• Alamar Biosciences, Inc. v. Olink Proteomics ABNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01353 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable: the asserted obviousness grounds failed, including because Kanan and Neri did not teach selecting the claimed cis-reactive cells.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, for purposes of this decision we adopt Petitioner’s proposal of a person of ordinary skill in the art, with the following changes noted in italics below: A person with “an advanced degree, such as a Ph.D., in organic chemistry, molecular biology, biochemistry, or a related field; and about two years of experience in industry and/or laboratory experience relating to small molecules and proteins and would have been familiar with nucleic acid chemistry and conventional hybridization techniques; and (b) access to one or more team members having an advanced degree, such as a Ph.D., in organic chemistry, molecular biology, biochemistry, or a related field; and about two years of experience in industry and/or laboratory experience relating to high throughput screening techniques such as nucleic acid sequencing. A person could also have qualified as a POSA with less formal education and more technical or professional experience.11 We emphasize, however, that our decision would not change if we instead used Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a POSA.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Because the parties have placed the limitation “selecting all cis- reactive cells exhibiting the detectable trace” into controversy, we construe the term below, but only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of this phrase, in light of the language of the claims, the Specification, and the prosecution history of record, requires “selecting all of the [molecular complexes or structures] meeting the defined criteria for [cis-reactive cells (CRCs)] and exhibiting the detectable trace.” Sur-reply 8 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 94, 98–119). We further agree that cis-reactive cells should be construed to mean “an association of at least two interactor moieties, joined by an associated oligonucleotide.” (PO Resp. 9 (quoting Ex. 1001, 9:35-37)). Accordingly, we determine that, properly construed, the claims require that what is “selected” at step 1(d) — what is differentiated or set apart from other molecular complexes or structures in the reaction mixture at the conclusion of step 1(d) — to be “an association of at least two interactor moieties joined by an associated oligonucleotide” that exhibits the detectable trace.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree that Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Kanan and Neri teaches “selecting all cis-reactive cells exhibiting the detectable trace,” as we have construed that phrase above. In particular, we determine that, properly construed, the limitation requires the selection of “all associations of at least two interactor moieties joined by an associated oligonucleotide and exhibiting the detectable trace.” Instead, as described in Kanan, what is “selected” is the molecules of interest joined by bond formation, with only one of the molecules of interest coupled to a nucleic acid moiety. Thus, the selected molecular complex or structure does not comprise two interactors (i.e., two molecules of interest coupled to NAMs). Moreover, to the extent there are two interactors, they are joined by the bond between the molecules of interest rather than an associated oligonucleotide.” slip op. at 35

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “III. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE Patent Owner moved to exclude Exhibit 1008, on the ground that it contains settlement statements and that Rule 408 of the Federal Rule of Evidence prohibits Petitioner from using the statements to impeach or contradict Patent Owner. Mot. 5. Because we do not rely in our analysis on this exhibit, we dismiss the Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 7,883,848 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,883,848
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01309 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 19–25 and 27–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Ellis and Spivey; the Board did not find the alternative Herzog, Spivey, and Ellis ground established.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties have not addressed whether the differences in these definitions impact the unpatentability analysis before us. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of a POSITA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’697 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Wicker. We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “And Patent Owner states that it “agree[s] with Petitioner’s construction” with respect to the MPF terms. PO Resp. 13. Although Patent Owner also contends that a “POSITA would understand the ‘means for transmitting’ to be a socket server transmitting through an event socket that implements the algorithms described in Figures 2, 3, 21A–21E and accompanying disclosures” (id.), Patent Owner’s proposed further construction is not disputed by Petitioner. See generally Pet. Reply. Furthermore, Petitioner’s proposed constructions of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 39) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 13–14. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoint[s],” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. at 2. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:11–13.6 Thus, on this record, because there is no dispute between the parties regarding the terms “means for transmitting,” “event socket,” or “socket,” construction is not needed. Accordingly, we decline to provide further analysis or an express construction for these terms.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” wherein Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . a POS[IT]A would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–4. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why a POSITA would have been motivated to make the necessary modification and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 44. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 19–24. In particular, Spivey’s discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”).” slip op. at 51

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for petitioner

    “demonstrated that a long-felt but unresolved need existed for the claimed invention. See Apple v. Samsung, 839 F.3d at 1056. As Petitioner points out, although Patent Owner argues that there is a long-felt need for a system that “allows broadcasters to deliver synchronized, low-latency video and audio content. . . . ” (PO Resp. 66), Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s showing that Ellis also discloses “a video streaming system that provided event information over a separate channel, which is not hard embedded in the video stream.” Pet. Reply 22–23. Further, as Petitioner also points out, “claim 19 simply requires a media source to receive the live stream of digital content and distribute it.” Pet. Reply 23. In fact, during Oral Argument, although Patent Owner argues that its invention is “the synchronization and the latency improvements through that one-to-many socket architecture,” Patent Owner conceded that the claims “could be broader than that.” Tr. 44:24–46:16. We find availing Petitioner’s argument that the “claim language” does not “relate to any synchronized, low-latency, scalable, flexible, or new and improved video streaming technique.” Pet. Reply 23. Nevertheless, as Petitioner points out, Patent Owner does not cite to any evidence as to any long-felt but unresolved needs. Pet. Reply 23 (citing PO Resp. 67–68). In particular, Patent Owner merely provides conclusory statements that, prior to the claimed invention, “conventional video streaming systems” include “hard-embedded event information,” and that “[t]he claimed invention satisfied the long-felt need for an innovative system.” PO Resp. 66–68. Thus, considering the totality of the evidence, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has failed to establish that there was a long-felt but unresolved need for the claimed invention.” slip op. at 59

  Patent outcomesUS 10,425,697 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,425,697
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01308 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable under § 103 over Ellis and Spivey, with Herzog added for claims 2–6; the alternative Herzog, Spivey, and Ellis ground fails.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). On this record, we give “socket” and “event socket” their ordinary and customary meaning. And, as to “socket,” both parties agree that the ordinary and customary meaning for “socket” is a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server. Pet. 37; PO Resp. 2. We decline to provide further analysis or an express construction as doing so is not needed to resolve the dispute between the parties. slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed constructions of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 37) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 12. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoint[s],” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:11–13.6 6 Patent Owner also refers to the District Court’s construction of “event socket” during Oral Argument, by claiming the court’s Claim Construction Order was a part of the record as “Exhibit 1069.” Tr. 73:14–74:17. However, as there is no “Exhibit 1069” in this proceeding, we will not “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). On this record, we give “socket” and “event socket” their ordinary and customary meaning. And, as to “socket,” both parties agree that the ordinary and customary meaning for “socket” is a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server. Pet. 37; PO Resp. 2. We decline to provide further analysis or an express construction as doing so is not needed to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of the invention of the ’697 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, and one to two years of experience in networking environments, including at least some experience with live-streaming network architecture.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education or experience in related fields could compensate for deficits in the above qualifications.” Id. Patent Owner contends that a POSITA at the time of the invention of the ’697 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 13. The parties have not addressed whether the differences in these definitions impact the unpatentability analysis before us. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of a POSITA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’697 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Wicker. We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” wherein Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . a POS[IT]A would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–4. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why a POSITA would have been motivated to make the necessary modification and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 41. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 17–21. In particular, Spivey’s discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”).” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 10,425,697 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,425,697
• Hanwha Solutions Corporation v. Maxeon Solar Pte. Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2026 · IPR2024-01198 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 10–20 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish the claimed metal impurities or a reason to combine Istratov’s gettering process with the cited solar-cell references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “These disclosures, taken together, indicate that “metal impurities” are undesirable, and, accordingly, the term “metal impurities” is not meant to include intentionally added dopants. The undesirability of “metal impurities” is also demonstrated by the Specification’s instruction that “contaminants and/or impurities” are used interchangeably throughout. Ex. 1001, 5:8–9. In that regard, “iron, nickel, and/or chromium, among others” are the only exemplary metal impurities and/or metal contaminants identified in the Specification. Id. at 4:65–5:1 (“In an embodiment, the silicon substrate 202 can have contaminants and/or impurities 220, for example metal contaminants and/or metal impurities, such as iron, nickel and/or chromium, among others); 5:35–39 (“In an embodiment, the heating can include gettering contaminants, e.g., metal impurities and/or metal contaminants, from the substrate to the emitter region. In an example, the metal impurities and/or metal contaminants can be iron, nickel, and/or contaminants 520, e.g. metal impurities and/or contaminants, can be located in the second emitter region 512 . . . the metal impurities 520 can be iron, nickel and/or chromium, among others.”). And metal impurities and metal contaminants are both described as gettering from the silicon substrate to the emitter region. See id. at 5:5–9 (“A gettering process can be used to trap the metal impurities 220 in the emitter regions 212, reducing recombination within the silicon substrate 202 and improving overall cell lifetime.”); 5:35– 40 (“In an embodiment, the heating can include gettering contaminants, e.g. metal impurities and/or metal contaminant[s], from the substrate to the emitter region. In an example, the metal impurities and/or metal contaminants can be iron, nickel and/or chromium among others.”); 6:5–8 (“In an embodiment, the heating can getter 232 contaminants 220 from, or nearby, the surface 204 of the silicon substrate 202 and/or from within the silicon substrate 202 to the emitter region 212.”) Accordingly, the Specification conveys that “metal impurities” are metal contaminants that are detrimental to the electrical conduction of solar cells.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner fails to sufficiently demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSITA would have been motivated to look to Istratov’s gettering process to improve Choi’s solar cell. Although Petitioner argues that a POSITA would have been motivated to look to Istratov’s gettering process upon identifying detrimental levels of metal impurities in Choi’s substrate, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Holman levels of metal impurities in Choi’s substrate, what level of metal impurities would be “detrimental,” or what detriment the metal impurities would cause. In that regard, Petitioner does not direct us to, nor do we discern, any teachings in Choi regarding the presence of metal impurities in the silicon substrate, let alone iron and/or copper impurities such as those described in Istratov.” slip op. at 24

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “We agree with Petitioner. As the Board indicated in Chicago Mercantile Exchange, whether a document qualifies as a printed publication requires a legal determination based upon evidence and “the issue of whether there is sufficient evidence in the record . . . should be presented in the patent owner response—not a motion to exclude.” Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Paper 35 at 52. Although addressing the admissibility of evidence (authenticity or hearsay) underlying the factual determinations of whether Exhibits 1018, 1034, and 1120 may be the subject of a motion to exclude, Patent Owner’s arguments in the Motion address whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that these exhibits are prior art, not the general admissibility of the documents. See Mot. 3–6; Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Paper 35 at 52. be excluded. These exhibits, for the most part, are offered to support Dr. Holman’s testimony regarding the background of the technology (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 42, 43, 45–52, 56, 57 (citing Ex. 1018), 55, 67 (citing Ex. 1034)) or what the ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood (Pet. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1120); Ex. 1089 ¶¶ 46–48, 56, 59, 60, 69 (citing Ex. 1120)). Furthermore, Exhibit 1018 was authored by Dr. Holman, and is identified in the curriculum vitae appended to Dr. Holman’s declaration in support of the Petition. Ex. 1003, 224 (App’x. A). Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s motion to exclude” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,251,315 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,251,315
• Hanwha Solutions Corporation v. Maxeon Solar Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2026 · IPR2024-01203 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 12 was not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish that Froitzheim’s silver contact was formed over silicon dioxide.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (i) an advanced degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, materials science, or a related discipline and (ii) at least one year of experience 7 Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner raises issues of objective indicia of nonobviousness. designing, developing, or researching the design and/or manufacture of solar cells or related technologies. Alternatively, a POSITA [i.e., a person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had (i) a bachelor’s degree in the aforementioned disciplines and (ii) at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching the design and/or manufacture of solar cells or related technologies. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, and vice versa.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claim terms according to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, we give claim terms “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reasonable expectation of success in the combination of Froitzheim and Gan. Petitioner explains that the combination of Froitzheim and Gan simply replaces one emitter, i.e., Froitzheim’s diffused emitter, with the polysilicon emitter of Gan. Pet. 36. According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have also readily understood how to replace a diffused emitter with a polysilicon emitter and oxide layer [and] would have understood that instead of diffusing boron into the substrate’s back side as taught by Froitzheim, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would instead follow the manufacturing technique taught by Gan. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1005, 246). Petitioner explains that the Gan processes are well-known and routine, and Dr. Holman states that “modifying Froitzheim in view of Gan simply involves using Gan’s known technique of a polysilicon emitter and oxide layer with Froitzheim’s known solar cell to improve Froitzheim’s solar cell in a similar way.” Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 144). For example, Petitioner directs our attention to “multiple instances” in which oxide layers and polysilicon emitters have been implemented successfully in the art. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1005, 246; Ex. 1006 ¶ 22; Ex. 1046, Abstr., 1121; Ex. 1003 ¶ 145). Furthermore, Gan’s statement that “cell performance can be improved if the diffused-emitter is replaced with the polysilicon emitter” and “polysilicon emitters with low J0 and ρc can be obtained with a very small fraction of interfacial oxide breakup” indicate a reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1005, 245, 249. Gan also states that “polysilicon emitters with these qualities can be quite useful for silicon concentrator solar cells.” Ex. 1005, 249. Thus, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Froitzheim and Gan.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded the record evidence rises to the level of a teaching away. “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). And “teaching away” requires more than the mere expression of a general preference.” Galderma Labs., L.P., v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Notably, our reviewing court has determined that a reference can distinguish prior art in order to show the novelty of an invention without teaching away from combining the prior art with the invention disclosed in the reference. See Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Li prefers a “heterogeneous PN junction” and states that “a PN junction is prepared by a low-temperature deposition method, which avoids a conventional diffusion process at 800–1000°C. Such high-temperature process will cause more defects or contamination in silicon material, which will affect the improvement of cell efficiency.” Ex. 1008, 4. But, Li’s preference for lower temperature diffusion processes does not amount to a teaching away from the broader disclosure. In fact, Li acknowledges that “[t]he silicon thin film can be prepared by any deposition method,” including conventional processes at higher temperatures. Ex. 1008, 4 (emphasis added). And, while Patent Owner asserts that “[d]eposition methods are not relevant to the parties’ dispute, which is over deposition temperature” (Sur-reply 17), the deposition method employed includes its deposition temperature. See Ex. 1008, 4 (Li describing “conventional” diffusion processes at temperatures of 800–1000° C). Thus, just because Li teaches one way of depositing its silicon thin film using a low-temperature deposition method does not mean that Li teaches away from high-temperature processes. Li’s teachings do not discredit or discourage high-temperature processes in a manner that may be said to teach away.” slip op. at 51

  Patent outcomesUS 8,222,516 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,222,516
• Hanwha Solutions Corporation v. Maxeon Solar Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2026 · IPR2024-01199 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over the grounds combining Froitzheim, Gan, and Smith, or Li, Gan, and Smith.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner also states that the Patent Owner “applies the level of ordinary skill in the art Petitioner proposed.” PO Resp. 24. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’053 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner and applied by Patent Owner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’053 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner contends that “[t]he claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning to resolve the issues in this proceeding.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 102–105). Patent Owner states that its Patent Owner Response “adopts petitioner’s proposal to apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the claims.” PO Resp. 24. Accordingly, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “teaching away. “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). And, “teaching away” requires more than the mere expression of a general preference. Galderma Labs., L.P., v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Notably, our reviewing court has determined that a reference can distinguish prior art in order to show the novelty of an invention without teaching away from combining the prior art with the invention disclosed in the reference. See Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Li prefers a “heterogeneous PN junction” and states that “a PN junction is prepared by a low-temperature deposition method, which avoids a conventional diffusion process at 800–1000°C. Such high-temperature process will cause more defects or contamination in silicon material, which will affect the improvement of cell efficiency.” Ex. 1008, 4. But, Li’s preference for lower temperature diffusion processes does not amount to a teaching away from the broader disclosure. In fact, Li acknowledges that “[t]he silicon thin film can be prepared by any deposition method,” including conventional processes at higher temperatures. Ex. 1008, 4 (emphasis added). And, while Patent Owner asserts that “[d]eposition methods are not relevant to the parties’ dispute, which is over deposition temperature” (Sur-reply 17), the deposition method employed includes its deposition temperature. Thus, just because Li teaches one way of depositing its silicon thin film using a low-temperature deposition method does not mean that Li teaches away from high-temperature processes. Li’s teachings do not discredit or discourage high-temperature processes in a manner that may be said to teach away.” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 8,878,053 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,878,053
• Thermaltake Technology Co., Ltd. / Thermaltake Inc. v. Chien-Hao ChenAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01230 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable; substitute claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable, and the Revised Motion to Amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “our Institution Decision comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’336 patent and the prior art of record. Inst. Dec. 15. Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill discussed in our Institution Decision. C.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Pharms. Inc. v. Amino Chemicals Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Accordingly, Patent Owner applies a different definition of “side,” in claim 1’s recitation of “an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at top of the body,” to that definition used to understand “side[s] of the body,” discussed above. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s dictionary definition of “side,” including “an area next to something” applies to “an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at the top of the body.” See id. at 8–9.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Hasegawa, and Huang teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 3, and that one skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine those teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 136– 140; Ex. 1008, 8:4–15, 3:20–29. Accordingly, we determine that claim 3 would have been obvious over Lai and Huang, or Lai, Hasegawa, and Huang. F.” slip op. at 50

  • 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “c) Conclusion We conclude that Patent Owner's Revised Motion to Amend adds new” slip op. at 90

  Patent outcomesUS 10,690,336 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,690,336
• Early Warning Services, LLC v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 11, 2026 · IPR2024-01221 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner failed to prove claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 17, 19–21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 34, 39–41, and 43 unpatentable because the cited grounds did not establish the required …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “image capture device” refers to an imaging-based barcode reader and not a laser-based barcode scanner because we are persuaded that claim language and Specification support that interpretation and also because Patent Owner persuasively shows that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the term as such. Claim 1 recites an “image capture device configured to capture an image.” Ex. 1001, 16:24–25. The plain meaning of the claim term requires that the image be captured, not just scanned. The claim further requires “generating an output based on the information embedded in the image,” requiring that information is retrieved from the captured image. Id. at 16:32–33. A device that does not capture an image is not an “image capture device” under the plain language of the claim. A laser-based barcode scanner employs light reflected from a laser beam to “generate an electrical signal that corresponds to the bars and spaces in the barcode being scanned.” See Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 42–43 (explaining in detail how laser-based barcode self-emitting a laser light across a code to be scanned, with a sensor tuned to capture the reflected light from the laser.”). It simply does not capture an image. slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on our review of the complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. The field of the ’167 patent “relates generally to secure transactions, and more specifically, to methods and devices for providing secure identification, verification, and authorization using a portable secure device.” Ex. 1001, 1:8–11. The ’167 patent seeks “to provide methods and devices that are capable of providing secure transactions in a more efficient manner.” Id. at 3:11–13. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. We note, however, that our patentability analysis would be the same under Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Wang fails to disclose limitation 1[a]. Wang discloses a portable electronic authorization device (PEAD) that can be used as a self-checkout terminal. Ex. 1004 ¶ 115. In this context, Wang discloses By entering the UPC code or barcode using keypad on the PEAD or scanning in the UPC code or barcode using the input device built into the PEAD such as a barcode scanner or OCR reader, the PEAD can generate the receipt with the list of item prices through the wireless network and Internet by querying the item price using the barcode as the index for price lookup table which is Stored in a Server System. Id. (emphasis added). As discussed above (Section III.C.1), we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that the claimed “image capture device” refers to an imaging-based device and not a laser-based barcode scanner. Petitioner does not contend that Wang’s disclosure of the barcode scanner necessarily refers to an imaging-based device, but argues that Wang’s disclosure is sufficient because “both imaging-based barcode scanners and laser-based barcode scanners constitute image capture devices.” Reply 11. In light of our claim construction above, we disagree.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner contends that claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 12, 17, 23, 26, 27, 29, 34, and 43 are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Wang and Drummond. Pet. 30–43. 1. Drummond Drummond is a patent titled “Automated Banking Machine System and Method,” and “relates to an automated banking machine apparatus and system that are capable of use in a wide area network, and which provides a user with a remote electronic receipt or other record related to a transaction performed at the machine.” Ex. 1008, code (54), ¶ 2. Drummond discloses that its automated banking machine, may “initiate the sending of a non-paper transaction receipt to the customer,” “[t]he receipt may be sent using a wide area network, such as the Internet,” and “[t]he receipt may be an electronic receipt, for example a receipt in the form of an e-mail message.” Id. ¶ 247. 2. Claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 12, 17, 23, 26, 27, 29, 34, and 43 For this obviousness ground, Petitioner relies on the same arguments and evidence as its Ground 1a (anticipation by Wang), discussed above, for the majority of claim limitations. See Pet. 33–43. Importantly, Petitioner relies solely on Wang as teaching independent claim limitations [1a], [23a], and [43b] relating to an image capture device and embedded information. Pet. 36, 41, 43. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above with respect to Ground 1a, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject matter of claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 12, 17, 23, 26, 27, 29, 34, and 43 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art over the combination of Wang and Drummond.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 7,314,167 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,314,167
• Pacificorp / Interstate Power & Light Company et al. v. Birchtech Corp.Other
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00687 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and 10–18 over all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandInstituted

    “Paper 34, 1 (requesting “Director Review of the Director’s August 22, 2025 Decision Referring the Petition to the Board (‘Referral Decision’)”). Patent Owner argued that institution of IPR2025-00687 and IPR2025-00688 “should be discretionarily denied.” Id. at 5. Petitioner opposed. Paper 37. The Director granted review and found that “granting institution of two petitions that each challenge the same claims of the ’370 patent and ’218 patent 2” was an “abuse[] of discretion.” Paper 40, 1. The Director remanded the cases “to the Board panel to determine which of the two petitions challenging each of the ’370 and ’218 patents to institute.” Id. at 3. Pursuant to the Director’s instruction that we choose only one of the two petitions challenging the ’370 patent to institute, and for the reasons set forth below, we choose to institute review of the ’370 patent in this Petition, and not in IPR2025-00688.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) and § 315(b). See, e.g., Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019)” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner “[does] not, at this time, contend that any term requires construction,” and instead, states that “[a]ll terms have been accorded their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 212–215). Patent Owner asserts that it “does not presently propose any constructions,” but discusses the Board’s claim construction in IPR2020- 00834, Paper 18, 7–8. Prelim. Resp. 7. Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to construe any claim term expressly.” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,933,370
• Pacificorp / Interstate Power & Light Company et al. v. Birchtech Corp.Other
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00717 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board instituted IPR of claims 1–4 and 6–26 on all six asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • Director reviewDirector review, grantedOther

    “The Director granted Director Review, finding that the panel “abused its discretion in granting institution of two petitions that each challenge the same claims” of the ’218 patent. Paper 39, 2. The Director vacated the DI and remanded the case “to the Board panel to determine which of the two petitions” to institute. Id. at 4.” slip op. at 4

  • Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner

    “On November 4, 2025, we instituted inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all the grounds raised in the Petition. Paper 35 (“DI”). In the DI, we noted that “Petitioner filed an explanation regarding the necessity of multiple petitions,” and “Patent Owner d[id] not challenge that multiple petitions are necessary” in the Preliminary Response. Paper 23, 3 n.3.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Therefore, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all the grounds raised in this Petition.3” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art [“POSITA”] would have at least a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related field of study with at least two years of experience implementing pollution control in power generation plants for natural gas, coal, and/or industrial waste incineration.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 48–51). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’218 patent and prior art. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,926,218

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.