- Apple Inc. v. Rfcyber Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00413 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable under § 103 over Dua and GlobalPlatform, with Smart Card Handbook and Thibadeau added for claims 7–12.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Here, the parties’ definitions differ in one significant way. Petitioner requires one year of more specific experience, i.e., mobile payment experience, while Patent Owner requires more experience, but that experience can be more general related to computer and network security. We agree with Petitioner that mobile payment technology is an important aspect of the claimed invention and should be included in the definition. However, we also find that Petitioner’s definition is flexible enough to address the concerns of Patent Owner because, as the definition explains “[l]ack of professional experience [can] be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’009 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below.2 See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“is “essential,” Petitioner has still shown a motivation to combine because the proposed combination does not “discard” SIP as Patent Owner contends. In particular, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner “argues that a [person of ordinary skill] would discard all of Dua’s SIP teachings and use GlobalPlatform’s system for personalization instead.” PO Resp. 12. However, we agree with Petitioner that this mischaracterizes the proposed combination. See Reply 6–7. As the Petition states, Petitioner relies on Dua’s SIP session to establish the initial connection between the endpoints (between the smart card and a server) and download the application and send application identifying information to the server. See Pet. 22 (describing GlobalPlatform’s receipts transmitted “via a wireless SIP session”), 23 (downloading extensions “during a SIP session”). As Mr. Smith credibly testifies, “Dua teaches utilizing the SIP protocol to connect endpoints,” and “Dua’s SIP networking protocol for connecting endpoints functions like a ‘pipe’ to connect the two endpoints (e.g., smart card and server or host such as Dua’s WCM) together over a network.” Ex. 1046 (Smith Supp. Decl.) ¶ 15. Moreover, as Mr. Smith clarifies in his Supplemental Declaration, “Dua’s SIP protocol constructs the connection between endpoints, and GlobalPlatform establishes a secure channel within that connection for smart are ‘not intended, in any way, to limit the scope of the present invention[,]” or “[t]he foregoing disclosure and description of the present invention is illustrative and explanatory thereof” as insufficient). card specific communications.” Ex. 1046 ¶ 14; see also Pet. 24–26 (discussing the use of GlobalPlatform to create the secure channel). We find that Mr. Smith credibly testifies that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that in the combination, GlobalPlatform’s processes relying on the exchange of Application Protocol Data Unit (“APDU”) messages would be sent over Dua’s SIP endpoint-to-endpoint connection (“pipe”) because, (1) SIP is derived from HTTP, (2) APDUs are the standard messaging protocol for smart cards, and (3) it was known to transmit APDUs over HTTP.” Ex. 1046 ¶ 16. Mr. Smith supports this assertion with detailed testimony relying on extensive citations to Dua, Ex. 1046 ¶ 17, GlobalPlatform, id. ¶¶ 18, 20, Chen5 (id. ¶ 19), and Thibadeau, id. ¶ 21. We find this testimony was reasoned, detailed, and entitled to substantial weight. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown that in the proposed combination Dua’s SIP protocol would not be “discarded,” but rather, would remain an integral part of the combination. See Ex. 1046 ¶¶ 14–21.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“(b) “Secure Element” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner fails to show that the combination teaches or suggests a “secure element,” as required by the claims. PO Resp. 18–20. Patent Owner argues that, although “a smart card may be a secure element . . . the ’009 patent does not state or suggest that all smart cards are secure elements.” Id. at 19. Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would therefore understand that a smart card may be a secure element only if it provides the necessary security, such as by being tamper-resistant.” Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 72–75). Patent Owner contends that “[w]hile some smart cards meet this definition, not every smart card will, and [Petitioner] does not show otherwise.” Id. We find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Dua and GlobalPlatform accounts for this limitation. To begin with, we do not find the testimony of Mr. Gomez on this point to be credible or entitled to much weight. In his Declaration, Mr. Gomez contends that “a secure element must include a heightened level of security and be tamper-proof,” Ex. 2007 ¶ 73, and that “while some secure elements may be smart cards, not all smart cards are secure elements,” id. ¶ 71. Yet, on cross examination, Mr. Gomez repeatedly contended that smart cards and secure elements were “distinctly different” and “separate and unrelated.” Ex. 1045, 53:16–54:1. Mr. Gomez continued to assert that “the common understanding was that a secure element . . . has a very strong level of security beyond what you would normally find . . . in products at the time, such as smart cards.” Id. at 55:22–56:8. This cross examination testimony is inconsistent with his prior testimony and with the Specification of the ’009 patent, which explains that the secure element “may be in [the] form of a smart card.” Ex. 1001, 6:59. There is no indication in the Specification that a “secure element” was a special product “beyond” what was available at the time. If anything, the Specification indicates that the term “secure element” is not intended to capture something different than a smart card, but rather a broad genus of items that include a smart card. See id. at 6:59–61 (“the [secure element] may be in [the] form of a smart card, an integrated circuit (IC) or a software module upgradable by overwriting some of all of the components therein.”). Even if we accept the Patent Owner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would . . . understand that a smart card may be a secure element only if it provides the necessary security, such as by being tamper-resistant,”6 we find that Petitioner has shown that the GlobalPlatform-compliant smart cards meet this standard. As Mr. Smith explains in great detail, supported by numerous citations to the prior art, GlobalPlatform-compliant smart cards have and support numerous features designed to make them tamper-resistant. See Ex. 1046 ¶¶ 30–36. We find this testimony wellreasoned, well-supported, and give it substantial weight. Patent Owner argues that the use of a key set cannot make a secure element tamper resistant because a key set is separately recited in the claim. However, Mr. Gomez confirmed that “a key-based encryption scheme” was “one way” to satisfy the claim term “secure element.” Ex. 1045, 57:7–11. Indeed, the only security for the “secure element” mentioned in the Specification is that the secure element “in the mobile device is installed with a set of default 6 Patent Owner and Mr. Gomez have repeatedly stated that no construction of this term is necessary. See Tr. 49:3–18; Ex. 1045, 55:9–56:9. We find no need to construe it because we find that even under the “understanding” that Patent Owner has offered the prior art teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“is “essential,” Petitioner has still shown a motivation to combine because the proposed combination does not “discard” SIP as Patent Owner contends. In particular, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner “argues that a [person of ordinary skill] would discard all of Dua’s SIP teachings and use GlobalPlatform’s system for personalization instead.” PO Resp. 12. However, we agree with Petitioner that this mischaracterizes the proposed combination. See Reply 6–7. As the Petition states, Petitioner relies on Dua’s SIP session to establish the initial connection between the endpoints (between the smart card and a server) and download the application and send application identifying information to the server. See Pet. 22 (describing GlobalPlatform’s receipts transmitted “via a wireless SIP session”), 23 (downloading extensions “during a SIP session”). As Mr. Smith credibly testifies, “Dua teaches utilizing the SIP protocol to connect endpoints,” and “Dua’s SIP networking protocol for connecting endpoints functions like a ‘pipe’ to connect the two endpoints (e.g., smart card and server or host such as Dua’s WCM) together over a network.” Ex. 1046 (Smith Supp. Decl.) ¶ 15. Moreover, as Mr. Smith clarifies in his Supplemental Declaration, “Dua’s SIP protocol constructs the connection between endpoints, and GlobalPlatform establishes a secure channel within that connection for smart are ‘not intended, in any way, to limit the scope of the present invention[,]” or “[t]he foregoing disclosure and description of the present invention is illustrative and explanatory thereof” as insufficient). card specific communications.” Ex. 1046 ¶ 14; see also Pet. 24–26 (discussing the use of GlobalPlatform to create the secure channel). We find that Mr. Smith credibly testifies that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that in the combination, GlobalPlatform’s processes relying on the exchange of Application Protocol Data Unit (“APDU”) messages would be sent over Dua’s SIP endpoint-to-endpoint connection (“pipe”) because, (1) SIP is derived from HTTP, (2) APDUs are the standard messaging protocol for smart cards, and (3) it was known to transmit APDUs over HTTP.” Ex. 1046 ¶ 16. Mr. Smith supports this assertion with detailed testimony relying on extensive citations to Dua, Ex. 1046 ¶ 17, GlobalPlatform, id. ¶¶ 18, 20, Chen5 (id. ¶ 19), and Thibadeau, id. ¶ 21. We find this testimony was reasoned, detailed, and entitled to substantial weight. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown that in the proposed combination Dua’s SIP protocol would not be “discarded,” but rather, would remain an integral part of the combination. See Ex. 1046 ¶¶ 14–21.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 9,240,009 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,240,009 - Hunter’S Manufacturing Company, Inc. D/B/A Tenpoint Crossbow Technologies v. Ravin Crossbows, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 10, 2023 · IPR2023-00407 · APJ Robert J Silverman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claim 1 on all asserted grounds because Grounds 7 and 8 met the reasonable-likelihood threshold.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_dis trict_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (“Interim Procedure”). The Interim Procedure explains that “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure 3 (internal footnote omitted) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020- 01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A) (“Sotera”)). The Interim Procedure explains that such a Sotera stipulation “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB . . . [and] allows the PTAB to review grounds that the parallel district court litigation will not resolve.” Id. at 7–8. In this proceeding, Petitioner offers a stipulation employing language nearly identical to that prescribed in the Interim Procedure: “Petitioner hereby stipulates that it will not pursue in the parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in this Petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised as to claim 1 in this Petition.” Pet. 6–7.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim Interpretation In an inter partes review, we construe claims using the same standard applied in a district court. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“’015 Patent pertains “would be a technical person who has at least some experience working in the field of archery, reviewing crossbows or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows, and is generally familiar with prior art crossbows” and “would likely have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or, alternatively, would have several years of experience in the field of archery or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶ 17). Patent Owner states: “Solely for purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSA’).” Prelim. Resp. 2. For the purposes of the present Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art pertinent to the ’015 Patent. E.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“The Federal Circuit has explained that “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden, Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner relies upon a portion of KSR in which the Supreme Court stated: When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Yet, in the analysis of Ground 2, Petitioner does not address the predicate factual determinations that the Supreme Court identifies — e.g., that there would have been “a design need or market pressure,” that there were “identified” and “predictable” solutions. Id. Therefore, based upon the present record, and for the purposes of the present Decision, Petitioner does not provide a sufficient reason for modifying Stanziale ’302, in order satisfy the identified limitation of claim 1. F.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,354,015 - Rideco Inc. v. Via Transportation, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 23, 2023 · IPR2022-00286 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations failed to teach or render obvious system-selected virtual bus stops and a pair of associated stops.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“2. Discussion We have considered the parties’ arguments and evidence of record, and we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the problems identified and solutions provided in the ’824 patent and the prior art. In particular, we agree with Petitioner that the relevant field of art is not limited to backend artificial intelligence components in a ride-sharing system as Patent Owner contends. See Pet. Reply 10–11; see also PO Resp. 31–32. We disagree with Patent Owner’s assertions that the ’824 patent is directed towards a complex artificial intelligence system far beyond the scope of traditional navigation systems. See PO Resp. 31–32. Neither Patent Owner nor its expert, Dr. Jacquillat, cites to the patent in determining the relevant skill in the art to explain why the art of the ’824 patent is limited to artificial intelligence components. See id.; Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 41–51. As Patent Owner acknowledges, the ’824 patent makes no reference to “artificial intelligence” directly, and Patent Owner instead relies upon declarant testimony to argue that the patent is directed towards an advancement in artificial intelligence. PO Sur-reply 11. Patent Owner claims, without support, that “programming a computer to make decisions in the place of humans is a form of artificial intelligence.” Id. Regardless, we need not determine the precise definition of artificial intelligence to determine the relevant skill in the art pertaining to a patent that never uses the term. We agree with Petitioner that an artisan with an understanding of computer programming and navigation systems as well as two to four years of experience in location-based systems would understand the “computer-implemented transportation system” of the ’824 patent. In summary, we find that the relevant level of ordinary skill in the art “would have been a person having (i) a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar technical field[;] (ii) a working knowledge of computer programming and navigation systems; and (iii) two to four years of experience with location-based systems, user interfaces and databases.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 37).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Having addressed the relevant skill in the art, we address Patent Owner’s contention that Mr. Andrews “is not qualified to offer opinions concerning the artificial intelligence components of a ride-sharing system that are at issue in the ’824 patent.” PO Resp. 37. As discussed previously, we disagree with Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art, and have adopted Petitioner’s position. Patent Owner does not offer an opinion as to whether Mr. Andrews would be qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art under Petitioner’s definition. The record reflects that Mr. Andrews possessed an advanced degree in electronic engineering, had a working knowledge of computer programming and navigation systems, and had more than two years of experience with location-based systems, user interfaces, and databases at the time of the ’824 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4–19; Ex. 1009. Therefore, we find that Mr. Andrews is qualified to offer opinions as a person of ordinary skill in the art for the ’824 patent under the relevant definition. Additionally, we find that Mr. Andrews’s background would qualify him as a person of ordinary skill in the art even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Under Patent Owner’s proposal, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have a “degree in computer science, operations research, industrial engineering, applied mathematics, or a related field with at least two years of experience with optimization modeling, large scale optimization algorithms, or artificial intelligence solutions in the context of ride-sharing systems.” PO Resp. 30 (emphasis added). The record demonstrates that Mr. Andrews meets these qualifications. Mr. Andrews possesses a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering and a Master of Science degree in Electronic Engineering, which we find to be in a “related field.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 6. Additionally, Mr. Andrews has significantly more than two years of experience in the fields Patent Owner suggests are relevant as evidenced by, for example, Mr. Andrews testimony that he has experience in “location-based systems,” and “work[ing] in database dispatch systems for fleet management.” Ex. 2023, 44:2–9; 44:15–19. Furthermore, given Mr. Andrews’s advanced degree, Patent Owner’s definition would allow Mr. Andrews to have less than two years of experience in the pertinent fields. PO Resp. 30; Ex. 1003 ¶ 6.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther
“Under these circumstances, where the parties now agree that the ordinary meaning should apply to “virtual bus stops” and the district court adopted the same approach, we see no reason to depart from applying the ordinary meaning in this proceeding. We therefore apply the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by the parties, where “virtual bus stops” means “pickup and dropoff locations selected by the ride-sharing system itself.” As to the construction of dependent claim 8, we agree with Patent Owner that we need not formally construe the term to resolve the issues before us. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). As to Petitioner’s remaining arguments, we do not read artificial intelligence or other limitations into the claims as Petitioner warns against, and Petitioner does not argue for any specific construction in relation to these arguments that would require us to resolve a specific claim construction dispute. See Pet. Reply 4–10.” slip op. at 16
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1004, 4:17–23. The Petition does not cite to any declarant support, additional prior art, other embodiments in Lambert, or any obviousness analysis when addressing “virtual bus stops.” See Pet. 25. Although for later aspects of claim 1 the Petition relies on Poykko and an obviousness analysis when arguing that it would have been obvious to configure Lambert’s server to operate in a certain way (e.g., to access memory that includes a database of locations as taught by Poykko), the Petition does not rely on such an analysis when first addressing “virtual bus stops” alone. See id. The combination of Lambert’s statement above with Poykko and other aspects of Lambert, potentially with allegedly obvious modifications of Lambert, may serve as the basis of Petitioner’s arguments for these later limitations involving “virtual bus stops,” but these later allegations do not reach back and redefine Petitioner’s more limited argument with respect to “virtual bus stops” in isolation.8 To the extent Petitioner argues in its Reply that a combination of Lambert and Poykko or other obviousness arguments 8 In our Institution Decision, we noted that Patent Owner, at that stage of the proceeding, failed to properly address Petitioner’s proposed combination of Lambert and Poykko for various “virtual bus stop” limitations. Inst. Dec. 22–23. That said, we do not view the Petition’s arguments and evidence as to “virtual bus stops” limitation in isolation, prior to addressing the “memory” limitation and adding Poykko and obviousness to the analysis, as relying on a combination of Lambert and Poykko or obviousness. See Pet. 25. satisfy the “virtual bus stops” limitation, we agree with Patent Owner that this introduces an improper new theory in the Reply. See PO Sur-reply 20– 22.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 9,816,824 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,816,824 - Lightricks Ltd. v. Plotagraph, Inc. And Sascha ConnellyInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 20, 2023 · IPR2023-00152 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted anticipation or obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim on any asserted ground.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it appears consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 42). Patent Owner proposes claim constructions for “set of pixels,” “pixels that lie along a link/length of pathway between the starting point and the ending point,” and “in a loop.” Prelim. Resp. 17–28. On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“First, the disclosure of AEM that Petitioner relies on for teaching selecting certain pixels to be transparent or nontransparent pertains to “compositing,” i.e., creating a composite image from multiple images. Ex. 1003, 315–16. AEM states specifically: “To create a composite from multiple images, you can make parts of one or more of the images transparent so that other images can show through.” Id. at 315. Thus, each pixel in the composite image is either transparent or nontransparent such that every pixel is “selected” under Petitioner’s usage of the term “selecting.” The possibility that some of these pixels, in theory, could extend along a non-linear motion path of a Deform pin is mere happenstance—we are not directed to any disclosure in AEM of actually selecting a set of pixels (either transparent or nontransparent) that extend along a non-linear motion path. See In re Facebook, Inc., 743 F. App’x. 998, 1001–02 (Fed Cir. 2018) (deciding that an example in a prior art reference showing that it is possible for image elements to be contiguous is not sufficient to teach a claim limitation that requires contiguity). We are not persuaded on the record before us that AEM’s disclosure of designating pixels as transparent or nontransparent satisfies selecting a first set of pixels extending along a nonlinear pathway. Second, Petitioner’s argument relies on AEM teaching that “AECS6 necessarily allows a user . . . to select any or all pixels of the layer to be nontransparent and thus included in the layer’s mesh to be moved and animated.” Pet. 21. We disagree, however, that AEM discloses selecting pixels to be nontransparent and including these pixels in a mesh to be moved and animated. That AECS6 arguably allows selected nontransparent pixels to be included in a mesh is not sufficient to establish that AEM discloses doing so. Petitioner contends that AECS6 and the screenshots of AECS6 created by Dr. Greenspun establish the background knowledge possessed by a person of ordinary skill in the art but does not explain adequately why AECS6’s alleged capability would cause one of ordinary skill in the art to understand AEM to teach selecting pixels of a layer to be nontransparent and including the selected pixels in the layer’s mesh. See Pet. 17 n.6 (quoting Qualcomm, 24 F.4th at 1376). Again, any pixels selected to be nontransparent being included in a mesh is mere happenstance.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,558,342 - PTAB · Apr 24, 2023 · IPR2022-01504 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that each challenged claim would have been obvious over the cited combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“trial. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (authorizing institution of a trial under particular circumstances, but not requiring institution under any circumstances); 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(a) (stating “the Board will authorize the review to proceed”) (emphasis added); cf. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 273 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech, Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that under § 314(a), “the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an [inter partes review] proceeding”). Petitioner anticipates potential discretionary denial issues under 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a) and 325(d). Pet. 70–73. On this record, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On this record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that the combination of Dua and Rosener teaches all the limitations of claim 1.” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the Kyriakakis Declaration Petitioner alleges a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in wireless (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 23). On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal because we are satisfied that it comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’852 patent.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther
“Petitioner, asserts construction is unnecessary and does not propose any term for construction. Pet. 11 (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”). On this record, no disputed term is identified. We preliminarily determine that no term requires construction to resolve this dispute. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803. Accordingly, we proceed on the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,848,852 - PTAB · Apr 24, 2023 · IPR2022-01503 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–26 and all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was unpatentable over Rosener, Dua, Price, and Nakagawa.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1‒26 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the Kyriakakis Declaration, Petitioner alleges a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in . . . an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in wireless communications across short-distance or local-area networks.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 23). Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it appears consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner asserts construction is unnecessary and does not propose any term for construction. Pet. 9–10 (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be the controversy.”)). On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“F. Collateral Estoppel Relying on the final written decisions that have been issued in IPR2021-00297, IPR2021-00381, and IPR2021-00305 (Exs. 1011–1013), Petitioner asserts that “while unnecessary to find the challenged claims unpatentable, Patent Owner is collaterally estopped from disputing that the cited prior art teaches the limitations” that the Board found the references to showing, without application of collateral estoppel, is sufficient at this stage of the proceeding, we do not reach the collateral estoppel arguments. However, we do note that, unlike MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018), which Petitioner relies on, this case involves different patents. Also, different parties and different prior art combinations are asserted. See Pet. 10–12. We question, but do not decide, how collateral estoppel applies here and leave the issue, if it becomes relevant, to trial. IV. CONCLUSION After considering the evidence and arguments of record, we determine” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,757,498 - Bj’S Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc. v. Walmart Apollo, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 12, 2023 · IPR2022-01561 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–14 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness grounds, and institution would be inefficient.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“In claim 1, “server” first appears in limitation 1b’s recitation of “a server.” Ex. 1001, 21:27–28. Every subsequent mention of “server” in claim 1 recites “the server.” Id. at 21:37, 21:40, 21:48, 21:51, 21:53, 21:60. Thus, grammatically, each time claim 1 recites “the server,” it refers back to the same “server” as in all previous recitations. Accordingly, claim 1’s plain meaning refers to the same server each and every time it recites “server.” See Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC, --- F.4th ---, 2023 WL 2778774 *3–4 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2023) (explaining claim language reciting element with definite article refers to same element previously recited) (citing Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Harari v. Lee, 655 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Neither party argues that any reason exists to construe claim 1’s recitations of “a server” and “the server” differently from their plain meanings. See generally Pet.; Prelim. Resp. We construe every one of claim 1’s recitations of “server” as referring to the same server (the “same-server requirement”).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as allegedly obvious over Fletchall and Xavier. As discussed above in Section II.B, we construe claim 1’s recitations of “the server” as all limited to the same server. Thus, as Petitioner contemplated, “the server” recited in limitation 1i is “limited to the same server as in antecedent [limitations 1e–1f].” Pet. 30. Petitioner inadequately supports its position that “Fletchall teaches that also.” Id. at 30–31. Petitioner’s and Dr. Shamos’s explanations do not persuasively support their position that Fletchall teaches product database (121) and payment server (130) are the same server.4 Pet. 30–31; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 210–212. For example, the observation that product database (121) and payment server (130) are part of system (100) and can communicate with one another via computer network (120) does not make product database (121) and payment server (130) part of the same server. Pet. 30–31; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 210–212; Prelim. Resp. 24. As Patent Owner 4 Also, to the extent Petitioner and Dr. Shamos have some other basis for contending that Fletchall teaches using the same server in performing the actions recited in limitations 1f and 1i, they do not support that view with sufficiently persuasive evidence or explanation. argues, following Petitioner’s reasoning would lead to the untenable conclusion that any two components of system (100) that can communicate with one another via computer network (120), including mobile device (104) and product database (121), would be part of the same server. Pet. 30–31; Prelim. Resp. 24–25. Accordingly, we find Petitioner’s and Dr. Shamos’s contentions unpersuasive. We also find unavailing Petitioner’s and Dr. Shamos’s observation that “Fletchall teaches that the product database 121 can be hosted on a merchant server . . . and be part of the common system 100 that includes payment server 130.” Pet. 31; Ex. 1002 ¶ 211. Hosting product database (121) on a merchant server does not make product database (121) and payment server (130) part of the same server. Nor does including product database (121) and payment server (130) within system (100).” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as allegedly obvious over Fletchall and Xavier. As discussed above in Section II.B, we construe claim 1’s recitations of “the server” as all limited to the same server. Thus, as Petitioner contemplated, “the server” recited in limitation 1i is “limited to the same server as in antecedent [limitations 1e–1f].” Pet. 30. Petitioner inadequately supports its position that “Fletchall teaches that also.” Id. at 30–31. Petitioner’s and Dr. Shamos’s explanations do not persuasively support their position that Fletchall teaches product database (121) and payment server (130) are the same server.4 Pet. 30–31; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 210–212. For example, the observation that product database (121) and payment server (130) are part of system (100) and can communicate with one another via computer network (120) does not make product database (121) and payment server (130) part of the same server. Pet. 30–31; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 210–212; Prelim. Resp. 24. As Patent Owner 4 Also, to the extent Petitioner and Dr. Shamos have some other basis for contending that Fletchall teaches using the same server in performing the actions recited in limitations 1f and 1i, they do not support that view with sufficiently persuasive evidence or explanation. argues, following Petitioner’s reasoning would lead to the untenable conclusion that any two components of system (100) that can communicate with one another via computer network (120), including mobile device (104) and product database (121), would be part of the same server. Pet. 30–31; Prelim. Resp. 24–25. Accordingly, we find Petitioner’s and Dr. Shamos’s contentions unpersuasive. We also find unavailing Petitioner’s and Dr. Shamos’s observation that “Fletchall teaches that the product database 121 can be hosted on a merchant server . . . and be part of the common system 100 that includes payment server 130.” Pet. 31; Ex. 1002 ¶ 211. Hosting product database (121) on a merchant server does not make product database (121) and payment server (130) part of the same server. Nor does including product database (121) and payment server (130) within system (100).” slip op. at 23
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“functions (VTSAs) of the server 111, the server 130, and merchant server hosting the product database 121 into the same server.” Pet. 41. As explained above in Sections II.C.3.a–c, Petitioner fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability of either of challenged independent claims 1 and 10 or any of challenged dependent claims 2–4, 6, 8, 9, and 11–14. Considering this, to the extent Petitioner’s arguments and evidence may demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claim 5 as allegedly obvious over Fletchall and Xavier, we do not find that instituting inter partes review would use the Board’s or the parties’ resources efficiently. See 35 U.S.C. 316(b).” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,803,435 - PTAB · Apr 12, 2023 · IPR2022-01528 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 15–19 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Yong anticipates claim 15.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 15‒19 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s parallel filing of four petitions warrants denying all four petitions. Prelim. Resp. 7 (“Petitioner’s abuse of process in filing four petitions justifies discretionary denial of all of the petitions.”). Accordingly, given that Petitioner ranks the instant Petition “1,” we decline to deny institution in this proceeding. Additionally, under the circumstances presented, where Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s observation that the ’435 patent has very long claims, we conclude it is not unreasonable for Petitioner to file multiple petitions. In our view, even if it were accurate, Patent Owner’s argument that the claims’ “narrowness” reflects quality examination does not detract from Petitioner’s argument that the length of the claims warrants more than one petition. Prelim. Resp. 6.” slip op. at 33
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Weighing the arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has met its burden under 35 U.S.C. § 314 of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that Yong qualifies as prior art. Hulu at 13. As Petitioner asserts, the KIPO logo and the multiple instances of publication number 10-2007-0087811 on Yong’s first page provide some evidence of authenticity. Ex. 1009, 1; Reply to Prelim. Resp. 3.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL Petitioner contends that [a] person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) as of the claimed priority date would have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field or equivalent coursework or experience, and one to two years of experience with mobile device applications and retail POS systems. (Shamos ¶ 34.) More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. (Id.) Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 18. For purposes of deciding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the ’435 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,803,435 - PTAB · Apr 11, 2023 · IPR2022-01564 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Keith anticipates at least claims 1 and 10.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1‒14 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“Under the circumstances presented, where the priority date of the challenged claims is disputed, we conclude it is not unreasonable for Petitioner to present separate challenges, one of which relies on references that are prior art only if the challenged claims are not entitled to Patent Owner’s claimed priority date, which has yet to be finally determined. See TPG 59 (stating that “a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references” can be a potential reason for the Board to institute trial on multiple petitions challenging the same patent). Thus, on the present record, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of this Petition on the basis of Petitioner filing multiple petitions.” slip op. at 46
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field or equivalent coursework or experience, and one to two years of experience with mobile device applications and retail POS systems,” also noting that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 34). Patent Owner, at this stage of the proceeding, does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 18. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s proffered level of skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’435 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We determine that an express construction of this or any other claim term is not necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,803,435 - Yantai Jereh Petroleum Equipment & Technologies Co., Ltd v. BJ Energy Solutions, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 6, 2023 · PGR2021-00102 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 5 and 9 are unpatentable as indefinite under §112(b); the Board did not find claims 1–4, 6–8, and 10–28 unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on our review of the record before us, particularly the ’459 patent’s description and Dr. Adnan’s testimony, we agree with Petitioner that the ordinary level of skill in the art does not require the high level of specialized knowledge of control systems suggested by Patent Owner. Moreover, we find that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition, although our conclusions with respect to obviousness would be the same if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Based on the full record, we are not persuaded that Mr. Marscher is unqualified to serve as an expert in this proceeding. As noted above, a person of ordinary skill in the art is not required to have been a fracturing operator. Patent Owner’s proposed definition does not even require experience as a fracturing operator. See PO Resp. 22. Furthermore, Mr. Marscher testifies that he has extensive experience developing pumps for fracturing applications. Ex. 2027, 6:24–8:7. Mr. Marscher also testifies that he has experience with control systems relating to pumps and pumps units. Id. at 212:19–23. This testimony, as well as his declaration and curriculum vitae, show that Mr. Marscher has extensive education and experience in relevant fields. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 8–17; Ex. 1004. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Mr. Marscher’s qualifications or experience provide reason to discount the weight associated with Mr. Marscher’s testimony.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“is the pump unit’s highest HHP output and one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood this value is the pump unit’s output power in intermittent duty. Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71–72, 123–124; Pet. 9– 10; Ex. 1036, 64:17–67:13, 119:17–120:11, 124:7–24, 198:9–200:9, 221:8– 222:15). However, even if Petitioner is correct that the “maximum power output value” is near or equivalent to a pump unit’s output power in intermittent duty, we are still not persuaded that the term “maximum intermittent power” should be tied to the “maximum power output value,” in conflict with the definition provided in the Specification. Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is indefinite. Pet. Reply 3. For the reasons discussed below (see supra § II.I.1), we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the term “maximum intermittent power,” as defined in the Specification, is indefinite. Thus, based on the complete record before us, we maintain our prior construction of “maximum intermittent power” for this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“5. Additional Terms We determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017; see also Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,907,459 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,907,459
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.