- Mediatek Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00796 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 11 would be obvious over Nevo and Avitabile.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on the information presented in the Petition and the supporting evidence, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Stipulate[s] and agree[s] that, if the PTAB institutes an inter partes review proceeding (“IPR”) for U.S. Patent No. 7,483,686 on the grounds presented in [the Petition], [Petitioner] will not pursue an invalidity defense in [the Western District of Texas Litigation] that the patent claims subject to the instituted IPR are invalid based on the same grounds as in the [P]etition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the [P]etition. Ex. 1015 (letter from M. Bernstein to J. Charkow, dated May 21, 2024); see also Prelim. Reply 1 (“Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 6) fails to acknowledge, much less address, Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation not to pursue in the related litigation the same grounds or any grounds of invalidity that could reasonably have been raised in this IPR.”); Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (Dec. 1, 2020) (Decision Granting Institution) (precedential as to § II.A).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of [radio frequency (‘RF’)] circuit design, or at least five years of work experience and training in the design and development of RF circuits and/or systems,” and “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree.” Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. We determine, on the current record, that Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill is consistent with the ’686 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. We adopt that level of ordinary skill in the level of ordinary skill in the art based on the full trial record. slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner contends that all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 74). Petitioner, however, notes that several claim terms in the ’686 patent, or closely related claim terms for patents related to the ’686 patent, have been construed during prior litigation involving Patent Owner. Id. Petitioner discusses five claim terms and various constructions proposed or adopted in prior litigation. Id. at 15–20.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,483,686 - PTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00934 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 19–21 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“On June 21, 2022, the Director issued interim guidance in the form of a memo that further clarifies how we should approach analyzing the Fintiv factors. See Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation at 3, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. Notably, the Director stated that “the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board (‘PTAB’)] will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any ground that could have been reasonably raised before the PTAB.” Id. With this interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of this proceeding under Fintiv because TI filed a Sotera stipulation. Pet. 80; Ex. 1041.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“construed as “indirectly or directly connecting such that an electrical signal can flow between”; and (2) “impedance device” was construed as “a device that exhibits an impedance.” Id. at 6. Even though TI identifies four claim terms in total in the Petition, TI argues that the asserted prior art renders the challenged claims unpatentable under any reasonable construction of those claim terms. See, e.g., id. at 4 (arguing that the “prior art analyzed here renders the claims unpatentable under either [party’s] constructions” proposed in the district court case), 6 (arguing that the “prior art renders the Challenged Claims unpatentable under . . . the [Board’s] constructions”). In its Preliminary Response, ParkerVision does not address TI’s proposed constructions, nor does ParkerVision identify additional claim terms that would require construction at this stage in the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp. Based on the preliminary record, there is no readily discernible controversy between the parties that requires us to construe any claim terms at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“§ 42.4(a), we may not institute an IPR unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Taking into account ParkerVision’s Preliminary Response, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that TI would prevail in demonstrating at least one of claims 19– 21 of the ’342 patent is unpatentable. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby institute an IPR as to claims 19–21 of the ’342 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of institution, there is sufficient evidence in the record that enables us to determine the knowledge level of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Galton, TI argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . as of the ’342 Patent’s priority date (April 14, 2000) would have had a least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of EM circuit design. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28–30). In its Preliminary Response, ParkerVision does not address TI’s assessment of the level of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt TI’s uncontested assessment of the level of skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’342 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,496,342 - Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. Johnson Health Tech Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01164 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–7 and 10–20 over Morris and Ray, and claims 8, 9, and 18 over Morris, Ray, and Cox.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Having considered the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that it comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’375 patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8. Patent Owner’s proposal adds “analyzing” and removes “cardiovascular,” but these differences are immaterial to this proceeding. See Pet. Reply 27 n.8. Moreover, all of our analysis in this Decision would remain the same under Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner asserts that the claim term “exercise use data” needs to be construed to resolve the issues raised by Petitioner. PO Resp. 4. Patent Owner asserts that exercise use data is “data that would represent an amount of exercise of the user.” Id.; Ex. 2004 ¶ 32. Petitioner disagreed with this proposed construction in its briefing (Pet. Reply 1–5) but adopted it during the oral hearing (Tr. 14:12–15:17). The parties also agree that “exercise use data” includes time, distance, and calories of a user exercising on an exercise apparatus. PO Resp. 4–5, 14; Pet. Reply 3–4. For purposes of this proceeding, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed construction. For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the challenged claims are unpatentable even under Patent Owner’s narrower construction. As a result, we do not need to construe this claim term further.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions. See PO Resp. We find that Petitioner has established that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to improve Morris’ treadmill by adding Ray’s camera, software instructions for validating user exercise data, its functionality of displaying a motivational image, and its ability to transmit exercise data to a remote location, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 16–19, 27–28; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 137–147, 161–163; Ex. 1004, 5:27–29, 7:11–22, 9:55–57; Paper 8 (Scheduling Order), 9 (cautioning Patent Owner that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived).” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“We have considered the testimony of Mr. van der Weide, who agrees with Patent Owner (see Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 35, 45–52), but we give his testimony on these points little weight. Mr. van der Weide discusses Mr. Rawls’ testimony, but he does not meaningfully discuss Ray’s disclosures. See id. As a result, he does not reconcile his opinions with the apparently conflicting portions of Ray. In addition, Mr. van der Weide’s testimony is conclusory because he does not identify evidence or reasoning sufficient to support his opinion that Ray fails to teach or suggest these aspects of the claim as discussed above. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 10,796,375 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,796,375 - Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. Johnson Health Tech Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01165 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Morris and Ray; the Board did not reach the alternative Ray–AAPA and Yi grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Having considered the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’340 patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8. Patent Owner’s proposal adds “analyzing” and removes “cardiovascular,” but we agree with Petitioner that these differences are immaterial to this proceeding. See Pet. Reply 29 n.12. Moreover, our analysis in this Decision would remain the same under Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends it means “data that would represent an amount of exercise of the user.” PO Resp. 4. According to Patent Owner, the Specification of the ’340 patent defines this term. Id. at 4–5 (citing Ex. 1001,6 1:43–46, 6:33–34, claims 4, 5, 17; Ex. 2004 ¶ 33). In its briefing, Petitioner disagrees with Patent Owner’s proposed construction, arguing that it is “overly narrow . . . and arbitrarily excludes other forms of ‘exercise use data.’” Pet. Reply 1–2; see id. at 1–5 (further contesting Patent Owner’s proposed construction). However, during the oral hearing, Petitioner adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Tr. 14:12–15:17. For purposes of this proceeding, we apply Patent Owner’s narrower construction and assume that “exercise use data” is “data that would represent an amount of exercise of the user.” We do not need to further construe this term because Petitioner shows that the Challenged Claims are unpatentable even under Patent Owner’s narrower construction.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find that Petitioner has established that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to improve Morris’ treadmill by adding Ray’s camera, software instructions for validating user exercise data, its functionality of displaying a motivational image, and its ability to transmit 8 By not challenging Petitioner’s contentions as to motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of success, we also find that Patent Owner has waived any argument contesting these contentions. See Paper 8 (Scheduling Order), 9 (“Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived.”). exercise data to a remote location, and that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the combination proposed for the reasons explained by Petitioner, as set forth above.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“are contradictory and we also disagree with Patent Owner that Ray teaches away from “maintain[ing] communication between the exercise apparatus and the remote location while the user is determined by the controller not to be engaged with the operating member” as recited in claim 7. On the former point, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner “improperly equates generation and reporting of exercise use data with maintaining a connection with a remote location.” See Pet. Reply 20. Petitioner previously asserted that generation and reporting of the data would stop when Ray does not detect a user, but this does not mean that the connection would also be stopped. On the latter point, “[a] reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference . . . would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Haruna, 249 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that, to teach away, the prior art must “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed”). Patent Owner fails to point to anything in Ray that discourages or would otherwise lead one of ordinary skill in the art away from maintaining a connection with a remote location when exercise use data is not reported at that precise moment. Rather, Petitioner provides a reason with rational underpinning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated, with a reasonable expectation of success, to maintain the connection—“to avoid delays in trying to re-establish the connection once the user had come back.” Pet. 39. That position is supported by the testimony of Mr. Rawls. Ex. 1002 ¶ 186.” slip op. at 53
Patent outcomesUS 11,227,340 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,227,340 - Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. Johnson Health Tech Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01163 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Morris and Ray, with claims 10, 11, 13, and 20 also unpatentable over Morris, Ray, and Cox.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art, except that Patent Owner states that the industry experience would have been “in analyzing and/or designing exercise equipment (such as treadmills, bicycles, steppers, ellipticals) or in a similar field.” PO Resp. 15–16. Having considered the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’227 patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8. Patent Owner’s proposal adds “analyzing” and removes “cardiovascular,” but these differences are immaterial to this proceeding. See Pet. Reply 28 n.10. Moreover, all of our analysis in this Decision would remain the same under Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends it means “data that would represent an amount of exercise of the user.” PO Resp. 4–6. According to Patent Owner, the Specification defines this claim term. Id. at 4–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 51:37– 40:59–6:4). In its briefing, Petitioner disagreed with Patent Owner’s proposed construction, arguing that it is “overly narrow . . . and arbitrarily excludes other forms of ‘exercise use data.’” Pet. Reply 2–4. However, during the oral hearing, Petitioner adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Tr. 14:12–15:17. For purposes of this proceeding, we apply Patent Owner’s narrower construction and assume that “exercise use data” is “data that would represent an amount of exercise of the user.” We do not need to further construe this term because Petitioner shows that the challenged claims are unpatentable even under Patent Owner’s narrower construction of it.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Morris and Ray because they provide complementary teachings and address similar objectives. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1004, Abstr., 5:41–48, 8:22–26, 11:56–61, 13:20–30; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 6, 25, 33, 35, Abstr.; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 135–138). Petitioner also asserts that Morris contemplates use of an optical sensor, provides exercise data and “a human analog display that mimic[s] the user’s bouncing motion,” and includes a signal processing and display system with the necessary capabilities to implement the combination. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 139–143; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 32–36, 50, 56–58, claims 29–37, Figs. 6, 11–12C); see also id. at 26–27 (asserting that “including multiple sensors in treadmills was a routine and well-known task”) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 159–162). Petitioner further asserts that Ray expressly teaches that “its user validation and motivation technology could be ‘easily and affordably merged’ into a treadmill.” Id. at 18 (quoting Ex. 1004, 9:55–57) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 143–144). Finally, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the proposed combination because it would have improved Morris’ treadmill to add both “Ray’s motivational image that showed a thinner image of the user as the intensity and duration of exercise increased” and Ray’s ability to share exercise data with a remote location. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 7:11–22, 11:55–59, 13:50–57; Ex. 1006 ¶ 50; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 138, 145); see also id. at 16 (arguing that detection of a user’s presence could provide benefits, including motivation (citing Ex. 1004, 8:22–26, 11:56–61; Ex. 1006 ¶ 25)), 41 (arguing that data transmission was “a well-known and routine task” (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 188–189)). Patent Owner does not dispute these contentions. See PO Resp. We find that Petitioner has established that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to improve Morris’ treadmill by adding Ray’s camera, software instructions for validating user exercise data, its functionality of displaying a motivational image, and its ability to transmit exercise data to a remote location, and that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 16–18, 26–27; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 135–138, 140–145, 161, 189; see also, e.g., Ex. 1004, 5:27–29, 7:11–22, 9:55–57.” slip op. at 22
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“We have considered the testimony of Mr. van der Weide, who agrees with Patent Owner (see Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 35, 60–71), but we give his testimony on these points little weight. Mr. van der Weide discusses Mr. Rawls’ testimony, but he does not meaningfully discuss Ray’s disclosure. See id. As a result, he does not reconcile his opinions with the apparently conflicting portions of Ray. In addition, Mr. van der Weide’s testimony is conclusory because he does not identify evidence or reasoning sufficient to support his opinion that Ray fails to teach or suggest these aspects of the claim. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,032,227 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,032,227 - Shanghai Hongene Biotech Corp. v. Chemgenes Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00862 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable because Aerschot anticipates them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Baran is principally experienced in P(V) chemistry presupposes that experience indicates an ignorance of P(III) chemistry. We do not find this position consistent with the breadth of Dr. Baran’s experience as indicated by his Curriculum Vitae. See Ex. 1003, 47–102. We weigh the testimonies of both Dr. Baran and Dr. Hrdlicka, against the cumulative weight of the evidence of record in assessing their credibility and probative value.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“The parties’ proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill, although different facially, are similar substantively. For example, both parties argue that a POSA would have high levels of skill, with advanced degrees and/or extensive work experience in organic chemistry.3 See Pet. 12; PO Resp. 20–21. In addition, Petitioner contends that a POSA would have had experience in the development of oligonucleotide building blocks. Pet. 16. Similarly, Patent Owner asserts that a POSA would have had education and/or experience in “the development and syntheses of nucleosides, nucleotides, and nucleic acids.” PO Resp. 20–21. After considering the parties’ arguments and the prior art, we determine that a POSA would have had a Ph.D. (or equivalent degree) in organic chemistry or medicinal chemistry, with at least two to three years of post-graduate work experience in the development and syntheses of nucleosides, nucleotides, and nucleic acids, including, but not limited to, the syntheses of oligonucleotides through solid phase oligonucleotide synthesis. In addition, an individual with a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree and at least five years of work experience in these fields also would qualify as a POSA.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to address the construction of any claim term.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every claim element, arranged as in the claim, must be disclosed in a single piece of prior art. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For a claim directed to a genus, if a prior art reference discloses a species falling within the claimed genus, the species anticipates the genus. In re Slayter, 276 F.2d 408, 411 (CCPA 1960); see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that when a claim element is written in Markush form, “the entire element is disclosed by the prior art if one alternative in the Markush group is in the prior art”).” slip op. at 5
Patent outcomesUS 8,541,569 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,541,569 - Dexcom, Inc. v. Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00520 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Dexcom did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 5–7 were unpatentable under either Stafford–Raymond ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Burden of Proof “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity … the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Therefore, in an inter partes review, the burden of proof is on the Petitioner to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable; that burden never shifts to the patentee. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). At the institution stage, Petitioner must show a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We do not find these arguments persuasive. It may be so that Turner teaches that its recesses 77 receive rotation-restricting protrusions 71, which “extend[] into each recess 77 such that the recess side walls interfere with the protrusions to prevent rotation of the insertion device relative to body 20.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 69. And, it may also be so that Turner teaches this assembly as an advantage in that it prevents rotation of body 20. Id. However, Petitioner did not present this “design choice” theory of obviousness in the Petition. Petitioner first raises its “obvious design choice” argument with respect to Turner and Ground 2 in its Reply Brief; it is not to be found in its Petition.12 Petitioner cannot raise an argument in its” slip op. at 32
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“In each of the ’335 Specification, Stafford, Raymond, and Turner, the OBU is universally depicted as having a circular perimeter oriented around a longitudinal axis, and possessing either a cylindrical shape (’335 patent, Stafford, Raymond) or a roughly domed shape, with a circular, circumferential collar. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 8, 17, 52, 54; Ex. 1009, Figs 3A–C, 4A; Ex. 1010, Figs. 14–16, Ex. 1011, Figs. 2A–B, 5G, 7A-B, 9, 11, 13A–B, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 25, 29, 30, 37, 38. Moreover, in each description of the location of recesses 3766 in the ’335 Specification, the recesses are described as being located “on the side walls” of the OBU. See Ex. 1001, col. 44, ll. 8–12; col. 45, ll. 61–64. Given the circular perimeter of all of these embodiments of the disclosures of the ’335 Specification, the teachings of Petitioner’s cited references, the dictionary definition of “periphery” as being “the perimeter of a circle or other closed curve,” and the ordinary meaning that the terms would have had to a skilled artisan at the time of the invention, in view of the ’335 Specification and file history” (Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13), we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the “plurality of recesses disposed on a periphery of the on body electronics unit housing” would be located “on the circumference of the on-body housing,” as we concluded in the ’01396 IPR Decision. See Dec. 48; see also Ex. 1001, col. 44, ll. 9–14 (stating that “gripping arms 3762 [of medical device carrier 3730] are provided with engagement boss 3764 which are configured to engage with corresponding recesses 3766 provided on the side walls of the on body housing 322”).” slip op. at 38
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“However, Petitioner did not present this “design choice” theory of obviousness in the Petition. Petitioner first raises its “obvious design choice” argument with respect to Turner and Ground 2 in its Reply Brief; it is not to be found in its Petition.12 Petitioner cannot raise an argument in its 12 The Petition makes a design choice argument with respect to the teachings of Raymond on Ground 1, contending that “it would have been an obvious design choice to implement two spaced-apart plural recesses on the housing—one to engage the protrusions on each of the two arms taught by Raymond.” Pet. 38. However, Petitioner adduced no prior art teaching or evidence of record of “spaced-apart plural recesses on the housing” that Reply Brief if that argument could first have been raised in its Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b); see also L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. Univ. of Massachusetts, 2018 WL 4278992, *5 n.4 (PTAB Sept. 7, 2018); Matterport, Inc. v. Appliance Comp. III, Inc., 2021 WL 6340164, *9–10 (PTAB Nov. 19, 2021).” slip op. at 32
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,266,335 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Irwin renders at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“We disagree. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the fact pattern presented here is not the typical situation in which the factors from General Plastic are considered. In particular, this proceeding challenges claims of a different patent than the patents at issue in PGR2020-00084 and IPR2023- 01235. Challenging claims of different patents significantly distinguishes the facts here from those in General Plastic, and we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to extend General Plastic in this regard. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“5. Weighing the Graham Factors “Once all relevant facts are found, the ultimate legal determination [of obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that Irwin would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1–9 and 11–24 of the ’451 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 38
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,488,451 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00374 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and all asserted grounds because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“petition for inter partes review. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016). In determining whether to exercise that discretion on behalf of the Director, the Board considers an early trial date in related litigation, among other factors, as part of an assessment of all relevant circumstances of the case—including the merits—to balance considerations such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5. When the same prior art is submitted in district court and to the Board, there are “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Id. at 12. Petitioner can mitigate those concerns by presenting a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“(2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. If a condition in the first part of the framework is satisfied and the petitioner fails to make a showing of material error, the Director generally will exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in digital video processing, or a related field.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 10035 ¶¶ 76–78). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner uses the same skill level in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 21. We also apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level in this Decision. Pet. 3.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,090,025 - Shanghai Hongene Biotech Corp. v. Chemgenes Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2023-00490 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable: claim 1 is anticipated by Reddy; claims 2–4 are obvious over the stated combinations; claim 5 is anticipated by Gaur.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“However, we prefer Patent Owner’s definition of the required 2–3 years of experience in “the development and syntheses of nucleosides, nucleotides, and nucleic acids, including, but not limited to, the syntheses of oligonucleotides through solid phase oligonucleotide synthesis (‘SPOS’)” to Petitioner’s more generalized requirement of having experience in “medicinal chemistry, synthetic organic chemistry, and nucleic acid chemistry, including the development of oligonucleotide therapeutics, diagnostics, or building blocks.” Both parties acknowledge that the level of skill in the art is very high. See, e.g., Resp. 17; Reply 2. We find that, to achieve a level of ordinary skill in the art, a person with the requisite educational background would require 2–3 years of experience for one possessing a doctorate in the relevant field, or 3–5 years for one with a lesser degree (to compensate for the additional educational experience gained by achieving a doctorate) in the specific techniques recited by Patent Owner. We reject the terminal clause “pursuant to P(III) chemistry” proposed by Patent Owner as redundant in that a person engaged for a number of years in “the development and syntheses of nucleosides, nucleotides, and nucleic acids” including SPOS, would likely have an operant knowledge of P(III) chemistry. Consequently we adopt the following definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art: “A person of ordinary skill in the art having a Ph.D. (or equivalent degree) in organic or medicinal chemistry, and 2 to 3 years of post-graduate work experience in the development and syntheses of nucleosides, nucleotides, and nucleic acids, including, but not limited to, the syntheses of oligonucleotides through solid phase oligonucleotide synthesis (‘SPOS’)” and, alternatively, “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree in organic or medicinal chemistry who had at least 5 years of extensive work experience in these fields.”” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“As for Dr. Baran, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Baran is not sufficiently experienced or qualified to opine with respect to the claimed subject matter. A review of Dr. Baran’s extensive curriculum vitae (Ex. 1003, 79–137), indicates that he is deeply experienced and extensively published in the field of oligonucleotide synthesis. Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Baran is principally experienced in P(V) techniques presupposes that experience in that technique indicates an ignorance of P(III) methodologies. We do not find this position consistent with the breadth of Dr. Baran’s C.V. We will weigh Dr. Baran’s testimony, and that of Dr. Hrdlicka, against the cumulative weight of the evidence of record in this inter partes review in assessing the credibility and probative value of their respective testimonies.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Both parties agree that the terms of the challenged claims should be given the ordinary and customary meaning of such terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. Pet. 17; PO Resp. 15 (both citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100). Accordingly we see no need for explicitly construing any of the terms of the challenged claims beyond that standard.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Furthermore, both Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that clear errors exist in the wording of challenged claims 3–5. Both parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the limitation reciting “where M is selected from the group consisting of succinyl, oxalyl, and hydroquinolynyl” should properly read “where M is selected from the group consisting of ethyl, oxalyl, and hydroquinolynyl.” Pet. 18–20; PO Resp. 15. Both parties further agree that the language of claim 5 mistakenly omits the italicized portions of the limitation reciting “NH is capable of being attached to a solid support with a spacer selected from the group consisting of C1–C20 alkyl, ethyloxyglycol, and a combination of alkyl and ethyleneglycoxy,” as is expressly recited in claims 3 and 4. Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158); PO Resp. 15. We agree with both parties’ reasoning with respect to these errors, and we construe the claims as reciting the corrected language, such that claims 3–5 read, in relevant part “where M is selected from the group consisting of ethyl, oxalyl, and hydroquinolynyl” and claim 5 additionally reads “NH is capable of being attached to a solid support with a spacer selected from the group consisting of C1–C20 alkyl, ethyloxyglycol, and a combination of alkyl and ethyleneglycoxy.” See Fitbit, Inc. v. Valencell, Inc., 964 F.3d 1112, 1119–20 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that the Board erred in not correcting a “conspicuous” and undisputed error in claim).” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 9,884,885 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,884,885
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.