• Allstate Insurance Company v. Atos, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 30, 2026 · IPR2021-01449 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand

  Claims 3–5 are unpatentable; claims 1 and 2 are not shown unpatentable. Claims 3 and 4 are obvious over the applied grounds under the remand construction of “movement vector.”

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “was incorrect, vacated the Final Written Decision as to claims 3 and 4, and remanded the case to the Board to determine the ordinary and customary meaning of “movement vector” and decide the outcome for claims 3 and 4 in accordance with that meaning. Atos, LLC v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2025 WL 1482404, at *5 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2025); Paper 35 (“Federal Circuit Remand,” “Remand,” or “Fed. Cir. Remand”). Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s instructions, the Board authorized the” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “considered individually and together, have well-understood, common meanings to ordinarily skilled artisans as of the invention date, reflected by the ’174 patent’s specification and other evidence of record noted above. Accordingly, we determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of “movement vector” is “a vector indicating movement of an object.” 3) “operation indicator” Petitioner” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Dr. Kanellakopoulos’s explanation that angular momentum is not inherent to an object, and its computation requires an arbitrary choice of a point of origin that has no physical meaning in the context of vehicle motion, also supports Patent Owner’s position. Id. ¶ 71 (citing Ex. 2004, 262). Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument, that angular momentum cannot be used to detect a vehicle turning, is persuasive. Id. We also find persuasive, as Dr. Kanellakopoulos explains, that Petitioner’s argument regarding the figure on Kleppner 234 is based on misinterpretation of the vectors in that figure. Id. ¶ 67 (explaining that Kleppner 233–234 does not depict a gravity vector).” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Kleppner does not disclose a rotation vector, a person of ordinary skill would have used the knowledge of a rotation vector (because it is a term of art) alongside Kleppner’s teaching, to arrive at claim 1. See Pet. Reply 11. This argument does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden to provide articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the conclusion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Petitioner does not explain which teaching of Kleppner a person of ordinary skill would have selected and combined with their knowledge of a rotation vector to yield the method of claim 1, or explain why a person of ordinary skill would have recognized based on Kleppner that estimating the angle between a rotation vector and gravity vector could be used to detect a vehicle turning. Nor does Petitioner respond to Patent Owner’s assertion that Kleppner provides no rationale for estimating an angle of alignment between a rotation vector and gravity vector as a way of detecting a vehicle turning. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 65.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 9,846,174 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,846,174
• Infineon Technologies AG v. Amatech Group LimitedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · IPR2022-00951 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–6, and 8–10 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3 and 11 were not shown unpatentable, and claim 7 was not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification currently before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For purposes of our Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and 1–2 years of experience researching and developing antennas used in RFID applications.” See Pet. 8. In addition, we note that we agree with Patent Owner’s statement that the distinction between the parties’ proposals is not material to any dispute before us and we find that our determinations would be the same under either definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded that Dr. van der Weide’s cited testimony is of a nature that should lead us to give his testimony no weight. We note that Patent Owner did not move to strike or exclude Dr. van der Weide’s testimony. When considering credibility and weight of evidence below, we consider Dr. van der Weide’s testimony as a whole as well as all other evidence of record and accord it the appropriate weight.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “provide an express construction of the full breadth of a claim term. “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms ... that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). As such, we proceed in line with Federal Circuit case law, which “prescribes—deciding only the issues necessary to resolve the dispute before it.” Nichia Corp. v. DSS, Inc., No. 2022-1704, 2023 WL 7211097, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 2, 2023) (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The Federal Circuit has long recognized that “[c]laim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope” and that claim construction may be required in an obviousness context “when the meaning or scope of technical terms and words of art is unclear and in dispute and requires resolution in order to determine obviousness.” U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In order to determine whether Petitioner’s obviousness grounds meet their required burden of proof, we need not expressly state the full scope of this claim term. Thus, we are within our authority to proffer a construction that determines the scope of a claim term in a manner sufficient to determine whether the asserted art teaches the claim. In other words, there may be other ways to meet the disputed limitation, but for the purposes of our Decision, it is proper to expressly determine a claim term’s scope only as much as is required to resolve the disputed issues before us.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “the invention(s), but rather as examples of some of the embodiments.” Id. at 25:65–26:1; see also id. at 6:18–20 (embodiments “should be construed as illustrative rather than limiting”), 5:22–24 (“non-limiting example”). The Federal Circuit has noted that “[e]mbodiments in the specification—even if there is only one embodiment—cannot limit the scope of the claims absent the patentee’s ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’” Apple Inc. v. Wi-LAN Inc., 25 F.4th 960, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Hill- Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). After reviewing the complete record, we see no such manifest exclusion or restriction in the ’240 patent specification. We decline Patent Owner’s request to limit the claims to the described single-frequency embodiments. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. We need not provide further express construction of this claim language for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 9,165,240 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,165,240
• Dexcom, Inc. v. Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2023 · IPR2022-00605 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8–10, and 12–17 are unpatentable over Gravesen and Brister; claims 7, 11, and 18–28 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The person of ordinary skill in the art as of the earliest possible effective filing date (“POSITA”) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Bioengineering, Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or a related subject, and one or more years of experience researching, developing and/or designing insertable medical devices, including, e.g., systems for implanting wearable medical devices such as cannulas, infusion sets, and analyte sensors, or equivalent experience. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a Master’s Degree, and vice versa. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 (Fletcher Decl.) ¶ 22). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. PO Resp. 11 n.1. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “Second, turning to the extrinsic evidence of record, Dr. Fletcher points to a general dictionary definition indicating that a rotor is simply a “rotating member.” Ex. 1003 (Fletcher Decl.) ¶ 81 (citing Ex. 1025 (dictionary excerpts), 1). In contrast, Dr. Cima provides no evidence corroborating his evidence. The language Patent Owner quotes from the Petition comes from a “Dictionary of Mechanical Engineering.” See Pet. 38 n.9 (quoting Ex. 1024, 328). This contradicts Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s proposed construction “has no basis in mechanical engineering.” PO Resp. 19. view that a rotor must rotate on a central axis. He cites a textbook indicating that “[r]otational motion needs to take place around an appropriate axis,” but he does not explain whether or why the “appropriate axis” must necessarily be a “central axis.” Ex. 2024 (Cima Decl.) ¶ 179 (quoting Ex. 2040 (Rotordynamics) 2 (emphasis added)). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “On the full trial record, we again find that Patent Owner’s proposed narrowing is unwarranted. First, the intrinsic record does not support Patent Owner’s required “central” axis. Patent Owner argues that the Specification describes two inserter embodiments as having “rotors,” and those rotors have a central axis. PO Resp. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1001, 29:25–28, 29:55–59, Figs. 32, 45). Patent Owner, however, fails to explain why those embodiments should be understood to limit the claims. For example, in Phillips, the Federal Circuit “expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323; see also SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.”). Second, turning to the extrinsic evidence of record, Dr. Fletcher points to a general dictionary definition indicating that a rotor is simply a “rotating member.” Ex. 1003 (Fletcher Decl.) ¶ 81 (citing Ex. 1025 (dictionary excerpts), 1). In contrast, Dr. Cima provides no evidence corroborating his evidence. The language Patent Owner quotes from the Petition comes from a “Dictionary of Mechanical Engineering.” See Pet. 38 n.9 (quoting Ex. 1024, 328). This contradicts Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s proposed construction “has no basis in mechanical engineering.” PO Resp. 19. view that a rotor must rotate on a central axis. He cites a textbook indicating that “[r]otational motion needs to take place around an appropriate axis,” but he does not explain whether or why the “appropriate axis” must necessarily be a “central axis.” Ex. 2024 (Cima Decl.) ¶ 179 (quoting Ex. 2040 (Rotordynamics) 2 (emphasis added)). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Although the Petition does state that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand the plain and ordinary meaning of a ‘recess’ to include ‘an indentation in a line or surface (as an alcove in a room),’” the Petition does not specify what else is “include[d]” in this term, nor does it specify that the plain and ordinary meaning of “recess” includes the entire interior of a housing. The Petition also does not invoke the Specification as demonstrating that the plain and ordinary meaning of “recess” includes the entire housing.13 Pet. 64 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s belated proposal also conflicts with the language of the claims themselves. Independent claim 1 recites “a rotor disposed within the inserter housing.” Ex. 1001, 43:42. Dependent claim 7 narrows claim 1 by reciting that “the housing comprises a recess in which the rotor is received.” Id. at 44:11–12. If the interior of the inserter housing and the recess could be one and the same as Petitioner proposes, there would be no need for claim 7, because it would not further limit claim 1. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) (“a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed”); see also Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The concept of claim differentiation ‘normally means that limitations stated in dependent claims are not to be read into the independent claim from which they depend.’”) (quoting Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, we decline Petitioner’s belated request to construe “recess” to include “an entire cavity of a housing or a cylinder.” 13 We acknowledge that Petitioner argued that the entire interior of Gravesen’s housing maps to the claimed “recess,” but this was in the context of comparing the prior art to the claim as construed. Indeed, Petitioner asserted that “the space within [Gravesen’s] housing is an alcove.” Pet. 64– 65 (emphasis added). In sum, Petitioner did not timely argue that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “recess” includes an entire cavity of a housing or a cylinder. We adopt the only construction Petitioner offered and supported in the Petition. In view of the above, we construe “recess” as meaning “an indentation in a line or surface (as an alcove in a room).”” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 10,945,649 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,945,649
• Pelican Biothermal, LLC v. Va-Q-Tec AGSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 16, 2023 · PGR2021-00085 · APJ Barry L Grossman · PGR · Final written decision

  The Board granted the motion to amend but held amended claim 64 unpatentable as anticipated by NanoCool 98596-type products and obvious over the cited combinations; all other amended claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

    “VI. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that amended claim 64 is unpatentable; FURTHER ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Non-Contingent Motion to Amend is granted for claims 64 and denied for all other amended claims; and” slip op. at 77

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “A. Status as Prior Art Is a Substantive Issue, Not an Evidentiary Issue. A motion to exclude is not an appropriate mechanism for challenging the sufficiency of evidence, such as whether a reference qualifies as prior art, or the proper weight that should be afforded an argument. See Flir Systems, Inc. v. Leak Surveys, Inc., IPR2014-00411, Paper 113, 4, 8–9 (PTAB September 3, 2015); PTAB Consol. Trial Practice Guide 79 (Nov. 30 Mr. Zumwalt testifies that other NanoCool products, designated by product number 85430 and 98630, also have the same configuration as the 98830 product and are made by the same process. Thus, “the 98830, 85430, and 98630 products can be collectively referred to as ‘98830-type’ products all having the same relevant design.” Ex. 1030 ¶ 17. 2019) (“A motion to exclude . . . may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a particular fact. A motion to exclude is not a vehicle for addressing the weight to be given evidence—arguments regarding weight should appear only in the merits documents.”); Caterpillar Inc. v. Wirtgen Am., Inc., IPR2017-02187, Paper 42,17 (PTAB May 21, 2019) (status as prior art “is a substantive issue, not an evidentiary issue.”) Thus, whether the NanoCool 98830 product is prior art is not the proper basis for Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude evidence concerning the NanoCool 98830 product.” slip op. at 29

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Harber provide any analysis of the factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill, identified above, to support their conclusory statements. We give Mr. Harber’s conclusory testimony minimal probative weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence to which we have been directed of the need for specific education or experience in biological or chemical technologies related to the claimed containers and inserts.” slip op. at 26

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “With regard to the level of ordinary skill in the art, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill would have had “a bachelor’s degree or higher degree in biological, chemical or mechanical engineering, or related sciences, and at least two to five years of experience in designing and testing ISCs [insulated shipping containers] depending on education level.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 23–24). Exhibit 1002 is the Declaration testimony of Mr. Paul Haber. Mr. Harber actually states a slightly different level of ordinary skill. Mr. Harber testifies: The hypothetical POSITA would have: (i) at least a bachelor’s degree in biological, chemical or mechanical engineering, or related sciences, and have at least three to five years of experience in designing and testing ISCs [Insulated Shipping Containers][29]. Such a person may also have (ii) a higher level degree, such as a PhD and/or Master’s degree in engineering, or related sciences, and have at least two to three years of experience in designing and testing ISCs. 29 See Ex. 1002 ¶ 23. Ex. 1002 ¶ 24 (emphasis added). Mr. Harber also testifies that “[t]hese descriptions are approximate, and a higher level of education or specific skill might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,766,685 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,766,685
• PNC Bank N.A. v. United Services Automobile AssociationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 10, 2023 · IPR2022-00076 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 8–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2–7 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner did not establish motivation to combine for their error-processing limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent field” and “two years of prior experience with image capturing/scanning technology, involving transferring and processing of image data to and at a server.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 45). Petitioner further asserts that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education and vice versa.” Id. For purposes of the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal (Inst. Dec. 16), and neither party alleges that a different level of ordinary skill should be applied in this proceeding (see PO Resp. 5; Pet. Reply). In this Decision, we again adopt the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner. We are satisfied that it generally comports with the level of and the asserted prior art. Accord Inst. Dec. 15–16.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “In the Petition, Petitioner states that it is unnecessary to construe any claim terms or phrases (Pet. 12–14), but for two phrases in claim 1, Petitioner specifically argues that the prior art teaches or suggests the phrase under each of two alternate meanings (id. at 34–35, 37). In the Institution Decision, we agreed with Petitioner’s primary understanding of these phrases and, as a result, did not reach the alternative contentions. Inst. Dec. 33 n.18, 38 n.21. At trial, Patent Owner states that claim construction is unnecessary to resolve the issues disputed in this proceeding. PO Resp. 6; Tr. 46:4–16. Petitioner agrees, but contends that Patent Owner’s arguments regarding dependent claim 3 are premised on a narrowing construction of one of its terms. Tr. 15:4–16:2. Patent Owner contends that the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms in that claim should apply. Id. at 46:12–16. We agree that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms or phrases in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “motivated to add error processing to Garcia’s mobile phone so that it could address errors before transmitting the check image in order “to avoid wasting communications resources and adding delays.” Pet. 42. But, Petitioner does not support this rationale with a persuasive explanation or evidence. Indeed, we assume that Petitioner’s theory is that the error checking at the mobile device would have conserved bandwidth and reduced delay because it would have allowed the mobile device to identify some unsuitable images before they were sent to the payee bank; however, the Petition does not actually include an explanation to this effect. Rather, it simply states that an ordinary artisan would have known that mobile telephone networks (such as that used by Garcia) “are bandwidth and resource-constrained, and that communications over such networks takes time.” Id.; see also Ex. 1002 ¶ 115. However, all networks have bandwidth and resource constraints, and all communications take time, and neither the Petition nor Dr. Mowry explain why these considerations would have been relevant to an ordinary artisan implementing Garcia. Indeed, the Petition next asserts that “Byrne provides the requisite solution to this problem” (Pet. 42), but neither the Petition nor Dr. Mowry identify any problem. For example, Dr. Mowry does not testify that an ordinary artisan would have expected Garcia’s system to consume excessive bandwidth or incur for claim 2). In addition, Petitioner recognizes that the verification process is performed by the payee bank in Garcia, yet does not address the fact that its proposal would apparently shift a portion of the verification process to the mobile phone. See Pet. 40–44. Dr. Mowry’s trial testimony casts further doubt on Petitioner’s rationale for this claim. Dr. Mowry testifies that conserving bandwidth would “potentially” have been one of the goals of an ordinary artisan “depend[ing] on how precious their resource is.” Ex. 2020, 68:12–24. But Dr. Mowry “wouldn’t necessarily characterize [Garcia] as bandwidth intensive.” Id. at 76:13–23. In addition, he disagreed that “in the Garcia system, the motivation would have been to shift it to the client side for the verification,” noting simply that “[t]here are tradeoffs” associated with doing the verification processing on either the client or the server. Id. at 241:22– 242:13. Petitioner attempts to limit the impact of Dr. Mowry’s answers (Pet. Reply 16); however, the fact remains that Petitioner has the burden of proof, and it does not identify persuasive evidence to support its contention. Petitioner’s Reply asserts that these considerations were “particularly important in 2006, when 3G bandwidth was at a premium” (id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶ 49)), but neither Petitioner nor Dr. Mowry provide analysis or evidence to support this conclusory assertion. Moreover, the Petition also fails to address whether the proposed combination would have, in fact, conserved communications resources or reduced delays. In Petitioner’s proposed combination, Byrne’s thin client application would be downloaded to Garcia’s mobile phone at each use (which would require communication resources and incur latency), but the Petition fails to address whether the net result of the proposed combination 148:1 (Dr. Mowry agreeing that the impact of downloading the thin client is not discussed in his report). Moreover, Garcia touts the “speed” of its process, stating that its “immediate processing . . . allows the immediate availability in the user’s account” (Ex. 1003, 7:18–8:3), which indicates that an ordinary artisan would not have perceived a problematic delay in Garcia’s system. Petitioner’s attempt to shift the burden to Patent Owner to determine whether or not its purported benefits would be realized (see Pet. Reply 17) is unavailing. In its Reply, Petitioner cites testimony from Dr. Mowry (see Ex. 1029 ¶ 37), but it simply compares the size of a compressed image with the size of a “large” application. This evidence does not outweigh the other evidence above, and it was submitted too late to remedy the Petition. See supra § II.A.; see also Trial Practice Guide 73 (explaining that a petitioner “may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability”). Finally, on this record, we are also not persuaded by Petitioner’s” slip op. at 60

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “would have been motivated to implement Garcia’s application by downloading, onto the mobile device, a thin client application, as disclosed by Byrne. See Pet. 19–25. Byrne touts the benefits of downloading a thin client rather than storing an application on a user’s device (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 45– 46; see also id. ¶¶ 47–48), and Dr. Mowry testifies that an ordinary artisan would have understood downloading a thin client to be a well-known way of distributing software in the relevant time period and suited for mobile devices (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 64–65, 70). In addition, Dr. Mowry testifies that a thin client improves security and ease of software maintenance. Id. ¶ 65 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 46–47); see also Ex. 1033, 140:11–141:2 (Dr. Creusere agreeing that thin clients “dramatically simplif[y]” software maintenance), 143:13–20 (agreeing that security is important for financial data); Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20–21 (evidence that the general background knowledge in the art identifies security as a concern for remote check deposit).14 In addition, we agree with Petitioner (see Pet. 21–22; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 66, 72) that an ordinary artisan would have understood such an implementation to apply a known 14 Patent Owner’s argument that security and software maintenance would have instead weighed against the proposed combination (see, e.g., PO Sur-reply 9–10) is untimely because it was not advanced in the Response and is not fairly responsive to the Reply. See supra § II.A; Pet. Reply 15–16 (noting that the Response had not addressed these issues). Moreover, even if this argument had been properly raised, it would not be persuasive because Patent Owner does not identify persuasive evidence to support its position. See, e.g., Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Attorney argument is not evidence.”). (Garcia’s mobile phone) with predictable results. We are also persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement Garcia’s application such that the application provides a user-interface and controls the image capture device, as disclosed by Byrne. See, e.g., Pet. 22–23. Garcia suggests that the application should perform these functions (see Ex. 1003, 5:1–6:10, 9:19– 10:18), and we credit Dr. Mowry’s testimony that an ordinary artisan would find this desirable (see Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 65, 67). Moreover, the references lend themselves to the combination because Garcia and Byrne both describe remotely depositing a check via the Internet using software on a user’s device that opens an interactive session, and both perform substantially similar steps. See Pet. 22–23; Ex. 1003, 9:21–10:3, 10:10–18, 11:7–15; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 41, 48, 174–175, 177–178. Finally, Dr. Mowry testifies that the ordinary artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in implementing the combination, and he provides supporting analysis and evidence. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 68–72; see also Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 38–39. We credit this testimony from Dr. Mowry because it draws reasonable inferences and is supported by the cited evidence.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,769,598 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,769,598
• Netflix, Inc. v. Avago Technologies International Sales Pte. LimitedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 22, 2023 · IPR2021-01343 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14–16, and 18–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Baldwin; claims 6, 8, 11, and 17 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have been a person with a “bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in digital video signal processing or digital video streaming or had a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in digital video signal processing.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–39). Petitioner also states that a person of ordinary skill would have been able to, among other things, encode and decode digital video signals, packetize, multiplex, and demultiplex encoded digital video signals for transmission, and implement modulation and channel coding. Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 40). Patent Owner states that a person of ordinary skill would have had “a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a similar discipline, with one or two years of experience in this or a related field.” PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2014 ¶ 20). Patent Owner states that its definition of a person of ordinary skill is similar to Petitioner’s definition and that any differences are not material. PO Resp. 13. We determine a person of ordinary skill would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field and two years of experience in digital video signal processing or digital video streaming, which is consistent with the parties’ arguments, the ’014 patent, and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “video information” Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill would have understood that “video information” means “digital video data.” Pet. 16. Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s proposed construction and contends “video information” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner also states that the construction of “video information” is immaterial to this proceeding. PO Resp. 13. We do not discern a meaningful dispute between the parties regarding the meaning of “video information,” and we do not expressly interpret the term. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe only those terms that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”) (internal quotation omitted).” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Among other problems with these arguments, it is not clear how or where Petitioner relies on the proposed combination to satisfy any specific claim limitations. Petitioner argues each of Cooper and Baldwin teaches each limitation of each independent claim, and Petitioner presents its combination of references separate from its comparisons of Cooper and Baldwin to the claims, without clearly stating how the references are to be combined or how those combined teachings satisfy particular limitations. Because Petitioner fails to identify its proposed combination with sufficient clarity, we are also not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Cooper and Baldwin to yield the subject matter recited by the challenged claims. We also disagree with Petitioner’s argument that Realtime Data suggests that Petitioner does not need to show a motivation to combine. Reply 27–29 (citing Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1373–74). Unlike here, in Realtime Data, the secondary reference was cited for the “sole purpose” of confirming that an element was disclosed in the primary reference. Id. In this case, Petitioner proposes combining some teachings from each of Baldwin and Cooper. See Pet. 19–20; Reply 27. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not articulated an adequate rationale to combine the references to arrive at any particular challenged claim.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Patent Owner contends, and we agree, that Cooper does not teach that its receiver identifies which of two streams is expected to result in a lower latency, as required by limitation [1d]. PO Resp. 36–52. Where Cooper describes receiving a multiplexed composite signal, Cooper teaches always identifying the normal mode packet stream for decoding when it is available, without regard to latency, and identifying the robust mode packet stream for decoding only when the normal mode packet stream is not available, such as when normal mode packets are lost. E.g., Ex. 1004, 7:8–8:28. In fact, it would be inconsistent with Cooper’s teachings for the receiver to select the robust mode packet stream when the normal mode packet stream is available: Cooper teaches that “[u]nder normal conditions, the error signal is not active on the error signal line E. In response, the selector 230 couples the normal mode packet stream to the multi-standard decoder 240, and the multi-standard decoder 240 begins to generate the content representative signal from the normal mode packets . . . .” Ex. 1004, 7:32–37 (emphasis added). Although Cooper also teaches that its receiver can decode the robust mode packet stream to avoid “undue delay” “at the beginning of any broadcast or channel change,” we find that Cooper does so only when the normal mode packet stream is not available. Ex. 1004, 17:23–45; see also Ex. 1004, 3:1–3. Specifically, Cooper states that “at the beginning of any broadcast or channel change,” there is a period of time (i.e., Tadv ) when the receiver’s delay device 220 is being filled. Ex. 1004, 17:23–26 (emphasis added). Cooper explains that waiting until delay device 220 is full would cause “undue delay when a receiver is switched on or a channel is changed.” Ex. 1004, 17:26–30. To address this delay, Cooper’s receiver decodes the robust mode packet stream, which “is immediately available,” so that a video signal can be presented until “the normal mode packet stream becomes available,” at which point the receiver switches to decoding the normal mode packet stream. Ex. 1004, 17:30–42. Consequently, we find that Cooper teaches that, at a channel change, its receiver receives (and decodes) the robust mode packet stream until it receives the normal mode packet stream. We disagree with Petitioner’s contrary argument that Cooper’s receiver receives both streams in this situation (see Reply 4–16), and, at a minimum, Petitioner has not persuasively shown that Cooper teaches or suggests this (see Ex. 2015, 82:22–85:13 (describing different scenarios but acknowledging that “Cooper doesn’t really illuminate either of these”)). Further, Cooper’s description of Figure 3 is consistent with our understanding of Cooper description of a channel change. Specifically, that portion of Cooper states: Time t0 may represent the time when the receiver is turned on, or when a user specifies a new content source to receive. During the time, Tadv, between t0 and t4, robust mode packets “a” to “j” are loaded into the delay device 220, and normal mode packets, designated “0” through “9” are received. At time t4, the normal mode packet “A” becomes available from the demultiplexer 210 and delayed robust mode packet “a” becomes available from the delay device 220. Under normal conditions, . . . the selector 230 couples the normal mode packet stream to the multi-standard decoder 240, and the multi-standard decoder 240 begins to generate the content representative signal from the normal mode packets, as described above. This is illustrated by the cross hatching 301 in the normal mode packets “A” through “G”. Ex. 1004, 7:24–39. Cooper includes this description in order to explain its typical operation as well as to illustrate the relative timing of the robust mode packet stream and the normal mode packet stream. See Ex. 1004, 7:24–25, 7:40–8:28. This passage teaches that normal mode packets designated with capital letters (e.g., “A”) are displayed after time t4 under normal conditions; however, it does not address which (if any) packets are displayed between time t0 and time t4. As a result, we understand this passage of Cooper to indicate that “0” to “9” are simply placeholders, which” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 8,646,014 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,646,014
• Allstate Insurance Company v. Atos, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2021-01209 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, and 9–25 are unpatentable; claims 5, 7, and 8 are not shown unpatentable, based on anticipation by Kim and obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “C. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, we interpret claims under the same standard” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Accordingly, Petitioner fails to establish that Kim discloses “determining that the individual is a driver of the vehicle based at least in part on acceleration, forces, velocity, the at least one location point, and time.”” slip op. at 46

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “nexus and therefore fails to establish that any alleged evidence of objective indicia supports a finding of non-obviousness. Accordingly, we give Patent Owner’s reliance on objective indicia of non-obviousness no weight in our obviousness analysis.” slip op. at 65

  Patent outcomesUS 9,152,609 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,152,609
• Cloudflare, Inc. / Splunk Inc. v. Sable Networks, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 18, 2022 · IPR2022-00228 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 9–13, 19–24, 29–33, and 39–44 are unpatentable under §103; claims 17, 18, 37, and 38 are not shown unpatentable over Yung alone.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner asserts that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to “an undergraduate degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer science, or comparable subject” and “3–5 years of academic or industry experience in computer networking or comparable industry experience.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 27). In the Institution Decision, we adopted this articulation of the level of ordinary skill. Inst. Dec. 15. At trial, neither party disputed our preliminary finding. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply. We remain persuaded that this articulation of the level of skill in the art is supported by the ’593 patent, the asserted prior art, and Dr. Jeffay’s testimony. See Inst. Dec. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 27). Accordingly, we determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to an undergraduate degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer science, or comparable subject and 3–5 years of academic or industry experience in computer networking or comparable industry experience.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. Means-plus-function limitations Petitioner contends the challenged claims include means-plus-function limitations that should be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, and for each, Petitioner identifies a construction for use in this proceeding. Pet. 11– 14.12 Petitioner submits that no other terms require construction for purposes of this proceeding. Id. at 12. In the Institution Decision, we agreed with Petitioner that the identified limitations are means-plus-function limitations. Inst. Dec. 16 (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”)). We also stated that we were persuaded that Petitioner had correctly identified the recited functions and the components in the Specification that perform those functions. Id. at 16– 17. As a result, we preliminarily adopted the following constructions: Limitation” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Instead, Patent Owner points to the Specification, but this also fails to support Patent Owner’s contention. Although claims are read in view of the Specification (Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315), they are not limited to the embodiments disclosed in it (id. at 1323). Patent Owner identifies (and we perceive) no passage in the Specification that could be read as redefining this claim phrase or disavowing part of its scope. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In fact, the passages cited by Patent Owner are directed to the handling of a single flow, and none expressly indicates that an identical method must be used for each flow processed. See Ex. 1001, 6:25–31, 7:51–52, 8:12–17. Thus, we determine that the Specification does not justify importing the limitation proposed by Patent Owner into the claims. Accordingly, having reviewed the intrinsic record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that claims 9 and 29 require computing a badness factor for each flow or all flows; rather, this claim limitation may be satisfied by computing a badness factor for a single flow.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “3. Other constructions The parties do not propose constructions for any other terms or phrases. See Pet. 11–14; PO Resp. Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions for any other terms or phrases. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 8,243,593 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,243,593
• Cloudflare, Inc. / Splunk Inc. v. Sable Networks, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 18, 2022 · IPR2021-00909 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 9–13, 19–24, 29–33, and 39–44 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 17, 18, 37, and 38 were not shown unpatentable over Yung.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to “an undergraduate degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer science, or comparable subject” and “3–5 years of academic or industry experience in computer networking or comparable industry experience.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 27). In the Institution Decision, we adopted this articulation of the level of ordinary skill. Inst. Dec. 15. At trial, neither party disputed our preliminary finding. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply. We remain persuaded that this articulation of the level of skill in the art is supported by the ’593 patent, the asserted prior art, and Dr. Jeffay’s testimony. See Inst. Dec. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 27). Accordingly, we determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to an undergraduate degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer science, or comparable subject and 3–5 years of academic or industry experience in computer networking or comparable industry experience.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “1. Means-plus-function limitations Petitioner contends the challenged claims include means-plus-function limitations that should be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, and for each, Petitioner identifies a construction for use in this proceeding. Pet. 11– 14.12 Petitioner submits that no other terms require construction for purposes of this proceeding. Id. at 12. In the Institution Decision, we agreed with Petitioner that the identified limitations are means-plus-function limitations. Inst. Dec. 16 (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”)). We also stated that we were persuaded that Petitioner had correctly identified the recited functions and the components in the Specification that perform those functions. Id. at 16– 17. As a result, we preliminarily adopted the following constructions: Limitation” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for patent owner

    “In particular, claim 9 recites a method for processing a flow that includes computing a badness factor for the flow. Ex. 1001, 11:63–8. Patent Owner identifies (and we perceive) no limitation that requires a badness factor to be computed for each flow. Inst. Dec. 44 (addressing substantially similar argument presented in preliminary response); see also Ex. 1001, 13:32–44 (claim 29). During trial, Patent Owner neither responds to this analysis nor points to a claim limitation that allegedly includes this requirement. Instead, Patent Owner points to the Specification, but this also fails to support Patent Owner’s contention. Although claims are read in view of the Specification (Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315), they are not limited to the embodiments disclosed in it (id. at 1323). Patent Owner identifies (and we perceive) no passage in the Specification that could be read as redefining this claim phrase or disavowing part of its scope. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In fact, the passages cited by Patent Owner are directed to the handling of a single flow, and none expressly indicates that an identical method must be used for each flow processed. See Ex. 1001, 6:25–31, 7:51–52, 8:12–17. Thus, we determine that the Specification does not justify importing the limitation proposed by Patent Owner into the claims. Accordingly, having reviewed the intrinsic record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that claims 9 and 29 require computing a badness factor for each flow or all flows; rather, this claim limitation may be satisfied by computing a badness factor for a single flow.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Having considered the parties’ arguments and evidence, we are persuaded that Copeland discloses this limitation. Copeland analyzes a flow’s statistics (including start time, end time, number of bytes, and number of packets) “to determine if the flow appears to be legitimate traffic or possible suspicious activity” and computes a concern index for the flow if it appears suspicious. E.g., Ex. 1007, 3:31–35, 7:38–67, 16:36–17:5. We find that Copeland’s concern index qualifies as a “badness factor for the flow . . . [that] provides an indication of whether the flow is exhibiting undesirable behavior,” as required by claim 9. E.g., Ex. 1007, 3:31–40, 4:30–33, Fig. 1 (identifying “‘bad’ flow(s)”). As Dr. Jeffay explains, an ordinary artisan would have understood that suspicious activity (such as a probe or network attack) is undesirable behavior. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 211–212. We also find that Copeland teaches computing a concern index “based at least partially upon the set of behavioral statistics” because, for example, it uses the number of packets to compute the concern index. Ex. 1007, 7:64–67, Fig. 6 (setting concern index to number of packets); see also Ex. 1003 ¶ 213.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,243,593 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,243,593
• NXP B.V. / NXP USA, Inc. et al. v. Bell Semiconductor, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 6, 2022 · IPR2021-00967 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 7, and 9–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have possessed “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field as well as at least four years of experience in high-frequency circuit engineering and development.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27). For purposes of the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal (Inst. Dec. 17–18), and neither party addresses the level of ordinary skill in the post-institution briefs (see generally PO Resp.; Reply; Sur-reply). In this Decision, we again adopt the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner. This level of skill is consistent with the Specification of the ’269 patent and the asserted prior art, and it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Choi. Accord Inst. Dec. 17–18.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “on an integrated circuit package substrate for connecting with a printed circuit board.” PO Resp. 9–12; Sur-reply 1–2. Petitioner disagrees. Reply 6. But, because we find that Petitioner has shown that Chin suggests implementing its invention in an IC9 package substrate as Patent Owner’s proposed construction would require (infra § III.D.2.), we need not resolve this dispute. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). However, if we needed to substantively address this dispute, we would reject Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Patent Owner advocates limiting the scope of this claim term to include only the contact pads in a particular location (i.e., the PCB-side of the IC package substrate),10 but the intrinsic record does not support importing such a limitation into the claim. Patent Owner identifies (and we perceive) no passage in the intrinsic record that redefines the term “contact pads” or disavows part of its scope. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that a term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning unless a patentee acted as his own lexicographer or disavowed claim scope). Rather, Patent Owner’s argument is that the term should be limited because the Specification only discusses “contact pads” in that location and does not apply its invention to other pads” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s ultimate assertion that the plain language of the claim is informative of its proper meaning, such that “vias connecting the contact pads with one of the electrically conductive layers” means that vias are used to connect the recited contact pads with an electrically conductive layer. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. After considering the parties’ arguments, we determine that no other claim terms require an express construction. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “we agree with Petitioner that Chin explains that its “concepts apply equally to an integrated circuit package substrate.” Pet. 22. In particular, we find that Chin discloses an IC package substrate. See Ex. 1004, 1:61–62 (referring to “a substrate used inside a BGA package”); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28–30 (Dr. Choi explaining that a BGA is a type of IC package). We credit Dr. Choi’s testimony on this point because it is logical and supported by cited evidence. See, e.g., Ex. 1014, 45;12 Ex. 1016, 5–7. We are also persuaded that Chin expressly suggests implementing its invention in an IC package substrate. Chin begins its description by stating that “[t]he present invention relates generally to the design and fabrication of printed circuits and multi-layered substrates.” Ex. 1004, 1:7–8 (emphasis added). Chin also states that its invention “is illustrated by way of example, and not by way of limitation,” in its figures. Ex. 1004, 3:26–27. Similarly, Chin’s final paragraph states that alternative implementations “will be apparent to those skilled in the art,” and it states that “semiconductor implementations . . . are contemplated as within the scope of the present invention” as they use “similar layered printed circuit routing techniques.” Ex. 1004, 5:54–6:10. Moreover, as background for its invention, Chin addresses problems encountered as signal speed increases and explains that “excess parasitics that limit the bandwidth” are caused by an impedance mismatch between landing pads and their associated interconnect conductors. Ex. 1004, 1:35–56. Chin then states: One example is the use of a ball-grid-array (BGA) package in a multi-gigahertz printed circuit board. The landing pads of current state of the art BGAs are typically 25–30 mils in 12 Unless otherwise noted, our citations refer to page numbers added to an exhibit by Petitioner or Patent Owner rather than the document’s native page numbers. diameter, which is significantly larger than the typically 5 mil microstrips used in interconnecting conductors. Another example is a substrate used inside a BGA package. Typical solder ball landing pad sizes for current technology BGA substrates are on the order of 20–25 mil, significantly larger than the typically 3 mil traces used in microstrip interconnects. Ex. 1004, 1:56–65 (emphasis added). Accordingly, given the context provided by Chin (see Ex. 1004, 1:7–8, 5:54–6:10), we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood this passage (see Ex. 1004, 1:61–65) to suggest applying Chin’s disclosure to an IC package substrate. Accord Inst. Dec. 23–24.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,288,269 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,288,269

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.