PTAB
Advanced fields
235 decisions · 750msnewest first
  • PTAB · Dec 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00848 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 10, 11, 15, 16, 20–22, 44, 47–49, 51–54, 58–60, and 62–64, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on all challenged grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 10, 11, 15, 16, 20–22, 44, 47–49, 51–54, 58–60, and 62–64 in the ’808 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner has applied Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because the Preliminary Response “does not depend on this skill level.” Prelim. Resp. 27. Patent Owner “reserves the right to argue in favor of different level of skill should trial be instituted.” Id. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’808 patent as well as the asserted references. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 24.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the current record, we agree with the parties that the term “skip coding mode” includes “a coding mode in which a zero (non-active) motion vector or a non-zero (active) motion vector is associated with each skip mode macroblock, depending on the characteristics of the motion in image segments surrounding the macroblock in question.” See Ex. 1001, 17:45–52; Ex. 1022, 5–10, 15; Pet. 12–14; Prelim. Resp. 29. “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no other claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 19

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Analogous artInstituted

      “Karczewicz teaches limitation 10a. See Pet. 17–25; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79, 155–174. As Petitioner asserts, Karczewicz discloses the following “coding options” or “coding modes” that collectively correspond to the claimed “skip coding mode”: (i) “[t]he segment may be represented as a prediction field only” that “may arise when the segment can be adequately represented in terms of the motion field of one or more of its previously coded neighbors and no refinement information is necessary, or in a case where the encoder has found it efficient to reduce the refinement field to zero”; and (ii) “[t]he segment can also be coded by using a zero motion vector field, e.g., a copy from the reference frame.” Ex. 1006, 17:8, 17:10–14, 31:22–24, 55:18–23; see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79, 158–161, 164, 169, 170–171; Pet. 21–22. For each of these “coding options” or “coding modes,” an encoder transmits no motion coefficients to a decoder and the MCI bit is zero, indicating the absence of motion coefficients. Ex. 1006, 17:8, 17:10–14, 31:22–24, 37:5–8, 37:12–13; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 169. Karczewicz also discloses “assigning” these “coding options” or “coding modes” based on a rate-distortion, best-match evaluation as follows: “a comparison between the amount of data of required a) to transmit motion coefficient data determined specifically for the second segment and b) that required if the second segment’s motion vector field is determined from a projection of the motion model of the first segment plus some ‘refinement’ information.” Ex. 1006, 15:15–20; see id. at 14:12–17, 15:22–25, 17:2–4, 19:2–5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 159. Based on the current record, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to combine these “coding options” or “coding modes” because the combination “minimizes the number of bits needed to encode the segment (e.g., utilizing the zero motion vector when appropriate, otherwise utilizing the prediction motion vector field, without refinement, when encoding motion information for the segment).” Ex. 1003 ¶ 170.” slip op. at 32

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,532,808
  • PTAB · Dec 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00847 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 23–25, 28–30, 32, 34, 36, 39–41, 43, and 65, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on the petition’s § 103 grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 23–25, 28–30, 32, 34, 36, 39–41, 43, and 65 in the ’808 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

      “Karczewicz teaches limitation 1a. See Pet. 17–24; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79, 93–115. As Petitioner asserts, Karczewicz discloses the following “coding options” or “coding modes” that collectively correspond to the claimed “skip coding mode”: (i) “[t]he segment may be represented as a prediction field only” that “may arise when the segment can be adequately represented in terms of the motion field of one or more of its previously coded neighbors and no refinement information is necessary, or in a case where the encoder has found it efficient to reduce the refinement field to zero”; and (ii) “[t]he segment can also be coded by using a zero motion vector field, e.g., a copy from the reference frame.” Ex. 1006, 17:8, 17:10–14, 31:22–24, 55:18–23; see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79, 96–99, 102, 110, 112–113; Pet. 21–22. For each of these “coding options” or “coding modes,” an encoder transmits no motion coefficients to a decoder and the MCI bit is zero, indicating the absence of motion coefficients. Ex. 1006, 17:8, 17:10–14, 31:22–24, 37:5–8, 37:12–13; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 111.” slip op. at 31

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

      “See Pet. 2 n.2, 3–4; Prelim. Resp. 18, 37 n.13. Patent Owner relies on the ’072 provisional to antedate Frojdh. Prelim. Resp. 37 & n.13. If a patent owner relies on an earlier application to antedate a reference, the patent owner must “show not only the existence of the earlier application, but why the written description in the earlier application supports the claim,” i.e., “all the limitations” in the claim. Tech. Licensing, 545 F.3d at 1327. Although Patent Owner notes that the ’808 patent claims the benefit of priority to the ’072 provisional’s March 15, 2002, filing date, Patent Owner does not the show why the ’072 provisional’s written description supports any of the challenged claims. See Prelim. Resp. 12–24, 37–39, 37 n.13. Based on the current record, Patent Owner has not shouldered its burden to antedate Frojdh’s November 27, 2002, filing date. See id. Hence, based on the current record, Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that Frojdh qualifies as prior art because Frojdh’s November 27, 2002, filing date precedes the ’549 application’s March 14, 2003, filing date. See Ex. 1001, code (22); Ex. 1007, code (22).” slip op. at 46

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “how the combined disclosures in Frojdh and H.263 teach the claimed subject matter. See Pet. 65–75. Further, Petitioner identifies reasons that would have prompted an ordinarily skilled artisan to combine Frojdh’s teachings with H.263’s teachings with a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed subject matter. See id. at 61–64. Dr. Havlicek’s testimony supports Petitioner’s positions. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 303–337.” slip op. at 61

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,532,808
  • PTAB · Nov 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00886 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution for claims 9–16 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and neither obviousness challenge presented compelling merits.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “When determining whether to exercise discretion to deny institution in view of a parallel proceeding, we consider the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “or Ingale in view of Jung. Pet. 18–51. For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner’s showing does not rise to the level of “compelling merits” according to the Office’s current guidance and Board precedents. CommScope at 3–4 (quoting Guidance Memo, 4) (“[W]hen determining whether there is a compelling unpatentability challenge, the Board evaluates whether the Petition presents challenges ‘in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.”); OpenSky Indus., LLC v. VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR2021-01064, Paper 102 at 49–50 (PTAB only ‘plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable’ . . . if it is highly likely that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim”). 1. Petitioner’s Showing for Claim 9 Below we provide an element-by-element analysis of Petitioner’s obviousness showing for claim 9. After considering the evidence supporting Petitioner’s obviousness showing, and Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence as to why Petitioners’ obviousness showing is deficient, we consider whether the totality of the evidence rises to the level of compelling merits.” slip op. at 19

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

      “For the reasons set forth above, and even if we consider Petitioner’s proposed rationale for combining Ingale and Jung to be supported by sufficient rational underpinnings (see e.g., Pet. 24–27), neither Jung nor Ingale, either individually or in the proposed combination set forth by Petitioner teach or suggest limitation 9.6 of claim 9 so as to rise to a compelling, meritorious showing for claim 9. 4. Remaining Claims Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for independent claim 13 (Pet. 58–59) and dependent claims 10–12 and 14–16 (id. at 51–57, 59–60) are substantially similar to Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for claim 9 and are unopposed at this stage by Patent Owner (except for the issues discussed above with respect to independent claim 9) (see e.g., Prelim. Resp. 15). Accordingly, Petitioner’s showing for claims 10–16 do not differ or deviate from the showing with respect to independent claim 9 so as to rise to the level of a compelling, meritorious showing, either for independent claim 9, or any of claims 10–16.” slip op. at 32

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “At this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition of the POSA. Prelim. Resp. 6–7 (“For purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.”). Petitioner’s description of a POSITA appears consistent with the subject matter of the ’557 patent and with the prior art of record, we apply it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,019,557
  • PTAB · Nov 7, 2024 · IPR2024-00803 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–18 obvious over Verhaege, Verhaege and Miller, or Ker.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelOther

      “(‘POSITA’) in the field of the ’665 patent in 2007 would have at least a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and three to five years of experience in integrated circuit design.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s definition is “excessively high.” Prelim. Resp. 3 n.1. In Patent Owner’s view, “a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or an equivalent technical degree and two years of experience in mixed-signal (i.e., analog/digital) circuit design.” Id. (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 30–34). We need not resolve this dispute because our decision would be the same under either definition.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). In Patent Owner’s view, “the claims require sharing ESD charge from one pad with a different I/O pad.” Prelim. Resp. 27. Patent Owner argues that charge sharing is the only way that charging the pad capacitance can reduce a maximum voltage, as recited. Id. at 24–25. Apart from the charge sharing, Patent Owner argues that the recited enable or control circuitry is not located in the circuit where the ESD event occurs. Id. at 27–33. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner disagrees with this interpretation. Id. Petitioner, though, argues that it would have been obvious to duplicate Verhaege’s and Ker’s protection circuits. See, e.g., id. at 18 (discussing claim 1 and Verhaege), 48 (discussing the Verhaege-Miller combination), 66 (discussing claim 1 and Kerr). For example, Petitioner argues that “a POSITA would have been motivated to use the improved protection circuit of Verhaege, apply it at every I/O pad, and share the ESD energy across multiple pad circuits as taught by Miller.” See id. at 48 (emphasis added). From statements like these, Patent Owner draws the conclusion that Petitioner must also be interpreting the claims to require charge sharing. Prelim. Resp. 25–27. For the reasons discussed in Section II.C below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of showing that any claims are unpatentable even under the implied claim construction used in its obviousness rationale. The Board need not expressly construe any claims in reaching that conclusion.” slip op. at 6

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Petitioner argues, “It would have been obvious to a POSITA that, because an ESD event could occur at any I/O pad, the Verhaege invention should be repeated at every I/O pad.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 67); id at 30–32 (claim 6); id. at 43 (claim 14). Yet Petitioner acknowledges that “there were many obvious ways to activate multiple circuits during an ESD event.” Id. at 51. The Petition does not sufficiently explain why it would have been obvious to have chosen the way that is claimed. See id. at 18, 30– 32, 43. Rather, Petitioner’s obviousness rationale appears to be based on impermissible hindsight gleaned entirely from the challenged patent’s 1327, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“It appears that [the expert] relied on the . . . patent itself as her roadmap for putting what she referred to as pieces of a ‘jigsaw puzzle’ together.”). For this additional reason, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenges to claims 1, 6, and 14.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 7,564,665
  • PTAB · Nov 7, 2024 · IPR2024-00605 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution

    Instituted review of claims 9–14, 23–28, and 30 on all petition grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.§ 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Upon consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record before us, we conclude Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’714 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’714 patent on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “Based on the foregoing arguments, which lack specifics and do not sufficiently map the particular teachings from Rusert relied on by Petitioner to the disclosures of Han, Tai, and Huang, we do not find Rusert to be cumulative of these references. Further, even if all of Rusert’s teachings 13 Han, Woo-Jin, et al., Improved Video Compression Efficiency Through Flexible Unit Representation and Corresponding Extension of Coding Tools, 20 IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology 1709 (2010). 14 Tai, Shen-Chuan, et al., A Multi-Pass True Motion Estimation Scheme with Motion Vector Propagation for Frame Rate Up-Conversion Applications, 4 Journal of Display Technology 188 (2008). 15 Huang, Ai-Mei, et al., A Multistage Motion Vector Processing Method for Motion-Compensated Frame Interpolation, 17 IEEE Transactions on Image Processing 694 (2008). relied on by Petitioner can be found in Han, Tai, and Huang as a collection of separate partial teachings from each, that still does not demonstrate Rusert as a cumulative reference. The quality of disclosure simply is not the same if three references have to be combined to yield what Rusert itself discloses. Patent Owner also does not explain how it combines Han, Tai, and Huang to provide the same teachings relied on from Rusert by Petitioner.16” slip op. at 65

    • Parallel petitionsDenied

      “Although we do not think 30 claims are too numerous for one petition to cover, many claims in the ’714 patent are extraordinarily lengthy and include numerous limitations. For example, claim 6, which depends from claim 5 which depends from claim 1, is more than one column long in the ’714 patent. The length of claim 20, which depends from claim 19, which depends from claim 15, also is more than one column long in the ’714 patent. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that the subject matter of the ’714 patent is complex. We further agree with Petitioner that the division of claims among the two petitions, i.e., encoder claims in IPR2024-00604 and decoder claims in IPR2024-00605, is a structured division which helps to facilitate the handling of two petitions. Patent Owner has not presented arguments urging that the filing of two petitions by Petitioner against the ’714 patent is excessive. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the filing of two petitions by Petitioner against the ’714 patent is reasonable under these circumstances. We decline to exercise discretion to deny either petition on the ground of the Petitioner filing an excessive number of petitions against the ’714 patent.” slip op. at 69

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Citing testimony from Dr. Creusere, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art (hereinafter “POSITA”) “would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study such as physics, and (2) approximately two to three years of practical experience with video encoding/decoding.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 57–59). Patent Owner states that it “has applied Petitioner’s POSITA for the sake of this Response.” Prelim. Resp. 31. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Creusere and not 11 The record does not include any evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). C.” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,536,714
  • PTAB · Nov 7, 2024 · IPR2024-00604 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–8, 15–22, and 29 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim based on the Rusert grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.§ 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Upon consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record before us, we conclude Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’714 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’714 patent on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “Based on the foregoing arguments, which lack specifics and do not sufficiently map the particular teachings from Rusert relied on by Petitioner to the disclosures of Han, Tai, and Huang, we do not find Rusert to be cumulative of these references. Further, even if all of Rusert’s teachings relied on by Petitioner can be found in Han, Tai, and Huang as a collection of separate partial teachings from each, that still does not demonstrate Rusert as a cumulative reference. The quality of disclosure simply is not the same if three references have to be combined to yield what Rusert itself discloses.” slip op. at 63

    • Parallel petitionsDenied

      “Although we do not think 30 claims are too numerous for one petition to cover, many claims in the ’714 patent are extraordinarily lengthy and include numerous limitations. For example, claim 6, which depends from claim 5, which depends from claim 1, is more than one column long in the ’714 patent. The length of claim 20, which depends from claim 19, which depends from claim 15, also is more than one column long in the ’714 patent. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that the subject matter of the ’714 patent is complex. We further agree with Petitioner that the division of claims among the two petitions, i.e., encoder claims in IPR2024-00604 and decoder claims in IPR2024-00605, is a structured division which helps to facilitate the handling of two petitions. Patent Owner has not presented arguments urging that the filing of two petitions by Petitioner against the ’714 patent is excessive. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the filing of two petitions by Petitioner against the ’714 patent is reasonable under these circumstances. We decline to exercise discretion to deny either petition on the ground of the Petitioner filing an excessive number of petitions against the ’714 patent.” slip op. at 67

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Creusere and not 11 The record does not include any evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). C.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,536,714
  • PTAB · Oct 28, 2024 · IPR2023-00792 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Lamb and Williams; claims 1 and 11 are also unpatentable as obvious over Sharma.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “In sum, we determine that Mr. McNair has experience in residential security and alarm systems and sixty years of experience in the research, design, development, and engineering of the technology underlying such systems that is sufficient for him to at minimum possess ordinary skill in the art. Id. ¶¶ 6–12. Also, his years of experience at the Security and System Reliability Architecture Group at AT&T Bell labs alone (id. ¶ 10; see also, id. at p. 147) meets the three or more years of commercial design and development experience in security and alarm systems, under Patent Owner’s definition (PO Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 34)). Thus, on this record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Bruce McNair lacks knowledge and skill at least of an ordinarily skilled artisan—even under Patent Owner’s definition. See PO Resp. 6. In this decision, we assign Bruce McNair’s testimony the appropriate weight, as discussed in our analysis below.” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, in electrical engineering, or a related field, and approximately two or more years of experience or equivalent study in sensor systems.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 10031 ¶¶ 37–40). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. at 12–13. Patent Owner disagrees and argues, [A person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had at least a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in electrical or electronic engi-neering or an equivalent field, and three or more years of com-mercial design and development experience in residential or business security and alarm systems. 1 Exhibit 1003 is the declaration of Bruce McNair. The differences between the two skill levels does not affect the Board’s analysis of Petitioner’s challenge. In fact, Patent Owner’s addition of experience in “security and alarm systems” only increases the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 6. Our conclusion that Petitioner has shown that all challenged claims are unpatentable is the same under either definition.” slip op. at 4

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Either way, “defining a particular claim term by its function is not improper.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For example, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has found that there is “nothing improper about defining ‘datalink’ as a link that conveys data.” Id. at 1375. “Many devices take their names from the functions they perform. The examples are innumerable, such as ‘filter,’ ‘brake,’ ‘clamp,’ ‘screwdriver,’ or ‘lock.’” Id. (quoting Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Here, the functions recited in claims 1 and 11 limit what the “timed alarm signal” indicates, how it is used as well as its relationship to a timer, alarm, and security panel. If not for a timer associated with the security panel, there is no clear purpose for transmitting the “timed alarm signal” only when the specific determination is made, and that claimed determination would be rendered superfluous. A construction that requires the purpose of initiating a timer associated with the security panel is consistent with rest of the functions and steps recited in claims 1 and 11. Considering the claim as a whole, the other expressly recited functions and steps support our decision to include the signal’s purpose in our construction.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree. Petitioner’s obviousness rationale is persuasive and supported by the evidence of record. See In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Essentially, Lamb assumes that the detected person is authorized. Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 37, 40, 58–59, cited in Pet. 17. Williams’s system permits authorized persons to use the space, while retaining security against intruders. Ex. 1010, 2:31–38, cited in Pet. 18. Petitioner persuasively supports the assertion that waiting for an authorization code would enhance system security in Lamb because one of ordinary skill in the art would been motivated “to verify—and not assume— that a potential alarm was triggered by an authorized person.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1010, 2:35–38). We credit Bruce McNair’s testimony on this issue (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–54) because it is supported by the record (Ex. 1010, 2:31–38; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 37, 40, 58–59).” slip op. at 33

    Patent outcomesUS 10,692,340 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,692,340
  • PTAB · Oct 4, 2024 · IPR2024-00725 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–22 were unpatentable; Yagasaki did not disclose the claimed intentional discontinuity in image-frame numbering.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.§ 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential) (footnote omitted). Upon consideration of the contentions of the parties and the evidence before us, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’134 patent. We decline to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Havlicek and not 8 The record does not include any evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Also, our conclusion would be the same even if we applied Patent Owner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art. C.” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner has not proposed a construction for any claim term and asserts that “no constructions are necessary to resolve any disputes identified in this Petition.” Pet. 7 (footnote omitted). Patent Owner does not disagree and also has not itself proposed any construction. Prelim. Resp. 9. We find that no express construction for any claim term is necessary. D.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable

      “According to limitation 1[a], the decoded “indication” must “inform[] an intentional discontinuity of numbering of the image frames.” Petitioner has not sufficiently shown any discontinuity of the numbering of image frames. Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner relies on continuously incremented ‘temporal_reference codes’ as the claimed numbering, but these continuously incremented ‘temporal_reference codes’ never have a discontinuity.” Prelim. Resp. 11. We determine that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown, for institution purposes, a discontinuity in these temporal_reference codes. Petitioner’s argument assumes, without adequate supporting basis, that when a duplicate picture is eliminated by the encoder such that no image picture content is provided in the encoder output, the temporal_reference code for that duplicate picture is also eliminated and not provided in the encoder output to be furnished to the decoder. To prevail, this alleged fact must be sufficiently shown and not assumed. The Petition made no adequate showing. Yagasaki expressly states: “The temporal reference generator [within the encoder] feeds the temporal reference code to the variable-length coder 1006 for inclusion in the coding apparatus output signal VC1.” Ex. 1005, 19:27–29. We find no statement or indication of an exception for a duplicate picture of which the image data is “eliminated,” and Petitioner has not pointed us to any such description.” slip op. at 28

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,204,134
  • PTAB · Sep 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00646 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Al-Shyoukh and Ivanov.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “and Trademark Office under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Applying that standard, we institute an inter partes review of all the challenged claims of the ’074 patent for the reasons explained below. This is a preliminary decision, and we will base our final written decision on the full trial record.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Relying on Dr. Chen’s testimony, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering, or alternatively a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and two years of experience working on analog circuit design.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 38). At this stage, Petitioner’s argument is uncontested, and it appears to be supported by the types of problems and solutions in the ’074 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:25–2:44. Thus, we adopt the formulation preliminarily for this decision.” slip op. at 9

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “claim constructions that correspond to constructions it expects Patent Owner to assert. See Pet. 20 n.2. After Patent Owner filed its Preliminary Response, Petitioner notified us that the district court in the parallel district court litigation issued a claim construction order interpreting two terms relevant to this proceeding, as shown below: Claim Term District Court’s Construction” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

      “limitation was indefinite because it was subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 and the ’074 patent failed to disclose sufficient corresponding structure. See Ex. 3001, 9. However, in its Petition, Petitioner adopts what it understands to be Patent Owner’s claim-construction in the parallel proceeding: “that 1[d] is not a means-plus-function element under [§ 112 paragraph 6], and to the extent it is, the claimed function is to enable/disable the biasing circuit for reducing standby current, and the corresponding structure is the signal input line at node M in Figure 3.” Pet. 21–22. Assuming that limitation 1[d] does not invoke § 112 paragraph 6, Petitioner argues that “Al-Shyoukh discloses inputs from a biasing circuit into its LDO but does not specify a design,” but Ivanov discloses a specific design for implementing the recited enable/disable function, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to incorporate Ivanov’s design into Al-Shyoukh’s LDO. Pet. 22–26 (citing Ex. 1004, 1732; Ex. 1005, 1:6–18, 3:43–49, 3:54–63, 4:26–33, 5:19–25, 6:7–22, 6:47–54, Figs. 1, 2; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60–70). Alternatively, if limitation 1[d] invokes § 112 paragraph 6 and Patent Owner is correct that the corresponding structure is the signal input line at node M in Figure 3 of the ’074 patent, Petitioner argues that this structure is identical to Ivanov’s input line 8. Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1001, Figs. 1, 3; Ex. 1002 ¶ 69).” slip op. at 24

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,471,074
  • PTAB · Sep 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00627 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 19–36 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 19, 25, and 31 are unpatentable over Walker and Karczewicz I and II.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), the Board may exercise discretion to deny a petition that presents the same or substantially the same art or arguments as were previously presented to the Office. To evaluate arguments for discretionary denial under § 325(d), the Board uses a two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. If a condition in the first part of the framework is satisfied and the petitioner fails to make a showing of material error, the Director generally will exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 5

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA): at the time of the alleged invention of the ’267 patent would have had a (1) Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study such as physics, and (2) approximately two to three years of practical experience with video encoding/decoding. Additional experience can substitute for the level of education, and vice-versa. Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 10038 ¶¶ 33–36). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition. Prelim. Resp. 27. For this decision, we also apply this definition.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 8 Exhibit 1003 is a declaration of Immanuel Freedman, Ph.D. According to Petitioner, the term “‘precision’ is satisfied by, but not necessarily limited to, ‘a number of bits needed to represent possible values.’” Pet. 12. According to Patent Owner, the Preliminary Response does not address the definition of “precision” because Patent Owner’s arguments do not depend on it. Prelim. Resp. 27. At this stage, we need not construe the term “precision” because it is not necessary to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionOther

      “values and final predictions, however, is not expressly recited in the claim. See id. Rather, claim 19 merely recites a “first” and “second” prediction. As noted by both parties, the claim limits predictions to those obtained from the reference block. See Ex. 1001, 23:35–39.11 The first and second reference blocks are determined from motion vectors. Id. at 21:15–31. The first and second predictions form a “combined prediction.” Id. at 21:28–29. Under Patent Owner’s description of intermediate values (Prelim. Resp. 46–56), the first and second predictions can be thought of as intermediate values with respect to the combined prediction. Thus, the plain language of the claim is not consistent with the argument that intermediate values cannot be predictions. Nor do we see, at this stage and on this record, any part of the specification of the ’267 patent that provides a clear standard for determining what it means for a value to be a “final” prediction. Indeed, the “claims ‘must be read in view of the specification,’” which “‘is always highly relevant” and usually dispositive. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id.” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 11,805,267

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.