- Osi Pharmaceuticals, LLC / Genentech, Inc. v. Arch Development Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 11, 2017 · IPR2016-01034 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, and 6 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 5, and 6 as obvious over Akinaga, Seynaeve, Friedman, and Tam; claim 6 also over Honma.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art. The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the effective filing date of the ’512 patent, “would have held an M.D. or Ph.D. in molecular biology, biochemistry, pharmacology, or a related field and have had several years of experience working in cancer research.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 19); PO Resp. 4. This level of ordinary skill is consistent with the prior art asserted in the Petition. See Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 779 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Accordingly, we adopt the parties’ definition for the purpose of this Decision. C.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Plain and ordinary meaningTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“which defines a “therapeutically effective amount” as “an amount of a DNA damaging agent and tyrosine kinase inhibitor that, when administered to an animal in combination, is effective to kill cells within the animal.” Id. at 5. The challenged claims, however, use “therapeutically effective amount” in a context different from the express definition set forth in the Specification. As noted by Petitioner, the definition at column 4, lines 16 to 19 of the Specification refers to “a combined amount of the DNA damaging agent and the tyrosine kinase inhibitor, while the claims require that only the tyrosine kinase inhibitor be administered in a ‘therapeutically effective amount.’” See Pet. 20.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Specification suggest that the inventors contemplated the induction of a differentiation pathway. See Ex. 2011 ¶ 4. To the contrary, and as discussed above in Section 1(C), the Specification focuses on the use of DNA damaging agents in combination with tyrosine kinase inhibitors to force damaged cells to override the G2 arrest checkpoint and enter mitosis before completing DNA repairs. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:46–48 (“By preventing delays in G2, cells will enter mitosis before the DNA is repaired and therefore the daughter cells will likely die.”). Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that, in light of the Specification, one of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the terms “enhanc[ing] cell death” and “enhancing apoptosis” to encompass the a process by which cancer cells are differentiated, become mortal, and, subsequently, “live out their days and die.” See Pet. 29; Ex. 1002, ¶ 127.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that the preamble of each challenged claim, as well as the “thereby” clause of claims 1–3 (“thereby improving chemotherapeutic intervention”), are non-limiting. Pet. 17–18, 21–22; Prelim. Resp. 5, 8; Ex. 2001, 15. On the present record, we adopt the parties’ proposed Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (instructing that only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). D.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 7,838,512 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,838,512 - PTAB · Sep 8, 2017 · IPR2015-01869 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1, 3–8, 10–12, 14–18, 20–23, 25, and 27–29 unpatentable over Shuen and RFC1234, and claim 19 unpatentable over Bellovin.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS When considering a request for rehearing, we review the Decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successDecided for petitioner
“mapping for the network address translation” under the Board’s construction of that phrase, i.e., “a property associated with the mapping in which the mapping expires after it has not been used in the translation of a packet for a period of time associated with the mapping,” the Petition cites the following language from Shuen:” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Disclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“from various documents into a host document . . . by citing such material in a manner that makes clear that the material is effectively part of the host document as if it were explicitly contained therein.” Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citations omitted). “To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents.” Id. (citations omitted). Whether and to what extent material has been incorporated by reference into a host document is a question of law. Id.” slip op. at 8
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). Notably, Patent Owner did not raise this argument (i.e., that Shuen’s “time to live” does not satisfy the recited “time out . . .” under the Board’s construction) in its Patent Owner Response. Patent Owner asserts, however, it “noted this deficiency of Petitioner’s proofs in the January 18, 2017 hearing” and “[t]his deficiency of Shuen was first raised in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response.” Req. Reh’g. 4. However, our rules do not allow Patent Owner to incorporate arguments by reference from its Preliminary Response (see 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference form one document into another document”)), and our Scheduling Order provides that any arguments and evidence not contained in the Patent Owner Response will be “deemed waived” (Paper 9, 3). Petitioner asserted at the oral hearing that the argument was new and, as such, Petitioner did not have a reasonable ability to respond to the argument. Tr. 43:8–14. We determine Patent Owner has waived its argument that Shuen does not disclose the “has not been used” portion of our construction of the phrase “time out of the mapping for the network address translation.”” slip op. at 3
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,544,079 - Topgolf International, Inc. v. Amit AgarwalRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 5, 2017 · IPR2017-00928 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request and left in place institution of inter partes review of claims 1 and 6 based on the reasonable likelihood of obviousness over Bertoncino and Foley.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must, in relevant part, “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768. We address Petitioner’s arguments with these principles in mind.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“most end located at the forward portion of the target green ha[s] an elevation that is significantly lower than at its rearmost end.” We note that the term “significantly lower” is a relative term, and Patent Owner does not offer a construction of that term.1 Nor does Patent Owner point us to anything in the prosecution history as providing a construction for that term. In addition, we note further that the Specification of the ’389 patent also does not define the relative term “significantly lower.” The Specification of the ’389 patent, however, teaches that each target green includes a target flag and a receptacle hole that is located near the front section of the green. Ex. 1001, 4:29‒32. According to the Specification of the ’389 patent, the target green is sloped downhill and has the general shape of a concave surface so that the receptacle hole is at the lowest portion of the green. Id. at 4:32‒35. Figure 4C of the ’389 patent is reproduced below: 1 We acknowledge that the ’389 patent expired as of September 2012, and we are, thus, guided by the principle that the words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). But, “[i]n determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Figure 4C shows a cross-sectional view of a target green. Id. at 3:28‒29. As taught by the ’389 patent, “[t]arget green 30 would appear to the golfer at the teeing area to have a sudden drop off near the front portion of the green, and then a gradual slope upwardly toward the back of the green.” Id. at 4:37‒40. Thus, at best, the Specification of the ’389 patent appears to support a construction of the claim limitation of a target green profile whose “forward most end located at the forward portion of the target green ha[s] an elevation that is significantly lower than at its rearmost end” as a green that has a sudden drop off near the front portion of the green and then a gradual slope upward toward the back of the green.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“established sufficiently a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims were rendered obvious by the combination of Bertoncino and Foley. Dec. 22. In particular, as to the limitation that the target green has a profile whose “forward most end located at the forward portion of the target green ha[s] an elevation that is significantly lower than at its rearmost end,” for purposes of institution, we determined: that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that this claim limitation is rendered obvious by Bertoncino. In particular, Figure 5 of Bertoncino clearly shows that the front ends of the target green on the driving range are substantially lower than the back ends. Ex. 1004, Fig. 5. In addition, we determine that to the extent they are not, Petitioner has reasonably demonstrated that Bertoncino makes such a green obvious by teaching that the ability to see the lie of the ball is dependent on the ability to visually follow the path of the ball (id. at 1:26‒ 29), as well as teaching a “sloped driving range” (id. at 4:12‒ 13; see also id. at 5:37‒39 (“Each target . . . preferably comprises a surface generally sloped towards the tee stands area)). Id. at 19.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 49. Figure 5 of Bertoncino, as addressed above, is a schematic perspective of a sloped driving range of Bertoncino. Petitioner also relied on its version of Figure 4 of Bertoncino, which was altered in line with the teaching of that reference that the target green may have only the inner section 22 (Ex. 1004, 6:61–65), and including the slope of the driving range shown in Figure 5 of Bertoncino, reproduced below: Pet. 49 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 92). Figure 4 of Bertoncino is a cross-sectional view of the sloped circular target of Figure 3. Ex. 1004, 4:8‒9. That is supported by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Robbins, who declares that “[a] person of skill in the art would interpret Bertoncino to disclose a range with a plurality of target greens, each of which is composed of a single section with the slope profile of inner section 22” as depicted above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 92. Thus, as we concluded in the Decision on Institution (Dec. 17‒18), Petitioner in its Petition has established reasonably that Bertoncino teaches a target green having a profile wherein the “profile’s forward most end located at the forward portion of the target green having an elevation that is significantly lower than at its rearmost end.” That is, Petitioner has established reasonably for purposes of institution that the target green of Bertoncino meets the “significantly lower” limitation as construed above, as it has as a green that has a sudden drop off near the front portion of the green due to the concave shape of the target green and then a gradual slope upward toward the back of the green. See Ex. 1004, 6:3‒11, 12:6‒12, Figure 4.” slip op. at 12
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 5,370,389 - L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. Liqwd, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 19, 2017 · PGR2017-00011 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–10 because Petitioner did not show that any claim was more likely than not unpatentable under § 112.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 324(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting a post-grant review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Moreover, “[a]pplicants can define . . . claim scope during prosecution,” just as they can in a patent specification. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Here, during prosecution of the ’419 patent, the applicant stated that “[t]he term ‘hair coloring agent’ refers to a colorant or pigment that is customarily used in hair care products, which changes the color or tone of the hair it is applied to based on visual inspection.” Ex. 1005, 7. To define specific terms used to describe an invention, the applicant need only set out the definition “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision,” “so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). On the present record, the definition of the term “hair coloring agent” set out in the prosecution history of the ’419 patent is sufficiently clear, deliberate, and precise to give a person of ordinary skill in the art notice that the term is used in the ’419 patent in a manner that does not include substances other than “colorant[s] or pigment[s] that [are] customarily used in hair care products,” even if those other substances might be described as “hair coloring agents” outside the context of the ’419 patent. Ex. 1005, 7. Accordingly, we should give effect to that definition. Because Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “wherein the mixture does not contain a hair coloring agent” gives effect to the prosecution history’s definition of “hair coloring agent,” we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction for purposes of the present decision. Thus, on the present record, and for purposes of the present decision, we construe “wherein the mixture does not contain a hair coloring agent” as “wherein the mixture applied to the hair does not have a colorant or pigment that is customarily used in hair care products, which changes the color or tone of the hair it is applied to based on visual inspection.”” slip op. at 6
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)Not shown unpatentable
“to determine the scope of the claims. As discussed above, however, we interpret “wherein the mixture does not contain a hair coloring agent” as “wherein the mixture applied to the hair does not have a colorant or pigment that is customarily used in hair care products, which changes the color or tone of the hair it is applied to based on visual inspection.” We have not been directed to evidence of record that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered a bleaching agent to be “a colorant or pigment.” Pet. 7 (describing bleaching as a “process[] that destroy[s] pigment to change hair color,” as opposed to a “process[] that deposit[s] dyes, pigments, or other substances onto the hair to change hair color”); Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 14–15 (contrasting “dyeing,” meaning “processes that alter or change hair color by depositing dyes, pigments, or other substances onto the hair,” with “bleaching,” meaning “the application of an oxidizing agent to hair to destroy the natural or artificial pigment”). Accordingly, on the present record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that claims 1–10 of the ’419 patent are indefinite.” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not shown unpatentable
“wherein the mixture does not contain a hair coloring agent.” Pet. 36–39; Prelim. Resp. 39–40. If “a hair coloring agent” encompasses bleaching agents, then the claims all require a bleaching formulation and simultaneously exclude a bleaching agent, a scope that Petitioner argues is not described in the specification of the ’419 patent. As discussed above, however, we interpret “wherein the mixture does not contain a hair coloring agent” as “wherein the mixture applied to the hair does not have a colorant or pigment that is customarily used in hair care products, which changes the color or tone of the hair it is applied to based on visual inspection.” We have not been directed to evidence of record that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered a bleaching agent to be “a colorant or pigment.” Pet. 7 (describing bleaching as a “process[] that destroy[s] pigment to change hair color,” as opposed to a “process[] that deposit[s] dyes, pigments, or other substances onto the hair to change hair color”); Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 14–15 (contrasting “dyeing,” meaning “processes that alter or change hair color by depositing dyes, pigments, or other substances onto the hair,” with “bleaching,” meaning “the application of an oxidizing agent to hair to destroy the natural or artificial pigment”). Accordingly, on the present record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown it is more likely than not that claims 1–10 of the ’419 patent lack written description support. slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 9,498,419 - Intel Corporation / Qualcomm Incorporated et al. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 1, 2017 · IPR2016-01312 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–9, 15, and 17 are unpatentable as anticipated by Sakamoto; claims 10–12 are unpatentable as obvious over Sakamoto and Cederbaum.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenOther
“Owner’s election not to file a Patent Owner Preliminary Response does not implicate any adverse inference. 37 C.F.R.§ 42.107(a); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide. 77 Fed Reg. 48756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012). However, as to the Patent Owner Response after institution of trial, under our Scheduling Order “Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments for patentability not raised in the response will be deemed waived.” Paper 11, 3; see In re Nuvasive, 842 F. 3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016)(finding that NuVasive waived public accessibility arguments in its Preliminary Response by failing to challenge public accessibility during the trial phase, i.e. by not addressing public accessibility in its Trial Response and explicitly declining to make further arguments at oral hearing). In this case, Patent Owner “defers to the Board” to determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated the challenged claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence. PO Resp. 2. There is no argument or evidence, other than that presented in the Petition and the accompanying Exhibits, for us to consider. Nevertheless, “In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ . . . and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“meaning to the terms not construed. We applied the broadest reasonable interpretation to the following term that required construction. Noting a claim construction dispute in co-pending district court litigation, Petitioner proposed that we construe the “diffusion region formed in said substrate” to mean “conductive terminal region, such as a source or drain, that contains dopants implanted in the silicon substrate.” Pet. 24. As discussed in the Decision to Institute, we determined that the subject matter of the claims concerns a local interconnect between a gate and a diffusion region and that there was no need to further construe “the diffusion region formed in said substrate” for purposes of this decision. Dec. to Inst. 5–6. Based on the complete record now before us, we discern no reason to change the constructions.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“embodiments, which all delineate p-well region 2 and Sakamoto’s fifth embodiment in which p-well region 2 is not shown, based on the record in this proceeding, we are persuaded that the evidence supports Petitioner’s contention that the implanted p-well region is part of the silicon substrate.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Petitioner cites Sakamoto’s disclosure of softening and reflowing BoroPhosphoSilicate Glass (BPSG) film to form insulating layer 9, stating that BPSG is a type of silicon oxide. Id. at 44–45 (citing Bravman Decl. ¶ 91; Ex. 1115, at 185).5 We credit Dr. Bravman’s testimony and are persuaded that insulating layer 9 is formed of silicon oxide.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 5,965,924 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 5,965,924 - Intel Corporation / Qualcomm Incorporated et al. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 1, 2017 · IPR2016-00290 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–9, 15, and 17 are unpatentable as anticipated by Sakamoto; claims 10–12 are unpatentable as obvious over Sakamoto and Cederbaum.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenOther
“Owner’s election not to file a Patent Owner Preliminary Response does not implicate any adverse inference. 37 C.F.R.§ 42.107(a); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide. 77 Fed Reg. 48756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012). However, as to the Patent Owner Response after institution of trial, under our Scheduling Order “Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments for patentability not raised in the response will be deemed waived.” Paper 11, 3; see In re Nuvasive, 842 F. 3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016)(finding that NuVasive waived public accessibility arguments in its Preliminary Response by failing to challenge public accessibility during the trial phase, i.e. by not addressing public accessibility in its Trial Response and explicitly declining to make further arguments at oral hearing). In this case, Patent Owner “defers to the Board” to determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated the challenged claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence. PO Resp. 2. There is no argument or evidence, other than that presented in the Petition and the accompanying Exhibits, for us to consider. Nevertheless, “In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ . . . and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“meaning to the terms not construed. We applied the broadest reasonable interpretation to the following term that required construction. Noting a claim construction dispute in co-pending district court litigation, Petitioner proposed that we construe the “diffusion region formed in said substrate” to mean “conductive terminal region, such as a source or drain, that contains dopants implanted in the silicon substrate.” Pet. 24. As discussed in the Decision to Institute, we determined that the subject matter of the claims concerns a local interconnect between a gate and a diffusion region and that there was no need to further construe “the diffusion region formed in said substrate” for purposes of this decision. Dec. to Inst. 5–6. Based on the complete record now before us, we discern no reason to change the constructions.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Petitioner cites Sakamoto’s disclosure of softening and reflowing BoroPhosphoSilicate Glass (BPSG) film to form insulating layer 9, stating that BPSG is a type of silicon oxide. Id. at 44–45 (citing Bravman Decl. ¶ 91; Ex. 1115, at 185).5 We credit Dr. Bravman’s testimony and are persuaded that insulating layer 9 is formed of silicon oxide.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“embodiments, which all delineate p-well region 2 and Sakamoto’s fifth embodiment in which p-well region 2 is not shown, based on the record in this proceeding, we are persuaded that the evidence supports Petitioner’s contention that the implanted p-well region is part of the silicon substrate.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 5,965,924 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 5,965,924 - Intel Corporation / Qualcomm Incorporated et al. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 1, 2017 · IPR2016-01314 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 8–12 are unpatentable as anticipated by Heath under § 102(b), because Heath discloses every limitation of the challenged claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“preliminarily interpreted the “angle limitation” set forth above—i.e., the limitation reciting “a side of the electrically insulative spacer has an angle relative to the substrate surface that is either a right angle or an acute angle of more than 85°”8—to mean “a side of the electrically insulative spacer has an angle relative to the substrate surface that is greater than 85° and less than or equal to 90°.” Dec. on Inst. 8–14. Importantly, we were unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the angle of a side of the insulating spacer must be obtained “through the use of a low selectivity etch” (Prelim. Resp. 15–19) and determined that the challenged claims do not require the use of a low selectivity etch. Dec. on Inst. 8–12. 8 Claim 1 includes essentially the same limitation, the only difference being that claim 1 recites “insulating spacer” instead of “electrically insulative spacer” recited in claim 8. Tracking the language of the claims, the ’552 patent uses the terms “insulating spacer” and “insulative spacer” interchangeably throughout the written description. See, e.g., Ex. 1101, col. 6, ll. 13–65; see also id. at col. 13, ll. 55–62 (using “the spacer portions of the insulating material” and “the spacer portions [of] insulative material” interchangeably). The parties also appear to use the terms “insulating spacer” and “insulative spacer” interchangeably in the Petition and the Preliminary Response. See, e.g., Pet. 28–29; Prelim. Resp. 15–16, 19. Upon considering the complete record, we deem the terms “insulating spacer” and “insulative spacer” to be interchangeable and to have no meaningful difference in their meaning in the context of the ’552 patent. The parties do not present additional claim construction arguments in their Patent Owner Response and Petitioner Reply. Upon considering the complete record, we discern no reason to deviate from our construction, which was adopted from the parties’ agreed construction at the district court (Dec. on Inst. 14 (citing Ex. 1124 (Dist. Ct. Claim Construction Order), 7– 8)), and maintain our construction of the “angle limitation” to mean “a side of the electrically insulative spacer has an angle relative to the substrate surface that is greater than 85° and less than or equal to 90°.”” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Principles of Law A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 only if a single prior art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We credit Dr. Bravman’s testimony and are persuaded that sources and/or drains are known in the art to be electrically conductive diffusion regions of a transistor structure, and that polysilicon used to form gate electrode 16 of Heath is an electrically conductive material. See Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 79, 80. Therefore, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence that Heath discloses “(a) a first electrically conductive material formed in and/or on a surface of a substrate” and “(b) . . . a second electrically conductive material formed on the substrate,” as recited in claim 8.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 6,784,552 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,784,552 - Intel Corporation / Qualcomm Incorporated et al. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 1, 2017 · IPR2016-00288 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 8–12 are unpatentable because Heath anticipates each challenged claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenUnpatentable
“art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind.” slip op. at 12
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“preliminarily interpreted the “angle limitation” set forth above—i.e., the limitation reciting “a side of the electrically insulative spacer has an angle relative to the substrate surface that is either a right angle or an acute angle of more than 85°”8—to mean “a side of the electrically insulative spacer has an angle relative to the substrate surface that is greater than 85° and less than or equal to 90°.” Dec. on Inst. 8–14. Importantly, we were unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the angle of a side of the insulating spacer must be obtained “through the use of a low selectivity etch” (Prelim. Resp. 15–19) and determined that the challenged claims do not require the use of a low selectivity etch. Dec. on Inst. 8–12.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 6,784,552 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,784,552 - Intel Corporation / Qualcomm Incorporated et al. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 1, 2017 · IPR2016-01313 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 14, and 16 are unpatentable as anticipated by Sakamoto; claims 4–6 and 13 are unpatentable as obvious over Sakamoto and Cederbaum.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“BACKGROUND On June 8, 2016 we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1–6, 13, 14, and 16 of U. S. Patent No. 5,965,924 (“the ’924 Patent”) based on a Petition filed by Intel Corporation. Paper 12 (“Dec. to Inst.”). DSS Technology Management, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) waived its right to file a Preliminary Response. On August 29, 2016 we instituted inter partes review of the same claims on the same grounds based on a substantially identical petition filed by Qualcomm Incorporated, Globalfoundries Inc., Globalfoundries U.S. Inc., Globalfoundries Dresden Module One LLC & Co. KG, Globalfoundries Dresden Module Two LLC & Co. KG, in IPR2016-01313. We then joined IPR2016-00289 and IPR2016-01313. Papers 18, 19. In this joined proceeding, we refer to Intel Corporation, Qualcomm Incorporated, Globalfoundries Inc., Globalfoundries U.S. Inc., Globalfoundries Dresden Module One LLC & Co. KG, Globalfoundries Dresden Module Two LLC & Co. KG, collectively as “Petitioner.”” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“meaning to the terms not construed. We applied the broadest reasonable interpretation to the following term that required construction. Noting a claim construction dispute in co-pending district court litigation, Petitioner proposed that we construe the “diffusion region formed in said substrate” to mean “conductive terminal region, such as a source or drain, that contains dopants implanted in the silicon substrate.” Pet. 25. As discussed in the Decision to Institute, we determined that the subject matter of the claims concerns a local interconnect between a gate and a diffusion region and that there was no need to further construe “the diffusion region formed in said substrate” for purposes of this decision. Dec. to Inst. 5–6. Based on the complete record now before us, we discern no reason to change the constructions.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“not shown, we are persuaded that the evidence supports the proposition that the implanted p-well region is part of the silicon substrate. Based on this analysis, we are persuaded that Sakamoto discloses element (a) a silicon substrate with a top surface. As to element (b), we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Sakamoto discloses a diffusion region formed in said substrate. Element (b) also recites that the diffusion region is adjacent said top surface. Having determined that the p-well region is part of the substrate, we agree that Figure 1 of Sakamoto illustrates a diffusion region in the form of source/drain region 7 adjacent to the top surface of the substrate.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable
“Petitioner persuasively argues that the evidence supports the conclusion that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Cederbaum with those of Sakamoto because they both teach the same type of device and are directed to the same problem, i.e., stacking transistors in an SRAM. Pet. 51. Petitioner points out that Cederbaum and Sakamoto also disclose nearly identical structures with nearly identical components, with both employing an electrically conducting plug within an opening that contains a sidewall spacer to directly connect a diffusion region to a gate. Id. at 52–53. Petitioner cites Cederbaum’s disclosure of materials, such as refractory metals, to be used in forming the conductive plug and Sakamoto’s discussion of the advantages to using a conductive plug of increased conductivity. Id. at 53–54. Thus, Petitioner has demonstrated that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill to replace the polycrystalline plug 15 of Sakamoto with a refractory metal plug of tungsten, as disclosed by Cederbaum. Id. at 51. This feature (“said electrically conducting plug is a refractory metal plug”) is recited in claim 5 of the ’924 Patent. Claim 4 recites a metal plug and claim 6 recites the electrically conducting plug is formed of a material selected for the group consisting of titanium, tantalum, molybdenum, and tungsten. Petitioner cites Cederbaum’s disclosure at column 9, lines 31–65 as disclosing a tungsten conducting plug. Id. at 49–50. Claim 13 of the ’924 Patent depends from claim 1 and recites the further limitation “said conducting plug comprises an outer glue layer and a plug material therein.” Petitioner cites Cederbaum as disclosing an outer glue titanium nitride (TiN) layer and an inner plug material, i.e., tungsten. Pet. 55. Petitioner notes that one of ordinary skill would have understood that because the TiN is deposited in opening 28 of Cederbaum before the tungsten is deposited, the TiN layer is an outer glue layer and the tungsten is the inner plug material. Id at 55–56 (citing Ex. 1004, col. 9, ll. 31–47). Petitioner further notes that Cederbaum discloses the TiN layer acts as an outer glue layer because it improves adhesion of the inner tungsten layer. Id. at 56 (citing Ex. 1004, col. 9, ll. 36–43).” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 5,965,924 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 5,965,924 - Intel Corporation / Qualcomm Incorporated et al. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 1, 2017 · IPR2016-00289 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 14, and 16 are unpatentable as anticipated by Sakamoto; claims 4–6 and 13 are unpatentable as obvious over Sakamoto and Cederbaum.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“CLAIM CONSTRUCTION In our Decision to Institute, we applied the ordinary and customary meaning to the terms not construed. We applied the broadest reasonable interpretation to the following term that required construction. Noting a claim construction dispute in co-pending district court litigation, Petitioner proposed that we construe the “diffusion region formed in said substrate” to mean “conductive terminal region, such as a source or drain, that contains dopants implanted in the silicon substrate.” Pet. 25. As discussed in the Decision to Institute, we determined that the subject matter of the claims concerns a local interconnect between a gate and a diffusion region and that there was no need to further construe “the diffusion region formed in said substrate” for purposes of this decision. Dec. to Inst. 5–6. Based on the complete record now before us, we discern no reason to change the constructions.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and recites that the insulator layer is formed of material selected from the group consisting of silicon oxide and silicon nitride. Petitioner cites Sakamoto’s disclosure of softening and reflowing BoroPhosphoSilicate Glass (BPSG) film to form insulating layer 9, stating that BPSG is a type of silicon oxide. Id. at 46 (citing Bravman Decl. ¶ 90; Ex. 1015, 185).5 We credit Dr. Bravman’s testimony and are persuaded that insulating layer 9 is formed of silicon oxide.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“not shown, we are persuaded that the evidence supports the proposition that the implanted p-well region is part of the silicon substrate. Based on this analysis, we are persuaded that Sakamoto discloses element (a) a silicon substrate with a top surface. As to element (b), we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Sakamoto discloses a diffusion region formed in said substrate. Element (b) also recites that the diffusion region is adjacent said top surface. Having determined that the p-well region is part of the substrate, we agree that Figure 1 of Sakamoto illustrates a diffusion region in the form of source/drain region 7 adjacent to the top surface of the substrate.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner persuasively argues that the evidence supports the conclusion that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Cederbaum with those of Sakamoto because they both teach the same type of device and are directed to the same problem, i.e., stacking transistors in an SRAM. Pet. 51. Petitioner points out that Cederbaum and Sakamoto also disclose nearly identical structures with nearly identical components, with both employing an electrically conducting plug within an opening that contains a sidewall spacer to directly connect a diffusion region to a gate. Id. at 52–53. Petitioner cites Cederbaum’s disclosure of materials, such as refractory metals, to be used in forming the conductive plug and Sakamoto’s discussion of the advantages to using a conductive plug of increased conductivity. Id. at 53–54. Thus, Petitioner has demonstrated that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill to replace the polycrystalline plug 15 of Sakamoto with a refractory metal plug of tungsten, as disclosed by Cederbaum. Id. at 51. This feature (“said electrically conducting plug is a refractory metal plug”) is recited in claim 5 of the ’924 Patent. Claim 4 recites a metal plug and claim 6 recites the electrically conducting plug is formed of a material selected for the group consisting of titanium, tantalum, molybdenum, and tungsten. Petitioner cites Cederbaum’s disclosure at column 9, lines 31–65 as disclosing a tungsten conducting plug. Id. at 49–50.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 5,965,924 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 5,965,924
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.