• CSPC Megalith Biopharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Lepu Biopharma Co. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00685 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–23 are unpatentable as obvious over Wei and Liu, and over Leanna, Wei, and Liu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “appears to be generally consistent with the level of skill presented in the cited prior art. See generally, e.g., Exs. 1005–1008; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). However, as at institution, we reject the portion of Petitioner’s proposed definition that includes having “access to other individuals with that knowledge and experience,” as not reflecting the individual level of skill of a given skilled artisan. See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that “[t]he person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.”) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted); but see Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labys., S.A., 930 F.3d 1325, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (no clear error in determination that “a person of ordinary skill . . . ‘would be on a team with an engineer or scientist . . . .’”). Consequently, we find the person of ordinary skill in the art was a person who had a Ph.D. in immunology, molecular biology, cellular biology, or a similar field, or an M.D. with similar experience, and had at least five years of experience with antibodies and antibody engineering.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner submits that no term of the Challenged Claims requires construction to resolve the challenges in this Petition.” Pet. 32. We did not construe any terms in our Institution Decision. See DI 6–7. Patent Owner presents no express positions on claim construction. See generally Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, no terms of the challenged claims require construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. D. slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “2 G. Wei et al., US 2015/0071923 Al, pub. March 12, 2015. Ex. 1005 (“Wei”). 3 J. Liu, CN 103772504 A, pub. May 7, 2014. Ex. 1007. The Liu reference is published in Simplified Chinese and Petitioner filed a certified English translation, to which we refer herein. See Ex. 1008 (“Liu”). Patent Owner does not contest the accuracy of the translation. See generally Resp. 4 M.R. Leanna & C.L. Becker, WO 2014/152199 A1, pub. Sept. 25, 2014. Ex. 1006 (“Leanna”). 5 Based on our review of each deposition transcript in view of the record as a whole, although each witness appears competent, we are left with the impression that Dr. Bournazos’s testimony is somewhat more credible than Dr. Atanackovic’s. This conclusion is based, inter alia, on each witness’s ability to recall the relevant record and respond to questions on evidentiary and technical issues.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We find that combining Liu’s BA03 antibody with Wei’s ADC platform would have been desirable, predictable, and routine for the ordinarily skilled artisan based on the facts that: (1) cetuximab was a wellknown and well-studied, U.S. regulatory approved, anti-EGFR antibody that would have served as a starting point for new cancer therapies; (2) humanization of therapeutic antibodies is generally desired (and “[e]very antibody can be humanized” and it is advantageous according to Patent Owner’s counsel); (3) BA03 was a well-known humanized version of cetuximab that had several known advantages over cetuximab in addition to lower immunogenicity from humanization; and (4) Wei taught a similar cetuximab-derived antibody, and a humanized cetuximab-derived antibody, each provided in an ADC with a well-known and validated off-the-shelf linker-drug platform, i.e., vc-MMAE, that exhibited a strong anti-tumor response. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:57–2:32, 2:50–3:1, 5:6–53, 18:3–33, 19:26– 29; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 14, 38, 42–43, 45–53, 56–73, 84–92, 109–117, 178–189, 202–271; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 9–10, 229–232, 434, 437, 476, 491–506, 664–675, 685, 688, 715, 732, 1103, 1092–1141; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 3–6, 60, 74, 141–160; Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 7–8, 38, 50, 57 (confirming our understandings regarding the claimed antibody and linker-drug payload); Ex. 2023, 173, 300; see also Resp. 1, 5–6, 23 (Patent Owner made the “choice” to use the prior-art-known BA03 antibody, and known-candidate cytotoxic payload MMAE); Hr’g Tr. 34:20–23, 36:6–38:20, 47:16–50:16 (Patent Owner’s counsel’s argument). When Liu’s BA03 antibody is provided in an ADC with a vc- MMAE or a Mc-vcPAB-MMAE platform (and used as cancer therapy as the references instruct) the invention of the challenged claims is achieved.” slip op. at 52

  Patent outcomesUS 10,792,370 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,792,370
• Evenflo Company, Inc. v. Baby Jogger II, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01122 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable as obvious over Liao or Liao and Cheng; Rolicki is not prior art, and the challenge over Offord ’341 and Offord ’797 fails.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Baby Jogger does not dispute Evenflo’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is that a person of ordinary skill in the art (hereinafter, “one skilled in the art”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field (e.g., mechanical engineering or industrial design) and at least two years of product design experience and/or industry experience with juvenile products” and that “[m]ore education can replace product design experience, and vice versa.” Pet 8 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 31–33); PO Resp. generally. We apply that definition here, as it accords with the problems addressed in the prior art and the specification of the ’682 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “At the outset, we note that the claim language requires only that “the first seat and the second seat” be arranged in an inline descending configuration, not that the seat’s mounting points or other physical connections be so arranged. Ex. 1010, 17:31–33. Baby Jogger improperly reads “seats” out of the claim and substitutes the seat’s “mounting points” on the frame. A proper reading of the claim language focuses on what happens when both seats are connected to the frame, not where they are so connected. In other words, “when connected to the frame” simply emphasizes that both seats must be connected to the frame to form the inline descending configuration, as opposed to the single stroller embodiment of Figure 1, where there cannot be an inline descending configuration because only one seat is connected to the frame and the other seat is removed, i.e., not connected to the frame. That reading is supported by the specification of the ’682 patent,” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “We find that testimony persuasive, for it shows what one skilled in the art would have recognized the 2008 Provisional as necessarily disclosing. The relevant inquiry is whether the disclosure of the prior application “convey[s] with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, the inventor was in possession of the invention.” PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). “While a prior application need not contain precisely the same words as are found in the asserted claims, . . . the prior application must indicate to a person skilled in the art that the inventor was ‘in possession’ of the invention as later claimed.” Id. In other words, “to satisfy the written description requirement, ‘the missing descriptive matter must necessarily be present in the [original] application’s specification such that one skilled in the art would recognize such a disclosure.’”7 Id. (quoting Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). “This requires that the written description actually or inherently disclose the claim element.” Id. at 1306–07. Moreover, a drawing may supply written description for the arrangement it depicts even though the text describes that arrangement in different terms. See Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1319–23 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Instead, Evenflo’s argument rests on isolating the statement—“A similar sub-frame arrangement is disclosed in [Offord ’797]”—from the remainder of the passage in which that statement appears in order to arrive at a reason to incorporate the reversibility teaching of Offord ’797. However, when that statement is read in the context of the full passage in which it appears, nowhere does that passage suggest reversibility as the reason for referencing Offord ’797. More accurately, it suggests a different reason that relates to a curved lug 108 by which sub-frame 100 rests on the stroller’s main frame 4 to carry the weight of the stroller’s two occupants— When the interface components 100 are attached to the frame assembly 4 they form a sub-frame of the frame assembly 4, and when the child-carrying units are mounted thereon, one behind the other, they are in a compact echelon formation, one of the connector sockets 106 of each component 100 being at a higher level in relation to the ground than the other connector sockets 106. The higher connector socket 106 and further connecting leg 102 are both connected to the respective opposite ends of an upper mounting piece 107. In addition, on the inner side of the lower connector sockets 106 there is a downwardly curved lug 108 which serves to rest upon a part of the basket frame 44, such that the weight of two infants is fully supported by the frame assembly 4. A similar sub-frame arrangement is disclosed in [Offord ’797]. Ex. 1051, 9:23–36 (emphasis added). That passage shows that, rather than reversibility of the sub-frame, the reference to Offord ’797 is more aptly directing the reader to the arrangement and details of a similarly curved lug structure in the stroller sub-frame of Offord ’797. Indeed, Figures 5 and 6 of Offord ’797, reproduced below, disclose just such a curved lug in the context of “corner pieces 20” having “channel 21.” Ex. 1054, 4:10–23.” slip op. at 53

  Patent outcomesUS 11,731,682 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,731,682
• GD Energy Products, LLC v. Kerr Machine CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · PGR2025-00031 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14 are unpatentable as obvious under each of four asserted grounds: Kerr; Aplex and Stanton; Blume, Stanton, and Wilkinson; and the sale of the Kerr Pump.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The person of ordinary skill in the art would have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or petrochemical engineering, or a comparable engineering discipline, and a minimum of 3-5 years of work experience in the design and/or manufacturing of reciprocating pumps and valves, including fluid ends and/or comparable high pressure fluid components, for industrial applications, including for use in the oil and gas industry. See, e.g., EX1003, ¶32.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We decline to expressly construe any claim language. slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Regarding the combining of Aplex and Stanton, Petitioner asserts that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood that providing a packing/stuffing arrangement, as taught by Stanton, within a fluid end housing, as taught by Aplex, would improve pressure and fluid isolation compared with an arrangement where the packing was bolted to the outside of the fluid end as in Aplex unmodified. Pet. 66 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 189, 236). Patent Owner does not dispute this rationale. We find this to be a reason, with rationale underpinning, why the person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined these references with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 29

  • Adverse judgmentOther

    “The record indicates that Patent Owner has statutorily disclaimed claim 15 as of April 28, 2025. Ex. 2206.” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 12,152,582 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,152,582
• First Quality Retail Services, LLC / First Quality Consumer Products, LLC et al. v. Essity Hygiene And Health ABAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2024-01487 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 20–22, 24, and 25 are unpatentable, based on anticipation by Bergstrom and obviousness over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition. Dec. 9–10. In its Response, Patent Owner cites to Petitioner’s definition and states that Patent Owner “applies Petitioners’ definition.” PO Resp. 7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We begin our analysis with the language of the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312; see also SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 874–875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“There is a ‘heavy presumption’ that the terms used in the claims ‘mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.’”). Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “said fluid flow control structure being a layered structure comprising a non-perforated fibrous polymeric layer and a first perforated polymeric layer.” Ex. 1001, 13:62–64 (limitation [1h]). The plain language of claim 1 does not address additional properties of the perforated polymeric layer; the language of the dependent claims, however, imposes additional limitations on the properties of the perforated polymeric layer such as a particular basis weight (claim 2), a particular makeup (claim 3), a particular aperture size (claim 7), a particular open area (claim 8), and that it “is a three-dimensionally formed layer having penetrating apertures extending from a first surface of the first perforated polymeric layer towards a second surface of the first perforated polymeric layer and forming protrusions on said second surface” (claim 4). The dependent claims’ additional language indicates that the term “perforated” within the term “perforated polymeric layer” in claim 1 is not limited in the manner asserted by Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “layer pierced through with holes or apertures,” we are persuaded that Petitioner meets its burden as to this limitation. Petitioner argues that under our construction, Bergstrom’s express disclosure of forming element 60, and Bergstrom’s explanation of the properties of forming element 60, meets the claimed “perforated polymeric layer” limitation. Pet. 38–41 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 114–117). Even under Patent Owner’s proposed construction, Petitioner argues, forming element 60 would also allow free flow of liquid bodily waste. Pet. Reply 3– 4 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 20–23). Importantly, Bergstrom expressly discloses: “suitable materials for the forming element 60 are plastic films, perforated plastic films and reinforced tissue or reinforced nonwoven materials.” Ex. 1004, 10:1–4. This express disclosure is clear. Even though the forming element 60 in Bergstrom might be “typically” liquid-impermeable (Ex. 1004, 9:24–30), that does not preclude a layer that is perforated, particularly where Bergstrom expressly discloses a perforated plastic film as one of the possibilities for forming element 60. Ex. 1004, 10:1–4. Additionally, although Patent Owner focuses on Bergstrom’s disclosure that forming element 60 is “typically liquid-impermeable” (PO Resp. 58–60; Ex. 1004, 9:24–30), we do not view Bergstrom’s use of the word “typically” as mandating that the forming element always be liquid impermeable. We agree that the word “typically” does not mean “always” and that such a reading would render “typically” superfluous. Pet. Reply. 5. We do not find any ambiguity in Bergstrom’s disclosure regarding possible use of perforated plastic films for its forming element 60; whether or not the forming element 60 provides other functions (like stiffness) does not dictate whether it may also be perforated, or be part of a fluid flow control structure. On this point, we credit Petitioner’s arguments and explanation, as supported by Dr. Pourdeyhimi’s testimony. Pet. Reply 6–7; Ex. 1021 ¶ 27–28 (“components of absorbent articles could be multifunctional”).” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “from the start” (PO Resp. 29), and that “using all or part of [Glaug’s] fluid-acquisition system in place of [Nakazawa’s] diffusion sheet would be antithetical to the teachings of both references” (id. at 35), we agree that the proposed combination of Nakazawa’s structure with the layers of Glaug is sufficiently motivated and reasonably expected to result in a successful article, for the reasons articulated by Petitioner. See, e.g., Pet. 59–65; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 176–192. Namely, although fluid may flow in both Z directions in Nakazawa (PO Resp. 30), that does not foreclose the combination with Glaug in the manner proposed by Petitioner. See generally Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 176–192; see id. ¶ 184 (detailing the mechanics of the proposed combinations), ¶¶ 188–191 (discussing motivation to combine), ¶ 192 (discussing reasonable expectation of success). The combination can be achieved “either by adding the lower acquisition layer 64 [of Glaug] to diffusion sheet 63 [of Nakazawa], or by replacing diffusion sheet 63 [of Nakazawa] with the two-layer fluid acquisition system 34 [of Glaug],” and as persuasively explained by Dr. Pourdeyhimi, the arrangement constitutes a “fluid flow control structure.” See Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 45–47. Additionally, the diffusion sheet in Nakazawa can be made from the same material as used in Glaug, namely, AquiDry™. Id. ¶¶ 53–55; see also Tr. 17:25–18:3 (“although Glaug does not specify the name AquiDry in its disclosure, Patent Owner’s expert testified that it’s his understanding that Glaug is discussing the AquiDry material, the same material that is in Nakazawa . . . . they disclose using the same material, and Nakazawa says this material work[s]”). When asked if Patent Owner’s expert had any concerns that AquiDry was not the same as between Nakazawa and Glaug, Patent Owner’s counsel replied “They are the same, Your Honor. And we embrace that.” Tr. 46:8–12; see also id. at 58:19 (Petitioner’s counsel commenting about Patent Owner’s counsel: “they agree, AquiDry is used in both Nakazawa and Glaug”). Thus, Patent Owner’s argument that Nakazawa’s diffusion sheet and Glaug’s fluid acquisition layer have different purposes because Nakazawa’s diffusion sheet allegedly must promote fluid flow in the Z-directions, both toward and away from the body (PO Resp. 29–37; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 26–28, 30– 35)) is not clearly supported by Nakazawa, and is also contravened by the shared disclosure of Nakazawa and Glaug as to the composition of the disputed layer. We have reviewed the complete record, including Patent Owner’s and Mr. Sheldon’s assertions that Nakazawa requires promoting fluid flow in both Z-directions (see id.), but find that Petitioner carries its burden to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Nakazawa and Glaug with a reasonable expectation of success. On this complete record, Petitioner explains sufficiently why and how a person of ordinary skill would modify Nakazawa’s diffusion sheet, i.e., to use Glaug’s fluid acquisition system, or the lower non-perforated layer of its fluid acquisition system, in Nakazawa, and Petitioner provides well-supported reasons for doing so.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 9,308,138 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,308,138
• Avation Medical, Inc. v. Emkinetics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 7, 2026 · PGR2024-00043 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–39 are unpatentable under Grounds 1–10; Petitioner did not prove lack of enablement under Ground 11, and Patent Owner’s motion to exclude was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST Petitioner identifies Avation Medical, Inc. as the real party-in-interest. Pet. x. Patent Owner identifies EMKinetics, Inc. as the real party-in-interest. Paper 5, 1; Paper 6, 1. Neither party contests the other’s assertions on this. C.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A POSA at the time of the claimed invention would have had an undergraduate degree in the field of biomedical engineering or a related discipline, such as electrical engineering, and at least two years of experience in the design and/or analysis of biomedical devices. Additional work experience could substitute for a formal degree and vice versa. Ex.1003, ¶21. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003). Patent Owner does not contest this proposed definition or offer an alternative. See generally Resp. We accept and use Petitioner’s uncontested definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’943 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may]” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). In construing claims, district courts and the Board here, by default, give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner states that, “no terms require construction for purposes of this Petition.” Pet. 21. Patent Owner presents no express position on claim construction. See generally Resp. We do not expressly construe any claim terms. E.” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “question, based on factual findings. VidStream, 981 F.3d at 1063–64. Moreover, public accessibility is the touchstone in determining whether a reference is a printed publication and such depends on whether the reference was available to interested, ordinarily skilled persons exercising reasonable diligence, which is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1065. Particularly pertinent here is that “[w]hen there is an established publisher there is a presumption of public accessibility as of the publication date.” Id. Hulu (which cites VidStream on this issue) concerned, inter alia, whether certain asserted references were shown to be publicly available and could be considered as prior art. Hulu, 2021 WL 487622. Hulu holds that, although testimonial evidence is one way to prove public accessibility, there are also a variety of hallmarks of publication and other evidence that may be considered as a totality of the evidence to determine if an asserted reference was publicly accessible and prior art. Id. at *10–13, 21. Facts to be considered in analyzing the issue, other than testimonial evidence, include, for example, whether there is an established publisher, a copyright date/notice, other publication-related dates (impression, printing, etc.), an ISBN number, citations to the reference before (and to a lesser degree, after) the priority date at issue corroborating its availability and/or that the publisher was established, and whether the reference’s “purpose of publishing . . . was ‘dialogue with an intended audience.’” Id. at *10–21 (citing Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 8 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021)).” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,844,943 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,844,943
• Anker Innovations Ltd. v. Powermat Technologies Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00994 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 and 9–14 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Onishi, Flowerdew, Baarman392, Partovi, and Tocci.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s proposed experience of two years in the field of wireless/inductive charging is a bit more specific than Petitioner’s proposal of three years of experience with circuits and “familiarity with power electronics and inductive power transfer circuits.” We, however, discern little material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Even if the Specification identified “linear regulation/control as being a central aim” of the ’696 patent, Patent Owner has offered no persuasive reason why a linear-control-related limitation should be read into independent claim 1, and we decline to do so. Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“While we read claims in view of the specification, of which they are a part, we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims.” (citing Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2004))); cf. Ex. 1105, 40 (the District Court, in the parallel litigation, excluding a witness’s testimony that the “substantially different” term requires “allow[ance] for some incremental change (increase or decrease) in frequency while remaining in the near-linear/linear regions” because, inter alia, Powermat “fails to offer any particularized arguments explaining why the ‘allow[ance]’ construction is proper.” (alterations in original)). Patent Owner also relies on dependent claim 2, which depends from independent claim 1. PO Resp. 28–29. Dependent claim 2 adds to claim 1 the requirement that the driver be configured to increase and decrease the transmission frequency when a particular signal is received. See Ex. 1001, 28:47–54. Patent Owner asserts that this means that the driver is configured to increase/decrease the “substantially different” frequency, namely a frequency that lies within the near-linear region of a frequency-amplitude graph, and argues that, “[i]n reading claim 2 as a whole, a POSITA would understand that the ’696 Patent is directed to a linear control technique for predictably regulating power transfer.” PO Resp. 28–29 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 101). Even if dependent claim 2 called for linear control as Patent Owner appears to assert, we would not read such a limitation into the underlying independent claim. See Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The doctrine of claim differentiation . . . normally means that limitations stated in dependent claims are not to be read into the independent claim from which they depend.”); but see PO Sur-reply 4 (arguing for a narrower interpretation of independent claim 1 because it must be read in the context of the entire patent, which includes dependent claim 2). In light of the parties’ agreement and the Specification’s description” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Woods testifies that Onishi’s “Paragraph [0180] is unambiguous that FIG. 4 does not illustrate the frequency-response of a single coil in isolation, but instead illustrates the ‘resonance characteristics of the primary coil L1 and the secondary coil L2’ when the coils are brought in electromagnetic proximity of each other for charging—i.e., in an inductively coupled state.” Ex. 1101 ¶ 18. Dr. Woods, in support of his opinion, notes that Onishi’s legend for Figure 4 describes f0 as the “RESONANCE FREQUENCY IN LOAD-CONNECTED STATE.” Id. We find Dr. Woods’s testimony more credible than Dr. Mercier’s. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument (PO Resp. 35) that Petitioner’s reliance on Onishi’s Figure 4 is misplaced, and we find that Figure 4 discloses a resonant frequency of the inductive couple between the primary and secondary coils, as recited in limitations 1.4 and 1.7.” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s arguments are incorrectly premised on a hypothetical combination involving the bodily incorporation of the two references’ specific structures. See Pet. Reply 17. “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); see also In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”). Rather, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 417. Petitioner’s proposed combination is the application, to Onishi’s charging system, of Flowerdew’s general teaching of the technique of using an alignment mechanism in order to optimize the alignment of the inductive coils and to maximize the inductive coupling. See, e.g., Pet. 15 (“[A] POSITA would have been motivated to implement Onishi in a manner that includes an alignment mechanism as suggested by Flowerdew (e.g., a dished recess or other shaped surface feature, a directional logo/marker, or both) so that the primary and secondary coils would be more readily ‘optimized’ for alignment and the inductive ‘coupling is maximized.’”). Flowerdew teaches, for example, that, with the use of a dished charging surface, the secondary unit “tends to align in one axis” and “[t]his alignment is such that the coupling between a solenoid receive coil in secondary unit 304 and the charging coils of charger 302 is maximized.” Ex. 1005, 11:25–52. Petitioner, with the supporting testimony of Dr. Woods, contends, and we agree, that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been sufficiently skilled to implement [the proposed] combination given the predictable techniques disclosed in each reference and the relatively advanced state of the art at the time.” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 55). We determine that Petitioner has shown that the proposed combination teaches or suggests the subject matter of limitation 1.3 and that Petitioner has set forth adequate and persuasive reasons with rational underpinning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Onishi’s system to utilize an alignment mechanism. We also determine, for the reasons stated by Petitioner, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination. See Pet. 16–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 55.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 9,048,696 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,048,696
• Front Line Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Prytime Medical Devices, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · PGR2024-00028 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Fogarty and Chengod; the Board found that combination sufficient for every challenged claim.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “7. Conclusion Based on the entirety of the record, we determine that a person of” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “3. Analysis In our claim construction analysis “[w]e begin, as we often do, with” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownOther

    “the feature of the solid wire being “secured at a proximal-most end thereof within the proximal hub” was added during prosecution to overcome a rejection. Ex. 1002, 573-580. The prior art was distinguished because its guidewire “is configured to be steered and manipulated through the blood vessel, and subsequently removed, and, therefore, cannot be secured at a proximal end thereof to the luer hub 310.” Id., 578-79 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the prosecution history further demonstrates “secured” was not intended to cover removable attachment.” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “2. Patent Owner’s Arguments Concerning Claim 1 and Our Analysis a. Reasonable Expectation of Success in modifying catheters to less than 6 Fr Patent Owner asserts “Petitioner has failed to perform a proper obviousness analysis by not adequately demonstrating a reasonable expectation of success in modifying Fogarty.” PO Resp. 35. Patent Owner asserts “the category of ‘Fogarty catheters’ is broad and diverse” and “Dr. Resnick admits he has no idea whether Chengod’s or Deaton’s catheters have interior constructions similar to that of the cited Fogarty reference.” Id. at 35‒36 (citing Ex. 2002, 52:16‒57:1). Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has therefore not demonstrated that a PHOSITA would have a reasonable expectation of success in modifying the particular catheter taught by the cited Fogarty patent (Ex. 1004) to the claimed size when considering the shaft has a spring coil and braid in addition to the outer tube and lumen. Id. Petitioner responds “(1) Fogarty did not indicate the catheter’s size; (2) Fogarty catheters smaller than 6 Fr were known and disclosed in Chengod (and Deaton); and (3) sizing Fogarty’s catheter less than 6 Fr would work (i.e., reasonable expectation of success) because it did work.” Pet. Reply 19. Petitioner asserts that Yassinzadeh “shows a catheter that is less than 6 Fr and that includes a similar spring coil construction as found in the Fogarty patent” where the “dilator 150 has a diameter of either 5 Fr or 6 Fr.” Id. at 19‒20 (citing Ex. 1033 ¶¶ 86‒97 (“Yassinzadeh”)). Petitioner asserts that Yassinzadeh’s “analogous construction being less than 6 Fr confirms a PHOSITA would have a reasonable expectation of success in sizing the catheter in Fogarty (Ex-1004) less than 6 Fr.” Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1034 ¶ 97). Patent Owner responds “Petitioner fails to specify what” slip op. at 53

  Patent outcomesUS 11,857,737 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,857,737
• Geneoscopy, Inc. v. Exact Sciences CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00459 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over each of the six asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Here, as in our Institution Decision, we do not discern a significant difference between the parties’ respective proposed definitions beyond the number of years of experience after obtaining a doctoral degree. Compare Pet. 12, with Prelim. Resp. 47, and Resp. 19–20; see also DI 7–8. Under either proposed definition, the ordinarily skilled artisan would have been very highly skilled and educated. For purposes of this Final Decision, we maintain that Patent Owner’s definition appears to be reasonable (and it falls between Petitioner’s two definitions asserted in the reexamination request and in the Petition). Further, Patent Owner’s proposed definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’781 patent itself, for example, Vilkin’s authors are a group of medical doctors and an editor of the journal is a PhD, Joost Louwagie, the named inventor of the ’781 patent, holds a PhD in Biochemistry, and the authors of Itzkowitz are medical doctors and PhDs. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see Ex. 1005, 3 (list of authors); Ex. 1016 (Dr. Louwagie profile); Ex. 1055; see also generally Reply (Petitioner did not contest our similar determination at Institution). Therefore, we adopt and use Patent Owner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, set forth above. C.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that no claim construction is necessary in this proceeding. See generally Pet. Similarly, Patent Owner states that it “does not believe that claim construction is necessary to resolve patentability” in this proceeding. Resp. 21. “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We agree with the parties that no construction of any claim term is necessary for purposes of our Final Decision. D.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “Pet. 12. In support of these grounds for unpatentability, Petitioner relies on, inter alia, the 1st and 2nd Declarations of Duncan Whitney, PhD. Ex. 1002; Ex. 1080. In support of its positions, Patent Owner relies on, inter alia, the 1st and 2nd Declarations of Vadim Backman, PhD, and the Declaration of Peter Wood. Ex. 2001; Ex. 2022; Ex. 2023.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “We have no reasonable doubt that aspects of the Cologuard product practice the invention of the ’781 patent’s claims 1 and 3, which are most generally directed to steps of collecting two portions of a fecal sample at home, and combining a respective buffer stabilizer/preservative with each of the two portions for claim 1, and then processing those fecal samples by testing for blood and nucleic acids (e.g., DNA) for claim 3. These appear to be nearly the most basic steps for using the Cologuard kit. See generally Ex. 2032. And, these steps do illustrate a certain ease of use and consumerfriendliness that may be a contributing factor in Cologuard’s success. See, e.g., Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 140–142, 155, 158–159, 170–171.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 11,634,781 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,634,781
• Provisur Technologies, Inc. v. Weber Food Technology GmbHAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00235 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8, 10, and 14–16 are unpatentable as anticipated by Young and obvious over Young and Norrie; the Johnson and Belk ground was not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Provisur proposes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had: (1) a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in mechanical engineering (or a similar field) and at least two years of experience working as an engineer (or similar role) on food processing and/or packaging systems (or in a similar field); or (2) at least seven years of experience working as an engineer (or similar role) on food processing and/or packaging systems (or in a similar field). Pet. 12. Weber does not contest Provisur’s framing of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. There being no dispute, we adopt Provisur’s definition of the level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Provisur construes the claim terms “according to their plain and ordinary meanings as understood by a [person of ordinary skill in the art] in view of the specification and prosecution history” and posits that “[n]o terms require an explicit construction to resolve the unpatentability controversy between the parties here.” Pet. 13. Weber appears to agree, stating in the related district court action that “most of [its] patent claims are plain and ordinary . . . [t]hey’re not difficult or complex claims or claim terms.” Ex. 3 US 5,514,032, issued May 7, 1996 (Ex. 1004, “Young”). 4 US 4,979,269, issued Dec. 25, 1990 (Ex. 1005, “Norrie”). 5 US 6,929,540 B2, issued Aug. 16, 2005 (Ex. 1006, “Johnson”). 6 US 6,198,834 B1, issued Mar. 6, 2001 (Ex. 1007, “Belk”). 1028, 5. This being the case, we do not find the need to expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (confirming that the Board need not construe claim terms where their construction is not material to the dispute).” slip op. at 5

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “without first determining how much fat existed to begin with, i.e., prior to the side of meat being trimmed. But, as Provisur correctly notes, Weber ignores what one skilled in the art reasonably would have understood from reading Young’s disclosure as a whole. See Pet. 30–36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–106, 109–112); Pet. Reply 2–12. When that is done, one skilled in the art would have understood that a necessary premise of Young’s determination of the thickness of fat to remain on the loin is knowing the thickness of the fat to begin with, which Young’s imaging system 190 and imaging processing routine 240 determine by first analyzing a series of “fat/lean separation lines” and “edge lines” in the side of meat being trimmed. Pet. 30–32 (citing Ex. 1004, 17:34–62, 18:33–56, 22:53–24:38, Figs. 2, 13); Pet. Reply 3–7 (citing portions of same evidence). More specifically, as described in Young (and articulated by Provisur), the side of meat is placed fat side down on a product support, i.e., platen 20. See Ex. 1004, 7:16–21, Figs. 1, 2. Using several cameras—top plan camera 196, end view camera 197, and fat line camera 198—Young’s imaging system 190 acquires multiple images of the side of meat from various angles and under various lighting conditions to “provide image data regarding each side of [meat].” See id. at 17:34–18:56. That image data is then used by Young’s image processing routine 240 to generate a series of demarcation lines on the side of meat, including: (1) fat/lean separation lines (representing the interface between the loin meat and the fat layer along top, side, and end views of the meat product; and (2) edge lines (representing lines along the outer surface of the meat product). See id. at 22:53–23:67, Figs. 10, 13 (Blocks 242, 246, 250, 254). In addition, “a plurality of points (preferably 20) are generated for each of the fat/lean separation and edge lines using known pattern matching routines.” Id. at 23:28–30, Fig. 13 (Blocks 244, 248, 252, 256); see also id. at 23:61–63 (essentially same). The fat/lean separation and edge lines (and points therein) generated by Young’s image processing routine 240 are then used to calculate certain dimensions and characteristics of the side of meat, such as height, length, and width. Id. at 24:10–22, Fig. 13 (Block 258). As Provisur’s expert credibly testifies, one skilled in the art would have understood that the dimension from the fat/lean separation line to the edge line along the outer surface represents the thickness of fat cover on the side of meat, i.e., before the fat is trimmed. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 106. Insofar as how that dimension is used, Young states that controller 172 uses “dynamic (real time) image data” of the fat/lean separation and edge lines “to dynamically modify the cutting profile of the loin knife assembly 100 so that the assembly follows a fixed distance from the separation line to provide the optimum fat cover for the loin.” Ex. 1004, 18:32–45; see also id. at 17:48–52 (describing “real time processor” for “image processing routines”). Notably, according to Young, the “fixed distance” represents the “desired” thickness of fat that remains on the loin, after trimming, and “sufficiently keeps the loin from drying out, but doesn’t make the loin look too fat,” although “[o]ther fat thicknesses may be desired in the alternative.” Id. at 20:60–66; see also id. at 10:39–42 (“Through control of the knife blade along several axes, assembly 100 preferably produces an optimum separation between loin and belly, with a desired fat covering left on the loin.” (emphases added)). Because the desired thickness of fat cover is what remains on the loin” slip op. at 9

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for patent owner

    “argument that Weber considers vital to its dispute of Provisur’s showing for the claimed fat thickness determination. During oral hearing, Weber repeatedly argued that Provisur changed theories midstream, i.e., between the time of the petition and the hearing. See Hrg. Tr. 22:18–24:47; see also id. at 31:14–22, 33:8–18, 34:16–20, 49:17–50:15, 54:16–56:25 (repeating same argument). More specifically, according to Weber, Provisur originally relied only on image data from Young’s “top view” camera as processed in “block 246” of Young’s image processing routine 240 when showing how Young meets the claimed fat thickness determination, whereas now Provisur relies on image data from Young’s “end view” cameras as processed in “Block 254.” Compare PO Sur-Reply 3–6 (focusing on Young’s “top view camera” in “block 246”), with Hrg. Tr. 27:4–16 (“[Block] 246, which is what they relied on, is processing images from the top-view camera in Young’s system. It is generating lines from the top-view camera in Young’s system. What they are newly trying to rely on today, for the first time, is Block 254 that is discussed toward the bottom of column 23 in Young, and that analyzes different images from a different camera. It is the end camera. It generates different lines. It demonstrates an end fat/lean line and an end edge line. Prior to today’s hearing, neither Petitioner, nor its expert, had ever discussed Block 254. You will not find a single reference to 254 in their papers, nor have they discussed the end edge line. It is completely new today. It finds absolutely no support in the record.” (emphases added)). We disagree with Weber’s contention. As shown and described in the petition, Provisur relies on more than simply Young’s “top view” camera and “block 246.” See Pet. 29–31. Rather, in its petition, Provisur annotates Young’s Figure 2 to show that image data from all three cameras of “imaging system 190”—“top plan camera 196, end view camera 197, [and] fat line camera 198”—play a role in the determination of fat thickness.8 Id. at 30. Moreover, Provisur cites the entire process depicted in “Figure 13” and described in columns “22:53–24:38” of Young as critical to the determination. Id. at 31. Those cited portions of Young involve not only the analysis of fat/lean and edge lines from “top view” images (block 246), but also the analysis of fat/lean and edge lines from “end view” images (blocks 250 and 254). See Ex. 1004, 23:12–24:13. In other words, Provisur’s showing for the claimed fat thickness determination is based on Young’s collective analysis of all those images. Indeed, Provisur’s expert confirms as much when confronted by Weber on cross-examination— Q. How does [Young] use the other cameras to identify that fat/lean separation line? A. Again, this is a -- this is a three-dimensional product that’s not regular, and all the views basically are needed to be able to describe that complex three-dimensional shape, so that the knife will be able to cut at that -- at that line, offset by whatever desired thickness there is, on that three-dimensional shape. Ex. 2006, 25:15–27:19 (emphasis added). 8 Indeed, contrary to Weber’s assertion, Provisur highlights “fat lean separation camera 198,” not top view camera 196, as most critical to the determination of fat thickness. Pet. 31. In the end, we reject the notion that Provisur changed theories” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 8,529,321 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,529,321
• Mastercard Incorporated And Mastercard International Incorporated v. Ov Loop, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 19, 2025 · IPR2023-01289 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–33 are unpatentable as obvious over Collinge; the Board did not reach the anticipation grounds based on Collinge or the grounds based on Fiske.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “the equivalent of an undergraduate degree in electrical and computer engineering (or a related field) and approximately two years of work experience in the field of secure payment system,” and that “[a]dditional education in the field could be substituted for industry experience, and vice versa.” PO Resp. 4. Patent Owner does not suggest that its proposed level of ordinary skill materially differs from the level of skill proposed by Petitioner. See id. We find, on the current record, that the ’171 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’171 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. We would have reached the same conclusions in this Decision had we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In light of the lack of any dispute over the Second Construction, a construction we find consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim language, we need not resolve whether the claim language also encompasses Petitioner’s First Construction. Moreover, as explained below, we find Collinge renders obvious the subject matter of the limitation under either construction. See infra Section III.D.5. For the foregoing reasons, we find that an express construction of any claim term is not necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments because here Petitioner is not relying on some other disclosure to fill a missing limitation absent from Collinge, but is instead relying only on Collinge and the knowledge a person of ordinary skill in the art would possess when appreciating the teachings of Collinge. Petitioner is not suggesting Collinge needed to be modified to add the use of an APDU, but, rather, that Collinge’s disclosure already contemplated it based on the well-known background of the art. Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that “the Collinge Provisionals state the disclosures therein are intended to be used in a ‘standard’ PayPass transaction,” and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered “the PayPass Specification (and EMV Specifications, with which the PayPass Specification complies) when reading Collinge.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1009, 8, 14–15, 22–23; Ex. 1050 ¶ 22). in a “standard” PayPass transaction and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known, at a minimum, that it would have been obvious from Collinge that the “first set of data” (i.e., the encrypted payload in Collinge) would have been “usable” by the application of Collinge “to formulate an application protocol data unit response,” as required by limitation [1.C]. Petitioner further demonstrates how Collinge discloses that the “first set of data” was “useable by the application to formulate” an APDU response in addressing limitation [1.E–3], which specifically requires “generating a response.” See Pet. Reply 11 (explaining that “[d]etails of how [the encrypted payload] is used to formulate an APDU response are explained where that is separately claimed”); see also id. (citing Pet. 48–50 (addressing limitation [1.E-3])).” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 10,032,171 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,032,171

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.