- PTAB · Jan 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01052 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all four asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success and insufficient nexus for GoPro’s objective-indicia evidence.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final but are made solely to determine whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–20 of the ’832 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have the following characteristics: “a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras[; a]lternatively, . . . four years of experience working on image or video processing or digital 7 Objective evidence of nonobviousness is presently asserted. Prelim. Resp. 23–30. cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–38). Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’832 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“any viewing window determined for frames of a video is sufficient to be a function of progress merely because they are frames of a video that can be played back.” Prelim. Resp. 14. This argument is unpersuasive because it does not consider the entire context of claim 1. The relevant recitation requires more than just playback; instead, the recitation requires determining “a viewing window for the visual content as a function of progress through the progress length based on the rotational positions of the image capture device as the function of progress through the capture duration.” Ex. 1001, 28:44–48 (emphases added). The recitation as a whole requires making a specific determination for the viewing window at different points in time. Patent Owner also argues that “Petitioner’s theory would improperly render the limitation superfluous” because the claim elsewhere requires that visual content be viewable as a function of progress. Prelim. Resp. 14–15. Similarly, Patent Owner argues that the claims already require obtaining rotational positions as a function of progress. Id. at 20–21. We disagree that the limitation is superfluous. Aside from playback or obtaining rotational information, claims 1 and 11 also require that the viewing window be determined for different times within the video. In other words, if the viewing window were determined only once and this single determination were applied to every frame of an entire video, this would not meet the recitation, even if the video could be played back. slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner adequately establishes that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu with a reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–81, 89–92; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 4, 8, 9, 27, 29, 35; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26, 41, 46, 51–52, 55–57, Figs. 6–7. Pecurariu and Thomason are in the same field of endeavor, and we agree with Petitioner, on this record, that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Pecurariu’s teachings would have predictably improved Thomason. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not adequately establish reason to combine with rational underpinning. Prelim. Resp. 5–10. In particular, Patent Owner quotes the Petition at pages 23–24 and argues that these statements regarding reason to combine are unexplained and conclusory. Id. at 6–7. On the present record, we disagree with Patent Owner. Petitioner’s statements regarding reason to combine must be considered in view of the context provided by the entire Petition including Petitioner’s discussion of the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu individually. See, e.g., Pet. 8–46. Similarly, the opinions of Dr. Katsaggelos regarding reason to combine (see, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–92, 95, 104, 112, 115) must be considered given the complete context of Dr. Katsaggelos’s discussion of the cited art and technology. Id. ¶¶ 47–115. As explained above, Petitioner and Dr. Katsaggelos explain the references’ teachings and, based on these teachings, assert that a person having skill in the art would have had reason to combine with reasonable expectation of success based on those teachings. Reason to combine may properly come from the references themselves. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (explaining reason to combine may come from “interrelated teachings of multiple patents). On this record and based on the teachings of these references and the great similarity of the references’ technology, as we discuss above and, in more detail, below, Petitioner has a reasonable likelihood in showing that a person having skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of the references with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 34
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,336,832 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Eight KHZ, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 7, 2025 · IPR2023-01003 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 6, 15, 16, and 19 are unpatentable; claims 2, 8–10, 12, 14, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“1. “Call” Terms (Claims 1, 8, and 15) The parties, and their respective experts, agree that “telephone call” (claim 1), “electronic call” (claim 8), and “electronic phone call” (claim 15) should be interpreted to mean “voice communication over an electronic network between at least two parties,” which was Patent Owner’s proposal in the district court case. See Pet. 16, 19 n.8, 58 (citing Ex. 1027, 9);1 Ex. 1003 ¶ 82; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 51–53; Ex. 2016, 176:10–177:6 (Dr. Kyriakakis agreeing that “there is live voice exchange during a telephone call” (in addition to “background noise”)), 180:22–181:11 (same). Based on our review of the ’090 patent, we agree as well and adopt that interpretation for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 3, l. 1–col. 5, l. 44 (“Consider an example in which a listener sits at his kitchen table and has an electronic telephone call with his mother.”), Fig. 1. 1 When citing non-patent references, we refer to page numbers added by Petitioner in the bottom-right corner of the exhibit. Listening Person” (Claim 1) and “Sound Localization Point . . . Away From and Proximate to the First Person” (Claim 15) a) Procedural History As explained above, the parties did not propose any express interpretations in their Petition and Response. See Pet. 15; PO Resp. 3. Patent Owner argued, however, that “Petitioner and Dr. Kyriakakis misapprehend the scope and meaning of the [c]hallenged [c]laims.” PO Resp. 35–49. For example, Patent Owner argued that they “mischaracterize [c]laim 1’s scope as exclusively directed at binaural recording (but not binaural synthesis),” claim 8 “inherently us[es] binaural synthesis and HRTF processing,” and “binaural synthesis methods must be employed” for claim 15. Id. at 36, 46, 48–49 (emphasis omitted). In its Reply, Petitioner characterized the dispute between the parties as pertaining to the phrase “away from and proximate to,” where Petitioner proposed an interpretation of “a distance from” and Patent Owner allegedly was proposing “externalization of sound through HRTFs and [6 degree of freedom (6DOF)] tracking of the listener relative to the SLP that represents the talker.” Reply 2–12. Patent Owner responded in its Sur-Reply by stating that Petitioner “mischaracterizes” Patent Owner’s arguments, Petitioner “disputes constructions that [Patent Owner] never proposed,” and Petitioner’s focus on certain claim language for which Patent Owner “never proposed construction” was “misplaced.” Sur-Reply 1–2, 11. Patent Owner agreed, though, that the parties’ disagreement was “whether the claims require HRTF processing and whether [the] prior art teaches such processing.” Id. at 5; see Tr. 49:19–21 (Patent Owner agreeing that the dispute is “whether the claims require . . . processing with HRTFs”). dispute between the parties, as many of the arguments regarding claim interpretation in the parties’ papers were interspersed with discussions of the prior art, the state of the art, and related declarant testimony. Paper 56, 3–4. In particular, we requested that the parties identify “the specific claim language that allegedly does or does not require HRTF processing” and the support in the record for each party’s interpretation. Id. at 4. Patent Owner responded that all of the challenged claims “require HRTF processing” because they recite the phrase “sound localization point . . . away from and proximate to the [listener].”2 PO Supp. Br. 1 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner disagreed. Pet. Supp. Br. 1. Accordingly, we interpret that phrase as it appears in independent claims 1 and 15 and, specifically, address whether the phrase requires HRTF processing.3” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“dispute between the parties, as many of the arguments regarding claim interpretation in the parties’ papers were interspersed with discussions of the prior art, the state of the art, and related declarant testimony. Paper 56, 3–4. In particular, we requested that the parties identify “the specific claim language that allegedly does or does not require HRTF processing” and the support in the record for each party’s interpretation. Id. at 4. Patent Owner responded that all of the challenged claims “require HRTF processing” because they recite the phrase “sound localization point . . . away from and proximate to the [listener].”2 PO Supp. Br. 1 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner disagreed. Pet. Supp. Br. 1. Accordingly, we interpret that phrase as it appears in independent claims 1 and 15 and, specifically, address whether the phrase requires HRTF processing.3” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner relies on its earlier arguments regarding claim 17. Pet. 41; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 184 (citing earlier analysis of Bedingfield). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to apply Ballas’s wearable frame with head tracking and HRTF processing to Bedingfield-Andrea’s headphones” to “provide[] a more realistic virtual experience,” but does not make any argument that Ballas teaches changing an ITD. Pet. 39–43; see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 175–191. For the reasons explained above, we are not persuaded that Bedingfield teaches changing an ITD. See supra Section II.D.6. Accordingly, Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 18 would have been obvious based on Bedingfield, Andrea, and Ballas under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” slip op. at 61
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied
“exceptional remedy of striking sentences in the Sur-Reply. Patent Owner filed the deposition transcripts of Dr. Welch and Dr. Roginska “only for the limited purpose of allowing the Board to understand the context of the cross-examination” and “does not rely on the[] [e]xhibits for any substantive argument in [the] Sur-Reply.” Sur-Reply v–vi. Patent Owner does not cite Exhibits 2029 and 2030 themselves in its Sur-Reply; it only cites Dr. Kyriakakis’s deposition transcript in this proceeding. Id. We agree with Patent Owner that its arguments in the Sur-Reply are properly responsive to the Reply because they address Dr. Kyriakakis’s cross-examination testimony where he was questioned about the opinions in his reply declaration (but we do not agree with Patent Owner’s claim interpretation arguments on the merits, for the reasons explained above). See Mot. to Strike Opp. 3; supra Section II.B.2.e. We also agree, under the particular factual circumstances presented, that filing Exhibits 2029 and 2030 was proper so the Board has the full context in which to evaluate Dr. Kyriakakis’s cross-examination testimony. Petitioner’s Motion to Strike is denied.” slip op. at 79
Patent outcomesUS 9,226,090 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,226,090 - PTAB · Jan 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00984 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 6, and 7 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Meulen and Chao obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’413 patent. We institute inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’413 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“relevant field “would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras,” or alternatively “would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras.” Pet. 6. Petitioner further argues that an “advanced graduate degree” may “make up for the work experience.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 33–34). At this stage of the proceeding, “Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” Prelim. Resp. 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’413 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that no claim terms “require a formal construction” and that “Petitioner interprets the challenged claims based on the breadth of GoPro’s infringement allegations.” Pet. 6 at n2. Patent Owner asserts that several claim terms are disputed in the parallel ITC litigation, but “none of them need to be resolved by the Board.” Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 34). We determine that, at this stage of the proceeding, no explicit constructions are required to resolve the dispute between the parties. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“persuaded, at this stage of the proceeding, by Petitioner’s arguments for the reasons summarized above. Specifically, we agree that the combination of Meulen and Chao teaches non-uniform pixel shifting. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, we agree with Petitioner that by teaching image scaling, Meulen teaches that pixels are shifted based on a scaling factor from the input to output positions. Further, we also agree that by disclosing stretching or shrinking of its background elements Chao also teaches pixel shifting. Petitioner argues that because Meulen mentions scaling of images without providing the details of how to perform scaling, a person of ordinary 1002 ¶ 262). Based on the teachings of these references and the similarity of the references’ technology, we determine Petitioner has established a reason to combine Meulen and Chao with a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,015,413 - Meta Platforms, Inc. / Meta Platforms Technologies, LLC et al. v. Eight KHZ, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01023 · APJ Lynne H Browne · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–9, and 11–14 are unpatentable under §103; claims 2, 10, and 17–20 were not shown unpatentable under either asserted ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“research experience in virtual/augmented reality, including visual and audio modeling and rendering” and that “[a]dditional education can compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–37). “Patent Owner accepts Petitioner’s definition of [a POSITA].” PO Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, we also adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “[t]he challenged claims are unpatentable under any reasonable construction, including their plain meaning.” Pet. 5. We understand Petitioner’s position to be that no claim construction is required. See id. Patent Owner contends “that ‘no express constructions of the claims are necessary.’” PO Resp. 2 (citing Dec. 10). We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction. See Vivid Techs. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). To the extent that the meaning of any claim term is addressed, we use its ordinary and customary meaning as discussed in our analysis below.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“preponderance of the evidence that the combined teachings of Pedrotti, Jang, and Begault disclose or suggest “highlighting, while the user is located in the zone and with a display of the WED, one of the multiple SLPs in the zone when the PED held in the hand of the user is pointed at one of the multiple SLPs in the zone” as required by claim 1. Even if we assume (without deciding) that Pedrotti’s virtual fence is an SLP, we agree with Patent Owner that Pedrotti’s virtual fence is “at the boundary” of its “safe area” (i.e., zone), not “in the zone” as required by limitation 1[c]. PO Sur-reply 4; Ex. 1005, 11:66–12:15. In other words, the virtual fence “defines the zone itself and thus is not in the zone” as the claim requires. PO Sur-reply 4. Petitioner has not addressed this difference between what is claimed and what is disclosed by Pedrotti or explained why the combined teachings of Pedrotti, Jang, and Begault would have rendered placement of the virtual fence “in the zone” obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. We further agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not adequately demonstrated that it would have been obvious for highlighting to occur in response to the user pointing a PED at the virtual fence (or any other virtual image). Rather, Petitioner repeatedly asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Pedrotti’s system could have used highlighting when the PED is pointed at one of the SLPs, without pointing to sufficient basis in Pedrotti’s disclosure or explaining why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement highlighting in the manner claimed. Pet. 20–22. Dr. Welch similarly testifies, without sufficient support in Pedrotti, regarding what a person of ordinary skill in the art “could” have done. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 268–272, 275–276. Such reasoning is inadequate to demonstrate obviousness because “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted) (citing InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).” slip op. at 18
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner also makes a number of new arguments in its Reply that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have used Pedrotti’s system to highlight other SLPs, such as Pedrotti’s virtual ‘weapon[s],’” relying in part on “additional references.” Reply 6–10. Petitioner, however, only briefly referenced virtual sword 802 in its Petition and did not advocate the same theories for limitation 1[c] in its Petition. See Pet. 13 (mentioning a “virtual weapon” in connection with limitation 1[a]), 19–20; Tr. 53:17–55:1. Accordingly, these arguments in the Reply are improper new arguments, which we do not consider. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) (“[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response”); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide at 74 (Nov. 2019) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated) (“CTPG”) (“‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.”); Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that the Board did not err in refusing to consider portions of a reply declaration “rais[ing] a new obviousness argument for [a claim] limitation that could have been made in the petition” but was not); Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding that the Board did not err in refusing to consider reply brief arguments advocating a “new theory” of unpatentability under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)).” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 10,798,509 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,798,509 - Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00983 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 10, 17, 19, and 20 for all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Memorandum 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). In a September 18, 2024 letter, Petitioner has stated that “Apple hereby stipulates that if the PTAB authorizes petitioner to enter this stipulation into evidence in IPR2024-00983 and institutes the proceeding, Apple will not pursue in the above-captioned litigation the same invalidity grounds raised (or any grounds that could have been raised) in IPR2024-00983 for any claim of the patent.” Ex. 1017 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12). Applying the guidance provided in the Memorandum, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution in this proceeding under Fintiv because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to challenged claims 1–6, 10, 17, 19, and 20 and the grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of vibration-generating systems; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree. Ex. 1003 ¶ 27. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 3. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’882 patent specification.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“We agree with the court and the parties in the Apple Litigation “that ‘control component’ is a nonce phrase tantamount to using the word ‘means.’” Ex. 2002, 19 (citing Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). We also agree that the ’882 specification links the stated function of the control component requirement with the direct sensing of position and velocity algorithm depicted in Figure 45, discussed above in Section II.C. Ex. 1013, 17; Ex. 2001, 10; Ex. 2002, 40.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,152,882 - Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00865 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–22 and all asserted grounds; the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“On June 21, 2022, the Director issued interim guidance in the form of a memo that further clarifies how we should approach analyzing the Fintiv factors. See Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. Notably, the Director stated that “the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board (‘PTAB’)] will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any ground that could have been reasonably raised before the PTAB.” Id. With this interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of this proceeding under Fintiv because Wiz filed a Sotera stipulation. Ex. 1083.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“The parties do not dispute that Veselov is the only reference that serves as the basis of Wiz’s asserted obviousness grounds that was considered by the Examiner during prosecution of the ’685 patent. See Ex. 1004, 57, 104. The Examiner, however, did not meaningfully address Veselov during prosecution of the ’685 patent. Stated differently, with respect to factor (a), the Examiner did not apply the teachings of Veselov to teach or suggest the limitations of the originally presented claims of the ’685 patent, nor did the Examiner apply the teachings of Veselov to account for language that was added via amendment during prosecution. It is undisputed that the other four references that serve as the basis of Wiz’s asserted obviousness grounds (i.e., Hufsmith, Chari, Price, and Huseinović) were not considered by the Examiner during prosecution of the ’685 patent. Nor did the Examiner have the benefit of Dr. Stavrou’s testimony regarding the teachings of all five references. Orca’s arguments do not appear to implicate factors (b) and (d), so we decline to engage in a substantive analysis of these two factors based on the record before us. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Orca’s arguments that the Petition presents substantially the same art and arguments that were considered previously by the Examiner during prosecution of the ’685 patent.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Based on the preliminary record, the only claim term that requires construction is “[analyze/analyzing] the at least one snapshot,” and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy between the parties. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We understand Wiz to propose a construction for the claim term “[analyze/analyzing] the at least one snapshot” that encompasses the following two alternative approaches: (1) “direct analysis of the snapshot data”; and (2) “analysis of a VM instantiated from the snapshot.” See Pet. 10–11. Orca disputes the latter approach, but not the former approach. See Prelim. Resp. 10–11. With this in mind, and for purposes of institution, we preliminarily agree that the claim term “[analyze/analyzing] the at least one snapshot” encompasses “direct analysis of the snapshot data.” This construction finds support in the specification of the ’685 patent.6 See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:19–20 (“The snapshot is parsed and analyzed by the security system 140 to detect vulnerabilities.”), 5:36–39 (“Further, the security system 140 may be configured to match the application files, either directly (using binary comparison) or by computing a cryptographic hash against [a] database of files in vulnerable applications.”). Because, as we explain below, Wiz’s obviousness analysis is sufficient under this first approach, we take no position on the second alternative approach in Wiz’s proposed construction. 6 At this stage of the proceeding, we do not make a finding of lexicography or disclaimer. Nor do we determine that “[analyze/analyzing] at least one snapshot” is necessarily limited to “direct analysis of the snapshot data.”” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“We do not discern a material difference between the assessments of the level of skill in the art advanced by either party, nor does either party premise its arguments exclusively on its own assessment. For purposes of institution, we adopt Wiz’s assessment, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the appropriate level of education. The qualifier expands the range without an upper bound (i.e., encompassing a Ph.D. degree and beyond), and does not meaningfully indicate the level of skill in the art. Wiz’s assessment—without the qualifier—is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stavrou and it is consistent with the ’685 patent and the asserted prior art. We note, however, that our obviousness analysis would be the same under each party’s assessment.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,693,685 - Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00864 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–25, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–11 and 13–25 would have been obvious over Veselov and Hufsmith, and claim 12 over those references and Hutchins.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“shows that ‘efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution.’” Prelim. Resp. 45 (quoting Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (Order Authorizing Supplemental Briefing on Discretionary Denial) (precedential). After Patent Owner filed its Preliminary Response, however, Petitioner filed a stipulation consistent with the stipulation filed in Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (Decision Granting Institution) (precedential as to § II.A) (“Sotera”). Ex. 1083. On June 21, 2022, the Director issued interim guidance in the form of a memo that further clarifies how we should approach analyzing the Fintiv factors. See Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. Notably, the Director stated that “the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board (‘PTAB’)] will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any ground that could have been reasonably raised before the PTAB.” Id. With this interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of this proceeding under Fintiv because Petitioner filed a Sotera stipulation. Ex. 1083.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“In evaluating arguments under § 325(d), we use a two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“snapshot.” Petitioner proposes we construe this term to encompasses two alternative approaches: (1) “direct analysis of the snapshot data”; and (2) “analysis of a VM instantiated from the snapshot.” See Pet. 10. Patent Owner disputes the second approach, but not the former. See Prelim. Resp. 9–11. For purposes of institution, we agree with Petitioner’s first alternative approach “analyz[ing] the snapshot” encompasses “direct analysis of the snapshot data.” This construction finds support in the specification of the ’032 patent. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:20–21 (“The snapshot is parsed and analyzed by the security system 140 to detect vulnerabilities.”), 5:37–40 (“[T]he security system 140 may be configured to match the application files, either directly (using binary comparison) or by computing a cryptographic hash against [a] database of files in vulnerable applications.”). Because, as we explain below, Petitioner’s obviousness analysis is sufficient under this first approach, we take no position on Petitioner’s second alternative approach, which Patent Owner disputes. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Although Petitioner submits an additional term for construction, see Pet. 8–9, we do not need to further construe the claims to determine whether to institute IPR. See Nidec Motor Corp. 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We do not discern a material difference between the assessments of the level of skill in the art advanced by either party, nor does either party premise its arguments exclusively on its own assessment. For purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the appropriate level of education. The qualifier expands the range without an upper bound (i.e., encompassing a Ph.D. degree and beyond), and does not meaningfully indicate the level of skill in the art. Petitioner’s assessment—without the qualifier—is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stavrou and it is consistent with the ’032 patent and the asserted prior art. We note, however, that our obviousness analysis would be the same under each party’s assessment.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,663,032 - Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00863 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–9, and 11–16 are obvious over Veselov and Price, with additional grounds for claims 2, 10, 6, and 14.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“On June 21, 2022, the Director issued interim guidance in the form of a memo that further clarifies how we should approach analyzing the Fintiv factors. See Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. Notably, the Director stated that “the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board (‘PTAB’)] will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any ground that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Id. With this interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of this proceeding under Fintiv because Petitioner filed a Sotera stipulation. Ex. 1083.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“B. Claim Construction Independent claims 1, 9, and 16 each require “analyz[ing] the at least one snapshot.” Petitioner proposes we construe this term to encompasses two alternative approaches: (1) “direct analysis of the snapshot data”; and (2) “analysis of a VM instantiated from the snapshot.” See Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner disputes the second approach, but not the former. See Prelim. Resp. 12–14. For purposes of institution, we agree with Petitioner’s first alternative approach—“analyz[ing] the at least one snapshot” encompasses “direct analysis of the snapshot data.” This construction finds support in the specification of the ’031 patent. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:17–18 (“The snapshot is parsed and analyzed by the security system 140 to detect vulnerabilities.”), 6:23–24 (“[T]he security system 140 may be configured to match the application files, either directly using binary comparison or by computing a cryptographic hash against [a] database of files in vulnerable applications.”). Because, as we explain below, Petitioner’s obviousness analysis is sufficient under this first approach, we take no position on Petitioner’s second alternative approach, which Patent Owner disputes. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We do not discern a material difference between the assessments of the level of skill in the art advanced by either party, nor does either party premise its arguments exclusively on its own assessment. For purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the appropriate level of education. The qualifier expands the range without an upper bound (i.e., encompassing a Ph.D. degree and beyond), and does not meaningfully indicate the level of skill in the art. Petitioner’s assessment—without the qualifier—is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stavrou and it is consistent with the ’031 patent and the asserted prior art. We note, however, that our obviousness analysis would be the same under each party’s assessment.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“As noted above, Petitioner explains that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Veselov’s virtual computing security assessment system with Price’s inactive/at rest security assessments “to provide the well-known security benefit of preventing further damage that might otherwise be caused if a potentially compromised VM actively runs (e.g., a vulnerability could be exploited, or suspected malware could contaminate other resources).” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1048 ¶ 14; Ex. 1002 ¶ 105). With this rationale, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that its proffered combination would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Patent Owner’s argument highlighting mere differences between Veselov and Price—i.e., Veselov’s active VMs versus Price’s inactive ones—does not undermine Petitioner’s proffered rationale and does not suggest that Price’s inactive security assessments are incompatible with Veselov’s general security-assessment structure. In addition, Petitioner presents sufficient arguments and evidence for purposes of institution that a skilled artisan would have a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination. Specifically, Petitioner explains, with relevant support from its declarant, Dr. Stavrou, and the prior art, that “[o]ffline snapshotting and offline analysis were routine and predictable.” Pet. 25 (citing Exs. 1002, 1073, 1081). “Moreover,” Petitioner explains, “most of Veselov’s snapshot-generation and analysis techniques require no interaction with the original VM and, as a result, the state of the original VM can be inactive or at rest when the snapshot is taken and while the snapshot analysis is being performed.” Id. (citing Exs. 1002, 1007). Patent Owner’s arguments that “[n]othing in Veselov discloses or suggests” either no-interaction snapshots or that the original VM can be inactive when the snapshot is taken, see Prelim. Resp. 31, does not undermine that one skilled in the art would have a reasonable expectation of success in taking and analyzing snapshots of inactive VMs.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,663,031 - Meta Platforms, Inc. / Meta Platforms Technologies, LLC et al. v. Eight KHZ, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 3, 2024 · IPR2023-01020 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Lyren and Reif; the Board did not reach the Clement, Osman, and Sauk ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art or “POSITA”] in the relevant timeframe (2015 to 2019) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science/engineering, music technology, or a related field, and at least two years of industry experience, or academic research experience, in virtual/augmented reality, audio engineering, or an equivalent. Additional education can compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. environment Patent Owner initially argues that “environment” should mean “physical surroundings in which a user operates.” PO Resp. 6. Petitioner responds that the plain meaning of environment “encompasses physical and virtual environments.” Reply 2. During the hearing, Patent Owner conceded that Petitioner’s construction for environment is correct. Tr. 49:24–50:10. We agree with this construction and apply it here. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 28:16 (referring to “a physical or a virtual environment”). “Environment” encompasses physical and virtual environments.” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“insufficient to support the concept of alerting a user that the user is leaving a virtual environment. In so deciding, we need not address the parties’ contentions about boilerplate. Regardless of whether the sentence at 168:15–16 of the ’140 application is boilerplate, we agree with Petitioner that “there is no suggestion of the specific claimed combination.” Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1146 ¶ 82). That is, if one views the “[e]xamples herein” from Figure 6 as taking place “in computer rendered spaces (VR)” or “in partially computer rendered spaces (AR),” there is still no disclosure of alerting a user that a user is leaving a virtual environment. See Ex. 1028, 168:15–16. For instance, if Alice in the Figure 6 example mentioned above is entering a virtual car instead of a real car, Alice is still in a virtual environment. See id. at 120:13–27. Thus, relying on Figure 6 to take place “in computer rendered spaces (VR)” does not support alerting that a user is leaving those virtual spaces. See id. at 168:15–16. Petitioner also correctly identifies a problem with analogizing the Alice example to a virtual environment—namely, it would no longer make sense to give Alice an audible warning. See Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1146 ¶ 82). In the example, Alice’s earphones switch from binaural sound to mono sound when Alice enters a real car because “[t]he state where Alice is located . . . prohibits drivers from localizing sound while driving a motorized vehicle.” Ex. 1028, 120:15–18. But it would not make sense (nor does the ’140 application disclose) for a state to prohibit Alice to localize sound while driving a virtual vehicle. We therefore find compelling Petitioner’s argument, supported by the testimony of Dr. Roginska, which we credit, that there is no “disclosure that 3D audio would not be permitted in a 3D virtual space.” Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1146 ¶ 82). Accordingly, Patent Owner’s second support argument fails.10” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“One benefit Petitioner proposes to support a rationale to combine is that a POSITA “would have implemented this feature to help protect the users from injury by bumping, hitting, tripping over, etc., real-world objects when moving around while viewing the virtual environment in the HMD (i.e., a type of head-mounted WED).” Id. at 43–44 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 90, 251–254). Petitioner provides additional argument and evidence supporting a motivation to combine, with a reasonable expectation of success. See id. at 42–46. We agree that, in the combination, a POSITA would have implemented Lyren’s audible alerts to alert the user that the user is leaving Reif’s safe zone (and thus the virtual environment) to help keep users safe. Id. at 52 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 250–268). We also agree with Petitioner’s articulated benefit that the combination would “help protect the users from injury by bumping, hitting, tripping over, etc., real-world objects when moving around while viewing the virtual environment in the HMD (i.e., a type of head-mounted WED).” Id. at 43–44. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Lyren and Reif discloses each limitation of claim 14, as well as similar limitations of claims 1 and 7, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Lyren and Reif in the manner proposed, with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 10,448,184 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,448,184 - PTAB · Dec 3, 2024 · IPR2024-00856 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2003). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’109 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Petitioner has stipulated as follows: Petitioners stipulate that, if the Patent Trial and Appeal Board institutes an IPR proceeding for U.S. Patent No. 8,982,109 on the grounds presented in the petition in IPR2024-00856, Petitioners will not pursue an invalidity defense in district court that the patent claims subject to the instituted IPR are invalid based on grounds that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in the IPR. Paper 13 (Updated Mandatory Notices), 1 (citing Ex. 1044). We determine that this stipulation is consistent in scope with the stipulation in Sotera Wireless cited approvingly in the Guidance Memo. Consistent with the Guidance Memo, therefore, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under Fintiv in view of the parallel district court proceeding.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “as of December 18, 2012, would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering, or a closely related field such as computer science, and two years of work experience with image capture and processing systems or related fields.” Pet. 7 (citing Karam Decl. ¶¶ 65–67). Petitioner adds that “[a] person with less and/or different education, but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard. The prior art also evidences such level of skill.” Id. Patent Owner states that it “applies Petitioners’ proposed level of skill for purposes of this Preliminary Response and reserves the right to propose a different level of skill should the Board grant institution.” Prelim. Resp. 13. At this stage, we adopt the formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and applied by Patent Owner as consistent with the prior art before us in this proceeding.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“We construe only those claim terms and phrases necessary to our decision. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). At this stage of the proceeding, we need not construe any claim terms and phrases to resolve a controversy. To the extent further clarification or explanation of any claim term is necessary for this Decision, we will do so in the context of our analysis of that term infra.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,982,109
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.