in dispute and its construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 11,488,451 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,488,451 - Babybjörn AB v. The Ergo Baby Carrier, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00110 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over the asserted prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus deny institution of inter partes review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) (“At any time prior to a decision on institution of inter partes review, the Board may deny all grounds for unpatentability for all of the challenged claims. Denial of all grounds is a Board decision not to institute inter partes review.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a four-year degree in a design-based field, which may include fashion design, industrial design, mechanical engineering, or another technical field, or equivalent experience, and familiarity working with child products and/or adjustable products.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Smith Decl. ¶¶ 32–38). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s proposed definition, which appears consistent with the record in this proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. Furthermore, Patent Owner does not argue that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly the term “at least one thigh support adjuster” because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). More particularly, and as discussed below, Petitioner does not show sufficiently how the prior art teaches the structure identified as corresponding to the alleged claimed function. Further, because we deny on the merits (as discussed below), we do not address Patent Owner’s alternative argument that we should deny institution because “Petitioner fails to construe th[is] limitation and otherwise argues for an advisory opinion from the Board on indefiniteness.” Prelim. Resp. 1; see id. at 1–6 (entire argument). 2. “defined by” Limitations 1j and 11l each recite “a first setting, a second setting, and a third setting defined by the adjustable child carrier.” Ex. 1001, 17:38–39 (emphasis added), 19:43–44 (emphasis added). Limitation 6k recites “a first position, a second position, and a third position defined by the adjustable child carrier.” Id. at 18:36–37 (emphasis added). Patent Owner proposes a construction for “defined by” in these limitations. See Prelim. Resp. 12–15. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly “defined by”” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“Public accessibility “has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ . . . .” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). In Hulu, the Precedential Opinion Panel (“POP”) rejected a petitioner’s argument that a reference necessarily meets “the reasonable likelihood standard for institution where the reference bears conventional markers of publication, such as a copyright date, edition identifiers, publication by a commercial publisher, and the assignment of an ISBN number.” Hulu, Paper 29 at 17. The POP stated: “We do not hold that any particular indicia per se is sufficient at the institution stage. Rather, the indicia on the face of a reference, such as printed dates and stamps, are considered as part of the totality of the evidence.” Id. at 17–18 (citing Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Here, Petitioner provides no citation, no discussion, and no support for its assertion that the Synergy Manual was “published” in “2007.” See Pet. 2. Instead, we are left to assume that Petitioner relies on the text “© BabyBjörn AB, Stockholm, 2007” at the bottom of page 6 of the Synergy Manual. More to the point, Petitioner does not discuss in the Petition any evidence supporting the implicit position that the Synergy Manual was publicly accessible prior to the critical date of the claimed invention.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,786,055 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01250 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–5, 7, 9–16, or 20 unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Min’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a bachelor’s [degree] in [electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science], physics, or equivalent, and two years of experience with cellular telecommunications, radio-access network architectures, protocols and signal propagation in wireless networks.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 59). Dr. Min testifies that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 59. Additionally, Petitioner contends that Dr. Min “exceeded this level of experience by the priority date.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1010 (curriculum vitae of Dr. Min)). In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not take a position on the relevant level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’946 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Neither party contends that any claim terms require an express construction to resolve the present controversy. Pet. 8 (“For purposes of this Petition only, Petitioner does not believe any terms require a formal construction.”); see generally Prelim. Resp. Nonetheless, Petitioner explains that the Petition is structured such that “Ground 1 is based on Patent Owner’s infringement contentions in the district court litigation, where the claimed ‘MUD module’ is generally mapped to multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) receivers in a wireless network.” Pet. 2. Petitioner contends that “[u]nder this broad interpretation of a ‘MUD module,’ Walton’s MIMO receiver renders every challenged claim obvious.” Id. In contrast to Ground 1, the Petition states that “Ground 2 is based on the plain meaning of ‘MUD module,’ which is a component that detects, separates, and decodes signals from multiple users transmitting simultaneously over the same frequency band.” Id. Petitioner contends that, “[a]pplying the correct meaning of the term, Walton’s MIMO receiver does not necessarily comprise a MUD module.” Id. Therefore, Petitioner explains that “Ground 2 combines Walton with Learned, which expressly discloses [a] multi-user detector, and thus renders every challenged claim obvious in combination with Walton.” Id. at 2–3.7 In other words, the Petition presents Ground 1 and Grounds 2/3 as alternatives depending on the meaning of 7 Although not specifically relevant to claim construction, Petitioner explains that “Ground 3 further combines Walton and Learned with Quigley, to the extent Patent Owner argues Walton does not disclose providing a burst control input.” Pet. 3. “MUD module,” where Ground 1 is based on Petitioner’s understanding of Patent Owner’s interpretation of the term and Grounds 2 and 3 are based on Petitioner’s interpretation of the term as having its plain meaning. Petitioner further contends that “[e]very other claim term carries its ‘ordinary and customary meaning’ . . . .” Id. at 8. Although Petitioner presents a potential dispute regarding the meaning of “MUD module,” we need not construe this term expressly because the determination we reach herein does not depend on which meaning MUD module is applied. Accordingly, we do not construe any claim terms expressly because express constructions are not necessary to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“IV. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL Patent Owners contends that the factors set forth in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 9 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), weigh heavily in favor of discretionary denial. Prelim. Resp. 40–46; Paper 10. Petitioner disagrees. Pet. 74–77; Paper 9. In light of the conclusion reached above, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding discretionary denial.” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,089,946 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01248 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–11, 16, and 21 unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’071 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes a specific construction of any claim term, although Petitioner contends each term should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 16; see generally Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because the meaning of the terms is not in dispute and an express construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“We find the Petition lacking in particularity because it does not clearly identify what aspect of Jin is alleged to teach the unique signal parameters (or unique estimated signal parameters) recited in claim 1. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if — (3) the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity, . . . the evidence that supports the ground for the challenge to each claim . . . .”). First, as reflected above, the Petition asserts that something called a “unique pilot parameter” teaches the recited unique estimated signal parameters. But “unique pilot parameter” is not a term or phrase recited in Jin. See Prelim. Resp. 19 (arguing the same). So, when Petitioner states “Jin discloses that the base station uses the unique pilot parameter (i.e., ‘unique estimated signal parameters’) to ‘identify which user (i.e., mobile terminal) has transmitted the received data,’” it is not clear what element in Jin Petitioner intends to identify by the term “unique pilot parameter.” Dr. Min’s testimony does not help resolve the ambiguity in the Petition. In particular, Dr. Min also refers to a “unique pilot parameter (i.e., ‘unique signal parameter’) for each user.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 89. But, as noted above, Jin does not disclose an element referred to as a “pilot parameter” and it is not clear what element Dr. Min intended to identify in Jin.8” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,814,071 - Hesai Technology Co., Ltd. v. Ouster, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 17, 2025 · IPR2023-01456 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–8, and 10–17 are unpatentable as obvious over Imai and Higashi, with Grzesik or Pacala for dependent claims; remaining grounds were not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics, plus 2–3 years of experience in LiDAR design. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–77). Patent Owner argues that a POSITA would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering and two to three years of work experience with electro-optical and electro-mechanical devices or systems, with, at a minimum, at least one year of work experience was with LIDAR designs, where less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education or vice versa. PO Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 60). We agree with and will apply Patent Owner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. This level of ordinary skill is reflective of the education and experience that would have been required to understand the problems and solutions identified in the ’381 patent and the prior art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“The term “coincident with” as used in the ’381 patent does not require perfect coincidence. To explain why, we provide an annotated version of Figure 2 of the ’381 patent below. In Figure 2 above, the rays of electromagnetic radiation indicated in red originate from illumination source 111, but they are not coincident with the corresponding aperture’s field of view, and instead they are absorbed or blocked by the aperture layer’s stop region. Ex. 1001, 3:61–4:5. As Figure 2 shows, out of five ray lines emitted by illumination source 111, only three are within its corresponding aperture’s field of view. This conveys an understanding that “coincident with” does not require perfect matching of the discrete spot of radiation from the illumination source and the aperture’s field of view.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We begin with the language of the claims. The claims merely require that the “plurality of pixels are arranged in a second arrangement, proportional to the first arrangement.” Ex. 1001, 17:30–31. There are no other specific requirements about “first arrangement” or the “second arrangement” and no specific requirement about what kind of “proportional[ity]” is required. Thus, the language of the claims does not provide a basis for Patent Owner’s narrow reading, nor does it necessarily preclude it.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner identifies multiple reasons to make this combination. First, with respect to Higashi’s bandpass filter, Petitioner argues that “a POSITA would have been prompted to implement Imai’s system to include a bandpass filter for the received light (as suggested by Higashi) so as to advantageously pass through only light of the operational wavelength of the corresponding laser emitter and ‘eliminate the effect of background light.’” Id. at 60 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 86; Ex. 1003 ¶ 256). Petitioner contends that “the resulting combination would advantageously filter out interfering light sources along the optical path of each of the detector pixels, thereby improving accuracy, improving the signal-to-noise ratio, and reducing the likelihood of false detections at the detector pixel.” Id. at 61. Second, Petitioner argues that “a POSITA would have been motivated to arrange multiple SPADs in each of Imai’s detector pixels (e.g., pixels 1- 16 in Imai’s FIG. 11) so that “erroneous detection of pixels[] can be reduced” and improved accuracy is achieved.” Id. (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 71–72; Ex. 1003 ¶ 257; Ex. 1009 ¶ 48). Third, Petitioner contends that using Higashi’s multi-SPADs in Imai’s detector pixels would have led to uninterrupted performance when an individual diode is quenched, and would have furthered Imai’s objective of “inhibiting the increase of detection obtaining time” because multi-SPADs facilitate high speed data processing as they can take turns to receive the incoming photons. Id. (Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 6–7; Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 71, 72; Ex. 1027 ¶¶ 3– 4; Ex. 1003 ¶ 258). Fourth, Petitioner asserts that the combination “was simply the” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 11,178,381 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,178,381 - Hesai Technology Co., Ltd. v. Ouster, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2023-01457 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 44–48 and 50 are unpatentable as obvious over Imai, Higashi, and Grzesik; the Board did not reach the other grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to know the relevant prior art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey–Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). In determining the skill level, the Board may consider various factors including the “type of problems encountered in the prior art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. “In a given case, every factor may not be present, and one or more factors may predominate.” Id.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“In relation to Grounds 1A to 1D, Petitioner and Patent Owner dispute whether the claimed “stop region” can encompass a partially transparent material as disclosed by Retterath. PO Resp. 21; Pet. Reply 7–8; PO Sur-Reply 10. Because we do not reach Grounds 1A to 1D in this decision (see § III.D, infra), we need not and do not decide whether a “stop region” may include a partially transparent material. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375, supra.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“The term “coincident with” as used in the ’750 patent does not require perfect coincidence. To explain why, we provide an annotated version of Figure 2 of the ’750 patent below. In Figure 2 above, the rays of electromagnetic radiation indicated in red originate from illumination source 111, but they are not coincident with the corresponding aperture’s field of view, and instead they are absorbed or blocked by the aperture layer’s stop region. Ex. 1001, 3:51–63. As Figure 2 shows, out of five ray lines emitted by illumination source 111, only three are within its corresponding aperture’s field of view. This conveys an understanding that “coincident with” does not require perfect matching of the discrete spot of radiation from the illumination source and the aperture’s field of view.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that multiple reasons would have prompted a POSITA to combine Grzesik’s cross talk absorption layer (corresponding to the claimed “aperture layer”) in the Imai-Higashi combination. Pet. 51–53. First, Petitioner contends that implementing Grzesik’s absorption layer in the Imai-Higashi combination would reduce cross talk consistent with Imai’s objective of improving resolution by allowing for more pixels to be used in a specified detection area. Id. at 51–52 (citing Ex. 1012, 4:65–5:6, 5:11–32; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 6–7; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 212–213). Second, Petitioner asserts that the combination would have been prompted as “the application of known techniques (Grzesik’s suggested improvement for a cross talk absorption layer to reduce secondary detection) to a known system (the primary Imai LiDAR system) ready for improvement to yield predictable results (benefits articulated above).” Id. at 52 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success at adapting Grzesik’s cross talk absorption layer to the scanning laser radar of the Imai-Higashi combination.” Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 214). Specifically, Petitioner contends that “Grzesik demonstrates the known benefits of implementing a cross talk absorption layer disposed on the detector array, with apertures of the cross talk absorption layer aligned with individual detectors, and describes using its cross talk absorption layer on Geiger-mode APDs (e.g., SPADs) as used by the Imai-Higashi combination.” Id. at 52–53 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 214). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions concerning the motivation to combine Imai, Higashi, and Grzesik, or the reasonable expectation of success a POSITA would have had in making the combination. Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Imai, Higashi, and Grzesik with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 11,190,750 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,190,750
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.