• AT&T Mobility LLC / AT&T Services Inc. et al. v. Daingean Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00402 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board granted Patent Owner’s revised non-contingent motion to amend, canceling claims 1–4 and substituting claims 7 and 8, which Petitioner did not prove unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.” See Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2019) (precedential). A “patent owner bears the burden of persuasion to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the motion to amend complies” with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(d)(1). Specifically, a patent owner must demonstrate the following: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent; and (4) the amendment does not introduce new matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)–(b). For the reasons explained below, Patent Owner satisfies its burden of persuasion to show that the amendments comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Both parties rely on expert testimony for their respective positions relating to the number of years of experience needed to attain ordinary skill, but neither expert cites supporting evidence for their testimony. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 2002 ¶ 15. Our decision is the same regardless of whether the length of experience is two years or three. We find Patent Owner’s proposed “wireless communications” is more consistent with the ’958 patent than Petitioner’s proposed “telecommunication,” which encompasses a variety of technologies including, e.g., landline and wireless telephones, cable, and satellite. See Ex. 1001, 1:11–62 (describing the invention in terms of wireless communications). Accordingly, we adopt a modified version of Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art, substituting “wireless communications” for “telecommunication.” Neither party, moreover, indicates the overall result would change based on a different definition.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the recited second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. The plain meaning of “first type” and “second type” indicates that the first type and second type are different in kind. RMTA 22 (App. A). Our interpretation is consistent with the Specification, which explains that second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. As Patent Owner points out, the ’958 patent discloses “first type of system information (1TYP SIB) is . . . essential . . . for initial system access” and “second type of system information (2TYP SIB) is nonessential system information . . . defined as all other types of information, and thus excludes the [] information required for initial access.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:34– 46); see also Ex. 1001, Abstract (interchangeably using the terms second type and non-essential). Despite Petitioner’s argument that this disclosure is non-limiting and directed to a disclaimed example embodiment (Opp. 8–9), Petitioner could not identify any embodiment, among the approximately forty disclosed embodiments, describing something other than the first type SIB being essential information and the second type SIB being non-essential information. Tr. 22:18–26. Even the Petition acknowledges that “the ’958 Patent further classifies a second type of system information, the ‘non-essential’ SI, which is defined as all other types of information excluding that first type of information required for initial access.” Pet. 5. Furthermore, the prior art of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill would have understood second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. See Ex. 1008 ¶ 48 (describing two categories of system information, “essential SI” and “Other SI”). Patent Owner’s expert also understood the recited first and second type SIBs as being mutually exclusive. See Ex. 1011, 49:10–13. For the above reasons, we do not agree with Petitioner that the recited second type SIB lacks any requirements, nor do we interpret claims 7 and 8 such that the first type SIB could be a second type SIB.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “(d) Limitation 7h: Analysis We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments with respect to limitation 7h are insufficient because they fail to address the limitation as written and improperly incorporate previous arguments by reference. For example, Petitioner did not map the recited “group identifier” when opposing Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend. See Opp. 16–17. In its Sur-reply, Petitioner contends that limitation 7h’s requirement of transmitting the group identifier was previously “set out in Patent Owner’s prior papers,” but does not refer to any specific papers or exhibits. Pet. Surreply 11–12. We decline to search for and piece together Petitioner’s arguments and evidence to develop a persuasive theory of unpatentability. See 37 C.F.R. section 42.6(a)(3). Petitioner similarly failed to address adequately where Lee discloses or suggests the recited “compressed format” and “plural parameters.” See Opp. 16–17. Aside from the above concerns, we also do not see sufficient explanation with respect to limitation 7h’s requirement that the transmitting by broadcast be based on a comparison of the value tag. Petitioner argues that, because Patent Owner does not dispute limitation 7g, “it would have been obvious to a POSITA to use the same value tag[] to determine the system information broadcast in Lee’s compressed format embodiment.” Pet. Sur-reply 12. This conclusory statement is not supported by any citations to evidence and was improperly introduced in the Sur-reply. Moreover, whether it was obvious to determine what system information is broadcast is not commensurate with the claim scope because limitation 7h requires that the broadcasting (not the broadcast content) be based on a comparison of the value tag. See supra III.B.4 and IV.B. Further, we are not persuaded that Lee’s transmitting by broadcast is” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 10,841,958 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,841,958
• Inergy Technology, Inc. v. Force Mos Technology Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00093 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 were not proven unpatentable because the asserted references did not establish the claimed epitaxial layer or the required coverage of the trench sidewalls.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner defines a person of ordinary skill in the art as having “a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, and at least two years of relevant work experience in the field of integrated circuit design and manufacturing.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–37, 57). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 6. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is supported by unopposed declaration testimony and appears to be consistent with the disclosures of the ’634 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Ex. 1001, 1:6–2:33 (describing the invention and related art in terms of integrated circuit design and fabrication); see also Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 1–6 (Hirler); Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 1–37 (Kobayashi); Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 2–29 (Shiraishi). Neither party, moreover, indicates the overall result would change based on a different definition.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that “the sidewalls of said trenches in said base layer are covered” should be construed to mean that “the entire sidewalls of” those trenches are covered. Pet. 18–19. We refer to this as “the sidewall limitation.” Petitioner shows persuasively that the disclosure and file history of the ’634 patent support its position on the sidewall limitation. Id. Patent Owner, for its part, observes that, after the filing of the Petition. two District Courts adopted the construction proposed by Petitioner.” PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2010, 6–9; Ex. 2011, 23). Patent Owner also agrees to apply Petitioner’s construction for purposes of this proceeding. Id. We agree with Patent Owner that an express construction of the sidewall limitation is necessary to this Decision, id., and adopt Petitioner’s undisputed definition because it is supported by the record. No other claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “On this record, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that any claim is unpatentable under any ground asserted in the Petition. IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–9 of the ’634 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 34

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Alternatively, even if we set aside that timing issue, Dr. Liu’s bare opinion, advanced for the first time during cross-examination, that an epitaxial layer is “obvious” from Hirler’s disclosure is inadequate to support the challenges. Id. at 24–25. We accord little weight to Dr. Liu’s opinion because it is conclusory. See Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). In any event, Petitioner does not meet, on this record, the “high standard” required to establish an inherent disclosure of an epitaxial layer in Hirler. PO Resp. 24.6 Dr. Liu opined for the first time during cross-examination “that it would have been impossible to create Hirler’s more lightly doped n- drift zone layer on top of its more heavily doped n+ substrate layer other than via epitaxy.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 2014, 164:16– 165:20). But Patent Owner effectively refutes that proposition with evidence that such a layer “could be created by counter-doping,” even if, as Dr. Liu contends, counter-doping may have been less ideal due to “disadvantageous mobility.” Id. (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 133; Ex. 2014, 166:15–167:8).” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 7,629,634 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,629,634
• Precision Planting LLC v. Maschio Gaspardo S.P.A.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00008 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–14, and 16 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds failed to establish the claimed thrust-bearing element and its required location.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “We determine that the evidence of record overcomes the presumption that § 112, para. 6 does not apply because “thrust-bearing element” does not recite sufficiently definite structure in this case. See, e.g., Pet. 22 (the term is not used here according to its common meaning). First, the word “element” is a “[g]eneric term[]” or “verbal construct[]” often “used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means’” because it does not “connote sufficiently definite structure.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. We find nothing in the ’121 patent or elsewhere in the record suggesting that “element” in the term “thrust-bearing element” should be considered other than a generic placeholder term. Second, although the term “thrust bearing” may connote certain structure, “thrust-bearing element” does not. A “thrust bearing” is “a well-known term of art in engineering and is ‘a bearing which sustains axial loads and prevents axial movement of a loaded shaft.’” Ex. 1003 ¶ 46 (citing Ex. 1017, 2147). “The balls of traditional thrust bearings are positioned inline with the axial force, as thrust bearings are designed specifically to transmit axial load.” Id. Here, however, “thrust-bearing” is hyphenated, and is therefore a phrasal adjective modifying “element” rather than the noun phrase “thrust bearing.”8 Further, there are “substantial differences”” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We largely agree with Petitioner. “[S]tructure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed.Cir.1997). The Specification of the ’121 patent “clearly links or associates” two components with the function of bearing axial thrust from the sowing disc: shaft 27 with flanging 30, and thrust-bearing plate 31. Ex. 1001, 3:25–35. Thrust-bearing plate 31 is expressly described as “bear[ing] on that surface of the disc which faces seal 24 . . . in order to withstand at least some of the axial load produced by the disc 16 on the seal 24. Ex. 1001, 3:28–31. Rotatably-mounted shaft 27 with flanging 30 is “fixed” to thrust-bearing plate 31 and therefore bears the axial load from the disc via the thrust-bearing plate. Id. at 3:25–28.10 10 Drive element 32 is described as part of thrust-bearing element 26 and permits thrust-bearing element 26 to be driven in rotation with sowing disc 16. Ex. 1001, 3:36–40. It is not described as bearing any axial load, however. Further, it is not necessary for the thrust-bearing element to rotate with the sowing disc for that element to bear axial load from the sowing disc. See id. at 3:58–59 (“Provision is also made for the thrust-bearing element 26 to be made idle and not driven in rotation by the [drive] shaft 20.”). Ultimately, however, whether drive element 32 is properly considered as part of the corresponding structure is not relevant to the outcome of this case. We disagree with Patent Owner that bearings 28 and seat 29 should be considered corresponding structure. The Specification does not associate these structures with any axial load-bearing function. Instead, bearings 28 and seat 29 are described as the means by which, and the location in which, shaft 27 is rotatably mounted. Ex. 1001, 3:25–27. Regardless, whether or not bearings 28 and seat 29 are considered corresponding structure does not affect the outcome of this case. In summary, we construe “thrust-bearing element” as a means-plus- function claim term under 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6. Its recited function is to bear thrust, or more specifically to “withstand at least some of the axial load produced by the disc on the seal.” The structure described in the Specification as corresponding to this function is shaft 27 with flanging 30, and thrust-bearing plate 31. We construe the limitation as directed to this structure, and equivalent structures.” slip op. at 21

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “The question is not whether the patentee disclaimed coverage over structures in which the thrust-bearing element is not located entirely in the movable portion of the housing. Instead, we must simply ascertain what the patentee meant by “supported rotatably in the movable portion.” To answer this question, we look to the Specification, which “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. “The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Id. at 1316. Here, it is undisputed that in the sole embodiment described by the ’121 patent, the thrust-bearing element is supported by and entirely within the movable portion of the housing. Ex. 1001, Figs. 1, 2; Pet Post-Hearing Resp. 1; PO Post-Hearing Resp. 2. Construing “in the movable portion” to require the thrust-bearing element to be entirely within the movable portion both “stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns” with the sole disclosed embodiment. Such a construction does not import the word “entirely” from the sole embodiment into the claims because the construction “arises from the claim language itself.” See SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., 2024 WL 1132219, *2–*3 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (construing “primary brush assembly disposed within the round housing perimeter” to require that the primary brush assembly be “entirely within” the round housing perimeter is not an improper incorporation of “entirely” from embodiments into the claims because the construction “arises from the claim language itself”). Accordingly, having reviewed the complete record and the parties’ pre- and post-hearing briefing, we determine that “supported rotatably in the movable portion” means supported rotatably entirely in the space defined by the movable portion.” slip op. at 25

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “b. When “Thrust-Bearing Element” is Construed as a Means-Plus-Function Claim Limitation, there is Insufficient Evidence in the Record to Support a Finding that VenHuizen Discloses a Thrust- Bearing Element that is Supported Rotatably in the Movable Portion As noted above, Petitioner contends that VenHuizen’s shaft 55, retaining hub 56, and handle 58 together constitute the claimed thrust-bearing element “under a proper means-plus-function definition.” Pet. Reply 18–19.12 We do not discern sufficient evidence of record or persuasive technical reasoning from Petitioner to support a finding that these elements together are “supported rotatably in the movable portion” of the housing, as claim 1 requires. Ex. 1001, 4:38–39. We construed this limitation to require the thrust-bearing element to be supported rotatably entirely in the space defined by the movable portion (the space defined by VenHuizen’s second housing member 90). Petitioner does not contend, much less show, that these components are supported rotatably entirely in the movable second housing member 90. On the contrary, of the three components constituting VenHuizen’s thrust-bearing element, all of retaining hub 56 and most of shaft 55 are located in the fixed portion of the housing (first housing member 50), not the movable portion 90. See Ex. 1001, Fig. 6. Only handle 58 is ever located in the movable portion (when the fixed and movable portions are joined together). See id. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that VenHuizen discloses a thrust-bearing element rotatably supported in the movable portion.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,770,121 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,770,121
• Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. NEC CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 3, 2025 · IPR2023-01239 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 14–18, 20–23, and 25–29 were not determined unpatentable because the asserted obviousness grounds failed to establish the claimed code-rate determination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner, supported by the testimony of Dr. Reader, argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer science, a related field, and 2–3 years’ experience researching, designing, or developing content delivery systems and related hardware, software, and firmware, or equivalent experience.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 67–69). Petitioner further argues “[o]ne having less education but more practical experience, or more education and less experience, might also meet this standard.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition or offer an alternative level or skill in the art. PO Resp. 12 (citing Pet. 14; Ex. 2012). Instead, “[f]or the purposes of this PO Response only, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of POSITA.” Id. Thus, on this record, the parties agree upon the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, and this level is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’101 patent and the prior art references that disclose content delivery systems. For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “the gap between the playback deadline and the target schedule, (td(n) − tT(n)), is the target buffer duration, i.e., ‘the desired client buffer duration (in client time).’” Id. at 22–23 (quoting Chou ¶ 74). Petitioner also argues that “in efforts to match upper bound tb(n) to target schedule tT(n), Chou takes into consideration the time duration between target schedule tT(n) and the playback deadline td(n).” Thus, it appears Petitioner assembles three separate and distinct time intervals from Chou’s timing diagrams and equations to construct one contiguous time interval equivalent to claim 1’s remaining time. However, Chou does not recognize the time interval that Petitioner posits, and Petitioner has not persuasively shown that this combined time interval exists as a teaching in the prior art and is used as part of any step or decision involved in determining the code rate. As admitted by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Reader, Petitioner’s analysis “used the claims as a road map to find limitations in the prior art.” Ex. 2015, 76:4–9 (Reader Deposition Transcript). See also Tr. 28:20–31:2 (Petitioner’s response to whether identification of and integration of separate time ranges described by Chou is hindsight reconstruction, Petitioner argues Chou’s device operates such that code rate is based on remaining time). Under the circumstances, this is improper because Petitioner and Dr. Reader do not justify this combination of separately identified time ranges except based solely on hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention. However, even if that were not the case, we are not persuaded that Chou or the other asserted prior art references suggest using the combined time interval td(n) − ta(n) as the basis for any decision related to determining the code rate.” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “d) Analysis In our Institution Decision, although expressing some uncertainty with respect to certain of Patent Owner’s arguments on the preliminary record then before us, “we [were] not persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions that [(1)] Wang teaches [1d]’s code rate” (Dec. 53 (citing Pet. 62–65) or (2) “a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Chou and Wang” (id. at 54 (citing Pet. 74)). Petitioner does not dispute those determinations in its Reply or otherwise. Furthermore, Petitioner does not address or otherwise dispute Patent Owner’s arguments challenging the asserted obviousness of claims 1, 4–6, 10–16, and 19–26 over the combined teachings of Chou and Wang. Thus, for at least the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to show that (1) one skilled in the art would have combined the teachings of Chou and Wang or (2) the combined teaching of Chou and Wang renders limitation 1(d) obvious. e) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claim 1 is unpatentable over the combination of Chou and Wang.” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 8,752,101 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,752,101
• Arista Networks, Inc. v. Corrigent CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2024 · IPR2023-00839 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–26 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the evidence did not establish the claimed LAG use between MPLS switches or explain how the references would be combined.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Consistent with our Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, apart from the phrase “at least” modifying the number of years of professional experience. See Dec. 17–18. As we previously explained, inclusion of such qualifiers renders the articulation vague by being open-ended thus encompassing the level of experience of an expert, someone with more than ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 18. Petitioner’s articulation otherwise appears consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) and related cases. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that precedent, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Neither party proposes any express claim constructions. Pet. 4; PO Resp. 3. Based on the parties’ arguments, we see no need to expressly construe any terms to resolve the dispute before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Pet. Reply 10–11. Despite Petitioner’s arguments, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated by knowledge of Rabie to combine the teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz at the time of the invention of the ’602 patent. First, the ’602 patent claims a priority date of May 6, 2005, which is not challenged by Petitioner (see Pet. 3), whereas Rabie was published more than two months later. Ex. 1021, code (65). Moreover, the question is not whether it may have been known at the time of the invention that a LAG could be used between switches, but rather whether the combined teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to utilize a LAG between switches, as claimed, when neither RFC 3209 nor Raz teaches such usage or suggests the existence of a problem that such usage would solve. We are not persuaded that they would.” slip op. at 36

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot reached

    “Pet. Reply 10–11. Despite Petitioner’s arguments, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated by knowledge of Rabie to combine the teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz at the time of the invention of the ’602 patent. First, the ’602 patent claims a priority date of May 6, 2005, which is not challenged by Petitioner (see Pet. 3), whereas Rabie was published more than two months later. Ex. 1021, code (65). Moreover, the question is not whether it may have been known at the time of the invention that a LAG could be used between switches, but rather whether the combined teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to utilize a LAG between switches, as claimed, when neither RFC 3209 nor Raz teaches such usage or suggests the existence of a problem that such usage would solve. We are not persuaded that they would.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 9,118,602 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,118,602
• Orthocision, Inc. v. PTL Opco LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 18, 2024 · IPR2023-00625 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 9, and 10 were not shown unpatentable under any asserted § 103 ground because Petitioner did not adequately explain how or why the prior art would be combined.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not specifically address Petitioner’s proposed definition. See generally Resp. Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Bovinet, uses a slightly different, but not materially so, definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan than Petitioner. See Ex. 2005 ¶ 13. Thus, the parties appear to agree on who the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been in terms of education and field of work experience. We accept and adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art (or ordinarily skilled artisan), which appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’129 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[]” evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). B.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “3. Summary on Claim Construction We maintain our earlier constructions of “open tip” and “releasing means . . . .” See DI 16–24. We determine that no other express construction of any claim term is necessary for purposes of rendering this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017. Although we maintain here our constructions of “open tip” and “releasing means . . . ,” we do so only for the sake of completeness. These claim constructions, ultimately, are not determinative of the outcome of this proceeding because, regardless of the meaning of any claim term, including these disputed terms, we find that Petitioner fails to adequately explain why any claim would have been obvious under the asserted grounds. We explain this in detail below. C.” slip op. at 29

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Ex. 1001, 6:28–38 (emphasis added). However, the language of claim 1 is very clear on the functionality of the “open tip,” expressly reciting that “the open tip cuts bone tissue away from the sacrum or the ilium.” Id. at 13:19– 20. Thus, the claim language itself provides the required functionality of the “open tip,” and we do not agree with Petitioner that additional functionality relating to where bone tissue might go once cut, as discussed in the Specification, should be read into the claims as a limitation. Patent Owner’s newly proposed interpretation is similar to Petitioner’s in that it requests addition of functionality discussed as an example in the Specification, but not recited in the claim’s expressly recited functional language relating to the “open tip.” We disagree with Patent Owner that the concept of dislodged tissue entering a void defined by the open tip is necessary to understanding the claim element. And, once more, Patent Owner reads too much structure from the written description into the claim language as a limitation because it is not apparent that the recited “open tip” language requires that we further clarify that any interior void defined by the open tip is on the interior of the abrading head, and behind the exterior abrading surfaces, or between interior surfaces of a first pair of opposing sides, as proposed by Patent Owner. “[W]hile it is true that claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification . . . , it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the claims. . . . [T]he claims define the invention.” Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581–82 (Fed. Cir. 1988).” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “A claim limitation is presumed to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (or pre- AIA § 112 ¶ 6) if, as here, it explicitly uses the term “means” and includes functional language; this presumption is overcome if the limitation further includes the structure, material, or acts necessary to perform the recited function. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). Here, the word “means” is recited, followed by functional language, and the claim recites no structure associated with the means or function. Moreover, the parties agree that this is a means plus function limitation. See Pet. 19–20; Resp. 9. We find “releasing means” is a means plus function limitation and, based on the plain language of the claim, the recited “releasing means” is a part of the also recited “slide hammer assembly,” as the above-quoted claim language defines. Ex. 1001, 13:10–17. Construing a claim term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) involves two steps: (1) identifying the claimed function; and then (2) determining what structure, if any, disclosed in the Specification corresponds to the claimed function. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351. In conducting this analysis, we may not incorporate structure from the written description beyond that which is necessary to perform the claimed function. See Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 11,020,129 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,020,129
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Corrigent CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00447 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–26 were not shown unpatentable because the Petition did not establish the claimed port assignment and packet labeling under Raz or adequately explain the Raz–Ferguson combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “packet-switched networking, MPLS and LAG.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 57–58). Petitioner also states that a lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 57). Patent Owner “uses the same definition.” PO Resp. 4. We apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill, which is undisputed and is consistent with the level reflected by the ’602 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe claims using the principles set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) and related cases. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2022). Under that precedent, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Neither party proposes any express claim constructions. Pet. 6–7; see PO Resp. 4. To the extent that the parties dispute the meaning of certain claim terms, we address those issues below, but we determine it is unnecessary to expressly construe any terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner argues, and we agree, that the cited portions of Raz do not disclose a LAG between two switches. PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner acknowledges this; as stated in Petitioner’s Reply, “Petitioner has always acknowledged that Raz addresses the use of subports within an LSR, but a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have found it obvious from Raz to use Ethernet physical data ports of a router or switch in an Ethernet LAG to communicate high-speed packet streams in [an] MPLS network.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Pet. 15, 19, 22–25; Ex. 1021 ¶ 13; Ex. 1006, 1:16–19, 2:23– 31, 7:7–29, 11:3–12, 13:16–19, 14:42–44, 15:56–58, 17:7–9). Petitioner argues that LAGs were well known and, “[w]hile PO argues that Raz teaches the use of a single high-speed link to communicate between LSRs, that is merely a design choice.” Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 15–17; PO Resp. 8–9). Further, Petitioner argues “[i]t would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that high-speed packet streams could be communicated between switches or routers through a physical tunnel port of a LAG.” Pet. Resp. 3 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 15–17) (emphasis added). Among other problems, though, those arguments were not in the Petition; the Petition does not describe modifications of Raz’s teachings, much less establish those modifications as a “design choice.” See Pet. 25; see also PO Sur-reply 3. Further, we agree with Patent Owner that Raz is fundamentally different with its teachings of multiplexing the outputs of multiple slow- speed subports/processors into a single stream for transmission across a single high-speed link. PO Resp. 7–9, 12–13, 15–16; PO Sur-reply 4–5. As stated in Raz, “[t]he present invention provides a subport forwarding and provisioning mechanism whereby a plurality of subports comprising slower speed processors are used to perform the packet processing for a higher speed packet stream.” Ex. 1006, 6:24–27. Additionally, where Raz describes communication between two LSRs, Petitioner acknowledges that Raz teaches that its cited second LSR assigns the port on which it will receive a data packet. Pet. Reply 4; Ex. 1021 ¶ 20 (“in Raz, the second LSR chooses the subport that will be used to transmit the data packet from the first LSR and receive the data packet at the second LSR”). According to Petitioner, Raz teaches that “a first LSR generates a data packet label in which a port serial number is encoded and sends the label to a preceding LSR. Subsequently, the preceding LSR sends a data packet to the proper subport for processing. The process is then repeated in sending the data packet from the first LSR to a second LSR.” Pet. Reply 4 (citations omitted). “This technique just as easily could have been implemented to identify a single physical tunnel port through which a data packet in a first router or switch would be communicated to a second router or switch via a LAG.” Pet. Reply 4 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1006, 2:23–25, 7:7–16, 7:22–26, 11:3–29, Fig. 5; Ex. 1021 ¶ 18). Again, these arguments were not made in the Petition (see Pet. 22–25), and Petitioner’s assertions that Raz’s teachings “just as easily could have been implemented” in the manner claimed is improper hindsight and inconsistent with the fundamental differences between Raz’s multiplexing within an LSR and the claimed link aggregation and port assignment between MPLS/LAG switches.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “[c]laims 1–13, 15–24 and 26 set forth above in Ground 1.” Pet. 52. Further, Petitioner states that “[f]or independent [c]laims 1, 15, and 26, Ferguson builds on the previous analysis of Raz by disclosing a system for communicating packets between switches and routers in an MPLS network.” Pet. 52; see Pet. 52–55. Critically, though, Petitioner does not specifically explain how the combined teachings of Raz and Ferguson would satisfy individual claim elements. Among other problems with Petitioner’s proposed combination, Petitioner does not adequately explain how or why a person of ordinary skill would have combined the references to include the claimed port assignment and packet labeling for transmission of a packet from a preceding node and then between a first and second MPLS switch. See Pet. 56–59. Instead, Petitioner generally advocates for the combination of Raz and Ferguson, arguing for example that “both Raz and Ferguson are directed to solving the problem of ensuring enough bandwidth is available to communicate high-speed packet streams through an MPLS network.” Pet. 57 (citing Ex. 1006, 10:60–11:12, 14:33–41, 15:47–55, 17:1–9, Fig. 5; Ex. 1007, 1:28–42, 2:54–57, 4:55–60; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 247–249). Further, Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill “would have understood from the disclosures in Ferguson that techniques for utilizing an Ethernet physical data port in a LAG to communication data packets between routers or switches in an MPLS network are also applicable to the use of subports transmitting the data packets within the routers or switches, and vice versa.” Pet. 59 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 250; Ex. 1007, 5:61–6:6); see Pet. 56–59; Pet. Reply 20. But Petitioner does not adequately explain how the proposed combination of Raz and Ferguson would cure the deficiencies addressed above in Petitioner’s analysis of Raz for Ground 1. Among other problems, none of Petitioner’s arguments adequately address port assignment and labeling in the proposed combination, much less adequately explain why the proposed combination would satisfy the challenged claims. See Pet. 55–56. As Petitioner does not adequately explain how the teachings of Raz and Ferguson might be combined to cure the deficiencies addressed above, we additionally determine Petitioner’s arguments and evidence advanced for the combination of Raz and Ferguson do not establish obviousness by a preponderance of the evidence for any of claims 1–26.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 9,118,602 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,118,602
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Ramot At Tel Aviv University, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 20, 2024 · IPR2022-01283 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–63 not shown unpatentable under either §103 ground because Petitioner did not sufficiently support the asserted digital mapping and delta limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Even assuming, arguendo, we were to credit Petitioner’s arguments that “it is sufficient for the prior art to render obvious a mapping exhibiting the deltas features; the prior art need not calculate the deltas themselves” (Pet. Reply 11) and that “Dr. Dallesasse agrees that modeling a Mach- Zehnder modulator as exhibiting a sinusoidal response—as Dr. Blumenthal did—was ‘reasonable’ ‘to a first order’” and “[a]ny other sources of non-linearity would merely be less significant, ‘second order effects,’” (id. at 12– 13), Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the sinusoidal response curve would look like the one Dr. Blumenthal proposes. Dr. Blumenthal asserts, without specifically or credibly explaining why, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have selected a region of the sinusoidal response curve that includes an inflection point such that deltas both decrease and increase over some portion of the curve being linearized. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 173–174 (scaling and shifting a sinusoidal response curve so that the curve contains an inflection point within the linearized region, but without adequately explaining the evidentiary basis for these selections); id. ¶ 52 (opining that “in the close vicinity of the center of the positive or negative inflection regions, otherwise known as the Quadrature point, the modulator is almost would have included regions on both sides of an inflection point). If a person of ordinary skill would have selected a region of the sinusoidal response curve on only one side of an inflection point, the evidence does not suggest that such a mapping would satisfy both limitations 1.8 and 1.9. At best, Petitioner presents an “obvious to try rationale”: In addition to the reasons mentioned above, a POSITA would have found it obvious to try a mapping scheme in which entries in the look-up table as taught by Taraschuk are selected such that successively decreasing inputs correspond to digital output entries with either decreasing, increasing, or similar deltas between their values. Doing so would have involved choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success. In that regard, the deltas between values of the corresponding digital outputs can either increase, decrease, or stay the same. Accordingly, there are only three possible relationships between deltas of successive digital outputs. With so few possibilities, a POSITA would have found it obvious to try each of them. Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 196). The analysis for 13.8 is incorporated by reference in 13.9. See Pet. 53–54. Although there are three possible relationships between two, consecutive deltas, there are many possible sequences of deltas––Petitioner does not sufficiently show a finite number of solutions in its challenge. Petitioner’s obvious-to-try rationale is insufficient to show that a person of ordinary skill would have used a digital-to-digital-mapping in which there are regions in which the deltas are both decreasing and increasing. Moreover, Petitioner’s Reply includes positions not supported by a Reply Declaration from Dr. Blumenthal and thus, constitute attorney argument that is not sufficiently supported by evidence. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 14–15 (Petitioner arguing “Roberts’ design obviates the need for a separate,” slip op. at 32

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

    “Inst. Dec. 35 (citing Ex. 1006, 8:2, 8:8). Based on our review of the complete record developed during trial, we are persuaded to modify our preliminary determinations. For the reasons discussed below, we are persuaded that the scope of claim 1 does not encompass linear compensation methods effected by analog pre-distortion because the ’998 patent specification distinguishes analog pre-distortion (see Ex. 1001, 1:64–2:36) and the prosecution history specifically distinguishes analog pre-distortion from the claimed approach (see Ex. 3001, 172).6 We find persuasive Dr. Dallesasse’s testimony that “a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the [’998] patent would understand that th[e] [claimed] approach of mapping, based on the converter output pattern differs 6 Ex. 3001 is a portion of the prosecution history of U.S. Patent No. 11, 133, 872, a parent of the ’998 patent. Ex. 2022 ¶ 34 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:5–9 (’998 patent disclosing common, prior art solutions such as “an analog pre-distortion circuit to feed the modulator”); Ex. 1005, 2:53; Ex. 1006, 7:67–8:5, Fig. 6); Ex. 1001, 2:35– 37(the ’998 patent describing the need for a “digital to analog converter” that would “improve[] linearity of response without sacrificing efficiency or dynamic range” as in the common, prior art solutions). Dr. Dallesasse explains how “the prosecution history of the parent ’872 patent [illustrates] that when [Patent Owner] changed ‘correct for non-linearities’ to the more specific language ‘determined based on a pattern for actuating drive voltages that alters the linearity of an optical response of the modulator,’” “the Examiner then allowed the claims over a rejection based on Roberts,” which “suggests that there are ways to ‘correct for non-linearities’ that do not meet the amended claims, as the ’998 Patent itself admits.” Id. ¶ 79 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:5–9; Ex. 2009, 2; Ex. 1010, 16–48). During prosecution, Patent Owner argued: Roberts does not disclose a “digital-to-digital mapping,” where, “for a given plurality of N digital input data bits, the mapping to the corresponding M digital output data bits is determined based on a pattern for actuating drive voltages that alters the linearity of an optical response of the modulator,” as recited in amended claim 1. Instead, the linear compensation in Roberts is performed pursuant to a compensation function c(t) when the Vx(n) multi-bit sample streams are generated. Importantly, this linear compensation in Roberts occurs before the mapping of Vx(n) to Sx(n). As a result, the mapping between Vx(n) to Sx(n) in Roberts, such as the mapping shown in Table 1 of Roberts, is not a part of the linear compensation operation performed in Roberts. Ex. 3001, 172 (emphasis added). We interpret the quoted passage to exclude analog pre-distortion because we interpret the argument distinguishing distortion techniques––in particular, those accomplished by analog compensation function, c(t). Id. Both the ’998 patent and Patent Owner’s arguments during prosecution support Dr. Dallesasse’s testimony and Patent Owner’s position that the scope of claim 1 does not encompass linear compensation methods effected by analog pre-distortion.” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “limitation 1.9. This is because the idealized sinusoidal curves that form the basis of Dr. Blumenthal’s analysis lack a sufficient showing of relevance to the teachings of Taraschuk cited by Petitioner. Patent Owner persuades us that Petitioner does not point to any basis for a LUT having the recited deltas except for Dr. Blumenthal’s analysis. Although Wright generally teaches compensating for mismatches, Dr. Blumenthal’s analysis fills in limitations 1.8 and 1.9––Petitioner does not set forth a sufficiently supported reason for using the specific values recited in limitations 1.8 and 1.9. Even assuming, arguendo, we were to credit Petitioner’s arguments that “it is sufficient for the prior art to render obvious a mapping exhibiting the deltas features; the prior art need not calculate the deltas themselves” (Pet. Reply 11) and that “Dr. Dallesasse agrees that modeling a Mach- Zehnder modulator as exhibiting a sinusoidal response—as Dr. Blumenthal did—was ‘reasonable’ ‘to a first order’” and “[a]ny other sources of non-linearity would merely be less significant, ‘second order effects,’” (id. at 12– 13), Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the sinusoidal response curve would look like the one Dr. Blumenthal proposes. Dr. Blumenthal asserts, without specifically or credibly explaining why, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have selected a region of the sinusoidal response curve that includes an inflection point such that deltas both decrease and increase over some portion of the curve being linearized. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 173–174 (scaling and shifting a sinusoidal response curve so that the curve contains an inflection point within the linearized region, but without adequately explaining the evidentiary basis for these selections); id. ¶ 52 (opining that “in the close vicinity of the center of the positive or negative inflection regions, otherwise known as the Quadrature point, the modulator is almost would have included regions on both sides of an inflection point). If a person of ordinary skill would have selected a region of the sinusoidal response curve on only one side of an inflection point, the evidence does not suggest that such a mapping would satisfy both limitations 1.8 and 1.9. At best, Petitioner presents an “obvious to try rationale”: In addition to the reasons mentioned above, a POSITA would have found it obvious to try a mapping scheme in which entries in the look-up table as taught by Taraschuk are selected such that successively decreasing inputs correspond to digital output entries with either decreasing, increasing, or similar deltas between their values. Doing so would have involved choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success. In that regard, the deltas between values of the corresponding digital outputs can either increase, decrease, or stay the same. Accordingly, there are only three possible relationships between deltas of successive digital outputs. With so few possibilities, a POSITA would have found it obvious to try each of them. Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 196). The analysis for 13.8 is incorporated by reference in 13.9. See Pet. 53–54. Although there are three possible relationships between two,” slip op. at 32

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “IV. MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner requests that we exclude Petitioner’s Exhibits 1031 through 1038 submitted with Petitioner’s Reply. Paper 25, 1. Petitioner opposes. Paper 27. As we do not rely on any of these exhibits in rendering the findings and conclusions in this Decision, Patent Owner’s motion is moot.” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 11,342,998 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,342,998
• BTC Corporation v. TG Biotech Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 13, 2023 · IPR2022-00998 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds; Patent Owner’s motion to strike Exhibit 1038 was granted.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that we should disregard Dr. Naumovski’s testimony because she may have taken a leave of absence from work for a couple of years. The record supports that Dr. Naumovski not only meets the requirements of the person of ordinary skill in the art, but also appears to have relevant knowledge with respect to Gynostemma pentaphylum (“GP”) saponins. See Ex. 2015 (Appendix A). related field, and at least two years of experience using techniques for extraction and characterization of plant-based materials.” PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶ 74). Because there are more than 400 species of plants that contain saponins, Patent Owner disagrees that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be familiar with the structure and utility of saponins. Id. The level of skill in the art is a reference point for gauging what would have been obvious based on the reference disclosures. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. In other words, the lens of the level of ordinary skill in the art does not change a prior art’s disclosure, though it may change one’s understanding of what is disclosed. Patent Owner, however, does not explain how its definition provides a reference point that would meaningfully alter the Petition’s assertions of obviousness. For purposes of this decision, we analyze the asserted prior art with respect to the level of skill set forth by Petitioner, but there would be no difference in the outcome of this Decision if we were to apply the level of skill in the art set forth by Patent Owner. C.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “during the full trial, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that applying the methods of Kim 460 to the G. pentaphyllum starting material of Razmovski necessarily results in the damulin levels as claimed. We agree with Dr. Naumovski’s explanation that the use of an impure damulin B standard containing a double peak renders the results as shown in Exhibit 1013 unreliable. Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 141–143, 162–173; see Ex. 2007. Dr. Naumovski further explains that the use of an impure standard would require the application of a correction factor, but this correction factor would need to be reassessed as the purity of the standard decreases over time. See Ex. 2015 ¶ 166. As Dr. Naumovski explains that applying a correction factor to the linear regression would result in a shallower slope. Ex. 2015 ¶ 165 (citing 2006, 71:12–73:5; 99:2–9). “Reducing the calibration curve slope increases the amount of damulin B calculated from the experimental extracts.” Ex. 2015 ¶ 165. However, in the Experimental Report-1 the same correction factor for the damulin B standard was used to” slip op. at 41

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner requests construction of the terms “an effective amount for improving or treating the metabolic syndrome,” which is found in claims 11–13, as meaning “an amount that produces any measurable amount of improvement in the metabolic syndrome” (Pet. 13–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 91)) and “[a] pharmaceutical composition for improving and treating a metabolic syndrome, comprising at least one of at least 0.7% damulin A and at least 0.5% damulin B . . . and a pharmacologically acceptable carrier or excipient,” which is found in claim 8, as meaning “a pharmaceutical composition that includes an extract with 0.7% and 0.5% of damulin A and damulin B[, respectively,] along with a carrier or excipient” (id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1002, 64–65, 251–52, 280; Ex. 1001, 12:15–67, Table 2)). Patent Owner argues that “constructions are not necessary.” PO Resp. 11–12. We agree with Patent Owner and determine that it is not necessary for purposes of this Decision to construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only terms” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success . . . all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re Droge, 695 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed.Cir.1988)); Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the expectation of success issue involves a showing of “a reasonable expectation of achieving what is claimed”) (emphasis added). Here, Petitioner relies on Kim 460 to show that heating ginseng, which contains the ginsenosides Rb1, Rb2, Rc, Rd, Rg3, and Rg5, results in a teaches that ginseng with the higher Rg3 and Rg5 content is 50-fold more potent in their vasodilation studies than the non-treated samples. Razmovski teaches that G. pentaphyllum contains over 100 saponins and eight of those saponins are the same as protoparaxadiol-type ginsenosides Rb1, Rc, Rb3, Rd, F2, Rg3, malonyl-Rb1, and malonyl-Rd that are found in P. ginseng. Ex. 1007, 4. Knowing that G. pentaphyllum also contains ginsenosides Rb1, Rb2, Rc, Rd, Rg3, and Rg5, we find Petitioner’s conclusion that heating a G. pentaphyllum extract that contains these ginsenosides would similarly increase the ginsenoside levels of Rg3 and Rg5 is a reasonable inference from the cited references. Based on the teachings in Kim 460, we agree with Petitioner that it would have been reasonable to expect that the same source material, although derived from a different plant, would behave similarly to heat treatment. See Pet. 24. Because G. pentaphyllum is a less expensive starting material, we also agree with Petitioner that there is sufficient motivation to substitute G. pentaphyllum for ginseng in the methods of Kim 460. slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,357,786 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,357,786
• Unified Patents, LLC v. Flexiworld Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 1, 2023 · IPR2022-00775 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 27 and 28 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the petitioner did not establish that Olgaard or Acharya was prior art; the revised contingent motion to amend was dismissed as …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Relying on Dr. Freedman’s testimony, Unified argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) an undergraduate degree in electrical and computing engineering or a closely related field; and (2) two or more years of experience in wireless content transmission,” where “[m]ore relevant experience could compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–38). Flexiworld does not contest Unified’s description of the level of ordinary skill for this proceeding. See PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶ 67). Because Unified’s description is supported by uncontroverted testimonial evidence and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’257 patent, we adopt it for this decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:20–5:35 (“Technical Field” and “Background” sections of the ’257 patent, describing background knowledge relating to wireless content transmission between electronic devices).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Unified argues that “all terms should be given their plain meaning,” and does not propose any explicit constructions. See Pet. 8. In the context of this proceeding, Flexiworld agrees. See PO Resp. 29. We do not find it necessary to explicitly construe any terms to resolve the issues in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “2. Conclusion as to Obviousness For the reasons above, we determine that evidence independent of inventor testimony corroborates (1) a conception date no later than October 22, 2000 and (2) reasonably continuous diligence in reducing the claimed invention to practice until January 19, 2001. Having considered the evidence as a whole under a rule-of-reason analysis, we determine that Unified has not shown that the conception date for the claimed invention was on or after October 24, 2000, or that the inventors did not exercise reasonably continuous diligence during the critical period between October 24, 2000 and January 19, 2001. Unified relies on a priority date of October 24, 2000 for Olgaard and a priority date of December 22, 2000 for Acharya. See Pet. 1–2 & n.2; see also Ex. 1005, code (63); Ex. 1007, codes (22), (43). However, the corroborated conception date for claims 27 and 28 antedates the above priority dates for both Olgaard and Acharya. See supra Section III.C.1. Thus, Unified has not shown that either Olgaard or Acharya is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006). Unified provides no theory of obviousness that does not depend on either Olgaard or Acharya being prior art. See Pet. 2, 8–80.” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “claimed inventions were conceived no later than October 22, 2000, and Unified has not shown to the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence. First, we find credible Mr. Chang’s testimony that Exhibit 2013 and other related drafts, including their filenames and metadata, have not been altered. Ex. 2031 ¶ 1. We regard the metadata as the most reliable indicator of the latest date each draft was completed. Although the filename dates may differ from the metadata dates, these minor differences do not call into question the reliability of the metadata as the last date on which the drafts were modified. Most significantly, the “last modified” date for Exhibit 2013 is October 22, 2000. That the inventors produced at least three other drafts and then filed a provisional application just ten days later on November 1, 2000 further supports a conception date before October 24, 2000. Ex. 2031 ¶ 6; Ex. 2016; Ex. 2040.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 9,836,257 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,836,257

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.