• Samsara Inc. v. Motive Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00574 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed video overlay and transmission for manual review.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s contentions in this ground do not cure the issues for limitations 1D and 1E. Petitioner’s contentions in this ground involve combining Khan and Ali’s teachings of identifying a horizon line and lane lines with Choe. For example, Petitioner argues that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have combined known elements according to known methods to yield predictable results” and that “[i]mplementing these known mathematical models in Choe’s calibration system, according to their known functions, would have yielded predictable results.” Pet. 39. Petitioner further argues that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have used a known technique (predictive models) to improve similar devices in the same way” and that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have also applied a known technique (predictive models) to a known device (a manual annotator device) ready for improvement.” Pet. 40. Petitioner’s proposed combination, therefore, still relies on Choe’s teachings of transmitting an overlaid image to an annotator device. We note that Petitioner asserts that, “[o]nce Khan in view of Ali identifies the horizon and lane lines, it overlays the horizon line and/or lane lines on the video, as shown in the screenshots below.” Pet. 41–42. Although Petitioner mentions Khan and Ali’s teachings with respect to video here, Petitioner does not adequately explain how the teaching of an overlaid video would be combined with Choe’s single image annotator teachings. As discussed above, Choe discloses transmitting a single overlaid image to the annotator” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Thus, Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence and argument to explain how the additional teachings of Khan and Ali teach limitations 1D and 1E in combination with Choe. Petitioner, therefore, has not demonstrated unpatentability of claims 1–5 by a preponderance of the evidence. F. Obviousness over Choe and Workman (Claims 1–4) Petitioner asserts that claims 1–4 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Choe and Workman. Pet. 47–52; Pet. Reply 26–30. Petitioner asserts that, “if [Patent Owner] alleges that Choe does not explicitly disclose which predictive models it uses or whether it uses predictive models to identify the horizon line, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have searched for references that use predictive models and how such models were used,” which “would have led to Workman, which discloses predictive models to identify the horizon line.” Pet. 47. According to Petitioner, “[u]sing Workman’s predictive model to identify the horizon line would also have merely been combining known elements ([convolutional neural networks (CNNs)] and annotation for camera calibration) according to known methods to yield predictable results and used known techniques (CNNs) to improve similar devices in the same way.” Pet. 48–49. Thus, Petitioner relies on Workman to teach a predictive model to identify a horizon line. See Pet. 47–49. Choe with respect to limitations 1D and 1E. Indeed, Workman involves horizon line estimation in single images. See Ex. 1011, 10 (§ 5) (“We introduced Horizon Lines in the Wild (HLW), a new dataset for single image horizon line estimation, to address the limitations of existing horizon line detection datasets.”). Petitioner, therefore, has not demonstrated unpatentability of claims 1–4 by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 24

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner criticizes Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for not requiring “any training or experience in ‘automotive systems,’ precisely what the ’580 [p]atent relates to.” PO Resp. 7. According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a training and/or experience in design of software for camera/sensor systems in the automotive industry.” PO Resp. 8–9 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 35).” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We need not construe expressly any claim terms to decide the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 11,875,580 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,875,580
• Silicon Motion Inc. v. K.Mizra, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01241 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–2 and 4–15 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 2, 4–7, and 9–15 are obvious over Johnson or Stubbs.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons provided below, and based on the present record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or a related field, and 2-3 years of experience in memory system design,” or, alternatively, “a Master’s degree in one of those fields and 1-2 years of relevant experience.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–29). Patent Owner “does not contest Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, but it reserves the right to do so in the event that trial is instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 7. There being no present dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that “that no construction is necessary for any terms for the purposes of this Petition as the challenged claims are invalid under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner states that “the Board need not construe any claim term in a particular manner to arrive at the conclusion that the Petition is substantively deficient.” Prelim. Resp. 7. 5 At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. In view of the parties’ positions, we determine that we need not expressly construe any terms for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “to combine Johnson and Moss is inadequate. See Prelim. Resp. 20–24. We tend to agree. In the “Motivation to Combine Johnson and Moss” section, the Petition first asserts that “Johnson and Moss are in the same field of endeavor,” which is insufficient without more to provide a motivation. See, e.g., Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 82 F.4th 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2023). The Petition then asserts that “[t]o provide enhanced flexibility, [one of ordinary skill in the art] in possession of Johnson would look to Moss to incorporate a plurality of delay elements to the data strobe signal.” Pet. 22. This is not persuasive because (a) Petitioner argues that Johnson already provides a plurality of delay elements, (b) Petitioner fails to explain where or how additional delay elements from Moss would be added to Johnson, and (c) Petitioner fails to explain how or why the modification would “provide enhanced flexibility,” or even what “enhanced flexibility” might mean in 9 “a first sampling circuit to sample the first delayed data signal based on the strobe signal” 10 “a second sampling circuit to sample the second delayed data signal based on the received strobe signal” this context. Petitioner also argues that “Moss further discloses that the size of the data path – i.e. the number of data pins in each data path – is a design choice well within the knowledge and ability of a POSITA, and expressly recites examples of 4, 8, and 16-bit wide data paths.” Pet. 23. We agree that varying the width of the data path would have been within level of ordinary skill and would have depended on the particular application, but the Petition fails to explain how or why that would have made it obvious to incorporate various elements of Moss into Johnson.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,111,608
• Charter Communications, Inc. v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 11, 2025 · IPR2024-01232 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any obviousness ground; it also found the petition time-barred.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied

    “later than one month after we initially instituted inter partes review in the Comcast IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). As discussed above, however, inter partes review is no longer instituted in the Comcast IPR. Under these circumstances, we do not grant Petitioner’s Joinder Motion because there is no pending proceeding to join. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition . . . that the Director . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review.”). Petitioner’s Joinder Motion is denied.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “least in part on a second message including at least one command in a second format.’” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1104, 168–173). The cited portion of the prosecution history shows that the applicant distinguished its claims from the prior art based on different first and second formats. The applicant argued in particular, Applicant submits that [the prior art] is completely silent with regard to “receiving, from the remote server device, a first message that includes at least one command in a first format, wherein the first message is received based at least in part on a second message including at least one command in a second format having been sent from the associated remote computing device.” In fact, [the prior art] never describes commands in different formats. . . . Ex. 1104, 170. Based on the applicant’s argument in this regard, we find that the prosecution history limits the scope of claim 1 to different first and second formats. In other words, the applicant’s argument during prosecution distinguishing its claims from the prior art based on different first and second formats overcomes the presumption based on claim differentiation that claim 1 encompasses first and second formats that are the same. See Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’Ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Although claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot . . . relieve any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution history.”). Accordingly, claim 1 is limited to different first and second formats.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “argument and evidence. As discussed above in the claim construction section, the recited first and second formats are limited to different formats. See supra Part IV.A. To satisfy this aspect of limitation 1D under its theory, Petitioner needs to show that in Danciu the format of the control information sent from the remote control to the server is different from the format of the control information sent from the server to the controlled device. The cited disclosures in Danciu, however, do not teach or suggest that these formats are different. Nor does Petitioner explain adequately how Danciu’s disclosures teach or suggest the two formats are different. We recognize that the control information in Danciu may be “processed” or “repackaged,” as Petitioner asserts, but it is not clear that the control information is processed or repackaged such that the format of the control information sent from the remote control to the server and the format of the control information sent from the server to the controlled device are different. Petitioner does not rely on Mahajan to teach or suggest the recited first and second formats but relies on Mahajan instead as providing “implementation details for transmission of commands for controlling a client.” Pet. 27. Petitioner contends that its proposed combination of Danciu and Mahajan would have provided a system where “Danciu’s remote control would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a generic format, transmit them to the controlled device, which would translate them to a command associated with a second type of media playing application for execution.” Id. at 31. In other words, the controlled device would receive the generic commands sent from the remote control and then translate the generic commands. It is not clear how the proposed combination in this way teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the remote control to a server is different from the format of a command sent from the server to the controlled device.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Aldrey and Mahajan meets limitation 1D under Petitioner’s second theory. Petitioner only alleges that it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan that Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module could operate at a server like Aldrey’s service provider network 103. Pet. 65. The Federal Circuit has explained that “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner does not adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating Mahajan’s abstraction module at a server, even if the abstraction module could operate at the server. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”). We note Petitioner further argues that combining Mahajan and Aldrey would have provided a system where “Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a command associated with a second type of media playing application on a STB.” Pet. 66–67; see also id. at 66 (“Mahajan’s server-command teachings could be implemented on Aldrey’s end terminal remote control.”). Arguing that Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands seems inconsistent with Petitioner’s earlier argument for locating Mahajan’s abstraction module (which translates commands) at Aldrey’s network service provider. See id. at 65–67. Moreover, it is not readily apparent how command translation by Aldrey’s end terminal––rather than Aldrey’s network service provider–– teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the end terminal to the network service provider is different from the format of a command sent from the network service provider to the STB. Petitioner does not close these logical gaps.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,048,751
• Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00324 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Comcast’s rehearing request and left in place denial of institution after finding no abuse of discretion in its construction and compelling-merits analysis.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 90 (Nov. 2019) (hereinafter, “CTPG”).5 In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); CTPG 90.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied

    “discretion to deny institution due to the advanced state of parallel litigation, taking into consideration the six factors identified in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), as well as applying guidance set forth in a Memorandum regarding the “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” issued by the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter, “Guidance Memo”).6 Inst. Dec. 6–43. We determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial,7 and that the Petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability as to independent claims 1, 12, and 17 under the sixth Fintiv factor. Id. at 15–16, 23–43. Because “the PTAB will not deny institution based on Fintiv if there is compelling evidence of unpatentability,” we declined to exercise our discretion to deny and instituted trial. Guidance Memo 5; Inst. Dec. 15–16. In our Rehearing Decision, however, we agreed with Patent Owner that we erred in determining the claim terms “first format” and “second format” are not limited to different formats, and determined that the proper construction of these claim terms indeed requires the two formats to be different formats. Reh’g Dec. 5–9, 19. Applying the proper construction, we further determined that none of Petitioner’s asserted challenges presents compelling merits of unpatentability as to any claim of the ’751 patent, 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_ proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20 220621_.pdf. 7 Our analysis of the first five Fintiv factors in our First Institution Decision remains undisturbed on rehearing. contrary to our initial determination in the Institution Decision. Id. at 19–20. Having determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, and that the Petition does not meet the compelling merits standard of the Guidance Memo under the sixth Fintiv factor, we modified our decision and denied institution on rehearing. Id. at 20.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

    “Contrary to Petitioner’s position, Patent Owner met its burden of showing that our Institution Decision should be modified. In our Institution Decision, we relied on claim differentiation when we determined that claim 1 is not limited to different first and second formats. Inst. Dec. 31. We did not consider the prosecution history, which was part of the record. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have held that a court ‘should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’”). As we noted in our Rehearing Decision, however, the Federal Circuit has explained that “[t]he prosecution history modifies the scope of a claim term if ‘the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.” Reh’g Dec. 8 (quoting Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The Federal Circuit also has explained that “[a]lthough claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot . . . relieve any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution history.” Id. at 13 (quoting Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’Ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). In other words, we erred in not considering the prosecution history, which led to our erroneous conclusion that claim 1 is not limited to different first and second formats. See Ex. 1104, 170 (prosecution history). Our Institution Decision was based on this erroneous conclusion of law, as Patent Owner argued, and we modified it accordingly.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “claim 1. As discussed above with respect to limitation 1D, Petitioner asserted that its proposed combination of Danciu and Mahajan would have provided a system where “Danciu’s remote control would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a generic format, transmit them to the controlled device, which would translate them to a command associated with a second type of media playing application for execution.” Reh’g Dec. 12–13 (quoting Pet. 31). In other words, both Danciu’s remote control and controlled device translate commands. With respect to claim 5, Petitioner asserted that Mahajan’s abstraction module could operate at Danciu’s server. Pet. 43. Even if Mahajan’s abstraction module (which translates commands) could operate at Danciu’s server, Petitioner does not adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reason to modify Danciu’s system to locate Mahajan’s abstraction module at the server, especially where both Danciu’s remote control and controlled device already translate commands. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”). Petitioner does not point to anything in its analysis of claim 5 that demonstrates we misapprehended or overlooked a matter.” slip op. at 15

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,048,751
• Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Enovsys, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00826 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. We, therefore, deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of GPS and related location tracking techniques, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Andrews Decl. ¶¶ 25–26). Patent Owner does not dispute this contention or offer an alternative formulation. See Prelim. Resp. 6. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’752 patent specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “1. Means-Plus-Function Terms Challenged claims 14 and 15 recite elements using the word “means.” See Ex. 1001, 13:6–18, 13:20–22. The use of the word “means” in a claim ’752 patent has a filing date prior to the effective date of the applicable AIA amendment, we refer to the pre-AIA version of §103. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process. We must first identify the claimed function. Then, we must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Id. at 1351 (citation omitted). The parties do not dispute that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies to those “means” elements recited in claims 14 and 15. See Pet. 8–12; Prelim. Resp. 11–19.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “geographic region.” The ’752 patent describes polling specific sub-regions of the network for a PRU. Ex. 1001, 2:12–15, 7:22–34. As Mr. McAlexander testifies, “[a] PRU may choose to instruct the network to relay certain information to mobile units in a specific geographic region. That information would then be appended to the geographic boundary information and beamed in the specified geographic region.” McAlexander Decl. ¶ 49 (quoting Ex. 1001, 10:19–23) (alteration in original). For example, a nearby boundary can be polled for the locations of nearby wireless customers within proximity of a distressed wireless customer. As described in the ’752 patent, a distressed mobile user M1 may need to find where another party might exist in that geographic region. The user could initiate a page from their PRU for the closest available PRUs that could be found in that geographic jurisdiction. Looking at FIG. 3, mobile user M1 will provide its location, latitude and longitude (x0,y0) to the closest available ground station serving area C1 or grid G1. As stated earlier, appropriate terrestrial technology will be scattered in that region to serve the PRUs in that area as shown in FIG. 1. Once a ground station picks up this signal, it sends a page for all location reporting devices in the specified boundary surrounding mobile unit M1, FIG. 3 to disclose their location. Ex. 1001, 7:22–34 (emphasis added). slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,441,752
• Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00324 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Rehearing

  Patent Owner’s rehearing request was granted; the Petition was denied and no trial instituted because the challenges did not meet the compelling-merits standard under Fintiv.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Our reviewing court has explained that “[t]he prosecution history modifies the scope of a claim term if ‘the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.’” Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 228 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “discretion to deny institution due to the advanced state of parallel litigation, taking into consideration the six factors identified in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), as well as applying guidance set forth in a Memorandum regarding the “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” issued by the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter, “Guidance Memo”).5 Inst. Dec. 6–43. We determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial,6 and that the Petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability as to independent claims 1, 12, and 17 under the sixth Fintiv factor. Id. at 15–16, 23–43. Because “the PTAB will not deny institution based on Fintiv if there is compelling evidence of unpatentability,” we declined to exercise our discretion to deny. Guidance Memo 5; Inst. Dec. 15–16.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “those arguments. See Inst. Dec. 45–47. As to Petitioner’s arguments on the claimed first and second formats of limitation 1D in particular, we found the record provided “some support” for Petitioner’s position that “it would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that one or more RTS Media Abstraction Modules could operate at a server, such as in [Aldrey’s] Service Provider Network 103,” even though Petitioner asserted that Mahajan teaches command conversion at the client. Id. at 45–46 (citing Pet. 66–67). Yet assuming Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module could have operated at a server, as Petitioner argued, it is not readily apparent why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating the RTS Media Abstraction Module at a server based on Mahajan’s disclosure of command conversion at a client. See also Pet. 66 (“[I]t would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that the RTS Media Abstraction Module could be located on the client or server.” (emphasis added)). Nor did Petitioner adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module at a server. We note Petitioner further argued that combining Mahajan and Aldrey would have provided a system where “Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a command associated with a second type of media playing application on a STB.” Pet. 68; see also id. at 67 (“Mahajan’s server-command teachings could be implemented on Aldrey’s end terminal remote control.”). Arguing that Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands seems inconsistent with Petitioner’s earlier argument for locating command conversion at Aldrey’s network service provider. See id. at 66–68. Moreover, it is not readily apparent how command translation by Aldrey’s end terminal––rather than Aldrey’s network service provider––teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the end terminal to the network service provider is different from the format of a command sent from the network service provider to the STB. Petitioner did not close these logical gaps, leaving its case short of compelling.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 11,048,751
• Alertus Technologies, LLC v. Desktop Alert, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00363 · APJ Andrew L Nalven · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–13 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Although claims 1 and 10 recite slightly different language, both clearly recite a “first triggering step” that precedes two subsequent polling steps. In the case of claim 1, the “first triggering step” precedes the “second step” and “fifth step.” See id. The explicit use of “second” and “fifth” supports limiting the steps to the recited order. See Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A] claim requires an ordering of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires an order of steps.” (cleaned up)).” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) “would have (i) a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in electrical engineering, computer engineering, network engineering, computer science, and/or a related field and (ii) 1-3 years of experience relating to computer and networking systems and/or methods including systems and methods for messaging.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 25–26). Patent Owner does not offer a position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, which appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and asserted prior art.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “with Patent Owner that Dillon discloses time-stamps as “alternatives.” Prelim. Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:36–41). Dillon explains that “[t]he time-stamp . . . may represent the status of the subscriber’s e-mail account in various ways . . . [m]ost commonly, it is an indication of an actual time.” Ex. 1005, 7:19–21. However, Dillon explicitly states that “[a]lternatively, a time-stamp may be a number, such as a version number . . . or it may be a binary indication of whether or not e-mail . . . has been received.” Id. at 7:23–28 (emphasis added). Petitioner has not identified any portion of Dillon that suggests using more than one type of time-stamp in the same process. See generally Pet. 30–36. Dillon’s lack of disclosure of using multiple time-stamps appears consistent with Dillon’s description of the time-stamp as providing “the status of the subscriber’s e-mail account.” Ex. 1005, 7:19–21. Each disclosed alternative — time, version number, or binary indication — provides status information for the same purpose, namely, to indicate “whether or not e-mail for the given e-mail alert service subscriber has been received by the e-mail server 12 at any given time.” Id. at 7:27–29, 9:7–17. Because each of Dillon’s alternatives for a time-stamp serves the same purpose, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has provided sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Dillon to both add a new polling step requesting a first time-stamp as a Boolean time-stamp and then request a second time-stamp as a version number or time indication. Indeed, Petitioner’s asserted rationale to modify Dillon here is conclusory and fails to explain sufficiently how using a second time-stamp will achieve the asserted benefits of reducing messaging bandwidth or uniquely identifying a particular message. See Pet. 31. Because Dr. Mangione-Smith’s declaration testimony mirrors Petitioner’s argument, his supporting testimony is similarly insufficient. Compare Pet. 31, with Ex. 1003 ¶ 62. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “the Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations”).” slip op. at 21

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,172,765
• Dropbox, Inc. v. Entangled Media, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00285 · APJ Donald E Daybell · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Dropbox did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Conclusion as to Claim 1 Based on the present record, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Havewala teaches at least the following limitations of claim 1: 1. “intercepting the request by a software client on the first device;” and 2. “determining by the software client if the file is physically located on the first device or if the file is a virtual file of a corresponding file physically stored on a second device by reviewing file metadata.” Petitioner does not identify any teachings from Adams that bear on these limitations. Therefore, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success that it would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 24

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “At this juncture, the parties only appear to dispute the educational background in the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. The only evidence in the present record regarding the educational background consists of Dr. McDaniel’s declarations in this case and in the underlying litigation. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 21; Ex. 2001, 14–15. We agree with Patent Owner that both of these declarations support that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had either a bachelor’s or a master’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering or a related degree. Prelim. Resp. 2–3. Moreover, Petitioner does not explain why a master’s degree is necessary. Thus, we revise Petitioner’s proposed definition to conform to Dr. McDaniel’s testimony. We additionally remove the qualifier “at least” from Petitioner’s proposed definition, because this qualifier introduces ambiguity. Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we apply the following definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art: a POSITA would have been a person holding a bachelor’s degree or a master’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering or a related degree, with two years of training or experience with networking and file systems. This definition appears to be consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references as well. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). We note, however, that our analysis below would not change even if we adopted Petitioner’s definition as stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Cir. 2017); Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner asserts that it “does not propose that any terms require construction.” Pet. 11. Similarly, Patent Owner asserts that it “does not propose that the Board expressly construe any claims.” Prelim. Resp. 4. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding.” slip op. at 11

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “The instant limitation recites “intercepting the request,” which relies for its antecedent basis on the “accepting a request” limitation recited above. Therefore, this claim requires that the same “request” be both accepted and intercepted. See Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that definite articles such as “the” and “said” create anaphoric phrases that refer to the initial antecedent phrase, and do not alter the meaning of the antecedent “in the slightest”). Petitioner, however, fails to identify any “request” that is both “accepted” and limitation, Petitioner relies on the “open” message sent to the file system as the recited “request” that is accepted. Id. at 20–22. For the “intercepting the request” limitation, however, Petitioner relies on an error message sent back from the file system to the application as the recited “request” that is intercepted. Id. at 33. Thus, Petitioner points to two different features of Havewala for teaching the same required “request” in claim 1. This is fatally inconsistent. Therefore, Petitioner fails to adequately demonstrate that Havewala teaches that the same “request” is first accepted and then intercepted, as required by the claim. Even were we to overlook the inconsistency in Petitioner’s analysis, Petitioner still fails to establish that Havewala teaches the claimed “request to operate on a file.” Petitioner relies for this limitation on an error message generated by the file system as the claimed “request.” Pet. 33. This error message, however, is not a “request to operate on a file,” as claimed. This error message is instead a response generated by the file system to a request from the application or operating system to open a file. Ex. 1005 ¶ 64. The response indicates that the request cannot be fulfilled because the target file has no data. Id. Havewala discusses its messaging paradigm with reference to Figure 6, which is excerpted below: steps performed in reconstituting a ghosted file from the sink. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 27. This excerpt depicts steps 601, 603, and 605. At step 601, the file system 16 receives an open command from an application 30. Id. ¶ 67. In this step, the “file system . . . notes that the ghosted file 14 does not contain the removed data 20.” Id. ¶ 68. Then, after the open command has already been received and processed by Havewala’s file system, the file system returns an error at step 603. Id. at Fig. 6. This “returned error” is what is intercepted by the ghosting filter 26, at step 605. Id. ¶ 68, Fig. 6. Figure 6 of Havewala and the associated text at paragraphs 67 and 68 demonstrate that the error message that is intercepted by Havewala’s ghosting filter is not a request; instead, it is a response to the “open” request. Petitioner’s argument that an error message is the claimed “request” is therefore unsupported by the evidence of record.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,484,260
• Dropbox, Inc. v. Entangled Media, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00284 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “For these reasons, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Aboulhosn and Phillips teaches “the virtual files [being] indistinguishable from the local files by the local file system,” as recited in claim 1. We additionally note that the same deficiencies discussed directly above infect Petitioner’s rationale for combining Phillips with Aboulhosn. Specifically, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan seeking “a smoother and more seamless user experience with Aboulhosn’s system” would have been motivated to incorporate “Phillips’s visual indistinguishability feature (i.e., displaying virtual files to the user in the same way as local files).” Pet. 54–55. Petitioner characterizes this alleged feature as “provid[ing] the perception that all the shared files are synced/stored locally.” Id. at 55. Yet Phillips’s virtual files are stored in a virtual drive that is segregated from local files. See Ex. 1006, 13:64–15:7, Fig. 4. As such, Phillips’s virtual files are visually distinguishable because they are located in that separate virtual drive, i.e., “the network connected storage device ‘F’” known as “Lets Work on ‘@v-drive.’” See id. Thus, we do not agree that Phillips’s presentation of virtual files in a separate virtual drive would have motivated an ordinarily skilled artisan to combine Phillips with Aboulhosn in the manner suggested by Petitioner. For these reasons, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Aboulhosn and Phillips.” slip op. at 26

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

    “The ’338 patent Specification both disparages certain prior art file systems and indicates the criticality of certain transparency features. Specifically, the ’338 patent acknowledges prior art systems where “the data on separate devices is kept separated when synchronized-local data is stored in a set of locations within the operating system’s native file system” and where “remote data on other devices or other online services is kept in a new location such as a new directory/folder or secondary location (e.g., removable hard drive) mounted on the device.” Ex. 1001, 1:58–65. In contrast to this prior art, the ’338 patent states that it is “[c]ritical to the unique nature of this system” that its shared file system is “totally transparent, not requiring the user to interact with software, nor distinguish files in local vs. remote locations.” Id. at 5:24–26. Indeed, the ’338 patent describes the invention in direct contrast to the prior art insofar as “the local operating system’s file system [is] modified to include remote files in the same locations of the local device (such as the ‘My Documents’ folder) as opposed to a separate and segregated location for such remote data (such as a synchronization folder or an additional hard drive ‘mounted’ on the device).” Id. at 6:25–30 (emphasis added). Furthermore, remote or virtual files in the disclosed system are visually represented “as if the files were indeed local, allowing the user to operate on them as if they were local to the device,” thus making their appearance “indistinguishable” from that of local files. Id. at 6:30–36. We find that these disclosures, taken together, indicate a disavowal of claim scope as to file systems where remote or virtual files are kept in a separate location, such as in a separate folder, device, or drive. See SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1341–43. For similar reasons, we find that remote or virtual files that are kept in a separate folder, device, or drive are not “indistinguishable” from local files as that term is used in the claims of the ’338 patent.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “above infect Petitioner’s rationale for combining Phillips with Aboulhosn. Specifically, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan seeking “a smoother and more seamless user experience with Aboulhosn’s system” would have been motivated to incorporate “Phillips’s visual indistinguishability feature (i.e., displaying virtual files to the user in the same way as local files).” Pet. 54–55. Petitioner characterizes this alleged feature as “provid[ing] the perception that all the shared files are synced/stored locally.” Id. at 55. Yet Phillips’s virtual files are stored in a virtual drive that is segregated from local files. See Ex. 1006, 13:64–15:7, Fig. 4. As such, Phillips’s virtual files are visually distinguishable because they are located in that separate virtual drive, i.e., “the network connected storage device ‘F’” known as “Lets Work on ‘@v-drive.’” See id. Thus, we do not agree that Phillips’s presentation of virtual files in a separate virtual drive would have motivated an ordinarily skilled artisan to combine Phillips with Aboulhosn in the manner suggested by Petitioner. For these reasons, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Aboulhosn and Phillips.” slip op. at 27

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “that Aboulhosn does not teach “the virtual files [being] indistinguishable from the local files by the local file system.” Pet. 44–45. To fill this gap, Petitioner relies on, inter alia, Phillips’s teachings of virtual files appearing to be the same as local files and appearing to be locally present. Id. at 45 (quoting Ex. 1006, 6:34–36, 14:62–66). Yet Phillips’s virtual storage device and its contents are segregated from local files in Phillips’s display window 1000. See Ex. 1006, 13:44–50, Fig. 4 (discussing and depicting “entry 1034 for the network connected storage device ‘F’” known as “Lets Work on ‘@v-drive’” and its corresponding files 1042 and folders 1044 displayed in sub-window 1040). Thus, virtual files in Phillips’s system are not stored in the same location as local files.6 Because Phillips’s virtual files are stored in a virtual storage device that is separated from Phillips’s local files, those virtual files are not “indistinguishable from the local files by the local file system,” as is recited in claim 1. Petitioner cites Phillips for teaching that “the virtual storage device and its contents . . . appear[], to the client node user . . . to be locally present” and “behave . . . as if locally present on the client nodes.” Pet. 45– 46 (quoting Ex. 1006, 9:36–39, 14:62–66). Based on this, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood Phillips 6 We acknowledge that Petitioner relies on Aboulhosn, not Phillips, for teaching “virtual files stored in the same locations as local files of the local file system.” See Pet. 43–44. However, as we discuss below, the fact that Phillips’s system stores virtual and local files in different locations means that Phillips’s virtual files are not “indistinguishable” from the local files by the local file system. to teach that its virtual files appear indistinguishable from local files, including file extensions.” Id. at 46 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 151). Yet the patentees of the ’338 patent disavowed coverage for the term “indistinguishable” as applied to virtual files stored in a separate location, such as a separate folder, device, or drive. See supra § II.C. And that is exactly what Phillips teaches. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 13:64–15:7, Fig. 4. We agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 16–18) that Phillips’s virtual files are distinguishable from local files by the local file system because they are stored separately in the virtual F: drive/storage device. See Ex. 1006, 13:64– 15:7, Fig. 4. Further, we do not credit Dr. McDaniel’s testimony as establishing that virtual files in Phillips are “indistinguishable” (as that term is understood in the ’338 patent (see supra § II.C)) because he includes no reasoning showing why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have interpreted Phillips’s teachings as extending beyond files in a segregated virtual drive appearing to be locally present. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 149–151.” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,296,338
• Lzlabs GmbH v. International Business Machines CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00274 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 10–12, 16, and 17 were not shown unpatentable because Loderer did not teach a target machine condition code.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “c. Analysis We agree with Patent Owner. On this record, we find that Loderer does not teach or suggest the recited “target machine condition code.” Loderer says that “[t]he object of [its] invention is . . . to specify a method for simulating a condition code when porting hardware-specific program code from a source hardware to a target hardware that is not providing for condition code.” Ex. 1005, col. 1, para. 5 (emphasis added). Loderer’s claims are directed to “[a] method for simulating a condition code (CC), used for the execution of hardware-specific program code (PCU) for a source hardware (M1), in the program code (PCZ), obtained following transformation, for a differing target hardware (M2) with a machine architecture which operates without a condition code (CC).” Id., claim 1. In other words, Loderer’s target machine does not support condition codes, let alone a “target machine condition code.” Accordingly, Loderer does not teach or suggest a “target machine condition code.”” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,713,289 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,713,289

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.