• Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00745 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 45–47, 51, 59, 60, 68, and 69 are unpatentable; claims 56 and 57 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 85–88 and 91 are unpatentable; amendment is granted for claims 92 and 93.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for the person of ordinary skill in the art, except we decline to adopt “at least,” as that language is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of 3 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness. skill reflected in the specification of the ’474 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner states that “no formal constructions are presently necessary,” and that it “maps [the] prior art in this Petition in a manner consistent with Patent Owner’s allegations of infringement before the district court.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1017; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 21–25). Patent Owner states that it believes there is no need to construe any terms of the challenged original claims because there is no underlying controversy regarding any claim terms. PO Resp. 10. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that it is not necessary to provide an express construction of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “3. Motivation to Combine Buibas and Sinyavskiy Petitioner argues that “it would have been obvious to partition Buibas’[s] spiking networks according to the specific techniques disclosed in Sinyavskiy” for multiple reasons. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 71–72, 85, 92, 179–203; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 12, 185, 188, 191, Fig. 6A; Ex. 1003 ¶ 63). First, Petitioner asserts, one of ordinary skill “would have been motivated to partition Buibas’[s] spiking neural network as suggested by Sinyavskiy to parallelize task execution on the robot and improve learning capabilities (e.g., through faster learning, greater computing efficiency, and task-specific learning models) of the Buibas mobile robotic apparatus as described by Sinyavskiy and discussed by Dr. Janet.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). Second, Petitioner contends, “partitioning Buibas’[s] robotic brain as suggested by Sinyavskiy would have beneficially expanded the range of tasks that the robot could perform by dedicating partitions to specialized tasks.” Id. at 13– 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 12, 185, 188, Fig. 6A; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 71–72, 85, 92, 179–205; Ex. 1003 ¶ 65). Third, Petitioner argues, one of ordinary skill “would have been motivated to partition Buibas’[s] spiking neural network as suggested by Sinyavskiy to permit unused partitions or unused resources in the partitions to be reassigned for different tasks,” which would allow for a network processing apparatus that has increased processing capability for the same network capacity while also having a lower cost, size and power consumption. Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 190–192, 105, 34, code (57); Ex. 1003 ¶ 66). Fourth, Petitioner argues that “Buibas briefly mentions that its spiking neural networks can be partitioned but discloses little detail about the partitioning,” which would invite one of ordinary skill to turn to other references, such as Sinyavskiy, for additional detail on how to implement partitioning. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 92; Ex. 1003 ¶ 67). Fifth, Petitioner asserts, combining Buibas and Sinyavskiy would merely “involve[] the application of known techniques (e.g., Sinyavskiy’s partitioned neural network) to a known system (e.g., Buibas’[s] mobile robot and robotic brain) to yield predictable results (e.g., Buibas’[s] robot using a spiking neural network partitioned as taught in Sinyavskiy),” particularly because “the partitioning of the Buibas neural network is reminiscent of Recurrent Fuzzy Neural Networks (RFNNs) that were already commonplace at the end of the 1990’s.” Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 68). Finally, Petitioner contends, the proposed combination merely involves “use of known techniques (e.g., Sinyavskiy’s partitioned neural network) to improve a similar system (e.g., Buibas’[s] mobile robot and robotic brain).” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 69). Petitioner further argues that one of ordinary skill “would have reasonably expected success implementing the combination, especially as Buibas and Sinyavskiy describe highly similar systems involving spiking neural networks used for training/operating robots.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 92; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70). Indeed, Petitioner contends, “Buibas itself confirms that its spiking neural network can be partitioned, while Sinyavskiy provides the details for doing so.” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 92; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We agree with Patent Owner and Dr. Saber that these “weights” are numerical values associated with connections among neurons, and the “weight vectors” are merely lists of weights. PO Resp. 13–14; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 66–67. When input is provided to the neural network, the network uses the weights of its connections in a feedforward calculation manner to provide an output that can include an instruction for operating a device. Ex. 2001 ¶ 66. We agree with and find credible Dr. Saber’s testimony that Buibas’s merging of weights or weight vectors results in updated network weights, and does not, by itself, disclose the merging of instruction sets for operating a device, or the correlation of the same set of inputs for all or a portion of a circumstance representation with instruction sets for operating two different devices. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 65, 67, 69–71.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 11,663,474 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,663,474
• Intel Corporation v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ)Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00728 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10–15, and 17–19 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 6, 9, and 16 are not shown unpatentable because the Midya-based grounds fail on the terminal limitation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full trial record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’430 patent and the prior art. In adopting this definition, we note that neither the title nor the “Field of the Invention” portions of the ’430 patent limit the invention to integrated circuits, and Patent Owner does not dispute that claim 1 encompasses inductors that are not provided on an integrated circuit. Ex. 1001, code (54), 1:16–22. Additionally, Dr. Prucnal’s definitions have shifted, and his latest definition purports to be based on Dr. Tentzeris’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill, but changes “experience designing integrated circuits or inductors for semiconductors” to “experience designing integrated circuits and inductors for semiconductors” without sufficient explanation of the reasons for the change. Supp. Prucnal Decl. ¶ 8; Reply Tentzeris Decl. ¶ 56. However, our Decision in this case would not change under Patent Owner’s revised articulation. See Reply Tentzeris Decl. ¶ 57 (stating that his opinion would not change under Patent Owner’s revised definition of the level of ordinary skill).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “After considering the full trial record, we agree with Petitioner that the phrase “on a semiconductor die” in the preamble of claim 11 is not limiting. First, we determine that the phrase “on a semiconductor die” in claim 11 does not provide antecedent basis for terms in the body of the claim. The body of claim 11 does not refer to “the semiconductor die” or even mention the “semiconductor die” at all, and neither do any of the claims that depend from claim 11. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that the phrase “on a semiconductor die” in the preamble of claim 11 provides antecedent basis for the term “the first inductor” in the body of the claim, because the “first inductor” language in the preamble provides antecedent basis for “the first inductor” language in the claim’s body. The “on a semiconductor die” language in the preamble is presented separately and can be easily parsed from the preamble’s language reciting a “first inductor” without impacting the understandability or grammatical completeness of claim 11. Therefore, the “on a semiconductor die” language in claim 11’s preamble is not necessary to provide antecedent basis for the phrase “the first inductor” in the body of claim 11. This use of language in claim 11 is distinguishable from the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Deere v. Bush Hog, cited by Patent Owner, where the preamble term “rotary cutter deck” provided antecedent basis for the term “said deck” recited in the claim body, because in Deere, the words “rotary cutter” appeared directly before, directly modified, and were not easily parsed from the term “deck.” See Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2012); PO Resp. 7–8.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Petitioner that claims 1 and 11 do not require that the first and second inductor be laterally spaced, but instead merely require that the second inductor be positioned at a “predetermined distance” from the first inductor. Nothing in the claim language restricts this “predetermined distance” from being in the X, Y, or Z direction, or requires that the inductors be laterally spaced in the same plane. Moreover, the fact that the ’430 patent Specification describes embodiments where the inductors are laterally spaced in the same plane does not limit the claims to those embodiments. As explained previously, our reviewing court “has expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.” Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906. “Even when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’” Id. We see no such “words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction” here. Accordingly, we give the term “predetermined distance” its ordinary meaning, which includes a distance in any direction. The parties do not dispute that Taniguchi’s inductors are spaced apart with an insulation layer in between. Therefore, under the ordinary meaning of the claim language, Taniguchi’s second inductor is “positioned at a predetermined distance from the first inductor.”” slip op. at 26

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with and adopt the ITC’s construction of “closely spaced,” which is “two terminals in proximity to each other (such that the electromagnetic field at a certain distance from the first inductor (where the second inductor is positioned) is reduced.” Ex. 1020, 12. We find that this construction is supported by the intrinsic record, including the Specification of the ’430 patent, which shows terminals being “closely spaced” compared to the dimensions of the inductor itself, and explains that the purpose of the close spacing is to make the field contributions from the two parts of the inductor identical. See Ex. 1005, Figs. 1–2, 4:28–32. Claims 1 and 11 of the ’430 patent lack specific dimensions for either the inductor or the spacing between the terminals, and indicate that the purpose of the close spacing is to “minimiz[e] magnetic field contributions from the terminals.” Ex. 1001, 10:22–25, 11:7–10. Dr. Prucnal’s ITC declaration, although not intrinsic evidence, further supports our conclusion. Although Patent Owner does not propose a construction for “closely spaced terminals,” it appears to argue that this term must be interpreted based on the dimensions of the semiconductor chip described in the ’430 patent. PO Resp. 43. We do not see any basis in the intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to impart such a narrow reading to the claim language, particularly because the ’430 patent Specification does not define the “closely spaced terminals” in relation to a semiconductor chip, and claim 1 is not limited to inductors on a semiconductor chip.” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 7,151,430 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,151,430
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2023-00993 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 15–17, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 3–6, 9, 14, and 19 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art [“POSITA”] at the critical time “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, computer science, or a similar field and two years of experience related to electronic consumer product design [and the] POSITA could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 31). Patent Owner states that it would require experience with electro-mechanical control systems rather than electronic consumer product design. PO Resp. 3. Because Petitioner provides for “similar knowledge and experience through other means,” we do not discern any meaningful distinction. Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’830 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “Determining whether a limitation that does not use the term “means” invokes § 112, paragraph 6, involves a three-part inquiry: (1) there is a generic placeholder that substitutes for the term “means”; (2) the generic placeholder is modified by functional language; and (3) the limitation does not include the structure, material, or acts necessary to perform the function in question without need to resort to other portions of the specification or extrinsic evidence for an adequate understanding of the structure. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Tri-Med, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 514 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1303–04 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (the court must “determine whether the claim nevertheless recites sufficient structure for performing the . . . function to take it outside the bounds of” § 112, paragraph 6).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Limitation [1b] With respect to limitation [1b], a “moveable component,” Petitioner argues that it should be construed as a means (component) having a function (moveable) that corresponds to a structure (a moving weight). Pet. 7. Petitioner argues that “essentially any physical component can perform the function of being moved,” references different types of structure as the moving components in the ’830 patent, and concludes that therefore the term has no definite structure. Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1001, Figs. 4A–4G, 14, 15–17). Patent Owner argues for a non-means-plus-function construction of a component that “is capable of being moved.” PO Resp. 7–8 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 55). Patent Owner argues, and Petitioner agrees, that “there is likely no material difference between” the parties’ proffered constructions such that construction is necessary. Id. at 8; Pet. Reply 7. We agree, because Petitioner has shown, and Patent Owner does not contest, that the prior art teaches such a component under either construction. Infra § II(D)(2)(a). Because Petitioner’s assertions and our determination would be unaffected by its proposed construction, we need not construe this term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that a showing of motivation is required. Whether a proposed combination rests on “combining disclosures from multiple references, combining multiple embodiments from a single reference, or selecting from large lists of elements in a single reference, there must be a motivation to make the combination and a reasonable expectation that such a combination would be successful.” In re Stepan Co., 868 F.3d 1342, 1346 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The General Electric decision cited by Petitioner does not hold otherwise. In General Electric, the Federal Circuit considered an obviousness challenge based on combining disclosures from multiple references. See Gen. Elec., 983 F.3d at 1339–40, 1344–52. The Federal Circuit criticized the Board for dissecting an embodiment disclosed in the primary reference into a collection of “individual elements” and requiring the patent challenger to “re-do the work already done” regarding that embodiment in the primary reference. Id. at 1351–52. The Federal Circuit did not consider an obviousness challenge based on combining multiple embodiments from a single reference. See id. at 1344–52. Therefore, we do not agree with Petitioner that no motivation to combine the Figure 3 and Figure 83 embodiments of Fukumoto need be shown.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 9,941,830 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,941,830
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2023-00992 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, and 17 are unpatentable; claims 3–6, 9, and 14 are not shown unpatentable, and claims 15 and 16 were disclaimed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, computer science, or a similar field and two years of experience related to electronic consumer product design.” 3 The parties do not provide evidence or argument regarding objective indicia of nonobviousness. See, e.g., Pet. 9–93; Resp. 18–66. Pet. 6. Petitioner also asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan “could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means.” Id. Dr. Wolfe’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience.” Resp. 3. Patent Owner also asserts that “[a]dditional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa.” Id. Dr. Goossen’s testimony supports Patent Owner’s assertions. See Ex. 2008 ¶ 16.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “10. SUMMARY “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Above, we discussed issues concerning the “component” limitations in claims 1, 3, and 4 and an ambiguity in claim 4. See supra §§ III.C.4(c), III.C.5(c), III.C.6(c), III.C.7(c), III.C.8(c), III.C.9. We determine that no other claim language requires a discussion of scope or an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “preponderance of the evidence” standard for proving unpatentability. D. Alleged Obviousness over Fukumoto: Claims 1–3, 7–9, and 17 Petitioner contends that claims 1–3, 7–9, and 17 are unpatentable under § 103(a) because the claims would have been obvious over Fukumoto. See Pet. 9–35; Reply 16–22. Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions. See Resp. 18–27; Sur-reply 7–14. Below, we provide an overview of Fukumoto. Then, we consider the obviousness issues. For the reasons explained below, we agree with Petitioner that claims 1, 2, 7, and 17 are unpatentable under § 103(a) because the claims would have been obvious over Fukumoto but disagree that claims 3, 8, and 9 are unpatentable based on Fukumoto.” slip op. at 44

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “2. MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMING The patent statute provides that “[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (2006). The absence of the word “means” in a claim limitation creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112’s means-plus-function provision does not apply. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). When a claim limitation lacks the word “means,” a party may rebut the presumption that § 112’s means-plus-function provision does not apply by demonstrating that “the claim term fails to ‘recite[] sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348 (alteration by the court) (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Construing a means-plus-function limitation involves two steps: first, identify the claimed function or functions; and second, determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the patent’s specification corresponds to the claimed function or functions. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351; see Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For the second step, a person of ordinary skill in the art must “recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the claim.” All-Voice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The “duty to link or associate structure to function is the quid pro quo for the convenience” of using means-plus-function claiming. B. Braun Med., Inc., v. Abbott Lab’ys, 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997). When a limitation recites two or more functions, the specification” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Conclusion About Obviousness/Nonobviousness For the reasons discussed above, Fukumoto teaches claim 1’s subject” slip op. at 64

  Patent outcomesUS 9,369,081 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,369,081
• Keysight Technologies, Inc. / Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 5, 2024 · IPR2023-01353 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–11, and 13–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Sourcefire and Emerging Threats; claims 5 and 12 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner, supported by Dr. Staniford’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and four years of industry experience,” and “would have had a working knowledge of packet-switched networking, firewalls, security policies, communication protocols and layers, and the use of customized rules to address cyber-attacks.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 23, 25). Patent Owner does not challenge the qualifications proposed by Petitioner for a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. We find Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), and, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther

    “We largely agree with Patent Owner that there is no explicit claim- construction dispute. We address Patent Owner’s issues of what ordinarily skilled artisans would have considered in creating and implementing packetfiltering rules in the discussion below. The preservation of the flow of normal legitimate network traffic without disruption is one aspect that those with a working knowledge of packet-switched networking, firewalls, security policies, communication protocols and layers, and the use of customized rules to address cyber-attacks would have considered. Nonetheless, overall, we determine that the plain and ordinary meaning of “configured to prevent an exfiltration operation,” does not require preventing all exfiltrations from occurring, nor allowing all non-exfiltration traffic, and that we need not consider the preservation of the flow of normal legitimate network traffic without disruption in the context of that claim construction. We determine that no claim terms need to be construed expressly for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. The identified aspects of Emerging Threats website would have allowed interested parties to locate the rule sets, download the rule sets and make determinations regarding what rule to use in a packet-handling system, such as Sourcefire. Emerging Threats need not be indexed or broadly searchable under Petitioner’s theory of the ground of unpatentability, namely that Emerging Threats was known, one of ordinary skill in the art would have gone to Emerging Threats, and downloaded the emerging-all.rules file, guided by the documentation wiki. As such, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that “the record evidence of this” slip op. at 16

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner

    “With respect to Petitioner’s assertions of collateral estoppel, notably in the Petition at pages 47, 49, 51, 52, and 54, with respect to limitations [1a] through [1d], we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is estopped from asserting that Sourcefire is not prior art to the challenged claims, and also estopped from asserting that those limitations are not taught or suggested by Sourcefire, to the extent that the limitations “do not materially alter the question” of patentability relative to the elements of the claims of the ’552 patent. See Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria’s Secret Direct Brand Mgmt., LLC, 778 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Independent Claim 1 a. Petitioner’s Assertions As discussed above, we concur with Petitioner that collateral estoppel exists with respect to limitations [1a] through [1d]. Thus, we begin with a discussion of Petitioner’s assertions regarding claim limitation [1e].” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 10,567,343 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,567,343
• Keysight Technologies, Inc. / Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00446 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–11, and 13–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Sourcefire and Emerging Threats; claims 5 and 12 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. The identified aspects of Emerging Threats website would have allowed interested parties to locate the rule sets, download the rule sets and make determinations regarding what rule to use in a packet-handling system, such as Sourcefire. Emerging Threats need not be indexed or broadly searchable under Petitioner’s theory of the ground of unpatentability, namely that Emerging Threats was known, one of ordinary skill in the art would have gone to Emerging Threats, and downloaded the emerging-all.rules file, guided by the documentation wiki. As such, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that “the record evidence of this” slip op. at 16

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner

    “With respect to Petitioner’s assertions of collateral estoppel, notably in the Petition at pages 47, 49, 51, 52, and 54, with respect to limitations [1a] through [1d], we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is estopped from asserting that Sourcefire is not prior art to the challenged claims, and also estopped from asserting that those limitations are not taught or suggested by Sourcefire, to the extent that the limitations “do not materially alter the question” of patentability relative to the elements of the claims of the ’552 patent. See Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria’s Secret Direct Brand Mgmt., LLC, 778 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Independent Claim 1 a. Petitioner’s Assertions As discussed above, we concur with Petitioner that collateral estoppel exists with respect to limitations [1a] through [1d]. Thus, we begin with a discussion of Petitioner’s assertions regarding claim limitation [1e].” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “how and why persons of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the existing rules to prevent exfiltrations. PO Sur-reply 3. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s assertions to make them “drop” rules, per Sourcefire, relies on what an administrator could have done, not what they would have been motivated to do. Id. at 4–5 (citing Pet. 57–58). We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. We continue to be persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art, combining Sourcefire and Emerging Threats, would have understood that downloaded rules should be reviewed, and it would have been obvious to enable rules that such persons deemed appropriate. We find Dr. Staniford’s testimony to be persuasive on this point. See Ex. 2011, 67:10–68:24, 69:8–72; Ex. 1020, 109. We acknowledge that downloading all of a particualr ruleset from Emerging Threats and enabling all the rules, might have resulted in a drop in performance of the network appliance, but, at the same time, we are significant drop in performance, especially if a potential threat might be sufficient to warrant a minor performance hit. Patent Owner’s counsel acknowledged at oral hearing that instituting all rules of a set in “alert” mode would not result in a decrease in performance, even though some computational outlay must be engaged to engage those alert rules. See Hr’g Tr. 24:24–25:4. We are persuaded that judiciously implementing certain rules would not necessary result in a network device that is unusable. Additionally, there is testimony from Dr. Staniford that “you start out with your rules in alert because there might be false positives. I mean, for the best rule in the world, Snort wasn’t known for false positives in the rules, when you apply them to a large network.” Ex. 2011, 68:2–7. As such, we continue to determine that it would have been obvious, in combining Sourcefire with Emerging Threats, for one of ordinary skill in the art to have downloaded rules and implemented specific rules.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightDecided for petitioner

    “Reviewing all of the evidence of record, we are persuaded that the Petition’s obviousness rationale based on Sourcefire and Emerging Threats is not guided by impermissible hindsight bias. We find persuasive Dr. Staniford’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that “this rule [SID:2003021] was not directed to looking for instances of exploits or attacks (which would be invisible within the encryption) but rather was looking for exfiltration of some kind of encrypted data.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 228. As discussed by Petitioner, such recognition was also made by Mr. Marinho and Dr. Goodrich, such that the rule would have been understood to possibly prevent exfiltrations. We continue to be persuaded that Petitioner provides that a correspondence exists between the REQUIRE-TLS-1.1-1.2 operator in the ’343 Patent and SID:2003021 in Emerging Threats, in that both detect an SSL/TLS version in application packet header field values to detect exfiltration attempts using out-of-date encryption protocols. Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 229–230). We are ’343 Patent discloses the interruption of a similar type of exfiltration, without resorting to impermissible hindsight bias, that Patent Owner asserts. Patent Owner has provided no evidence that Petitioner used the specification of the ’343 Patent to find an applicable rule in Emerging Threats, as opposed to the testified-version provided by Dr. Staniford that he recalls “working on a similar feature where we looked for large encrypted transmissions outbound from the network on non-HTTP ports as a possible symptom of exfiltration of large amounts of data.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 228. Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 10,567,343 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,567,343
• Shenzen Chic Electrics Co., Ltd. v. Pilot, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 9, 2023 · IPR2021-01232 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 4–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 3 was not shown unpatentable because Petitioner presented no evidence under the adopted construction.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “of battery charging systems.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner states that it adopts this definition for purposes of its Response. PO Resp. 4. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’653 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’653 patent and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). It is also consistent with the level of skill in the art adopted in the 777 IPR, which also involves the ’653 patent. IPR2021-00777, Paper 7 at 6–7.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “construction “contradicts the technical disclosure of the ’653 patent” and that “[t]he proper construction of this term is ‘switching circuit under control of the microcontroller that selectively conducts power supply or power outage for the load.’” Pet. Suppl. Br. 3.10 In particular, Petitioner contends that claim 3, through claim 1, only recites one connection between the microcontroller and the first battery, such that the connections in claim 3 do not allow the power supply from the first battery to pass through the microcontroller to the load. Pet. Suppl. Br. 4–5. Claim 1, however, recites “an automobile charger, comprising . . .” which is an open-ended term, meaning that claim 1 is not limited to only the connections expressly recited therein. Petitioner’s arguments do not address this open-ended aspect of the plain language of the claims. Petitioner also argues that the language of claim 3 is consistent with its construction because claim 3 “places the switching circuit between the second pole of the first battery . . . and the second lead of the load.” Pet. Suppl. Br. 5. Although Petitioner’s interpretation may be consistent with the language in claim 3, we discern nothing in claim 3 that expressly limits the placement of the switching circuit, especially considering the open-ended “comprising” language used in claims 1 and 3.” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “Specifically, Dr. Kirtley testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that connections between components depicted as single lines in Yu’s figures “may comprise multiple connections, such as multiple signal connections, and common power and ground connections for sensors and microprocessors.” Ex. 1020 ¶ 84 (citing Ex. 1021 (US 7,973,534 B2)). We credit Dr. Kirtley’s testimony, as Patent Owner does not dispute the substance of Dr. Kirtley’s testimony or the supporting exhibit. Instead, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner is attempting to “sneak in new evidence that is improper in a reply” and create a new ground. Sur-reply 13–15. We disagree, as Petitioner and Dr. Kirtley offer this evidence to demonstrate what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood in considering Yu—not as a new ground. Moreover, Petitioner properly offered this exhibit and Dr. Kirtley’s testimony in response to Patent Owner’s arguments that claim 1 requires negative side switching, which Yu does not disclose. In its Reply, Petitioner is entitled to “respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). A party also may submit rebuttal evidence in support of its reply. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1077–78 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 4 is unpatentable as obvious in view of Yu and Thomason. As discussed above, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding negative pole switching, and find that Petitioner presents persuasive evidence that Yu teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 1. Petitioner also presents undisputed evidence that Yu and Thomason teach or suggest the additional limitations in claim 4. Pet. 52–54. Additionally, Petitioner directs us to a disclosure in Thomason itself regarding a protection mechanism to prevent the jump starter from self-destructing, and presents testimony from Dr. Kirtley that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered Thomason’s teaching in order to avoid damage to Yu’s internal battery, and would have been able to implement Thomason’s teachings. Pet. 52–54; Reply 20–21; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 189–192. Patent Owner and Mr. McAlexander do not challenge or otherwise refute this testimony. PO Resp. 9–10. Thus, contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, Petitioner does direct us to evidence in the asserted prior-art references themselves that provide a reason to combine their teachings, and does not rely solely on conclusory statements regarding the similarities of Yu and Thomason to support its obviousness challenge. In view of Petitioner’s persuasive evidence demonstrating where the prior-art references teach or suggest each limitation in the challenged claims, and explaining why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the prior-art references with a reasonable expectation of success, we find Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 4 is unpatentable as obvious in view of Yu and Thomason.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,046,653 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,046,653
• The Noco Company, Inc. v. Pilot, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 3, 2022 · IPR2021-00777 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–9, 11–18, and 20 are unpatentable; claim 3 was not shown unpatentable, because the adopted construction foreclosed the asserted obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering (or equivalent subject) together with two or three years of experience in [the] automotive electrical systems industry.” Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 13). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition or offer its own. Mr. McAlexander indicated that he adopted Petitioner’s definition for purposes of his declaration. Ex. 2005 ¶ 16. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’653 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’653 patent and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of the phrase “the switching circuit conducts power supply or power outage for the load through the microcontroller.” Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the plain language of the claim, and comports with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Chef America. Ex. 1001, 6:13–14; Chef Am., 358 F.3d at 1373–74 (holding that courts may not redraft claims to make them operable or sustain their validity, and construing the claims “based on the patentee’s version of the claim as he himself drafted it”). Additionally, the Specification of the ’653 patent states that “the automobile start control module conducts the power supply or power outage for the load module through the microcontroller.” Ex. 1001, 1:61–65. Furthermore, Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s arguments or evidence, or present a competing construction. In view of this, we construe the phrase “the switching circuit conducts power supply or power outage for the load through the microcontroller” to mean “[t]he power for charging the load passes through the microcontroller.” Pet. 15; Reply 3–6.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that we do not need to expressly construe any other terms for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 1008 ¶ 12 (under the heading “Basis for My Opinion”). In addition to this general statement, Dr. Kattamis also cites to exhibits in specific paragraphs of the Kattamis Declaration to support the statements made therein. See, e.g., Ex. 1008 ¶ 18 (citing Ex. 1013), ¶ 22 (citing Ex. 1014), ¶¶ 63–68 (citing Krieger and Richardson), ¶¶ 70–74 (citing Baxter and Krieger), ¶¶ 76–79 (citing Richardson and George). In view of this, we consider Dr. Kattamis to have provided a sufficient disclosure regarding the basis for his opinions to at least avoid a determination that the Kattamis Declaration, in its entirety, is entitled to little or no weight. The fact that Dr. Kattamis, in preparing the Kattamis Declaration, re- used material he had previously written for an earlier proceeding involving a different patent does not justify a different outcome. To the extent Dr. Kattamis used previously prepared material in the Kattamis Declaration, he indicates that he “reviewed all of these passages in detail and confirmed that they were all still accurate and suitable for inclusion in his declaration in the current proceeding.” Reply 8; Ex. 1016 ¶ 6. Additionally, as Patent Owner demonstrates, Dr. Kattamis supplemented the re-used material by adding, where appropriate and necessary, language directed to the facts of this proceeding and specific citations to exhibits in this proceeding. See PO Resp. 8–9 (showing in redline the additions Dr. Kattamis included in the Kattamis Declaration).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,046,653 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,046,653
• Quantum Metric, Inc. / Decibel Insight, Ltd. et al. v. Content Square Israel Ltd. (F/K/A Clicktale Ltd.)Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 1, 2022 · IPR2021-00364 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8, 14–18, and 24 are unpatentable as obvious over Phillips and Zambonini; claims 9–13 and 19–23 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “IV. PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Petitioner moves to exclude the Declaration of Christopher Schmandt” slip op. at 113

  • Skill levelDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Dr. Cooperstock testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Bachelor of Science or Engineering degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or another academic discipline emphasizing the design or development of web-related technologies, in combination with training or at least one to two years of related work experience with web-related technologies.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 15. Further, Dr. Cooperstock testifies that “the person could have also had a Master of Science degree in a relevant academic discipline with less than a year of related work experience in the same discipline.” Id. Mr. Schmandt testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Bachelor of Science (or equivalent degree) in Computer Science or Computer Engineering, in combination with at least two years of additional experience with technologies related to media or web-based technology, or equivalent work experience.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 25. The descriptions of an ordinarily skilled artisan articulated by” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “C. Claim Construction 1. GENERALLY We construe claim terms “using the same claim construction” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMixed

    “Conclusion About Obviousness/Nonobviousness for Claim 1 For the reasons discussed above, the combined disclosures in Phillips” slip op. at 79

  Patent outcomesUS 10,063,645 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,063,645
• Google LLC v. Personalized Media Communications, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 27, 2021 · IPR2020-00725 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 4 is unpatentable as obvious over Torpey and Cox ’645; claims 5–10 were not shown unpatentable over Cox ’645 and Cox ’404.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “transmission station’ is defined in” the ’560 patent. Ex. 1013, 29; see Ex. 2003, 3, 6. We agree that the ’560 patent defines the term “intermediate transmission station.” See Ex. 1001, 21:67–22:1. In particular, the patent states: “stations that receive and retransmit broadcast transmissions are called ‘intermediate transmission stations.’” Ex. 1001, 21:67–22:1; see Ex. 1013, 29; Ex. 2003, 3, 6. The ’560 patent further describes the “intermediate transmission station” as retransmitting programming both “over-the-air (hereinafter, ‘broadcast’) or over hard-wire (hereinafter, ‘cablecast’).” Ex. 1001, 7:16–22; see also 44:28–31 (“transmitting said transmissions via conventional broadcast or cablecast means”); 169:45–54. Consistent with the ’560 patent’s definition and both district courts, we construe “intermediate transmission station” to mean “station that can receive and retransmit broadcast transmissions.” See Ex. 1001, 21:48–50; Ex. 1013, 28–31, 88; Ex. 2003, 5–15. This definition does not exclude a station that can receive and retransmit hard-wire or cablecast transmission. See Ex. 1001, 7:16–22; see also id. at 44:28–31 (“transmitting said transmissions via conventional broadcast or cablecast means”), 169:45–54.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “2. Other Terms Because the express construction of other claim terms are not needed to resolve any dispute in this proceeding at this time, we do not construe any of the other claim limitations. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1005, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in digital electronics, electrical engineering, computer engineering or a related technical degree, and two to five years of post-degree experience in a similar field.” PO Resp. 5. Dr. Weaver’s testimony supports Patent Owner’s position. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 35. Based on our review of the ’560 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’560 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of both Mr. Lipoff (see Ex. 1003 ¶ 33) and Dr. Weaver (see Ex. 2001 ¶ 35), we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering (or equivalent), and at least two years of work experience in the field of television broadcasting systems, computer systems or television electronics, and/or multimedia or real-time video systems. We agree with Petitioner’s contention that “[w]ith more education, for example, postgraduate degrees and/or study, less experience is needed to attain an ordinary level of skill in the art. Similarly, more experience can substitute for formal education.” We note that our analysis would be the same under either party’s proposed level of skill in the art. C.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to demonstrate sufficiently that Cox ’404’s column address code constitutes a record or that it is stored. See, e.g., Tr. 30:25–31:14. Additionally, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the column address code is altered “to indicate at least one of reception and storage of said selected a portion of units of programming,” as required by the challenged claim. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument that Cox ’404 discloses that “generated column address code which is incremented in response to each character Byte of the acquired data row” (Pet. 62–64; Tr. 17:24–20:13), Cox ’404 explicitly states the following: Each character Byte of a data row acquired by data acquisition circuit 44 is coupled to page memory 46 by a data line 56 and written into a corresponding memory location thereof in accordance with the address signals developed on an address bus 58, the address signals being formed by the row address code transmitted with the data row and an internally generated column address code which is incremented in response to each character Byte of the acquired data row. In other words, the row address code transmitted with each data row will cause the character Bytes of that row to be stored in the corresponding memory address row of page memory 46 while a clock internal of data acquisition circuit 44 will increment the column address for each character Byte of the row. Ex. 1007, 6:9–23 (emphasis added). We understand Cox ’404 to disclose that its incrementing step occurs in data acquisition circuit 44 of Figure 3, while the first character is being stored in page memory 46. Id. at 6:13–16, Fig. 3. But we do not find where incrementing is an indication of storage or that the purported record is maintained to indicate reception of a unit of programming. Based on the entire disclosure of Cox ’404, the incrementing may happen before, after, or at exactly the same time as the storage of the first character. Cox ’404 does not disclose any feedback mechanism for page memory 46 to indicate storage to data acquisition circuit 44, and therefore, the incrementing does not appear to be an indication of storage. See id. at 6:19–23, Fig. 3. Accordingly, based on the entirety of the trial record before us, we find Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Cox ’645 and Cox ’404 teaches more than one operating record or that the alleged operating records are altered to indicate reception and storage of a selected unit of programming as recited by the challenged claim.” slip op. at 54

  Patent outcomesUS 9,674,560 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,674,560

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.