• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 11, 2026 · IPR2024-01305 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable: claims 1, 8, and 9 as obvious over Ellis and Spivey, and claims 2–7 as obvious over Ellis, Spivey, and Herzog.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Relying on the declaration of Dr. Wicker, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) at the time of the invention of the ’687 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, and one to two years of experience in networking environments, including at least some experience with live-streaming network architecture.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education or experience in related fields could compensate for deficits in the above qualifications.” Id. Patent Owner contends that a POSA at the time of the invention of the ’687 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 99). The parties have not addressed whether the differences in these definitions impact the unpatentability analysis before us. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of a POSA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’687 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Wicker. We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner contends that the plain and ordinary meaning should apply to all terms of the challenged claims except for “event socket.” PO Resp. 12. Petitioner argues that an “event socket” should be construed as “uniquely addressable communication endpoints that transmit event information.” Pet. Reply 8–10. Patent Owner does not disagree with Petitioner’s proposal. See generally PO Sur-Reply. As the parties do not dispute the meaning of “event socket,” we need not, and do not, expressly construe the term beyond the parties agreed meaning. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner’s contention that Ellis and Spivey differ in that Ellis uses HTTP request-response messages whereas Spivey uses websocket connections between the content delivery system’s server and user equipment. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 106–115). As Petitioner points out, in Ellis’s HTTPS connections, a user equipment requests the server to respond with any new messages. Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 50, 51); Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 37, 40. We agree with Petitioner that Spivey’s websocket connections were a known alternative to HTTP requests. Id. (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 52, 53, 58, 59). We further agree that such websockets constitute bidirectional, full-duplex, stateful, and persistent connections that provide instant updates from the server to the user equipment without the need for the user equipment to request them from the server (referred to as “push” technology). Id. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that, under some scenarios, a POSA would have viewed Spivey’s websocket connections as more advantageous for providing video content and event data to end-users than Ellis’s HTTP request-response protocol, thus motivating simple substitution of Spivey’s LDSD and MQSD for Ellis’s SCS. Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 34, 47; Ex. 1017 ¶ 34; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 114, 115). See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (simple substitution of one known element for another is a recognized rationale supporting a motivation to combine). For example, if server requests are frequent, a POSA would have recognized that the processing overhead of setting up and tearing down HTTP connections would exceed any latency disadvantages of Spivey’s persistent websocket connections. Ex. 1064 ¶ 35. Thus, under some circumstances, a POSA would have been motivated to make the Ellis-Spivey combination, and we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Considering the totality of the evidence, we find Patent Owner has not demonstrated that a long-felt but unresolved need existed for the claimed invention. See Apple, 839 F.3d at 1056. As Petitioner points out, although Patent Owner argues that there is a long-felt need for a system that “allows broadcasters to deliver synchronized, low-latency digital content, such as a video content, and audio content . . . ” (PO Resp. 64), Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s showing that Ellis also discloses “a video streaming system that provided event information over a separate channel, which is not hard embedded in the video stream.” Pet. Reply 23. Further, as Petitioner also points out, “claim 1 simply requires a media source to receive the video stream and distribute the video stream.” Pet. Reply 23. In fact, during Oral Argument, although Patent Owner argues that its invention is “the synchronization and the latency improvements through that one-to-many socket architecture,” Patent Owner conceded that the claims “could be broader than that.” Tr. 44:24–46:16. We agree with Petitioner’s argument that the “claim language” does not “relate to any synchronized, low-latency, scalable, flexible, or new and improved video streaming technique.” Pet. Reply 23. Furthermore, as Petitioner points out, Patent Owner does not cite to any evidence of long-felt but unresolved needs. Pet. Reply 23 (citing PO Resp. 66). In particular, Patent Owner merely provides conclusory statements that, prior to the claimed invention, “conventional video streaming systems” include “hard-embedded event information,” and that “[t]he claimed invention satisfied the long-felt need for an innovative system.” PO Resp. 64–66. Thus, considering the totality of the evidence, we agree with” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 10,805,687 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,805,687
• Qualcomm Incorporated v. Cobblestone Wireless, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01336 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–9, 24, and 25 are unpatentable; claims 10, 13, 14, 17, and 21–23 were not shown unpatentable, principally due to missing limitations or insufficient motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “information” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning as “data,” and that Patent Owner’s narrower construction of “first information” and “second information” lacks sufficient support in the intrinsic record. We agree with Petitioner that the ’802 patent Specification defines “information” as data when it uses the phrase “information (i.e., data).” See Ex. 1001, 5:60–62 (“Information (i.e., data) to be transmitted may be received in a baseband digital system 250, such as a wireless digital baseband processor.” (emphasis added)), 11:30–32 (“In this example, the signals 911 and 912 carry the same information (data).” (emphasis added)). As the Federal Circuit has explained, a “specification’s use of ‘i.e.’ signals an intent to define the word to which it refers.” Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “argument based on Fernandez alone, we find that Petitioner has not provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to support a motivation to remove the amplification from each of Fernandez’s signal generators 10A-10E and add a single power amplifier instead. See Pet. 76–77 Ex. 1003 ¶ 235. Petitioner’s only rationale for this modification to Fernandez is that “[a] single amplifier has several advantages compared to multiple amplifiers, including lower complexity, a single (vs. multiple) potential point of failure, and lower cost,” and that one of ordinary skill “would have found a single amplifier to be a simple matter of design preference.” Pet. 76–77. Dr. Almeroth simply repeats these cursory allegations without providing any further explanation or evidentiary support. Ex. 1003 ¶ 235. Moreover, Dr. Cooklev provides credible testimony that replacing Fernandez’s amplification in signal generators 10A–10E with a single amplifier would not necessarily have the advantages that Petitioner suggests. See Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 99, 104–105. For example, Dr. Cooklev testifies that a single amplifier would need to have a wider bandwidth than the multiple amplifiers used in Fernandez, which could cause potential stability issues. Id. ¶ 105. According to Dr. Cooklev, this wider bandwidth would require more circuit elements, and thus would not provide the reduction in space usage and power consumption that Petitioner asserts. Id. According to Dr. Cooklev, Montojo also points to several “substantial, and potentially impractical, drawbacks” of using a single amplifier for multiple signal generators, including power constraints imposed by spectral emission requirements and on-board battery capacity. Id. ¶ 104 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 7– 8). In light of this testimony, which we find credible, Petitioner has failed to provide sufficient explanation or evidence to support its assertion that one of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to replace the multiple amplifiers in Fernandez’s signal generators with a single amplifier.” slip op. at 65

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “argument based on Fernandez alone, we find that Petitioner has not provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to support a motivation to remove the amplification from each of Fernandez’s signal generators 10A-10E and add a single power amplifier instead. See Pet. 76–77 Ex. 1003 ¶ 235. Petitioner’s only rationale for this modification to Fernandez is that “[a] single amplifier has several advantages compared to multiple amplifiers, including lower complexity, a single (vs. multiple) potential point of failure, and lower cost,” and that one of ordinary skill “would have found a single amplifier to be a simple matter of design preference.” Pet. 76–77. Dr. Almeroth simply repeats these cursory allegations without providing any further explanation or evidentiary support. Ex. 1003 ¶ 235. Moreover, Dr. Cooklev provides credible testimony that replacing Fernandez’s amplification in signal generators 10A–10E with a single amplifier would not necessarily have the advantages that Petitioner suggests. See Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 99, 104–105. For example, Dr. Cooklev testifies that a single amplifier would need to have a wider bandwidth than the multiple amplifiers used in Fernandez, which could cause potential stability issues. Id. ¶ 105. According to Dr. Cooklev, this wider bandwidth would require more circuit elements, and thus would not provide the reduction in space usage and power consumption that Petitioner asserts. Id. According to Dr. Cooklev, Montojo also points to several “substantial, and potentially impractical, drawbacks” of using a single amplifier for multiple signal generators, including power constraints imposed by spectral emission requirements and on-board battery capacity. Id. ¶ 104 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 7– 8). In light of this testimony, which we find credible, Petitioner has failed to provide sufficient explanation or evidence to support its assertion that one of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to replace the multiple amplifiers in Fernandez’s signal generators with a single amplifier.” slip op. at 65

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “We find credible and agree with Dr. Cooklev’s testimony that the predistortion signals from tables 17-1 and 17-2 “are cancelled out by Suzuki’s amplifier” 28. Ex. 2013 ¶ 50. Dr. Cooklev supports his opinion by referring to paragraph 1 of Suzuki, which states that Suzuki’s invention is directed to “a multi-band lookup table type predistorter” (such as the one implemented using lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 in Figure 6) that “compensates for a distortion of a power amplifier.” Ex. 2013 ¶ 54; Ex. 1004 ¶ 1. Dr. Cooklev’s opinion is also supported by paragraph 3 of Suzuki, which explains that a conventional digital predistorter uses a lookup table “for linearizing non-linear characteristics of an amplifier.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 3; Ex. 2013 ¶ 54. Dr. Cooklev further supports his opinion by relying on Suzuki’s disclosure in paragraph 46 that power amplifier 28 is “subject to distortion compensation” by the predistorter, and that distortion components in the signal output by the amplifier are canceled by “distortion compensation data [that] are read out from the lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 and provided to the adders 13-1 and 13-2, respectively.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 46; Ex. 2013 ¶ 54. And, Dr. Cooklev’s opinion is supported by Suzuki’s disclosure in paragraph 47 that the distortion compensation added by adders 13-1 and 13-2 add the distortion compensation data from lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 “to perform distortion compensation (addition of predistortion)” to “signals to be transmitted.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 47; Ex. 2013 ¶ 54. Petitioner agrees that the distortion compensation data from lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 “are added to the respective frequency band from” input signal ST “in order to predistort the output signal, which is then transmitted,” and does not dispute that the distortion compensation data from lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 is ultimately cancelled out by the distortion created by amplifier 28. Pet. Reply 8. In light of the above evidence, we agree with Patent Owner that Suzuki’s distortion components from lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2 in Figure 6 (which Petitioner relies on for the first and second digital signals in limitations 10a and 10b) are cancelled out by the distortion created by power amplifier 28 before the signal is ultimately transmitted. We agree with Petitioner that these first and second digital signals include data in the form of distortion compensation data. However, because these signals are cancelled by the distortion from amplifier 28 before transmission, the data from these signals is never transmitted. Thus, the first and second digital signals identified by Petitioner (the distortion compensation data from lookup tables 17-1 and 17-2) do not comprise data “to be transmitted,” as limitations 10a and 10b require.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 7,924,802 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,924,802
• Alamar Biosciences, Inc. v. Olink Proteomics ABNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01353 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable: the asserted obviousness grounds failed, including because Kanan and Neri did not teach selecting the claimed cis-reactive cells.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, for purposes of this decision we adopt Petitioner’s proposal of a person of ordinary skill in the art, with the following changes noted in italics below: A person with “an advanced degree, such as a Ph.D., in organic chemistry, molecular biology, biochemistry, or a related field; and about two years of experience in industry and/or laboratory experience relating to small molecules and proteins and would have been familiar with nucleic acid chemistry and conventional hybridization techniques; and (b) access to one or more team members having an advanced degree, such as a Ph.D., in organic chemistry, molecular biology, biochemistry, or a related field; and about two years of experience in industry and/or laboratory experience relating to high throughput screening techniques such as nucleic acid sequencing. A person could also have qualified as a POSA with less formal education and more technical or professional experience.11 We emphasize, however, that our decision would not change if we instead used Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a POSA.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Because the parties have placed the limitation “selecting all cis- reactive cells exhibiting the detectable trace” into controversy, we construe the term below, but only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of this phrase, in light of the language of the claims, the Specification, and the prosecution history of record, requires “selecting all of the [molecular complexes or structures] meeting the defined criteria for [cis-reactive cells (CRCs)] and exhibiting the detectable trace.” Sur-reply 8 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 94, 98–119). We further agree that cis-reactive cells should be construed to mean “an association of at least two interactor moieties, joined by an associated oligonucleotide.” (PO Resp. 9 (quoting Ex. 1001, 9:35-37)). Accordingly, we determine that, properly construed, the claims require that what is “selected” at step 1(d) — what is differentiated or set apart from other molecular complexes or structures in the reaction mixture at the conclusion of step 1(d) — to be “an association of at least two interactor moieties joined by an associated oligonucleotide” that exhibits the detectable trace.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree that Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Kanan and Neri teaches “selecting all cis-reactive cells exhibiting the detectable trace,” as we have construed that phrase above. In particular, we determine that, properly construed, the limitation requires the selection of “all associations of at least two interactor moieties joined by an associated oligonucleotide and exhibiting the detectable trace.” Instead, as described in Kanan, what is “selected” is the molecules of interest joined by bond formation, with only one of the molecules of interest coupled to a nucleic acid moiety. Thus, the selected molecular complex or structure does not comprise two interactors (i.e., two molecules of interest coupled to NAMs). Moreover, to the extent there are two interactors, they are joined by the bond between the molecules of interest rather than an associated oligonucleotide.” slip op. at 35

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “III. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE Patent Owner moved to exclude Exhibit 1008, on the ground that it contains settlement statements and that Rule 408 of the Federal Rule of Evidence prohibits Petitioner from using the statements to impeach or contradict Patent Owner. Mot. 5. Because we do not rely in our analysis on this exhibit, we dismiss the Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 7,883,848 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,883,848
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01309 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 19–25 and 27–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Ellis and Spivey; the Board did not find the alternative Herzog, Spivey, and Ellis ground established.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties have not addressed whether the differences in these definitions impact the unpatentability analysis before us. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of a POSITA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’697 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Wicker. We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “And Patent Owner states that it “agree[s] with Petitioner’s construction” with respect to the MPF terms. PO Resp. 13. Although Patent Owner also contends that a “POSITA would understand the ‘means for transmitting’ to be a socket server transmitting through an event socket that implements the algorithms described in Figures 2, 3, 21A–21E and accompanying disclosures” (id.), Patent Owner’s proposed further construction is not disputed by Petitioner. See generally Pet. Reply. Furthermore, Petitioner’s proposed constructions of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 39) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 13–14. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoint[s],” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. at 2. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:11–13.6 Thus, on this record, because there is no dispute between the parties regarding the terms “means for transmitting,” “event socket,” or “socket,” construction is not needed. Accordingly, we decline to provide further analysis or an express construction for these terms.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” wherein Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . a POS[IT]A would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–4. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why a POSITA would have been motivated to make the necessary modification and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 44. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 19–24. In particular, Spivey’s discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”).” slip op. at 51

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for petitioner

    “demonstrated that a long-felt but unresolved need existed for the claimed invention. See Apple v. Samsung, 839 F.3d at 1056. As Petitioner points out, although Patent Owner argues that there is a long-felt need for a system that “allows broadcasters to deliver synchronized, low-latency video and audio content. . . . ” (PO Resp. 66), Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s showing that Ellis also discloses “a video streaming system that provided event information over a separate channel, which is not hard embedded in the video stream.” Pet. Reply 22–23. Further, as Petitioner also points out, “claim 19 simply requires a media source to receive the live stream of digital content and distribute it.” Pet. Reply 23. In fact, during Oral Argument, although Patent Owner argues that its invention is “the synchronization and the latency improvements through that one-to-many socket architecture,” Patent Owner conceded that the claims “could be broader than that.” Tr. 44:24–46:16. We find availing Petitioner’s argument that the “claim language” does not “relate to any synchronized, low-latency, scalable, flexible, or new and improved video streaming technique.” Pet. Reply 23. Nevertheless, as Petitioner points out, Patent Owner does not cite to any evidence as to any long-felt but unresolved needs. Pet. Reply 23 (citing PO Resp. 67–68). In particular, Patent Owner merely provides conclusory statements that, prior to the claimed invention, “conventional video streaming systems” include “hard-embedded event information,” and that “[t]he claimed invention satisfied the long-felt need for an innovative system.” PO Resp. 66–68. Thus, considering the totality of the evidence, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has failed to establish that there was a long-felt but unresolved need for the claimed invention.” slip op. at 59

  Patent outcomesUS 10,425,697 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,425,697
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01308 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable under § 103 over Ellis and Spivey, with Herzog added for claims 2–6; the alternative Herzog, Spivey, and Ellis ground fails.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). On this record, we give “socket” and “event socket” their ordinary and customary meaning. And, as to “socket,” both parties agree that the ordinary and customary meaning for “socket” is a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server. Pet. 37; PO Resp. 2. We decline to provide further analysis or an express construction as doing so is not needed to resolve the dispute between the parties. slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed constructions of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 37) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 12. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoint[s],” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:11–13.6 6 Patent Owner also refers to the District Court’s construction of “event socket” during Oral Argument, by claiming the court’s Claim Construction Order was a part of the record as “Exhibit 1069.” Tr. 73:14–74:17. However, as there is no “Exhibit 1069” in this proceeding, we will not “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). On this record, we give “socket” and “event socket” their ordinary and customary meaning. And, as to “socket,” both parties agree that the ordinary and customary meaning for “socket” is a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server. Pet. 37; PO Resp. 2. We decline to provide further analysis or an express construction as doing so is not needed to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of the invention of the ’697 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, and one to two years of experience in networking environments, including at least some experience with live-streaming network architecture.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education or experience in related fields could compensate for deficits in the above qualifications.” Id. Patent Owner contends that a POSITA at the time of the invention of the ’697 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 13. The parties have not addressed whether the differences in these definitions impact the unpatentability analysis before us. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of a POSITA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’697 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Wicker. We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” wherein Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . a POS[IT]A would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–4. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why a POSITA would have been motivated to make the necessary modification and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 41. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 17–21. In particular, Spivey’s discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”).” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 10,425,697 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,425,697
• Apple Inc. v. Varia Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01364 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–39 are unpatentable under § 103 over Willgert and Mooney; claims 3–9, 15–19, 22–28, and 34–38 are also unpatentable over Willgert, Mooney, Holloway, and Pitroda.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on a review of the record, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with its inclusion of a Computer Science background, because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ‘984 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, our Decision would not be altered if Petitioner’s definition applied.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “d) Analysis Re Construing “Voice Call Signals” We conclude that it is unnecessary to define “voice call signal.” Patent Owner’s construction would read into the term additional limitations that are for the most part already set forth in the claims: “a switchable mobile communications device capable of . . . voice call communication” (claims 1, 13, 21, 32); “output . . . a voice call signal for transmission . . . over a wireless network” (claims 13, 21, 32); “wherein the mobile communication device is a selected one of a wireless mobile phone and a personal digital assistant equipped with communication capability” (claims 12, 20, 31, 39). Thus the claims require a mobile communications device that is capable of communicating a voice call signal, but do not restrict the voice call signal to only be communicated by a mobile communications device. Likewise, claims 13, 21, and 32 (but not claim 1) require the voice call signal to be transmitted over a wireless network, but do not restrict transmission to only a wireless network, and do not restrict the wireless network to “a network of a wireless network service provider,” as Patent Owner would require.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “construction for the RFID transponder signal or data terms — it is sufficient for purposes here to conclude that the claims encompass Petitioner’s “functional emulation” articulation. See Reply 11–12. That is, the purpose of the frequent references to “emulated,” “emulation,” or the like in the ‘984 patent is to emphasize the fact that the mobile communications device of the claims has a dual role: to provide voice call communications, and to transmit RFID transponder data. In the latter role, transmitted RFID transponder data appears to an RFID reader to have been transmitted from an ordinary RFID transponder. But there is no need to rewrite the claims to restore the emulation terms, given that, as we discuss further below, Patent Owner deliberately removed those terms during prosecution. The functional emulation implicit in the ‘984 specification and claims” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “the fact that Willgert teaches that integrating its communications unit into a mobile telephone designed for Bluetooth communication was a “highly user-friendly application,” and that it was well known practice to use a Bluetooth headset wirelessly communicating with the phone to enable hands-free phone calls, as specifically taught by Mooney. Pet. 12–14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, ¶¶ 7, 39, 46–48; Ex. 1021; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner further argues that Bluetooth headsets were widely available, that incorporating the headset involved known methods yielding predictable results, and that one of ordinary skill would have reasonably expected to succeed in combining the teachings of Willgert and Mooney. Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 10; Ex. 1005, ¶ 8; Ex. 1017, 1, 3; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77–79). Patent Owner does not specifically address the issue of motivation to combine Willgert and Mooney. See generally PO Resp. We find, based on the record, that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Willgert and Mooney as proffered by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 8,127,984 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,127,984
• Apple Inc. v. Varia Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01363 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–32 are unpatentable under § 103 over Willgert and Mooney, or Willgert, Mooney, Holloway, and Pitroda, as applicable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner “disputes the narrow range of educational experiences in the Petition’s POSITA definition, but does not otherwise dispute the remaining portion of the definition.” PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner contends that person of ordinary skill in the art: [W]ould have been someone “with at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related field, with a background in radio frequency communications and software development, as well as approximately two years of experience working with or researching radio frequency communication systems. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 34).7 Based on a review of the record, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with its inclusion of a Computer Science background, because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’947 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, our Decision would not be altered if Petitioner’s definition applied.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached

    “d) Analysis Re Construing “Voice Call Signals” We conclude that it is unnecessary to define “voice call signal.” Patent Owner’s construction would read into the term additional limitations that are for the most part already set forth in the claims: “the voice call signal is output over a wireless network” (claims 1 ); “outputting the voice call signal over a wireless network” (claim 9); “output a voice call signal for transmission over a wireless network” (claim 16); transmit voice call signals . . . over a wireless network” (claim 26); “wherein the mobile communication device is one of a wireless mobile phone and a personal digital assistant equipped with communication capability” (claims 8, 15, 25, 32). Thus the claims require the voice call signal to be transmitted over a wireless network, but do not restrict transmission to only a wireless network, and do not restrict the wireless network to “a network of a wireless network service provider,” as Patent Owner would require. We also agree that there is nothing in the ’984 prosecution history that supports Patent Owner’s assertion that the Examiner found that the Bluetooth signal of Cooper was not a voice call signal. Cooper was distinguished because: The term “transceiver,” however, is well understood by those of ordinary skill in the art. One of ordinary skill in the art would not reasonably interpret a “transceiver” so broadly as to incorporate an entire mobile device’s circuitry, and in particular to be read on by two separate transmitters, as Cooper teaches. Ex. 1008, 40. On the other hand, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “This functional emulation solution is served regardless of how the specific RFID transceiver is implemented — the ’947 specification specifically provides for both software and hardware implementations. Id. at 2:24–28 (“Embodiments of the present invention includes . . . certain hardware and/or software embodied therein for the practice of the emulated RFID method”), 3:35–36 (“mobile communication device 102 is equipped with hardware and/or software elements”), 3:52–54 (“substantial portions of the hardware and/or software elements employed to provide a RFID”), 5:16 (“A Hardware/Software Implementation”). There is no reason why one version of the hardware used to emulate the RFID function could not be RFID transponder circuitry. The issue is not whether an RFID transponder can emulate itself, but rather whether RFID transponder circuitry incorporated into a mobile communications device can be used to allow the mobile communications device to emulate a separate RFID transponder. For example, rather than requiring the person described in the Background of the ’947 patent to carry both a mobile phone and a “key with remote control for gaining access to his/her vehicle,” they need only carry the mobile communications device of the claims. The statement in the ’947 patent that “the present invention is related to an emulated radio frequency data input method” (Ex. 1001, 1:22–24), and the other references to emulation, are consistent with a conclusion that the claims encompass the “functional emulation” option as described above. However, there is no basis for adding the negative limitation proposed by Patent Owner (“without the use of a physical RFID transponder”). Omega Engineering, 334 F.3d at 1333 (rejecting a construction because “neither the plain text of the claims, the specification, nor the file wrapper justifies the imposition of this negative limitation”). See also BillJCo, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2023-2189, 2023-2190, 2025 WL 1417957, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2025): Our court has “identified claim constructions that exclude a particular element as including a ‘negative limitation’ and held that such exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 F. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Moreover, the prosecution history of the ’984 grandfather patent is not” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated by the fact that Willgert teaches that integrating its communications unit into a mobile telephone designed for Bluetooth communication was a “highly user- friendly application,” and that it was well known practice to use a Bluetooth headset wirelessly communicating with the phone to enable hands-free phone calls, as specifically taught by Mooney. Pet. 16–18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 30, 32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, ¶¶ 7, 39, 48; Ex. 1021; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–65). Petitioner further argues that Bluetooth headsets were a well-known concept and widely available, that incorporating the headset involved known methods yielding predictable results, and that one of ordinary skill would have reasonably expected to succeed in combining the teachings of Willgert and Mooney. Id. at 19–21 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 10, 30; Ex. 1005, ¶ 8; Ex. 1016; Ex. 1017, 1, 3; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–68). Patent Owner does not specifically address the issue of motivation to combine Willgert and Mooney. See generally PO Resp. We find, based on the record, that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Willgert and Mooney as proffered by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 9,405,947 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,405,947
• Apple Inc. v. Varia Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01362 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable under § 103 over Willgert and Mooney, or over Willgert, Mooney, Holloway, and Pitroda for claims 3–6, 10, 11, and 13–17.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner “disputes the narrow range of educational experiences in the Petition’s POSITA definition, but does not otherwise dispute the remaining portion of the definition.” PO Resp. 12. Patent Owner contends that person of ordinary skill in the art: [W]ould have been someone “with at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related field, with a background in radio frequency communications and software development, as well as approximately two years of experience working with or researching radio frequency communication systems. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 34).7 Based on a review of the record, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with its inclusion of a Computer Science background, because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’974 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, our Decision would not be altered if Petitioner’s definition applied.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s description of the characteristics and operation of a wireless mobile phone, which are not in dispute. Also, the Specification’s description of wireless mobile phones is relied on by Patent Owner in its arguments regarding the construction of “voice call signal,” as discussed below. Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that it is unnecessary to construe the term, “wireless mobile phone.” Reply 4. We agree. The term “wireless mobile phone” is only used in dependent claim 19 (not in independent claim 12, as Patent Owner alleges), and the principal reference relied on by Petitioner (Willgert) explicitly discloses the use of a mobile telephone. Ex. 1001, 12:2; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 30–32. For these reasons, and because our analysis of the issues set forth below is not dependent on Patent Owner’s proposed construction, it is unnecessary to adopt Patent Owner’s construction or otherwise construe the term “wireless mobile phone.”” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “to an emulated radio frequency data input method” (Ex. 1001, 1:20–21), and the other references to emulation, are consistent with a conclusion that the claims encompass the “functional emulation” option as described above. However, there is no basis for adding the negative limitation proposed by Patent Owner (“without the use of a physical RFID transponder”). Omega Engineering, 334 F.3d at 1333 (rejecting a construction because “neither the plain text of the claims, the specification, nor the file wrapper justifies the imposition of this negative limitation”). See also BillJCo, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2023-2189, 2023-2190, 2025 WL 1417957, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2025): Our court has “identified claim constructions that exclude a particular element as including a ‘negative limitation’ and held that such exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 F. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Patent Owner’s argument that the claim language, “[a] transceiver . . . configured to output . . . RFID transponder [signals or data],” only makes sense “if the transceiver is not itself an RFID transponder” (Sur-Reply 10) is not persuasive. Examination of the complete version of the passage that Patent Owner only paraphrases — “[a] transceiver configured to output voice call signals in the first state and to output RFID transponder signals in the second state” — shows that the transceiver is capable of both voice call and RFID functions, and thus there is no inconsistency in allowing the RFID function to be performed by RFID transponder circuitry incorporated into the transceiver.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated by the fact that Willgert teaches that integrating its communications unit into a mobile telephone designed for Bluetooth communication was a “highly user-friendly application,” and that it was well known practice to use a Bluetooth headset wirelessly communicating with the phone to enable hands-free phone calls, as specifically taught by Mooney. Pet. 14–17 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, ¶¶ 7, 39, 46–48; Ex. 1021; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner further argues that Bluetooth headsets were widely available, that incorporating the headset involved known methods yielding predictable results, and that one of ordinary skill would have reasonably expected to succeed in combining the teachings of Willgert and Mooney. Id. at 17–19 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 10; Ex. 1005, ¶ 8; Ex. 1017, 1, 3; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77–79). Patent Owner does not specifically address the issue of motivation to combine Willgert and Mooney. See generally PO Resp. We find, based on the record, that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Willgert and Mooney as proffered by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 8,381,974 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,381,974
• Hanwha Solutions Corporation v. Maxeon Solar Pte. Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2026 · IPR2024-01198 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 10–20 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish the claimed metal impurities or a reason to combine Istratov’s gettering process with the cited solar-cell references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “These disclosures, taken together, indicate that “metal impurities” are undesirable, and, accordingly, the term “metal impurities” is not meant to include intentionally added dopants. The undesirability of “metal impurities” is also demonstrated by the Specification’s instruction that “contaminants and/or impurities” are used interchangeably throughout. Ex. 1001, 5:8–9. In that regard, “iron, nickel, and/or chromium, among others” are the only exemplary metal impurities and/or metal contaminants identified in the Specification. Id. at 4:65–5:1 (“In an embodiment, the silicon substrate 202 can have contaminants and/or impurities 220, for example metal contaminants and/or metal impurities, such as iron, nickel and/or chromium, among others); 5:35–39 (“In an embodiment, the heating can include gettering contaminants, e.g., metal impurities and/or metal contaminants, from the substrate to the emitter region. In an example, the metal impurities and/or metal contaminants can be iron, nickel, and/or contaminants 520, e.g. metal impurities and/or contaminants, can be located in the second emitter region 512 . . . the metal impurities 520 can be iron, nickel and/or chromium, among others.”). And metal impurities and metal contaminants are both described as gettering from the silicon substrate to the emitter region. See id. at 5:5–9 (“A gettering process can be used to trap the metal impurities 220 in the emitter regions 212, reducing recombination within the silicon substrate 202 and improving overall cell lifetime.”); 5:35– 40 (“In an embodiment, the heating can include gettering contaminants, e.g. metal impurities and/or metal contaminant[s], from the substrate to the emitter region. In an example, the metal impurities and/or metal contaminants can be iron, nickel and/or chromium among others.”); 6:5–8 (“In an embodiment, the heating can getter 232 contaminants 220 from, or nearby, the surface 204 of the silicon substrate 202 and/or from within the silicon substrate 202 to the emitter region 212.”) Accordingly, the Specification conveys that “metal impurities” are metal contaminants that are detrimental to the electrical conduction of solar cells.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner fails to sufficiently demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSITA would have been motivated to look to Istratov’s gettering process to improve Choi’s solar cell. Although Petitioner argues that a POSITA would have been motivated to look to Istratov’s gettering process upon identifying detrimental levels of metal impurities in Choi’s substrate, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Holman levels of metal impurities in Choi’s substrate, what level of metal impurities would be “detrimental,” or what detriment the metal impurities would cause. In that regard, Petitioner does not direct us to, nor do we discern, any teachings in Choi regarding the presence of metal impurities in the silicon substrate, let alone iron and/or copper impurities such as those described in Istratov.” slip op. at 24

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “We agree with Petitioner. As the Board indicated in Chicago Mercantile Exchange, whether a document qualifies as a printed publication requires a legal determination based upon evidence and “the issue of whether there is sufficient evidence in the record . . . should be presented in the patent owner response—not a motion to exclude.” Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Paper 35 at 52. Although addressing the admissibility of evidence (authenticity or hearsay) underlying the factual determinations of whether Exhibits 1018, 1034, and 1120 may be the subject of a motion to exclude, Patent Owner’s arguments in the Motion address whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that these exhibits are prior art, not the general admissibility of the documents. See Mot. 3–6; Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Paper 35 at 52. be excluded. These exhibits, for the most part, are offered to support Dr. Holman’s testimony regarding the background of the technology (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 42, 43, 45–52, 56, 57 (citing Ex. 1018), 55, 67 (citing Ex. 1034)) or what the ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood (Pet. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1120); Ex. 1089 ¶¶ 46–48, 56, 59, 60, 69 (citing Ex. 1120)). Furthermore, Exhibit 1018 was authored by Dr. Holman, and is identified in the curriculum vitae appended to Dr. Holman’s declaration in support of the Petition. Ex. 1003, 224 (App’x. A). Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s motion to exclude” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,251,315 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,251,315
• Hanwha Solutions Corporation v. Maxeon Solar Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2026 · IPR2024-01203 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 12 was not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish that Froitzheim’s silver contact was formed over silicon dioxide.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (i) an advanced degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, materials science, or a related discipline and (ii) at least one year of experience 7 Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner raises issues of objective indicia of nonobviousness. designing, developing, or researching the design and/or manufacture of solar cells or related technologies. Alternatively, a POSITA [i.e., a person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had (i) a bachelor’s degree in the aforementioned disciplines and (ii) at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching the design and/or manufacture of solar cells or related technologies. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, and vice versa.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claim terms according to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, we give claim terms “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reasonable expectation of success in the combination of Froitzheim and Gan. Petitioner explains that the combination of Froitzheim and Gan simply replaces one emitter, i.e., Froitzheim’s diffused emitter, with the polysilicon emitter of Gan. Pet. 36. According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have also readily understood how to replace a diffused emitter with a polysilicon emitter and oxide layer [and] would have understood that instead of diffusing boron into the substrate’s back side as taught by Froitzheim, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would instead follow the manufacturing technique taught by Gan. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1005, 246). Petitioner explains that the Gan processes are well-known and routine, and Dr. Holman states that “modifying Froitzheim in view of Gan simply involves using Gan’s known technique of a polysilicon emitter and oxide layer with Froitzheim’s known solar cell to improve Froitzheim’s solar cell in a similar way.” Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 144). For example, Petitioner directs our attention to “multiple instances” in which oxide layers and polysilicon emitters have been implemented successfully in the art. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1005, 246; Ex. 1006 ¶ 22; Ex. 1046, Abstr., 1121; Ex. 1003 ¶ 145). Furthermore, Gan’s statement that “cell performance can be improved if the diffused-emitter is replaced with the polysilicon emitter” and “polysilicon emitters with low J0 and ρc can be obtained with a very small fraction of interfacial oxide breakup” indicate a reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1005, 245, 249. Gan also states that “polysilicon emitters with these qualities can be quite useful for silicon concentrator solar cells.” Ex. 1005, 249. Thus, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Froitzheim and Gan.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded the record evidence rises to the level of a teaching away. “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). And “teaching away” requires more than the mere expression of a general preference.” Galderma Labs., L.P., v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Notably, our reviewing court has determined that a reference can distinguish prior art in order to show the novelty of an invention without teaching away from combining the prior art with the invention disclosed in the reference. See Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Li prefers a “heterogeneous PN junction” and states that “a PN junction is prepared by a low-temperature deposition method, which avoids a conventional diffusion process at 800–1000°C. Such high-temperature process will cause more defects or contamination in silicon material, which will affect the improvement of cell efficiency.” Ex. 1008, 4. But, Li’s preference for lower temperature diffusion processes does not amount to a teaching away from the broader disclosure. In fact, Li acknowledges that “[t]he silicon thin film can be prepared by any deposition method,” including conventional processes at higher temperatures. Ex. 1008, 4 (emphasis added). And, while Patent Owner asserts that “[d]eposition methods are not relevant to the parties’ dispute, which is over deposition temperature” (Sur-reply 17), the deposition method employed includes its deposition temperature. See Ex. 1008, 4 (Li describing “conventional” diffusion processes at temperatures of 800–1000° C). Thus, just because Li teaches one way of depositing its silicon thin film using a low-temperature deposition method does not mean that Li teaches away from high-temperature processes. Li’s teachings do not discredit or discourage high-temperature processes in a manner that may be said to teach away.” slip op. at 51

  Patent outcomesUS 8,222,516 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,222,516

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.