• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00114 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; claim 20 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyDenied

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Wieselthaler’s Declaration (Exhibit 1041), portions of Mr. Crosby’s Reply Declaration (Exhibit 1042), portions of the deposition transcript of Dr. Wieselthaler (Exhibit 2028), and the exhibits “upon which that testimony is based” (Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050). Mot. 1. According to Patent Owner, the Motion was made “to preserve objections previously made in the record.” Id. (citations omitted). Patent Owner did not timely move to strike any of the evidence at issue as being outside the scope of reply evidence. Patent Owner asserts that because an inter partes review must be based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), the testimony of Mr. Crosby and Dr. Wieselthaler concerning “various physical devices allegedly known” to a person of ordinary skill in the art is inadmissible, along with all of the exhibits (consisting of printed materials such a journal abstracts, press releases, and papers) related to those physical devices. Id. at 3–4; see also Mot. Reply 1–4 (arguing that “devices that Petitioner’s witnesses assert were the basis of an inter partes review”). According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wieselthaler was unable to “link two of these physical devices to the printed prior art asserted in this [inter partes review], but those attempts fell apart during his cross examination.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner further reasons that because the evidence “cannot be the basis” of an inter partes review, it “has no tendency to make any fact of consequence in this trial more or less probable,” “is irrelevant and not admissible,” “presents substantial danger of confusing the issues, causing undue delay, and wasting time in this trial,” and “are not ‘based on sufficient facts[,] the product of reliable principles and methods[, or] ‘a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” Id. at 7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401–403, 702) (modification in original). With regard to Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that Patent Owner identifies no plausible legal theory for their inadmissibility based on the contention that they discuss physical devices. See Mot. Resp. 3. We also agree with Petitioner that the exhibits are not “the basis for any ground” asserted in this proceeding, and may be properly relied upon by Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby as support for their rebuttal testimony directed to Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine the prior art relied upon in the instituted grounds. See id. at 3–4. In regard to the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and” slip op. at 77

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “1. “magneto coupling” Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “a second magnetic device . . . positioned to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Ex. 1001, 5:34–37. Claim 11 recites, in relevant part, “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor so as to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor relative to the one or more walls via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Id. at 6:42–48. Petitioner argues that “magneto coupling” means “a transfer of torque from one rotating permanent magnetic component to another rotating permanent magnetic component via a magnetic field.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 68–87). According to Petitioner, this construction is consistent with the ’879 patent, which describes “a coupling between two rotating ‘bar magnets’—a drive wheel rotates one bar magnet which causes another bar magnet (connected to a rotor) to rotate.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–55 (analyzing Ex. 1001, 2:28–52, 4:44–64, Fig. 2)). Patent Owner argues that “magneto coupling” should be afforded “its plain and ordinary meaning, which would encompass a magnetic coupling through both rotating magnets and the use of a rotating magnetic Owner directs us to the testimony of Mr. Leschinsky, who explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’879 patent to use “magneto coupling” to generally describe “a way to couple the rotor to a drive element while sealing the two from one another and avoiding use of a direct mechanical coupling.” Ex. 2015 ¶ 67. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner provides no recognizable basis for limiting the plain meaning of magnetic coupling to one type of magnet and excluding another type of magnet.” PO Resp. 6–7 (citing Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc., v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989–992 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not provide a sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’879 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 13 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 7; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)).” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableUnpatentable

    “reasons discussed above. See supra Section III.D.3. Accordingly, because Petitioner’s contentions are premised on an unsupported claim construction that we reject, Petitioner fails to show how Wampler teaches or suggests “a magnetically driven rotor . . . axially adjacent to a first magnet device,” as required by claims 1 and 11, as well as by claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14– 16, and 18–20, which depend from either claim 1 or claim 11. In its Reply, Petitioner suggests that “[u]nder [Patent Owner’s] construction from the [Patent Owner Response], Wampler also teaches or suggests this limitation,” because Patent Owner “concedes [that] ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 11,572,879 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,572,879
• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–12 were held unpatentable over Wannamaker alone or with Avellan; claims 1–6 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not teach the claimed screen-capture sequence and assembly.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 17. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 18. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Yet paragraph 122 of Mr. Lipoff’s declaration merely repeats the Petition’s argument almost verbatim. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶ 122, with Pet. 28. Mr. Lipoff does not add any citation to Avellan or any other source that supports his testimony. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 122. Nor does Mr. Lipoff offer any additional technical reasoning than what is stated in the Petition. Testimony may be entitled to little weight if it merely restates the petition’s unsupported, conclusory assertions without adding supporting evidence or technical reasoning. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). That is the case here.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that claim 1 is not obvious over Avellan because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 21–23. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. PO Sur-reply 20. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 20.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,002 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,002
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00189 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 19 is unpatentable as obvious over Kim and over Nam; the challenge based on Lee and Park fails for lack of a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “B. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of Claims 17 and 20 As indicated above, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 17 and 20 of the ’666 patent. See Ex. 2005. In view of Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer, we treat claims 17 and 20 as having never been part of the ’666 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because inter partes review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, we do not consider claims 17 and 20 to be within the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claim 19, the challenged claim that has not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) 3D memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–37). Petitioner further contends that the “POSITA would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D memory’s structure, its component parts, and how it operates.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–37).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “evidence from the complete record now before us, we determine that the claim term “curved side surface” encompasses any outer surface of the structure with curvature. See Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1338–1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that it is acceptable for the Board to adopt its own claim construction where the parties “had notice of the contested claim construction and an opportunity to be heard”). We do not adopt Patent Owner’s position that “curved side surface” requires the side surface to be curved along a direction perpendicular to the top surface of the structure (e.g., the z-axis).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “curved side surface” are premised on its proposed claim construction which, as set forth above, we decline to adopt. Instead, we determined that “curved side surface” as used in the challenged claim encompasses any outer surface of the structure with curvature, which does not need to be curved in any specific direction. See § II.B.1, supra. Kim states: Embodiments of the inventive concepts in which the protrusion pad PAD_P has a rectangular parallel[] shape is illustrated, but the protrusion pad PAD_P is not limited thereto and, in some embodiments, may have a shape including a curved surface based on a virtual rectangular parallel[] shape, a cylindrical shape, or any shape. Ex. 1005, 8:29–34 (emphases added). Dr. Lee testifies that “[a] POSITA would have recognized that this includes configurations where the sides of the protrusion pads are curved, particularly to optimize electrical connectivity and mitigate stress at material interfaces.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 201. Dr. Lee further testifies that a POSITA would have understood Kim’s disclosure “teaches a variety of different protrusion pad PAD_P shapes” including “pads with curved sides when viewed in cross-section or pads with curved sides when viewed from above.” Id. ¶ 202. Accordingly, we determine that Kim discloses a cylindrically-shaped PAD_P that has a “curved side surface” as required by the challenged claim. slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,145,666 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,145,666
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• X Corp. v. Sterling Computers CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00299 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated Dumais-based and Kircher/Krug grounds; Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s motions to exclude are dismissed as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 8–9. In its response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See PO Resp. 14–15 (“Patent Owner and its expert adopt the Board’s definition for purposes of this Response”). Having considered the record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’217 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached

    “1. “computer program modules” The parties dispute whether four “computer program modules comprising” (1) “a monitoring module,” (2) “a first relevance measurement module,” (3) “a second relevance measurement module,” and (4) “a relevance analysis module” (collectively, “module limitations”) invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and should be treated as means-plus-function limitations. See Pet. 8–18; PO Resp. 15–18; Pet. Reply 3–5; PO Sur-reply 4–7. However, the parties do not argue that the construction of these terms affects the analysis of Petitioner’s challenges. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Moreover, our analysis does not rely on any particular construction of these terms and, so, we need not resolve this dispute.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “2. “one or more measures derived from the group consistent of” Petitioner asserts limitations 1[g] and 1[g][i]–1[g][iv] recite an open Markush group listing alternatively useable members. Pet. 20–21 (citing Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbot Lab’ys v. Baxter Pharm. Prod., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that the listing of specified alternatives within a claim is referred to as a Markush group or Markush grouping)); See Ex. 1001, 47:47–58. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s construction. See PO Resp; PO Sur-reply. As these terms are not in controversy, we need not opine on this construction.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s respective constructions overlap in their requirement that “cognate” users share similar past user actions and assessments or are defined by similar direct input by the user. See Pet. 18; PO Resp. 20–21; PO Sur-reply 10. Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s construction “exclude[s] ‘groups’ from the claims” and further limits the scope of to users who share actions (Pet. Reply 8–9), but Patent Owner states that its proposed construction does not so limit the claims (PO Sur-reply 10). As such, there is no disagreement that “cognate” users share similar past user actions and assessments or are defined by similar direct input by the user. As there is no controversy, we need not, and do not, construe the meaning of “cognate.” However, Patent Owner’s requirement that “at least one other of the plurality of users” is specifically cognate to “the user” who was sent the content is plainly recited in the claim language itself. The claim recites a “relevance score of a piece of electronic content sent from a sender to a user” in the preamble and similarly again in limitation 1[g]. See Ex. 1001, 47:25–28 (emphasis added), 45:62–64. The limitation in question directly references the claimed “user” when reciting the cognate relationship: “identify at least one other of the plurality of users . . . that is cognate to the user.” Ex. 1001, 47:43–45 (emphasis added). As such, the claim language plainly supports Patent Owner’s requirement and Petitioner does not contest that requirement. See Pet. Reply 8. least one other of the plurality of users . . . that is cognate to the user” as requiring that the identified other user is cognate specifically to the user whose relevance score is being determined.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 7,716,217 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,716,217
• Rocket Media, LLC D/B/A Launch Labs v. Fullthrottle Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00148 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Doughty and Van Boucq, and over Doughty, Van Boucq, and Maginnis.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art in June 2021 would have had “(1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field plus at least one year of experience working on computer networking, or (2) at least 3 years of experience working on computer networking, even without a formal degree.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 44–47). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered definition. PO Resp. 23. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the disclosure of the ’947 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We determine that no terms require express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes in this case, but address certain claim construction arguments made by the parties in the analysis below. See id.; Inst. Dec. 11 (determining that “no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms”); PO Resp. 23 (agreeing that “no express constructions are necessary to resolve this IPR”). slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner has shown that the combination of Doughty and Van Boucq accounts for these limitations. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that claim 1 somehow excludes, what Patent Owner calls, the “Unique Identifier/Tracker Embodiment.” See PO Resp. 27, 31. Beginning with the language of the claims, the claims are silent as to where the “location data” recited in limitation 1[c] is stored. See Tr. 21:7– 16 (Patent Owner agreeing that “the stored location data does not actually have a required location at all” in the claim, and need not be stored in a database). Nor does Patent Owner direct us to any claim language that would specifically exclude “location data” stored on the user’s device. See Sur-reply 2–3. “The patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain the full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning unless the patentee clearly redefines the term (lexicography) or disavows claim scope (claim disavowal).” Aortic Innovations LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 159 F.4th 1, 8 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Patent Owner directs us to statements in the Specification, stating “[f]or example, the computing device may access a database or other storage location that maintains a mapping of unique identifier to a browser session, a user computing device, and/or location data.” Ex. 1001, 9:52–55; see also id. at 39:26–30 (same), 43:55– 59 (same). But none of those passages amounts to lexicography or disavowal of claim scope. Indeed, when read in their full context, these passages support a broad reading, not a narrow reading, of the claims. The full passage of the Specification states: The computing device may determine, at 406, whether there is a unique identifier that is associated with the user (e.g., the user computing device, the browser, and/or the browser session) stored on the computing device. For example, the script may inform the computing device that there is no unique identifier for the user computing device. The computing device may determine that there is no unique identifier associated with the user computing device when there is no location data stored for the user computing device. For example, the computing device may access a database or other storage location that maintains a mapping of unique identifier to a browser session, a user computing device, and/or location data. Additionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine whether there is a unique identifier for associated with the user based on presence of a location tracker (e.g., cookie) installed in the browser application on the user computing device. Ex. 1001, 9:43–59. The passage above is full of language that indicates that the patentee did not intend to limit the claims to a single embodiment. Indeed, the specific portion of the passage cited by Patent Owner begins with “[f]or example” and further states “[a]dditionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine whether there is a unique identifier for associated with the user based on presence of a location tracker (e.g., cookie) installed in the browser application on the user computing device.” Id. at 9:52–59 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Specification states “[a]dditionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine the location data using the tracker installed in the browser application on the user computing device.” Id. at 10:2–5. The Specification also explains that the tracker may “maintain data related to the user and/or user computing device.” Id. at 12:62–63. Based on these disclosures, we find that the Specification supports a reading where the location data are stored in the user computing” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find persuasive Petitioner’s reasoning that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Doughty, based on Doughty’s own teachings regarding cookies and similar files, and would have recognized that the techniques of Van Boucq would have offered an efficient and commonly used way to determine whether the user already has been assigned a unique identifier. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 153. Patent Owner’s arguments about the precise contents of Van Boucq’s connection cookie attack Van Boucq individually and ignore the combination and modifications that Petitioner proposes. In the combination, Petitioner proposes incorporating the unique identifier from Doughty into Van Boucq’s connection cookie. See Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1008, 16:59–17:33; Ex. 1007 ¶ 153). As for Patent Owner’s contention that “[n]othing in the record suggests that Van Boucq’s connection cookie could contain any information about either Doughty’s table 105 Profile ID or Doughty’s hashed email address,” PO Resp. 33, as Dr. Gottesman testifies, “[a] cookie is a small piece of data (text file).” Ex. 2012 ¶ 55. We fail to see why a skilled artisan at the time of the invention would have any difficulty incorporating Doughty’s alphanumeric unique identifier into a text file. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 153, 166. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown a motivation to combine Doughty and Van Boucq for these limitations.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,556,947 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,556,947
• Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. Halozyme, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2026 · PGR2025-00004 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 7–19, and 22 are unpatentable under § 112(a) for lack of written description and enablement, and under § 103 as obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “1. Petitioner’s Position Petitioner asserts that the “terms used in the claims are either” slip op. at 12

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable

    “7. Analysis We find the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the” slip op. at 59

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable

    “6. Analysis Petitioner has the burden to identify how the specification allegedly” slip op. at 70

  Patent outcomesUS 12,018,298 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,018,298
• Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00160 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10–13, 15–18, and 20–31 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed Toge-Kumar combination did not establish the claimed remote internet site hosted on a server.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner filed a Response. Paper 23 (“PO Resp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply. Paper 27 (“Reply”). Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply. Paper 35 (“Sur-reply”). Additionally, during trial, Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name a real party in interest (namely, Petitioner’s corporate parent, Resmed Inc.). Paper 37. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 38. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 39. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 44.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability. C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level). D. Summary of the Asserted Prior Art” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “summarized above, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have implemented Toge’s physician-side computer as a web server using a “localhost” architecture as proposed by Petitioner because such a configuration cannot communicate with external devices over the public internet, a deficiency that directly contradicts Petitioner’s stated motivations for the combination of permitting broad data access. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Chatterjee, expressly acknowledged in his Reply Declaration that when a client and server reside on the same machine, the communications between them do not traverse the internet. Ex. 1069 ¶ 8. Specifically, Dr. Chatterjee cited the Microsoft Computer Dictionary’s definition of “localhost” as “[t]he name that is used to represent the same computer on which a TCP/IP message originates,” noting that “[a]n IP packet sent to localhost has the IP address 127.0.0.1 and does not actually go out to the Internet.” Id. (citing Ex. 1070, 316). Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed configuration of placing both the client and web server on Toge’s physician-side computer would create a closed loop of communication that does not reach the broader network. Id. As noted by Patent Owner, “[i]f ‘the physician-side computer and the web server are on one machine,’ the local web server would not communicate with other devices via the Internet.” Sur-Reply, 3–4 (comparing Ex. 1069 ¶ 19 with id. at ¶ 8). Thus, the consequence of Petitioner’s proposed Toge-Kumar configuration is that other devices in the system, such as the PAP device that generates the treatment data and any remote client devices that might need to access that data, would be unable to send data to or retrieve data from the localhost web server. Patent Owner persuasively argues, supported by evidence of record, that under Petitioner’s proposed configuration, “the PAP device could not send data thereto nor could other clients receive data therefrom, as only the local client browser can exchange data.” Id. (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 8); see Ex. 2003, 4 (one-tier architecture “is not suitable for a web application” because “it can only access data available in a single computer or server” and therefore “is not suitable for a web application.”); Ex. 2022, 3 (Unlike more advanced multi-tier systems, a one-tier architecture “cannot transmit information from one client machine to another.”); Ex. 2020, 4 (While “the client process and server process can be on the same computer,” this architecture “is rarely used today” precisely because it cannot “take advantage of the distributed computing environment.”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,786,680 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,786,680
• Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 2, 2026 · IPR2025-00140 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 7–18 were not shown unpatentable because Ribarits does not disclose a mouthpiece disposed on the pivotal mount.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Trove contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products” and that “[m]ore work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 25). While CamelBak offers “a similar, though slightly different level,” it nonetheless “discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 27. That being the case, we adopt Trove’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, as it is 2 JP 2002-211613A, published July 31, 2002 (Ex. 1004, “Nakajima”). 3 WO 2004/063042 A2, published July 29, 2004 (Ex. 1006, “Ribarits”). 4 US 4,485,963, issued Dec. 4, 1984 (Ex. 1007, “Panicci”). 5 US 6,523,711 B1, issued Feb. 25, 2003 (Ex. 1008, “Hughes”). reasonable and consistent with what is reflected in the asserted prior art and the specification of the ’250 patent. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We will not bite. CamelBak’s original assertion—that the plain and ordinary meaning of the constituent parts of “mouth” and “piece” is “a piece (or part) that goes in the mouth”—underscores the fallacy of CamelBak’s additional physical contact requirement. PO Resp. 28 (emphasis added). Indeed, in support of that earlier assertion, CamelBak pointed to the very dictionary definition that we relied on at institution in construing “mouthpiece” as a part that either “goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied.” See id. at 31 (citing Ex. 2005 (emphasis added)). Even the original testimony of CamelBak’s own expert confirms that one skilled in the art “would understand that the term ‘mouthpiece’ is commonly known in the art as a part designed for a user’s mouth,” without any requirement for physical contact with the mouth. Ex. 2016 ¶ 58 (citing Ex. 2005) (emphasis added)). And nothing in the Specification limits that common understanding. Although, indisputably, the Specification contemplates an embodiment where the user physically contacts the mouthpiece with their teeth (i.e., a bite-actuated mouthpiece), it also contemplates an embodiment where the user simply inserts the bottle in their mouth and commences fluid flow by squeezing it. See Ex. 1001, 10:9–13. That disclosure supports a meaning of “mouthpiece” that simply requires placement in the opening of the user’s mouth without necessarily incurring physical contact with some portion of the mouth, such as the teeth, tongue, or lips. Indeed, had CamelBak wished to premise the meaning of “mouthpiece” on some sort of physical contact with the mouth, it knew how to do so. For instance, the independent claims of CamelBak’s earlier ’255 patent, which is the subject of the related 1137 IPR, are limited in just such a manner, as they recite “wherein the resilient mouthpiece is adapted to resiliently compress responsive to compressive forces applied to the resilient mouthpiece by a user’s teeth.” Ex. 2023, at 20–25 (emphasis added). Thus, we reject CamelBak’s attempt to narrow our construction of “mouthpiece” to something other than “a part (as of an instrument) that goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied.” Neither the intrinsic nor extrinsic evidence supports the narrower construction proposed by CamelBak.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “In reply, Trove argues that CamelBak’s “novel” construction that the mouthpiece moves with rotational motion about that same axis of rotation defined by the two joint as the pivotal mount and in the same direction as the pivotal mount “are inconsistent with the claim language’s plain and ordinary meaning and find no support in the intrinsic and extrinsic record.” See Pet. Reply 16. But, because we find that, when properly construed, the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” about “two joints that define a pivotal axis” requires that the mouthpiece rotate about the same axis and in the same direction as the pivotal mount, we reject Trove’s argument as unavailing. And, although we agree with Trove that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in counter-clockwise rotation about a “Second Pivot Axis” when Nakajima’s lid 4 is opened (id. at 20–22), that rotation is about a different axis—one defined by Nakajima’s protrusions 24 rather than the claimed “pivotal axis” defined by Nakajima’s hinge shafts 19—and in a different manner—an upward and counterclockwise path rather than the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” defined by Nakajima’s lid 4. Finally, in an alternative theory, Trove and its expert use “image- manipulation tools” in an attempt to show that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in some initial “clockwise-rotation” with Nakajima’s lid as it is opened. See Pet. Reply 18–24. We reject that theory as entirely conjectural and unsupported by the evidence.” slip op. at 39

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We disagree. As discussed above, the proper construction of “for pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” requires that the mouthpiece mirror the rotational movement of the pivotal mount, i.e., rotate about the same axis as the pivotal mount and in the same direction as the pivotal mount. See supra § II.B.3. But Nakajima’s mouthpiece does neither, and, thus, does not exhibit the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” about “two joints that define a pivotal axis for . . . the pivotal mount axis,” as properly construed.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 11,851,250 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,851,250
• AT&T Services, Inc. / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Pegasus Wireless Innovation LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 2, 2026 · IPR2025-00083 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Takeda and Yan; the Board found the alternative Marinier, Yan, and R1-1711853 ground insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related discipline, knowledge of the relevant 3GPP standards” and “at least 2 years of experience working in a field involving wireless communications.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–40). According to Petitioner, a “person with a different degree but with additional relevant experience could still qualify if the additional experience compensates for the different educational background.” Id. Petitioner also asserts a “person with less than 2 years of experience working in a field involving wireless communications could still qualify if the person has additional education that compensate[s] for their lesser experience.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. See generally PO Resp. We find that “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill in the art is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, because it appears consistent with the ’463 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached

    “Petitioner asserts that elements 1[b] and 1[c] constitute a mean-plus- function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s assertion. See Pet. 5–7; PO Resp. 11–13. As demonstrated below, there is no dispute as to whether the prior art teaches limitations 1[b] and 1[c] under Petitioner’s claim construction. Therefore, we need not address whether 35 U.S.C. § 112 (f) applies. “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s backward compatibility rationale for combining the teachings of Yan and Takeda. Patent Owner’s arguments are misplaced because they are premised incorrectly on Takeda’s teachings being limited to 5G NR (i.e., standalone 5G NR), and the proposed combination requiring “mixing standards and behaviors.” To the contrary, Petitioner explicitly asserts that “Takeda states that its teachings are applicable to both 4G and 5G”––i.e., non-standalone 5G. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 239). Likewise, instead of mixing 5G and 4G standards and behaviors as argued by Patent Owner, Petitioner merely proposes retaining Yan’s 4G method of allocating UL channel resources sets with Takeda’s teaching of 5G NR BWPs. See Pet. 14–15. We credit Dr. Roy’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network capability because it is supported by the cited evidence of record. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 105, 106 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 239; Ex. 1031, 1, 3; Ex. 1033, 5:23–31; Ex. 1034, 10; Ex. 1035, 1, 5; Ex. 1037, 31). Moreover, as pointed out by Petitioner, Dr. Shimony’s deposition testimony regarding the usefulness of backward compatibility and the importance of a non-standalone UE having the ability to communicate over both 4G and 5G standards supports Dr. Roy’s testimony, yet undermines Patent Owner’s arguments. See Ex. 1050, 178:16–182:16; Pet. Reply 14–15. Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network compatibility.10 See Pet. 13–15; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We credit Dr. Roy’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network capability because it is supported by the cited evidence of record. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 105, 106 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 239; Ex. 1031, 1, 3; Ex. 1033, 5:23–31; Ex. 1034, 10; Ex. 1035, 1, 5; Ex. 1037, 31). Moreover, as pointed out by Petitioner, Dr. Shimony’s deposition testimony regarding the usefulness of backward compatibility and the importance of a non-standalone UE having the ability to communicate over both 4G and 5G standards supports Dr. Roy’s testimony, yet undermines Patent Owner’s arguments. See Ex. 1050, 178:16–182:16; Pet. Reply 14–15. Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network compatibility.10 See Pet. 13–15; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,638,463 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,638,463

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.