• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00914 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’679 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Petition relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard. Pet. 12–13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). The Petition also addresses the construction of “peer-to-peer architecture” recited in independent claim 1 of the ’679 patent, a limitation we need not construe to resolve the parties’ dispute in this proceeding. Id. at 13; see, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Owner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard without further analysis. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “RS6000 with Menon, namely because RS6000 provides an overview of the IBM SP2 multiprocessor and Menon teaches the use of “IBM SP2, a modern high performance distributed memory multiprocessor” used in the MultiMATLAB system. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 142–145; Ex. 1005, 5–6, 14; Ex. 1007, 1, 11). The Petition also explains why POEref pertains to the field of cluster computing in a parallel operating environment. Id. at 26 (citing Ex.1008, 11 (“PE Software is designed to run on an … RS/6000 network cluster”)); (further citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–149). The Petition contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of POEref with Menon “because Menon suggests the combination by teaching that MultiMATLAB uses ‘POE, IBM's Parallel Operating Environment.’” Id. at 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005, 6); (further citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–153; Ex. 1005, 14; Ex. 1008, 11, 46). We agree with Petitioner’s analysis. We find the Petition’s argument and evidence of a motivation to combine the asserted prior art references in the manner claimed to be compelling, persuasive, consistent with the disclosures in the references, which include internal cross-references to each other, and supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Bajaj.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner argues that Menon teaches away from a combination with Trefethen because “Menon expressly states that Trefethen’s first-generation architecture is inadequate for the objectives that motivated the newer design.” Resp. 35–37. The evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position. First, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is inconsistent with the strong evidence of a motivation to combine Menon and Trefethen discussed above. Second, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is contrary to the evidence of record for the reasons given in Petitioner’s Reply. Reply 13–15 (e.g., “Menon explicitly cites Trefethen and explains that Menon builds on the teachings of Trefethen.”) (citing Pet. 22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, 1–3; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 47–53). We are further persuaded by Dr. Bajaj’s reply testimony: the “MultiMATLAB teachings in Trefethen. In fact, Menon describes enhancing the system of Trefethen. For example, Menon describes a list of “goals” already achieved by MultiMATLAB and then states that the architecture has been “redesigned to achieve two further goals.” One of these two “further goals” is “extensibility,” which Menon achieves by its description of adding “MEX routines” to the system of Trefethen. Far from showing an “incompatibility” between Menon and Trefethen as the POR argues, Menon’s addition of the “MEX routines” to MultiMATLAB shows that such a modification was within the capabilities of a POSITA, because the authors of the Menon paper actually implemented the modification. Ex. 1163 ¶ 49 (citing Ex. 1005, 1–3). Dr. Bajaj’s testimony is unrebutted, credible, and supported by the record. We agree with Dr. Bajaj’s reasoning, which is based on direct quotes in Menon. We further agree with Dr. Bajaj’s conclusion that Menon does not teach away from the combination with Trefethen. Id. ¶¶ 50–52. Menon’s description of building on and enhancing the teachings of Trefethen—the earlier work of the same research group at Cornell—by adding MEX routines to achieve high-performance parallel computing and extensibility for MATLAB, demonstrates a classic motivation for a POSITA to combine the teachings of Menon and Trefethen. RS6000 and POEref are specifically referenced in Menon-Trefethen and add operational details of the parallel operating platform that teach a POSITA how to implement the MultiMATLAB system with a reasonable expectation of success. Such facts are inconsistent with Patent Owner’s teaching away and lack of motivation arguments.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 12,021,679 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,021,679
• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00913 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable: claims 1–25, 27–28, and 30 as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref; claims 26 and 29 over those references plus MPIref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’034 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “processor,” “multi-core” processor, or “singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’” as Patent Owner contends. Resp. 11–12, 21; see also Ex. 1163 ¶ 22 (“The claim does not recite ‘single chip,’ ‘single package,’ ‘single die,’ or ‘single multi-core microprocessor.’”). Nor do the claims recite a plurality of processing cores “within” a single-chip package or read as “multi-core within a processor” as argued by Patent Owner. Resp. 12–14; Sur-Reply 2; see Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1163 ¶ 23 (“Thus, the phrase ‘with a plurality of processing cores’ identifies the required processing resources associated with the hardware processor; it does not import a packaging limitation.”)). The claims do recite a hardware processor “with” a plurality of processing cores; a critical distinction even Patent Owner reads as open-ended, i.e., as a hardware processor that “comprises” a plurality of processing cores. See Resp. 11 (“the claims require a singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’”). Consequently, the claim language does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” as a single multi-core processor. cores it contains” in reliance on a parsed description in the ’034 patent specification: The specification explains: “Each processor can contain one or more processor cores that are capable of single-threaded execution. Processor cores are generally independent microprocessors, but more than one can be included in a single-chip package.” Id. at 1212 (partially quoting Ex. 1001, 5:11–16); Sur-Reply 2. The quoted description does not support Patent Owner’s contention that the claimed “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” must be limited to a “single multi-core processor” that “locates multiple cores within a ‘single-chip package,’” i.e. limited to a single multi-core microprocessor such as “a Core 2 Duo is one processor package with two cores.” Resp. 12– 13, 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:15–25). The description quoted above from column 5, moreover, describes a “processor” that “can contain one or more processor cores” each of which can be an independent microprocessor. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:11–16; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 10–14). As Petitioner emphasizes, the specification distinguishes a “processor” from a “microprocessor” and describes a “processor” that “can be one or more general purpose single-core or multi-core microprocessors,” rather than limiting a “processor” to a single multi-core microprocessor. Reply 3–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:14–36, Fig. 1; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 15–18).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “art because they pertain to the same “field of cluster computing” as the ’034 patent and “are reasonably pertinent to the problem of the ’034 patent, namely, executing a single program on multiple nodes.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 65–69; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract). The Petition emphasizes that Menon expressly cites and builds on the MultiMATLAB system taught by Trefethen. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–2). The Petition contends that: combination of prior art elements according to known methods (executing MATLAB code on a multiprocessor system) to yield the predictable result discussed in both papers: the MultiMATLAB system executing MATLAB in parallel to perform mathematical calculations. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, Abstract; Ex. 1006, 2–7). The Petition further contends that a POSITA would have found it predictable to combine Trefethen with Menon with a reasonable expectation of success “because researchers had a strong desire to parallelize MATLAB.” Id. at 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 73; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, 11–12.)” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “A POSITA would have had an especially strong reason to read these references together because they address the same project, the same MATLAB-based parallel-computing problem, and the same MultiMATLAB command environment. Menon expressly identifies Trefethen’s MultiMATLAB work and then describes a redesigned architecture that preserves the same user-level objective––parallel MATLAB computations—while improving implementation details and extensibility. A POSITA therefore would not view the references as mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, a POSITA would understand Trefethen as teaching specific MultiMATLAB commands and examples, including Eval, Send, Recv, and the architecture was implemented and improved in a later version. Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 71–72 (emphases added). We find the above reasoning persuasive and adopt it as our own. Petitioner and Dr. Bajaj demonstrate a sound technical motivation for a POSITA—someone having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of cluster computing or parallel processing—to combine Menon and Trefethen: to improve MATLAB’s operational performance and extensibility in a parallel operating environment. Menon builds on Trefethen to improve and extend the parallel processing capabilities of MultiMATLAB: “This system will enable users to access high-performance parallel routines from within the MATLAB environment, to extend the environment with new parallel routines, and to use these routines to develop parallel applications with the MATLAB language.” Ex. 1005 Abstract. Menon is intended to be read in conjunction with Trefethen, as would be expected from two references generated by the same research group at the same university addressed to the same technical subject matter about a year apart. Ex. 1005, 1; Ex. 1006, Ex. 1086 ¶¶ 65, 101, 102. The very first citation in Menon is to Trefethen. Ex. 1005, 2, 16.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,570,034 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,570,034
• Qualcomm Incorporated v. Cobblestone Wireless, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01336 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–9, 24, and 25 are unpatentable; claims 10, 13, 14, 17, and 21–23 were not shown unpatentable, principally due to missing limitations or insufficient motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “information” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning as “data,” and that Patent Owner’s narrower construction of “first information” and “second information” lacks sufficient support in the intrinsic record. We agree with Petitioner that the ’802 patent Specification defines “information” as data when it uses the phrase “information (i.e., data).” See Ex. 1001, 5:60–62 (“Information (i.e., data) to be transmitted may be received in a baseband digital system 250, such as a wireless digital baseband processor.” (emphasis added)), 11:30–32 (“In this example, the signals 911 and 912 carry the same information (data).” (emphasis added)). As the Federal Circuit has explained, a “specification’s use of ‘i.e.’ signals an intent to define the word to which it refers.” Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “argument based on Fernandez alone, we find that Petitioner has not provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to support a motivation to remove the amplification from each of Fernandez’s signal generators 10A-10E and add a single power amplifier instead. See Pet. 76–77 Ex. 1003 ¶ 235. Petitioner’s only rationale for this modification to Fernandez is that “[a] single amplifier has several advantages compared to multiple amplifiers, including lower complexity, a single (vs. multiple) potential point of failure, and lower cost,” and that one of ordinary skill “would have found a single amplifier to be a simple matter of design preference.” Pet. 76–77. Dr. Almeroth simply repeats these cursory allegations without providing any further explanation or evidentiary support. Ex. 1003 ¶ 235. Moreover, Dr. Cooklev provides credible testimony that replacing Fernandez’s amplification in signal generators 10A–10E with a single amplifier would not necessarily have the advantages that Petitioner suggests. See Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 99, 104–105. For example, Dr. Cooklev testifies that a single amplifier would need to have a wider bandwidth than the multiple amplifiers used in Fernandez, which could cause potential stability issues. Id. ¶ 105. According to Dr. Cooklev, this wider bandwidth would require more circuit elements, and thus would not provide the reduction in space usage and power consumption that Petitioner asserts. Id. According to Dr. Cooklev, Montojo also points to several “substantial, and potentially impractical, drawbacks” of using a single amplifier for multiple signal generators, including power constraints imposed by spectral emission requirements and on-board battery capacity. Id. ¶ 104 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 7– 8). In light of this testimony, which we find credible, Petitioner has failed to provide sufficient explanation or evidence to support its assertion that one of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to replace the multiple amplifiers in Fernandez’s signal generators with a single amplifier.” slip op. at 65

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “argument based on Fernandez alone, we find that Petitioner has not provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to support a motivation to remove the amplification from each of Fernandez’s signal generators 10A-10E and add a single power amplifier instead. See Pet. 76–77 Ex. 1003 ¶ 235. Petitioner’s only rationale for this modification to Fernandez is that “[a] single amplifier has several advantages compared to multiple amplifiers, including lower complexity, a single (vs. multiple) potential point of failure, and lower cost,” and that one of ordinary skill “would have found a single amplifier to be a simple matter of design preference.” Pet. 76–77. Dr. Almeroth simply repeats these cursory allegations without providing any further explanation or evidentiary support. Ex. 1003 ¶ 235. Moreover, Dr. Cooklev provides credible testimony that replacing Fernandez’s amplification in signal generators 10A–10E with a single amplifier would not necessarily have the advantages that Petitioner suggests. See Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 99, 104–105. For example, Dr. Cooklev testifies that a single amplifier would need to have a wider bandwidth than the multiple amplifiers used in Fernandez, which could cause potential stability issues. Id. ¶ 105. According to Dr. Cooklev, this wider bandwidth would require more circuit elements, and thus would not provide the reduction in space usage and power consumption that Petitioner asserts. Id. According to Dr. Cooklev, Montojo also points to several “substantial, and potentially impractical, drawbacks” of using a single amplifier for multiple signal generators, including power constraints imposed by spectral emission requirements and on-board battery capacity. Id. ¶ 104 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 7– 8). In light of this testimony, which we find credible, Petitioner has failed to provide sufficient explanation or evidence to support its assertion that one of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to replace the multiple amplifiers in Fernandez’s signal generators with a single amplifier.” slip op. at 65

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “We find credible and agree with Dr. Cooklev’s testimony that the predistortion signals from tables 17-1 and 17-2 “are cancelled out by Suzuki’s amplifier” 28. Ex. 2013 ¶ 50. Dr. Cooklev supports his opinion by referring to paragraph 1 of Suzuki, which states that Suzuki’s invention is directed to “a multi-band lookup table type predistorter” (such as the one implemented using lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 in Figure 6) that “compensates for a distortion of a power amplifier.” Ex. 2013 ¶ 54; Ex. 1004 ¶ 1. Dr. Cooklev’s opinion is also supported by paragraph 3 of Suzuki, which explains that a conventional digital predistorter uses a lookup table “for linearizing non-linear characteristics of an amplifier.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 3; Ex. 2013 ¶ 54. Dr. Cooklev further supports his opinion by relying on Suzuki’s disclosure in paragraph 46 that power amplifier 28 is “subject to distortion compensation” by the predistorter, and that distortion components in the signal output by the amplifier are canceled by “distortion compensation data [that] are read out from the lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 and provided to the adders 13-1 and 13-2, respectively.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 46; Ex. 2013 ¶ 54. And, Dr. Cooklev’s opinion is supported by Suzuki’s disclosure in paragraph 47 that the distortion compensation added by adders 13-1 and 13-2 add the distortion compensation data from lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 “to perform distortion compensation (addition of predistortion)” to “signals to be transmitted.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 47; Ex. 2013 ¶ 54. Petitioner agrees that the distortion compensation data from lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 “are added to the respective frequency band from” input signal ST “in order to predistort the output signal, which is then transmitted,” and does not dispute that the distortion compensation data from lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 is ultimately cancelled out by the distortion created by amplifier 28. Pet. Reply 8. In light of the above evidence, we agree with Patent Owner that Suzuki’s distortion components from lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 in Figure 6 (which Petitioner relies on for the first and second digital signals in limitations 10a and 10b) are cancelled out by the distortion created by power amplifier 28 before the signal is ultimately transmitted. We agree with Petitioner that these first and second digital signals include data in the form of distortion compensation data. However, because these signals are cancelled by the distortion from amplifier 28 before transmission, the data from these signals is never transmitted. Thus, the first and second digital signals identified by Petitioner (the distortion compensation data from lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2) do not comprise data “to be transmitted,” as limitations 10a and 10b require.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 7,924,802 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,924,802
• Google LLC v. DH International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01322 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Mooney; the Board also found Mooney combined with Lee renders the disputed limitations obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’294 patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in design, development, and/or testing of network-enabled consumer devices, and familiarity with payment cards, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 2 (citing Lipoff Decl. Ex. 1003 ¶ 57). “Patent Owner agrees with the Petitioner on the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Resp. 4. Patent Owner adds that a POSITA would have had “at least three years of relevant industry or research experience in wireless communication between devices.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 26–29). Mr. Zaheer testifies that a POSITA “would” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The claim language and specification define and describe an “activation cue” in functional terms: a data communication from an external source is received by the cell phone and recognized as an activation cue if it causes the switching element to be assigned its first (activated) state. Ex. 1001, 9:28–31, 9:42–46, 10:14–16, 13:55–60, 14:53–59, 15:4–6, 19:20–26. Patent Owner agrees that “upon an activation cue being received by portable electronic device 10, switching element 44b switches to its activated state.” Resp. 19 (quoting Ex. 1001, 10:14–16). The activation cue may be a predetermined bit sequence, a predetermined contactless data transmission, continuously emitted, pulsed, or punctual, but these are unclaimed non-limiting embodiments of the preferred form of data transmission. Id. at 9:25–26 (“for example a predetermined bit sequence”), 11:20–22 (“One example . . . emit an activation cue in the form of a predetermined contactless data transmission”), 14:65–15:3 (continuously emitted, pulsed or punctual cue). We will not read such preferred embodiments from the specification into claim language that is not so limited. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (care should be taken “not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim”); see also In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“limitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification”); see also IQRIS Techns. LLC v. Point Blank Enterprises, Inc., 2025 WL 727717, *4 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“It is the claims, not the preferred embodiments, that” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “operatively linked to said electronic circuit” under 35 U.S.C. Section 112, sixth paragraph or not, the result is the same. We note there is no presumption of applying means-plus-function analysis to the switching element, because the limitation does not use the words “means for” that would mandate such claim construction treatment, and “switching” may invoke structure as well as function. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349–1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”). Regardless, we look to the meaning of the claim phrase at issue in view of the specification. We determine that the ’294 patent provides a clear, concise meaning for the switching element upon which both parties rely for construction. Patent Owner’s express agreement with Petitioner, that the claimed switching element is described in the ’294 patent as “any type of device allowing data to be conveyed according to alternate data conveyance operations in response to an activation cue being received by transceiver 18 or not,’” is particularly telling because it is not consistent with Patent Owner’s argument that the switching element means “switching of the data.” Resp. 7, 31 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:28–318). The claim language does not recite, and the specification does not describe, the switching element as a device that switches the data. Therefore, we determine the claimed “data conveyance switching element” means any type of switching device that allows data to be 8 We presume Patent Owner’s citation to “Exh. 2001, 9:28-31” on page 7 was intended to be a citation to the ’294 patent (Ex. 1001), as cited on page 31. whether or not an “activation cue” is received by the cell phone “cue receiver.”” slip op. at 21

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “[external] data exchange device” as a device with a data transceiver coupled to a circuit that carries out the function of exchanging data. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:14–17, 4:7–14, 9:3–6; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–68). As above, whether we construe the “[external] data exchange device” under 35 U.S.C. Section 112, sixth paragraph or not, the result is the same. Patent Owner, quoting the description of a data exchange device in the ’294 patent, contends that a “[external] data exchange device” “can be any sort of data exchange device comprising an electronic circuit (not shown) therein and a data transceiver 9a.” Resp. 8 (quoting Ex. 1001, 9:4–6). Patent Owner also responds to the Petition by clarifying that “[a]n external data exchange device is not a transceiver but a device with a transceiver.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 48). Petitioner argues in reply that Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s mappings of Mooney’s “cordless telephone base unit” or “cellular network infrastructure” to the claimed data exchange devices, such that no construction is necessary to resolve the dispute. Reply 5 (citing Resp. 16–37; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Limitations [1.c] and [1.d] recite “a first [second] data transceiver operatively linked to said electronic circuit [in the cell phone],” both of which are defined functionally as “for exchanging data between said electronic circuit [in the cell phone] and a first [second] external data exchange device over a first [second] communication link.” Nothing in the the other independent claims, further limits the form or function of the “[external] data exchange device,” although a device external to the cell phone may invoke additional structure. We determine the plain meaning of “[external] data exchange device” as claimed and described in the ’294 patent governs: any [external] device that comprises an electronic circuit and data transceiver for exchanging data with the electronic circuit in the cell phone over a communication link. slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 9,022,294 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,022,294
• Reed Semiconductor Corp. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01158 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–15, 17, and 18 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18 as anticipated by Tateishi, and claims 5, 7, 8, and 15 as obvious over Tateishi.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Patent Owner has not offered persuasive evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the claims in light of the Specification would understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “control signal” to be as narrow as Patent Owner proposes. We do not construe the claims such that the “control signal” must be the exclusively controlling factor of a component, as Patent Owner urges. Petitioner’s position, on the other hand, is consistent with the evidence of record. We construe “control signal” as having its plain and ordinary meaning, namely a signal configured to control a circuit component. D. The Asserted Anticipation of Claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18 by Tateishi” slip op. at 24

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Tateishi discloses the “control signal” recited in limitations 1B2 and 1D of independent claim 1.” slip op. at 37

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “based on the Tateishi application publication (Ex. 1007), that the Tateishi Patent (Ex. 1005) also anticipates claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18. See Pet. 23–24 (“The Tateishi Patent is also prior art under (pre-AIA) §102(e)”; identifying Ground 1 as anticipation “under §102 by Tateishi and/or the Tateishi Patent”). However, we are unable to locate in the Petition or Petitioner’s Reply a discussion of or citation to the Tateishi Patent other than under the Petitioner’s heading “Identification of Challenge and Relief Requested” on pages 23 and 24 of the Petition. Cf. id. at i–x (Table of Contents identifying a section of the Petition discussing the Tateishi (Application) anticipation ground but not a section discussing a Tateishi Patent anticipation ground). Although the issued patent may be substantively identical to the published application, Petitioner does not assert that, and we decline to compare the documents to determine whether that is the case. In light of Petitioner’s silence on the alternative ground, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Tateishi Patent anticipates 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18.” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 9,041,377 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,041,377
• Orca Security Ltd. v. Wiz, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01083 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Shivamoggi disclosed the required natural-language list of abnormal connections, including for the dependent-claim grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’554 patent. We do not institute inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’554 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing computer science (i.e. computer science, computer information systems, computer engineering, etc.) or cybersecurity, with at least two years of experience in the field of cybersecurity.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Petitioner further argues that “additional education or experience might substitute for these requirements.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA at this stage of the proceeding. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’554 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that “no claim terms need to be construed to resolve any issues in controversy in the Petition.” Pet. 7 (citing Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Patent Owner asserts that “[n]o constructions are necessary to deny institution because denial is warranted for numerous reasons that do not depend on claim construction, as further detailed below.” Prelim. Resp. 2. We determine that, at this stage of the proceeding, no explicit constructions are required to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Having reviewed the record presently before us, we agree with Patent Owner. Limitation 1[d] requires generating “insights, wherein the generated insights include at least a list of abnormal connections between the identified network objects.” The ʼ554 patent states that “[n]etwork insights are natural-language representations of aspects of the network graph.” 1 Ex. 1001, 10:15–17. Petitioner acknowledges that the recited “insights” are “natural-language representations.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1001, 10:16–18). Dr. Easttom also agrees that insights are natural-language representations. Ex. 1003 ¶ 100 (testifying that “Shivamoggi’s insights are provided to the user as textual descriptions (i.e. natural-language representations).”). As an 1 The parties do not address whether the “wherein” clause of limitation 1[d] runs afoul of the printed matter doctrine. “[T]he petition must set forth . . . . [h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104. Even though “insights” are described in the ʼ554 patent as “natural-language representations of aspects of the network graph” (Ex. 1001, 10:15–17), Petitioner does not construe “insights, wherein the generated insights include at least a list of abnormal connections between the identified network objects,” as “printed matter” that may be disregarded because it is “not functionally related to the substrate.” See Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hosp. Prods. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d 1024, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“‘Where the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability.’. . . For example, in In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) there was no functional relationship between claimed instructions and a diagnostic kit, as the instructions ‘in no way depend[ed] on the kit, and the kit [did] not depend on the’ instructions.” (quoting Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Because the parties have not addressed it, we decline to consider if the printed matter doctrine applies here. “virtual machine one to load balancer five, where port eighty is routed to port 1337 on virtual machine one, then from load balancer five to firewall two, where port eighty of firewall two is open, then from firewall two to subnet sixteen, where subnet sixteen has a network address of 10.0.1.0/24, then from subnet sixteen virtual network ten, where virtual network ten has a network address of 10.0.0.0/16, then from virtual network ten to virtual network eleven, via peering connection twelve, where peering connection twelve includes a routing rule to virtual network twelve, specifying virtual network twelve's network address, where virtual network twelve's network address is 172.31.0.0/16.” Ex. 1001, 10:31–45 (quotation marks in original). This example illustrates that an insight is provided in natural-language, or textual, format, consistent with the description of an insight in the ʼ554 patent and the testimony of Dr. Easttom. The limitation, which recites “the generated insights include at least a list of abnormal connections,” therefore requires generating a naturallanguage representation of a list of abnormal connections.” slip op. at 18

  Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,722,554
• Google LLC v. Cellular South, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00877 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–11 because the Zhao-Kouzani combination did not sufficiently show a fractal representation based on landmarks.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’853 patent is unpatentable, and we do not institute an inter partes review. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “generally known in the art, and that this is acknowledged by the ’853 patent. Pet. 40–41 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1001, 15:40–44). Petitioner asserts that Kouzani touts the benefits of fractal models and that it would have been obvious to use Kouzani’s fractal model as the object model in Zhou. Pet 44 (asserting that “[a] person of ordinary skill would have therefore been motivated to implement Kouzani’s techniques in Zhao’s system”); see also id. 42–45. (entire argument). Patent Owner argues that Kouzani’s fractals would not result in the claimed limitation. Prelim. Resp. 21–23. In particular, Patent Owner points out that Kouzani’s fractals use a block-based fractal system, which do not include “a representation of the object based on landmarks associated with the object” as required by claim 1. Id. at 21–22. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. Even if Kouzani teaches fractals, claim 1 is not broadly claiming any fractal, but rather one that is “based on landmarks” (e.g., eyes, nose, etc.). See Ex. 1001, 13:53–57. The block-based system of Kouzani is based on abstract, repeated patterns of pixels, without regard to what the pixels represent. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 8 (describing a “search . . . through the domain pool to find a domain block whose contractive transformation best approximates the range block” and then storing all of the transformations that, together, “represent the compressed image of a person’s face”), Fig. 4 (showing example blocks). This is in contrast to looking for particular landmarks in the image. Thus, we find that Petitioner has not sufficiently established that Kouzani’s fractal is based on landmarks. In Petitioner’s ground, Petitioner asserts that Zhao already teaches the claimed landmarks (Pet. 39, citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 58, 65), but Petitioner’s ground replaces or modifies the object model of Zhao with the fractals of Kouzani, which are not based on landmarks. Petitioner does not explain how Zhao’s modified model, now using a block-based fractal system, would still have the landmarks of Zhao’s original model. Even if it were obvious to include fractals, we are persuaded that the fractals included by Kouzani are not based on landmarks. Alternatively, if Petitioner is asserting merely to use fractals in Zhao’s models, then Petitioner has not sufficiently accounted for the particular fractals claimed and explained persuasively how merely using fractals in Zhao would lead to the claimed subject matter, i.e., fractals based on landmarks. In either event, Petitioner has not sufficiently established that the proposed combination satisfies the “fractal includes a representation of the object based on landmarks” limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. Even if Kouzani teaches fractals, claim 1 is not broadly claiming any fractal, but rather one that is “based on landmarks” (e.g., eyes, nose, etc.). See Ex. 1001, 13:53–57. The block-based system of Kouzani is based on abstract, repeated patterns of pixels, without regard to what the pixels represent. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 8 (describing a “search . . . through the domain pool to find a domain block whose contractive transformation best approximates the range block” and then storing all of the transformations that, together, “represent the compressed image of a person’s face”), Fig. 4 (showing example blocks). This is in contrast to looking for particular landmarks in the image. Thus, we find that Petitioner has not sufficiently established that Kouzani’s fractal is based on landmarks. In Petitioner’s ground, Petitioner asserts that Zhao already teaches the claimed landmarks (Pet. 39, citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 58, 65), but Petitioner’s ground replaces or modifies the object model of Zhao with the fractals of Kouzani, which are not based on landmarks. Petitioner does not explain how Zhao’s modified model, now using a block-based fractal system, would still have the landmarks of Zhao’s original model. Even if it were obvious to include fractals, we are persuaded that the fractals included by Kouzani are not based on landmarks. Alternatively, if Petitioner is asserting merely to use fractals in Zhao’s models, then Petitioner has not sufficiently accounted for the particular fractals claimed and explained persuasively how merely using fractals in Zhao would lead to the claimed subject matter, i.e., fractals based on landmarks. In either event, Petitioner has not sufficiently established that the proposed combination satisfies the “fractal includes a representation of the object based on landmarks” limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). That is, “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning’ . . . that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1312–13 (quoting in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). We do not need to construe any claim terms to reach a decision in this proceeding. Realtime, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms. . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 6

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,126,853
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00983 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 10, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over Alexander and Cosper; the alternative Gregorio-based grounds did not establish unpatentability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “112(f). Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But if the term does not use the word “means,” then it is presumed not to be subject to Section 112(f). Id. “That presumption can be overcome, but only if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., 948 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “The correct inquiry, when ‘means’ is absent from a limitation, is whether the limitation, read in light of the remaining claim language, specification, prosecution history, and relevant extrinsic evidence, has sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014).” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “both parties have asserted in the Apple Litigation that the “control component” requirement is a means-plus-function limitation subject to 35 U.S.C. §112(f), despite the fact that the control component limitation does not recite “means for.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1012, 3–8; Ex. 1013, 13); PO Resp. 6–7. Indeed, the court in the Apple Litigation has concluded that the control component requirement is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), and has construed that requirement accordingly: Function: receiving control signals input to the oscillating resonant module; receiving outputs from the one or more sensors; controlling oscillation of the mass to produce a vibration response according to the received control signals by generating, using one or more of the received sensor outputs, control outputs to an actuator that drives the mass to oscillate. Structure: a microcontroller, a processor, a microprocessor, or a CPU that performs the algorithm shown in Figure 45 or the algorithm described in the corresponding text. See, e.g., 31:19–32:13, and equivalents thereof. Ex. 2001, 10; Ex. 2002, 40. Because of the Apple Litigation record, Petitioner presents its challenges in the alternative, first applying a plain meaning approach to the control component requirement, and also analyzing the requirement under the construction adopted in the Apple Litigation. Pet. 3–5. We adopt the court’s construction in the Apple Litigation. 35 U.S.C.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of vibration-generating systems; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 27. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 2. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’882 patent specification.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “(1) Analogous Art Our reviewing court has stated that “[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotes omitted). While these two criteria are helpful in many instances, we must not lose sight of the key question at hand: what is “prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)? References that are “too remote to be treated as ‘prior art’” are excluded from the obviousness analysis. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The non-analogous art test provides helpful insight on the underlying question of what is “prior art” within the meaning of the statute; we should not, however, be blind to the reality of the circumstances of the case before us. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA (1979). Nor should we adhere to rigid and mandatory formulas that overly limit the inquiry. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 419.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,152,882 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,152,882
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems Inc., D/B/A/ RevelhmiAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00698 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 based on the asserted combinations of Izumi, Cosper, Rossi, Ibuki, and Aldrich.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. PO Resp. 2–3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention. Id. at 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Our reasoning herein would be the same under Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1, Preamble. Both parties agree that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting. PO Resp. 6. We agree that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. We also note that the parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither party asserts that construction of “driving component” or “control component” is necessary to resolve the issues before us, we decline to expressly construe these claim terms. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For clarity, because Petitioner argues that plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate and because Patent Owner does not dispute that construction, we adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of these claim terms when comparing the challenged claims to the prior art. Other claim terms. It is unnecessary for us to expressly construe other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Izumi’s module to include multiple sensors in accordance with Cosper’s teachings. Pet. 15. Petitioner argues that the sensors would monitor the moving element and generate a control signal in accordance with Izumi. Id. at 15–16. Petitioner further argues that Izumi’s controller would have been implemented using a microprocessor and memory as Cosper suggests. Id. at 16. Petitioner argues three reasons why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Izumi with Cosper’s teachings. Id. at 16–19. First, Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked to Cosper as a way to further Izumi’s objective of having a sensor that detects the and controls the movement of the moving element. Id. at 16–17. Second, Petitioner argues that the combination of Izumi and Cosper would have enhanced reliability of the feedback sensors by capturing “data specific to different operating parameters.” Id. at 17–18. Third, combining the references’ teachings would “facilitat[e] implementation of software instructions” by using a microprocessor and memory. Id. at 18–19. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s rationale to combine the references’ teachings. Based on our review and consideration of the record, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Izumi and Cosper in the manner Petitioner argues (“the Izumi-Cosper combination”).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 8,093,767 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,093,767
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems Inc., D/B/A/ RevelhmiAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00697 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable under § 103 based on the combinations of prior art listed in the decision.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. PO Resp. 2–3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention and states that “Patent Owner does not believe that any of the arguments herein would change if the Board were to adopt Petitioner’s definition for the level of ordinary skill rather than Patent Owner’s.” Id. at 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Our reasoning herein would be the same under Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1, Preamble. Both parties agree that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting. Pet. 6; PO Resp. 6. We agree that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. We also note that the parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither party asserts that construction of “driving component” or “control component” is necessary to resolve the issues before us, we decline to expressly construe these claim terms. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For clarity, because Petitioner argues that plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate and because Patent Owner does not dispute that construction, we adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of these claim terms when comparing the challenged claims to the prior art. Other claim terms. It is unnecessary for us to expressly construe other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Our reviewing court has stated that “[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotes omitted). While these two criteria are helpful in many instances, we must not lose sight of the key question at hand: what is “prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)? References that are “too remote to be treated as ‘prior art’” are excluded from the obviousness analysis. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The non-analogous art test provides helpful insight on the underlying question of what is “prior art” within the meaning of the statute; we should not, however, be blind to the reality of the circumstances of the case before us. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA (1979). Nor should we adhere to rigid and mandatory formulas that overly limit the inquiry. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,093,767 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,093,767

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.