- PTAB · Sep 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 are obvious over Yamaguchi-727.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 9 (“Prelim. Resp.”).1 Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenInstituted
“We disagree. Positioning module 6 to face a “predetermined direction” is a form of preventing movement that falls within the scope of limitation 1b. Moreover, Yamaguchi-727 uses a method for preventing movement of its module 6 in its housing 20, silicone potting material, that is expressly recognized by the Specification of the ’421 patent when it states: “A common technique used to assist in fixturing the electrical sensor device 40 known within the automotive industry is to fill the internal cavity with a coating material such as a neutral silicone or the like for purposes of retaining placement position.” Ex. 1001, 13:56–60. Although the Specification also asserts that the sensor assemblies disclosed in the 421 patent “do not use or require the use of any such coating or filing agents or materials for any fixturing of the electrical sensor device 40,” id. at 13:61–64, limitation 1b merely requires that the “sensor device . . . is disposed within the internal cavity and attached therein to prevent movement of the device within the internal cavity,” id. at 30:25–27. Absent a persuasive argument to the contrary, we preliminarily conclude that Yamaguchi-727’s use of potting material to hold its module 6 in place within its housing 20 meets the requirements of limitation 1b. Both parties are encouraged to adduce intrinsic evidence relating to the meaning of limitation 1b at trial. For all the reasons set forth above, we find that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of proving the Yamaguchi-727 renders claim 1 unpatentable as obvious. 2. Dependent Claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 Petitioner identifies the portions of Yamaguchi-727 that teach the limitations introduced in dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24, all of which ultimately depend from claim 1. Pet. 32–40. Patent Owner relies upon its argument that Petitioner’s showing for claim 1 is deficient as the reason why Petitioner’s challenge to dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 fails. We reject this argument for the reasons stated in Part II.C.1 above. Based on our review of Petitioner’s otherwise uncontested argument and evidence cited in support, we find that Petitioner also establishes a reasonable likelihood of proving that Yamaguchi-727 renders dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 unpatentable as obvious. D. Remaining Challenges” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner complies with the requirement of identifying “[h]ow the claim language is to be construed” by setting forth proposed interpretations of various claim terms in the table above.7 Both cases cited by Patent Owner relate to an issue presented by a petitioner’s alleged inconsistent handling of whether a claim term is subject to interpretation as a means-plus-function element under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Orthopediatrics Corp. v. K2M, Inc., IPR2018-01546, Paper 10 at 11 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2019); 10x Genomics, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, IPR2023- 7 Neither party has identified any claim language that might invoke interpretation as a means-plus-function limitation, and we discern no such claim language. Additionally, we do not imply that a petitioner must always propose express interpretations for specific claim language to comply with Rule 42.104(b)(3). Rather, we only note that Petitioner has, by any measure, complied by expressly proposing interpretations for identified claim language.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“We disagree. Positioning module 6 to face a “predetermined direction” is a form of preventing movement that falls within the scope of limitation 1b. Moreover, Yamaguchi-727 uses a method for preventing movement of its module 6 in its housing 20, silicone potting material, that is expressly recognized by the Specification of the ’421 patent when it states: “A common technique used to assist in fixturing the electrical sensor device 40 known within the automotive industry is to fill the internal cavity with a coating material such as a neutral silicone or the like for purposes of retaining placement position.” Ex. 1001, 13:56–60. Although the Specification also asserts that the sensor assemblies disclosed in the 421 patent “do not use or require the use of any such coating or filing agents or materials for any fixturing of the electrical sensor device 40,” id. at 13:61–64, limitation 1b merely requires that the “sensor device . . . is disposed within the internal cavity and attached therein to prevent movement of the device within the internal cavity,” id. at 30:25–27. Absent a persuasive argument to the contrary, we preliminarily conclude that Yamaguchi-727’s use of potting material to hold its module 6 in place within its housing 20 meets the requirements of limitation 1b. Both parties are encouraged to adduce intrinsic evidence relating to the meaning of limitation 1b at trial. For all the reasons set forth above, we find that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of proving the Yamaguchi-727 renders claim 1 unpatentable as obvious. 2. Dependent Claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 Petitioner identifies the portions of Yamaguchi-727 that teach the limitations introduced in dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24, all of which ultimately depend from claim 1. Pet. 32–40. Patent Owner relies upon its argument that Petitioner’s showing for claim 1 is deficient as the reason why Petitioner’s challenge to dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 fails. We reject this argument for the reasons stated in Part II.C.1 above. Based on our review of Petitioner’s otherwise uncontested argument and evidence cited in support, we find that Petitioner also establishes a reasonable likelihood of proving that Yamaguchi-727 renders dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 unpatentable as obvious. D. Remaining Challenges” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,835,421 - Champion Laboratories, Inc. / First Brands Group, LLC v. Hengst SENo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00603 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 5, 8–11, 15–17, 19, 23–25, and 28–30 were not shown unpatentable over Yokoyama, Yokoyama and Cline, or Honermann and Cline.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Because the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in dispute, and because the parties’ definition is consistent with the disclosures in the ʼ203 patent, the prior art, and the declaration testimony of Mr. Nranian and Dr. Basirat, we view the prior art and arguments through this lens when determining whether the claims are unpatentable as obvious over the prior art.5 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (identifying “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art” as an underlying factual inquiry to be resolved in deciding obviousness, which is a question of law).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Although the parties spend significant portions of their briefing discussing the term “eccentric” and how it applies to certain figures from the ʼ203 patent and the relied-upon prior art, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe the term “eccentric” beyond the parties’ agreed-upon definition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“(opining that “Patent Owner’s construction of ‘having an axis no located in a geometric center’ is too narrow”). Mr. Nranian’s Declaration testimony in this respect is not persuasive for several reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent. Compare Ex. 1016 ¶ 3 (criticizing the “axis” language in Patent Owner’s definition), with id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (relying on that very language to support an argument). Also, Mr. Nranian’s proposed definition of “eccentric” to merely mean “not located at the center” begs the question of what, precisely, is “the center”? Mr. Nranian does not persuasively explain how far a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand she could travel from the exact center point of an object and still be in “the center” of that object. See Tr. 10:13–19 (Judge McGee asking whether the center is “a miniscule point in the middle of [the] disc”); see also id. at 10:25–12:26 (Judge Weatherly highlighting the significant ambiguity in referring to something as in “the center”). Also, Mr. Nranian’s opinion is inconsistent with how the ʼ203 patent compares something that is “central,” i.e., “at the center,” and something that is “eccentrically” located. Ex. 1001, 7:13–14 (describing pipe nozzle 15 as “central”); id. at 8:53–56 (describing a “through hole” as “located in the center of the front panel 22” depicted in Figures 7 and 8); id. at 10:23–31 (describing return 12 as “in the center” and outlet 13 as “eccentrically thereto” in Figure 17). Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated Figure 7 is reproduced below: Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated version of Figure 7 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates “central pipe nozzle 15” in yellow passing through the “through hole” located in “the center” of front panel 22. PO Resp. 20. Significantly, pipe nozzle 15 and the through hole in panel 22 are both described as “central” and in “the center” but must have different diameters; otherwise, “central pipe nozzle 15” would not be capable of traveling through “through hole 22.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 7. Thus, the ʼ203 patent intrinsically bases whether an element is “central” or “in the center” on whether its axis is located at the geometric center. This is also illustrated in Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent, reproduced below: Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates filter housing 10 with return 12 “in the center . . . and, eccentrically thereto, the outlet 13 with the seat 14 for the blocking element 24.” Ex. 1001, 10:23–30. Finally, Mr. Nranian’s narrow interpretation of “eccentric”––which excludes the “having the axis or support so located” in the geometric center language––is at odds with the arguments it was proffered to support. Cf. Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 9,023,203 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,023,203 - PTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00437 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Wang anticipates claim 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Owner”) did not file a Preliminary Response on the merits of patentability. Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). When applying that standard, we interpret the claim language as it would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner contends that “no special constructions are required.” Pet. 10. We agree and do not expressly construe any claim term.” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,788,690 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00436 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Mizobuchi or Akashi anticipates any of claims 1–17.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“All independent claims recite “a light engine driving circuit disposed on the substrate.” Ex. 1001, 9:59 (claim 1), 10:64 (claim 12), 12:7 (claim 15). Petitioner contends that “Mizobuchi discloses a light engine driving circuit disposed on the substrate that includes a clock data recovery (“CDR”) circuit and a power supply circuit.” See Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:57–4:18, 12:27–41, Figs. 2, 3A; Ex. 1003 ¶ 76 while addressing limitation 1d); see also id. at 26–28 (addressing claims 12 and 15 by cross-referencing showing for claim 1). Petitioner identifies the driving circuit on Mizobuchi’s “first circuit board” 2 in the annotated version of Mizobuchi’s Figure 2, reproduced below. See Pet. 19.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that the Board may find it necessary to interpret “feedthrough device,” “interconnect device,” and “opposing arrangement.” Pet. 8–11. Patent Owner responds to Petitioner’s proposed interpretations of these terms, but contends that the Board need not interpret them to determine whether to institute review. Prelim. Resp. 17–18. For reasons that become apparent below, we agree with Patent Owner and do not expressly construe these terms. B. Legal Standards” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,313,024 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00631 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–13, and 15–22 on all five asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’027 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims (i.e., 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–13, and 15–22) of the ’027 patent, based on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “possessed an undergraduate degree in chemistry, polymers, materials science, chemical engineering (or related field) and one to two years of experience with constructing and manufacturing tires, tire patches, tire decals/stickers and/or the like.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–11). According to Petitioner, “Additional education could compensate for less practical experience. Conversely, additional practical experience could compensate for less education.” Id. Patent Owner does not provide an alternate definition, but, “Patent Owner does not acquiesce to, and reserves the right to address, [Petitioner’s] definition of a POSA.” Prelim. Resp. 6 n.6. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the disclosure of the ’027 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s contentions that these disclosures indicate that Wilson’s patch would not meet the construction of “barrier material composition.” None of these disclosures even suggests that the base of Wilson’s patch is rigid as Patent Owner suggests. To begin with, the fact that the housing is “more rigid” provides no information about the absolute rigidness of the patch. See Ex. 1009, 9:16–21. As for the disclosure that the patch is contoured (id. at 3:35–67), Patent Owner provides only attorney argument to support its contention that the contour demonstrates that Wilson’s patch must be so rigid that it cannot be meet the claim limitation. In contrast, Petitioner demonstrates that Wilson discloses using the exact same materials described in the challenged patent (see Ex. 1001, 6:33–58 (noting “[e]lastomeric materials useful for forming the intermediate layer 24 include but are not limited to gum rubber, vulcanized natural rubber SBR . . . or comparable materials”); Ex. 1009, 3:49–55 (noting the patch may be constructed from natural rubber (NR), a preferred mixture of chlorobutyl rubber and natural rubber (CR/NR), or a preferred mixture of SBR and natural rubber (SBR/NR)), and provides detailed testimony from its expert to support its contentions (see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–119). On the current record, we find Petitioner’s reasoning and evidence to be persuasive, and find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Willson discloses or teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,124,027 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00557 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 11, 12, and 15–21 are unpatentable as anticipated by Rogers and obvious over Rogers.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill appear to be substantially the same, are both supported by testimonial evidence, and appear to be consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions addressed in the ’067 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:7–53. Although Patent Owner’s proposed level is more specific about the nature of the practical or industry experience, neither party has argued that the differences between the parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill would affect the outcome. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“inside” it, the evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position. First, the plain language of independent claim 1 states that the proxy object “compris[es]” the one or more haptic output devices. Ex. 1001, 10:42–43. This is broader than the “within” language of the non-entered amendment. See Ex. 1002, 258. Not only does the evidence fail to show clear disclaimer (see United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 782–83 (Fed. Cir. 1988)), the adoption of broader “comprising” language shows an intent for the claims not to be limited to systems in which the proxy object contains haptic output devices “inside” it. We also do not agree with Patent Owner that the applicant’s attempts during prosecution to distinguish Gonzales are a clear disclaimer of claim scope. The applicant argued that Gonzales’s AR glove, which contained haptic output actuators in it (see, e.g., Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 80–82, Fig. 3B), was not a “proxy object” as recited in the claims because “the virtual objects and/or visible alterations to the vehicle [the user is sitting in while wearing the 6 Once again, Patent Owner mistakenly references Exhibit 2001. glove] are not overlaid on the AR glove . . . [a]nd the physical portions of the vehicle were visible alterations are overlaid do not include any feedback devices.” Ex. 1002, 287. Thus, the issue raised during prosecution was not whether the AR glove comprised haptic output devices—which it clearly did even under Patent Owner’s proposed construction—but whether the AR glove had modified visual effects displayed on it as per limitation 1D3. slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For the above reasons, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a proxy object comprising one or more haptic output devices” as meaning “a physical object that acts as a proxy for a virtual object and that itself contains inside a haptic output device, e.g., an actuator.” PO Resp. 10. Instead, we conclude that no explicit construction is necessary beyond the ordinary and customary meaning.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Alternatively, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had used both the camera data and the inertial sensor data in determining the “reloading” haptic effect. Pet. 77; Pet. Reply 19–22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 318; Tr. 31:3–10. This is evident in light of Rogers’s disclosures (1) that both sets of data are used to determine the pointing direction of interface object 104 in at least some contexts (Ex. 1010 ¶ 106); and (2) that the “reloading” haptic effect is based on the pointing direction (Ex. 1010 ¶ 105). See Intel Corp., v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[If] there’s a known technique to address a known problem using prior art elements according to their established functions, then there is a motivation to combine.” (internal quotation omitted)). Thus, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Rogers discloses limitation 1D2, and alternatively that limitation 1D2 would have been obvious based on Rogers’s disclosures.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,665,067 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,665,067 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 31, 2025 · IPR2024-00508 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18, 21–24, and 26–29 are unpatentable as anticipated by Rosenberg; the Board did not reach the alternative Brock grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry experience or graduate-level academic experience with human-computer interaction.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–45). This level of skill appears reasonable in view of the disclosures in the ’546 patent and asserted prior art. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that we need not construe any claim terms explicitly because “the Petition’s prior art discloses each element of the challenged claims under any plausible construction.” Pet. 8. We agree with Petitioner that, for this Decision, we do not need to construe any of the terms explicitly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent that we discuss specific claim language, we do so below in the context of the prior art. See, e.g., infra Section III.C.2(e).” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“A claim is unpatentable for obviousness under § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.4 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 9,116,546 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,116,546 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00434 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1–7 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that either Shen or Soldano anticipates any challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2019); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2019) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions and the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’301 patent. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s request and do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We analyze” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 10,379,301 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00556 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Astala and Shahoian; claims 1, 6–9, 13, 14, and 18 also over Keely and Kolmykov-Zotov; claims 2–5, 10–12, and 15–17 also over those references with Shahoian.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“As we explained in the Institution Decision, we have reviewed the Board’s prior decision in IPR2016-01777 and we disagree with Valve that the previous Board panel actually construed the “determining a press” limitation. See Dec. on Inst. 9–10. The previous Board panel was merely making the point that the three conditions in the “determining a press” limitation had to be related in some way, and pointed to Figure 3 of the ’507 patent as an example of that relationship. IPR2016-01777, Paper 7 at 14–15 (Ex. 1023) (explaining that the interval in Figure 3 is “an integral part of the ‘determining a press imitation’”). The prior Board decision in IPR2016-01777 did not contain a claim construction because, in its Decision on Rehearing, the previous Board panel stated that it “did not expressly construe the ‘determining a press limitation’ or interpret[] the limitation to require the first two conditions recited in the limitation to be maintained for the duration of the first interval.” Apple Inc. v. Immersion Corp., IPR2016- 01777, Paper 9 at 3 (PTAB Apr. 27, 2017) (Decision Denying Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing). Thus, the prior Board decision outcome was not reliant on any particular claim interpretation or characterization of Figure 3; instead, it faulted the petitioner in that case for not considering the three conditions as a whole in the manner required by the claims. Id. at 3–4 (explaining that the petitioner needed to show the “‘first interval has elapsed’ condition as a part of the ‘determining a press limitation’” (emphasis added)). Notwithstanding, and for the sake of clarity, to the extent the prior Board decision in IPR2016-01777 characterized Figure 3 of the ’507 patent to require the pressure and change in pressure conditions to be met during the entire interval, we agree with Valve that such a reading of Figure 3 is incorrect. As Valve points out in its analysis, with which we agree, the flowchart in Figure 3 allows for both the pressure and change in pressure conditions to be met during some but not all of the entire time interval in certain circumstances. Pet. 12–14.3 In summary, we agree with Valve that the three conditions of the “determining a press” limitation are independent insofar as satisfaction of one condition is not predicated on the satisfaction of another condition. In our view, however, that point is merely reciting what the claim already requires—namely, that “determining a press” is defined as the satisfaction of the three conditions. Nothing more is required. Thus, we do not see the need to construe independent claim 1 beyond its plain language.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the testimony of Mr. Ward, Valve argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . on November 26, 2003 would have had a Bachelors’ degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 47–51). Accordingly, we maintain our preliminary determination regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Dec. on Inst. 8. That is, we adopt Valve’s proposed assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art because (1) it is consistent with the ’507 patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Mr. Ward. We apply this assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art in our obviousness evaluations below.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Turning to rationale to combine, Valve contends that, because Shahoian recognizes that “[o]ne problem with existing touchpads is that there is no haptic feedback provided to the user” to “assist and inform the user” when interpreting gestures, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Astala’s input touch screen 70 was ready for the improvement that Shahoian provides—namely, “haptic feedback associated with touchpad/touchscreen input gestures.” Pet. 17–18 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 6) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 158–160). Valve argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that incorporating Shahoian’s haptic feedback into Astala’s input touch screen 70 would have introduced certain benefits taught by Shahoian, including, but not limited to, using haptic feedback to inform users of touchpad gestures by “assist[ing] users in noisy environments . . . where sound may not be easily heard by the user.” Id. at 18 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 178) (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 6, 187, 188, 193; Ex. 1003 ¶ 161). Valve also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Shahoian’s pressure-sensing components in Astala’s input touch screen 70 because, among other reasons, using actual pressure sensors in a touchpad would have provided more accurate determinations of user input. Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 41; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 164–166). Valve asserts there was a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination because it involves “us[ing] Shahoian’s haptic feedback and pressure sensors for their intended use.” Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 180, 181). In addition, Valve asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably expected Shahoian’s haptic feedback and pressure sensors to succeed in Astala because “Shahoian demonstrates that algorithms for haptic feedback were known and predictable.” Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 182). In summary, upon reviewing Valve’s unrebutted arguments and evidence explaining how the combined teachings of Astala and Shahoian account for all the limitations of independent claims 1, 9, and 14, we agree with and adopt Valve’s analysis. See Pet. 17–31, 38–41. Accordingly, Valve has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of these independent claims would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Astala and Shahoian.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,749,507 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,749,507 - PTAB · Jul 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00413 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Murphy and over Petrik.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see also Intelligent BioSystems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious. slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or similar disciplines, and at least two years of professional experience in the automotive industry with research, design, and/or development of automotive electrical and control systems or an equivalent level of skill knowledge, and experience.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 23). In addition, “[t]he more education one has, the less experience needed to attain an ordinary level of skill,” and “more experience in the field may serve as a substitute for formal education.” Id. at 6. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition. Paper 10, 4. Based on the current record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision, as it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner proposes that all terms be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 5. Patent Owner “does not believe any terms need to be construed at this time.” Paper 10, 4. Because there is no dispute between the parties, and after reviewing the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
Claim constructioncites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,045,101
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.