- PTAB · May 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00060 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 12 are anticipated by Ogawa.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner notes that it “applies [Petitioner’s] definition of a POSITA for the purposes of th[e] preliminary response but expressly reserves the right to urge a different definition of a POSITA and support such definition with evidence including expert testimony.” Prelim. Resp. 6. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s currently uncontested definition because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’080 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner submits that “the Board need not construe any terms of the challenged claims to resolve the underlying controversy.” Pet. 9. Petitioner however notes the multiple “displays” recited in, e.g., independent claim 12 and dependent claims 2 and 4, and submits that Patent Owner’s infringement contentions “suggest that the ‘first display’ and ‘second display’ in claim 12 read on a single physical display divided into two or more logical displays.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1015, 33–34). Petitioner submits that (i) the presented grounds 1 and 2 cover the respective claims under Patent Owner’s interpretation of “display” which Petitioner alleges to encompass the claimed “first display” and “second display” being logically divided displays of a single physical display, (ii) grounds 3 and 4 cover the respective claims under a narrower interpretation of “display” under which the claimed “first display” and “second display” are physically distinct from each other,7 and (iii) ground 3 also covers the respective claims under Patent Owner’s interpretation of “display.” In response, Patent Owner submits that for the purposes of the Preliminary Response, its arguments “do not turn on any specific construction of ‘display’ and the Board need not address the construction of this term for institution.” Prelim. Resp. 5. Based on the record at this stage of the proceeding, we need not construe “display” or any other claim term to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner begins its argument with the premise that “Ogawa’s teaching of an active screen indicator cannot suggest the claimed open application state indicator.” Prelim. Resp. 8. We note that Patent Owner does not direct us to any portion of the Specification or prosecution history of the ’080 patent describing the recited “open application state” nor does Patent Owner propose a construction of this term. See generally Prelim. Resp. Our review of the Specification and prosecution history does not reveal any explicit description of “open application state.” Consequently, we give this term its plain and ordinary meaning that an application screen is open in the display.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,842,080 - PTAB · May 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00059 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–3, 5–9, 15, 16, 19, and 20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of user interface technologies, including e.g., graphical user interface technologies, or a related field” and that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 20, 21, 22–34). “Patent Owner applies [Petitioner’s] definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art] for the purposes of [its] preliminary response but expressly reserves the right to urge a different definition . . . and support such definition with evidence including expert testimony.” Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Pet. 5–6). Based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s as yet undisputed level of ordinary skill to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“displays information selectively” has a meaning broader than Patent Owner’s proposal. In particular, claim 3 depends from claim 1 and recites: wherein modifying the display of the annunciator window further includes: displaying the changed state across a portion of the annunciator window; and masking at least one icon representing the device status, connectivity status, or messaging status, wherein the first display is on a first screen of the multi-display device, and wherein the second display is on a different second screen of the multi-display device. Ex. 1001, 30:1–9 (emphasis added). Dependent claim 8 and unchallenged dependent claim 12 recite similar limitations. Id. at 30:56–64, 32:8–14. The limitation “masking at least one icon representing the device status, connectivity status, or messaging status” of these dependent claims indicates that “displays information selectively” recited by the independent claims has a meaning broader than Patent Owner’s proposal of “display[ing] information in a way that involves intentionally choosing some information to display and not others.” Prelim. Resp. 7. At this stage, on the preliminary record, we determine that, in view of the language of dependent claims 3, 8, and 12, the phrase “wherein the modified display of the annunciator window displays information selectively across the annunciator window” of the independent claims has a meaning broader than Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation. Prelim. Resp. 7–8. slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Also, on the present record, Petitioner argues sufficiently that Yook’s status bar on screen 140 displays information showing device status and connectivity status. Pet. 33. Furthermore, on the present record, Petitioner sufficiently argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement and pre-configure Yook’s status bar to display dynamically the device status and connectivity status, so that Yook discloses or suggests “wherein the modified display of the annunciator window displays information selectively across the annunciator window.” Id. at 33–36, 38–39. In other words, as we understand the argument, Petitioner associates dynamically updating a status via a status icon with “display[ing] information selectively.” See id. at 38–39; Ex. 1002 ¶ 67. Moreover, even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation for “displays information selectively,” Petitioner’s arguments for dependent claim 3 include contentions that Yook modified by Bauer would have “mask[ed] at least one icon representing the device status, connectivity status, or messaging status.” Pet. 53–55 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:45–50; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 82, 83; Ex. 1007, 6:14–29, 6:33–42 (describing that “the interactive indicator (e.g., the icon 204 and the corresponding preview) are superimposed over the static indicators” and that “[o]nce the preview intensity of the static indicators may be restored”), 6:47–61, 7:22–27, Fig. 2A). At this preliminary stage, based on the arguments presented for dependent claim 3, Petitioner sufficiently shows that Yook and Bauer would have rendered obvious an annunciator window that “displays information selectively across the annunciator window,” as recited by claim 1, under an interpretation of that limitation meaning “displays information in a way that involves intentionally choosing some information to display and not others,” as proposed by Patent Owner. For the reasons above, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to claim 1 as unpatentable over Yook.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,141,135 - PTAB · May 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00032 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10, 19, and 28 are obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“At least because of the material differences in Ferro compared to Hafner ’174 and the reliance on Donnelly and Letendre, which were not before the Office, we find that the same or substantially the same art was not previously presented to the Office.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“We disagree with Patent Owner. It is true that Oyobe focuses on alerting a vehicle user to a low state of charge by raising a physical indicator on the exterior of the vehicle (i.e., the “informing apparatus 102) when the battery is low. Ex. 1005 ¶ 40. Oyobe explains: even in such a case where the vehicle user exit from the vehicle without checking the SOC of main battery B on the console panel, informing apparatus 102 disposed at a location where it can easily be seen outside the vehicle by the vehicle user allows the vehicle user to easily recognize the necessity of charging main battery B. Id. However, Oyobe’s focus on raising a physical indicator on the vehicle as a reminder does not detract from Oyobe’s unambiguous disclosure that its vehicle also includes position detecting apparatus 108 that uses wireless communication to “sense that the vehicle is parked at the location where charging equipment is installed.” Id. ¶ 142. Oyobe’s ability to sense whether a vehicle is parked next to a charger allows Oyobe’s system to remind the user to charge the battery by raising low battery indicator 102 while the vehicle is located next to a charger but not “where charging cannot be performed.” Id. ¶¶ 143–145. Accordingly, regardless of the reason that Oyobe provides for including its vehicle position detecting apparatus, Oyobe undeniably describes a vehicle sensor that can provide “information indicative of a presence of an electric vehicle in a parking space” near a charging station. And, we find that Petitioner has sufficiently explained why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to use Oyobe’s sensor in Ferro’s electric vehicle to “advantageously allows a user to instruct charging without exiting the vehicle and physically interacting with a charging station.” Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–152).” slip op. at 20
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Third, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner violates Rule 42.6(a)(3) by improperly incorporating arguments from Mr. Andrews’s Declaration into the Petition to establish that Oyobe teaches sensing the presence of a vehicle in a “parking space” as recited in limitation 1e. Prelim. Resp. 42–43 (citing Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 178–181)). Patent Owner contends that Mr. Andrews’s citation of four references that are not expressly cited in the Petition, Exhibits 1018, 1053, 1057, and 1059, implicitly demonstrates that the Petition incorporates arguments by reference. Id. Not only do we find Petitioner’s reliance on Mr. Andrews’s testimony to be persuasive, but we also find that Mr. Andrews’s citations to Exhibits 1018, 1053, 1057, and 1059 provide strong support for his testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand that Oyobe teaches that its vehicle is in a parking space when Oyobe’s apparatus 108 detects that “the vehicle is parked” near charging equipment. Far from improperly incorporating arguments by reference, we find Mr. Andrews’s citation to objective evidence to support his opinions on how an ordinarily skilled artisan would read Oyobe’s disclosure to be preferred and highly persuasive.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,563,338 - Google LLC v. Metarail, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-01271 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–21 were unpatentable over either asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the arguments presented and the evidence of record, we conclude that there is not a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging at least one of claims 1–21 of the ’342 patent as unpatentable under the grounds presented in the Petition. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby do not institute an inter partes review as to these claims of the ’342 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“(3) Discussion We observe first that “[Halevy’s] first step in processing a web source is to locate the forms in the source and to extract the text corresponding to the fields in the form.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 53. According to Halevy, the “web source is subsequently classified into the ontology classes.” Id. ¶ 55. Then, the “forms on the page are classified into the classes in the ontology.” Id. ¶ 57 (emphasis added). Halevy explains that this classification is used to predict what kinds of objects are in the databases queried by the form. Id. For “Schema Matching,” Halevy discloses “a mapping between the fields in the form and the SO-properties of the SO-classes[.]” Id. ¶¶ 61–62. Missing, however, from Halevy’s disclosure is any teaching or suggestion that fields are mapped “to one another using normalized variables stored in a normalized variable data database” as required by claim 1.” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner contends that a POSITA “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience with web programming and search engine systems[; m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal. Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 35–36) (“Patent Owner and its expert apply this definition.”). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner present claim construction in the Petition or Preliminary Response. Pet. 9; see generally Prelim. Resp. Nonetheless, Petitioner contends that Patent Owner’s construction of “universal variable map” is too narrow, but does not appear to offer an alternative construction other than to state that a “universal variable map” includes “a database that links variables from different websites to each other.” See Reply 1-2 (emphasis omitted) (“PO’s arguments for why Halevy’s ‘form database’ is not a universal variable map are all premised on improperly narrowing the term’s scope by adding restrictions that are unsupported by the intrinsic record.”). In the Sur-Reply, Patent Owner reiterates that it has not proposed a construction for “universal variable map.” Sur-Reply 1 (“Patent Owner did not present any claim construction arguments regarding that term, nor does that term’s construction have any bearing on the arguments set forth in the POPR for denying the Petition.”). Based on our review of the preliminary record, we do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,262,342 - Google LLC v. Metarail, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-01270 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any of claims 1–26 unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the arguments presented and the evidence of record, we conclude that there is not a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging at least one of claims 1–26 of the ’378 patent as unpatentable under the grounds presented in the Petition. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby do not institute an inter partes review as to these claims of the ’378 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA or POSITA) at the time of the invention of the ’378 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience with web programming and search engine systems[; m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal. Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 35–36) (“Patent Owner and its expert apply this definition.”). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Based on our review of the preliminary record, we do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“(3) Discussion We observe first that “[Halevy’s] first step in processing a web source is to locate the forms in the source and to extract the text corresponding to the fields in the form.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 53. According to Halevy, the “web source is subsequently classified into the ontology classes.” Id. ¶ 55. Then, the “forms on the page are classified into the classes in the ontology.” Id. ¶ 57 (emphasis added). Halevy explains that this classification is used to predict what kinds of objects are in the databases queried by the form. Id. For “Schema Matching,” Halevy discloses “a mapping between the fields in the form and the SO-properties of the SO-classes[.]” Id. ¶¶ 61–62. Missing, however, from Halevy’s disclosure is any teaching or suggestion that a “plurality of computer-readable field identifiers” are mapped “to one another” as required by claim 1. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Fox, testifies that “[t]he ‘SO-classes’ are identified for each form and used to map the fields in the form (i.e., “the plurality of computer-readable field identifiers”) to one another using “SOproperties,” as shown . . . in annotated Figure 3.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 104 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 39–40, 45, 49, 62, 67). Yet, those cited portions of Halevy do not support Dr. Fox’s testimony. As Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Sam Malek, explains: the language highlighted by Petitioner in Figure 3 does not actually show that “[t]he ‘SO-classes’ are . . . used to map the fields in the form . . . to one another using ‘SO-properties,’” as he contends. Id. Rather, the language in Figure 3 that Dr. Fox has highlighted merely shows that, for any given form, there is “mapping between fields” of that form and “class properties.” EX1006, Fig. 3. In other words, fields in a form are mapped to class properties. Figure 3 does not show any mapping of fields to each other, as Dr. Fox argues.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,633,378 - Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCInstitutedPTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Julia Heaney · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–17 and 22–28 and all asserted grounds, finding a sufficient likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Further, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion not to institute review. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther
“On this record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed experience level of at least five years in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction to be supported. As to the necessity of experience in textile engineering and fiber science, Patent Owner’s position, although not supported by declarant analysis of the factors listed above, is consistent with the disclosure of the ’854 patent, which describes features of a mesh layer in textile and fiber terms. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:17–11:14, 12:65–13:8, 14:20–24. On the whole, however, we do not discern on this record how specific experience in textile engineering and fiber science of a person of ordinary skill would materially alter the outcome at this stage of the proceeding. For purposes of this decision only, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, except for the requirement of five years of experience in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction. The level of skill in the art remains an open issue in this proceeding. Further submissions by the parties may include argument and evidence that would assist in the resolution of this issue at the close of trial.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 10; Reply 1, 4. Patent Owner contends the terms “mesh layer” and “coefficient of friction” require construction. Prelim. Resp. 14–16; Sur-reply 2–5. We have considered the parties’ arguments and discuss them below with regard to each of the terms Patent Owner contends should be construed. Because our determination that Petitioner demonstrates at least one challenged claim meets the threshold for institution (see SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60) is not based on construing the term “mesh layer” or “coefficient of friction,” we determine we need not construe either claim term at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). As further discussed below, we invite the parties to address claim construction at trial.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the ’854 patent specification does not include clear and explicit lexicography or a disclaimer that would support requiring “coefficient of friction” to be determined by a specific ASTM test method. The portion of the specification Patent Owner asserts as a definition of “coefficient of friction” (see Ex. 1001, 11:31–42) is a description of an embodiment; we find it does not express patentee intent to redefine the term. Further, the statement that “the coefficient of friction … may be determined using the … ASTM D1894 standard test method” (id. at 11:32–35) indicates that use of that specific test method is optional. Accordingly, in the absence of patentee lexicography or disavowal, we do not limit the scope of the term “coefficient of friction” to require that it be measured by a specific ASTM standard. Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Absent lexicography or disavowal, we do not depart from the plain meaning of the claims.”); In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). We note that the ’854 patent specification sets forth a definition for the coefficient of friction between the surfaces of the mesh material and the slide surface. Ex. 1001, 4:38–46. As stated above, however, we do not expressly construe any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. Should the parties address the construction of “coefficient of friction” at trial, we will make a determination after the close of evidence and any hearing.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,998,854 - SAP America, Inc. v. Cyandia, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Apr 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01433 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–7, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 23, 29, 35, and 36 based on the PCT publication and Austin-Lane under § 103.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation will eliminate the overlap between this proceeding and invalidity at the district court. Unlike the other, related IPRs for which we discretionarily deny review (e.g., IPR2024-01432, -01495, & -01496), this proceeding does not involve references that fundamentally convey the same information as may be presented as system art in the Texas litigation. In light of the stipulation and nature of the asserted ground, we conclude that this ground strongly favors institution.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We conclude that the claim language reads on Austin-Lane’s disclosure of determining “a presentation method of the notification” such as “using an instant message to the notebook computer” (Ex. 1105 ¶¶ 39, 46), in combination with teachings regarding the device to which the notification is sent and the protocol used to deliver it. We further conclude that Petitioner has provided an adequate reason that skilled artisans would have looked to Austin-Lane’s teachings and combined them with the system described in the PCT publication, as discussed. We have further reviewed the uncontested aspects of the challenge to claim 1 (Pet. 43–58) and determine that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail proving obviousness of claim 1. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to unpatentability of at least one claim. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review of claims 1–7, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 23, 29, 35, and 36 of the ’948 patent is instituted on the grounds raised in the Petition; and” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of filing “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or equivalent, with two or more years of experience developing and implementing graphical user interfaces for controlling server-based applications, including handling asynchronous notifications generated by those applications and web services, such as portal systems, or an equivalent amount of relevant work or research experience” and “would have been familiar with common approaches for presenting information on a graphical user interface, including various layouts for presenting multiple elements, such as icons, widgets, windows, etc.” Pet. 14–15. Petitioner describes further capabilities that such a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had. Id. at 15–16. Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or the like, and/or four or more years of experience in server-based applications” and that “[a]dditional experience may make up for a lack of education and vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the challenged patent and prior art, we adopt it and use “skilled artisans” to refer to people with such skill at the time the invention was filed. We do not perceive a substantive distinction between the parties’ definitions, but note that Petitioner’s definition provides more detail about the capabilities of skilled artisans. Should either party believe that the definition of ordinary skill in the art affects a disputed issue in the trial, it should point out how and identify any potential dispute about the level of skill.” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree. Petitioner notes that certain disclosures added to the April 2011 CIP application describe a “notification manager” to “determine the best alert notification method.” Pet. 27 (quoting Ex. 1110 ¶ 131; citing id. ¶¶ 90–93, 130–132, 145–147, 160). That does not mean that Petitioner construes the claim language to require determining the best method, only that disclosing a mechanism that “determine[s] the best alert notification method” provides written-description support for a requirement to “determin[e] a notification method.” Petitioner is clear in its position that the May 2009 application “does not describe how to determine a notification method or how to use ‘session data’ in the manner required by this claim limitation.” Pet. 27–28. Patent Owner asserts that the May 2009 application discloses “determining a notification method” through a channel alert server that can “determine the active devices of the subscriber . . . to provide a visual or auditory alert in the channel.” Prelim. Resp. 32 (quoting Ex. 1106 ¶ 39). That disclosure appears to address the claim language requiring an alert “based on the current state of the at least one external device indicated by the session data.” It does not, however, address the claim language “determining a notification method.” Patent Owner recognizes that Petitioner asserts disclosures in the prior art for “determining which devices to send the alert to, the protocols used to send the alert, and how alerts are presented.” Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted). But when Patent Owner asserts that the May 2009 application discloses determining how alerts are presented, it points to paragraphs that do not support the assertion. Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1106 ¶¶ 23, 39). The first, paragraph 23, states that a “trigger may cause the information channel to change its appearance or to take other actions that may be implemented by the developer” and that “one action that may be implemented is to provide a notification to the user.” Ex. 1106 ¶ 23. Nothing about that indicates the system determines how an alert is presented. The second, paragraph 39, states that the channel alert server may “provide a visual or auditory alert in the channel” and that the “alert can appear as defined on other platforms.” Nothing about that indicates the system determines how an alert is presented. Patent Owner has not shown how the May 2009 application discloses a determining a notification method, as claimed. In Patent Owner’s view, Petitioner admits that the May 2009 application (which is the same as the asserted PCT publication) describes determining a delivery mechanism because Petitioner compares it to Austin-Lane, stating that the PCT publication “already includes a channel alert server that determines the active devices of the user and delivers an alert to the user’s device” and “discloses setting the same type of alert (stock alert) and presenting it in the same way (visually) as Austin-Lane.” Prelim. Resp. 35 (quoting Pet. 54) (emphasis omitted). But simply delivering an alert does not necessarily mean the notification method for that alert was determined. We conclude that Petitioner’s statement does not show the PCT publication discloses “determining a notification method” as claimed.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,751,948 - Google LLC v. DH International Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 24, 2025 · IPR2024-01322 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10–12, and 19 are obvious over Mooney and over Mooney in view of Lee.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Pre-Institution Reply, Pre-Institution Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’294 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’294 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“the claims nor the specification of the ’294 Patent require such a narrow reading of the term ‘activation cue’” as that proposed by Patent Owner. Reply 1 (citing Prelim. Resp. 9–10). Operative claim language—“a cue receiver operatively linked to said electronic circuit for receiving an activation cue from a source external to said cellular phone”—does not limit “activation cue” to a predetermined bit sequence or predetermined indicator as argued by Patent Owner. Claim 1 further recites the “data conveyance switching element . . . being assigned a first state upon an activation cue having been received by said cue receiver,” which also does not limit “activation cue” to a predetermined bit sequence or predetermined indicator. Both parties, moreover, cite the same description of the structure and function of the “activation cue” in the ’294 patent: “This activation cue is in the form of a data communication of a specific type which will be recognized by electronic device 10 as an activation cue, for example a predetermined bit sequence.” Prelim. Resp. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:24–27); Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:24–27); Sur-Reply 1 (citing same). The recited “activation cue,” when read in context and in view of the” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“for the recited “data conveyance switching element” pursuant to §112, sixth Petition characterizes the corresponding structure as “a physical structure, a virtual program, or both because the ’294 patent explains that a switching element ‘can be any type of device allowing data to be conveyed according to alternate data conveyance operations,’ such as ‘a series of instructions programmed onto [a] microchip’ or a ‘decisional logical circuit,’ and ‘can be a physical structure, a virtual program, or both.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 9:28– 31, 9:40–41; Lipoff Decl. Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). The Petition identifies the claimed function as switching between inactive and activated states based on whether or not the cellular phone receives an activation cue. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:4–9, 4:18–23, 5:48–53; Ex. 1003 ¶ 64).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“construction of an “external data exchange device” as a data transceiver coupled to a circuit that carries out the function of exchanging data. Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:4–6, 12:62, 13:28, Figs. 1, 3, 4; Ex. 2001 ¶ 48); see Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:14–17, 4:7–14, 9:3–6; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–68). Patent Owner states that “[a]n external data exchange device is not a transceiver but a device with a transceiver.” Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 48). On this preliminary record, we need not construe “external data exchange device” to decide whether or not to institute. To the extent there is a dispute over the plain meaning of “external data exchange device,” the parties are invited to address it in detail in their briefs following institution. On the present record, we determine that no further construction of claim terms is necessary to determine whether to institute a trial in this case. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties are free to address any further claim construction issues bearing on this inter partes review following institution.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,022,294 - Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01285 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 1 were obvious over the Yerazunis–Fiedler and Ely–Fiedler combinations, respectively.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. With these factors and guidance in mind, we consider parties’ contentions.5 1.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’752 patent. We exercise our discretion to institute inter partes review and, as required, we do so as to all the challenged claims of the ’752 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is supported by Dr. Sarhan’s testimony, except that we find that the phrase “at least” in Petitioner’s proposed definition creates a vague, open-ended upper bound for the level of ordinary skill, and we therefore do not adopt that aspect of the proposal.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Only claim terms in controversy require express construction, “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need resolve the controversy.”). Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, we determine no terms require express construction to resolve the disputes at this stage of the proceeding.8 A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,928,752 - Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01284 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Per Board practice, if the Board institutes trial, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’540 patent. We exercise our discretion to institute inter partes review and, as required, we do so as to all the challenged claims of the ’540 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“issued an order temporarily staying all deadlines and hearings scheduled in the matter.6 Ex. 1058, 1–2. The District Court’s order notes that Patent Owner asserts 8 patents in the litigation, that IPRs have been instituted on 4 of those patents covering 10 of the 14 claims asserted in the litigation, and that further consideration of a stay will depend upon whether IPRs are instituted on patents including the 4 remaining claims. Id. at 1, 3. The District Court also ordered the parties to update their positions on a stay within one week of a decision on institution. It is unclear if, and when, a new trial date would be set. In light of this stay, we determine that this factor weighs strongly against discretionary denial. 2.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“or undergraduate training in an equivalent field and at least two years of relevant experience in electronics technology.” Ex. 1051 ¶ 30. Dr. Sarhan further opines that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is supported by Dr. Sarhan’s testimony, except that we find that the phrase “at least” in Petitioner’s proposed definition creates a vague, open-ended upper bound for the level of ordinary skill, and we therefore do not adopt that aspect of the proposal.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Having reviewed the parties’ arguments we determine, as explained further below in our analysis of claim 1 (§ III.D.4.a), that an express construction of the term “file” is not necessary at this stage of the proceeding. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,310,540
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.