- PTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00618 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 7, 8, 12–15, 18, and 19 on both § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim under each ground is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’823 patent. We institute inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’823 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa” and that “POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and techniques.” Id. Patent Owner “does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition” of a POSITA at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 17. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’823 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific claim construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 10. Petitioner explains that the parties have proposed “different constructions for various claim terms pending in the Related Litigation” but that the Grounds “render the claims unpatentable under either party’s construction, and any reasonable construction, and thus the Board need not construe any term.” Id. at 10–11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 367; Ex. 1070; Ex. 1071).2 Patent Owner does not expressly address claim construction in its Preliminary Response. We determine that, at this stage of the proceeding, no explicit constructions are required to resolve the dispute between the parties. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“E. Combination of Vasell, Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall As explained above, Petitioner contends that the technical implementation details that were intended to implement Vasell’s teachings are described in Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall. Pet. 36. Petitioner argues, therefore, that the motivation to modify Vasell to include features described in the other references is demonstrated by the references themselves. Id. at 36–37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 375–376). For example, according to Petitioner, a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Vasell with Alves’ teaching of a centralized application repository for storing its distributed applications to provide increased scalability. Id. at 38, 39 (citing Ex. 1008, 263, 266; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 378–379). Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Vasell with Rellermeyer’s management software to provide for load balancing, failover and elastic scalability. Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 380). Finally, Petitioner argues that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Vasell with Hall’s management software that requires digital signatures for distributed applications to provide increased security for using third party applications. Id. at 38, 39 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 381). Patent Owner does not separately dispute Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Vasell, Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall. to combine the prior art references and determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Vasell, Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall with a reasonable expectation of success for the reasons provided by Petitioner.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,695,823 - Adc Solutions Auto LLC v. The Noco CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00671 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 15, 17, 18, 51, 54, and 57 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Richardson, Zhao, Yu, Paparrizos, and Dao.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, would have been a person with at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and at least two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience with DC power supply or battery charger design[;] . . . [l]ess work experience could be compensated for by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa.” Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–44; Ex. 1014, 10–11). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’243 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’243 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary to decide whether to institute, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that the skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the teachings of Richardson and Zhao to achieve the subject matter of claim 1. For example, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Richardson’s system to include the USB input circuit of Zhao “to avoid the need to supply a proprietary charger or other type of AC ‘power brick’ that would be less ubiquitous or less standardized,” increase flexibility and convenience, and cater to consumer demand for USB technology. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88–89). Petitioner further alleges that the addition of a USB input circuit would provide for an alternative where traditional charging methods are lost, damaged, or otherwise unavailable. Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 88). Thus, Petitioner has provided sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the teachings of the applied references. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 1005 ¶ 28 (emphasis added). Dr. MacCarley testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known what external battery charger could have been used and where to place it in Richardson’s system. Ex. 1044 ¶ 13. In particular, Dr. MacCarley explains that there are numerous points in the circuitry disclosed by Richardson where a charging pathway from an external battery charger (e.g. the “battery charger” that Richardson explains is “not shown”, EX1005, ¶ [0028]) could be connected to charge Richardson’s batteries. EX2010, 52:3–54:5. Any of these connection points would be a trivial modification of Richardson’s embodiment. A PHOSITA would have understood how to implement this type of well-known configuration of an external battery charger and associated charging circuitry, which would have been as simple as wiring connections to the terminal anode and cathode of the batteries. The simplicity of this connection is why it is not surprising that Richardson describes such a pathway and leaves it “not shown” in the figures. Id. We credit the testimony of Dr. MacCarley in this regard. Moreover, Dr. Fayed confirms that it was known to recharge a jump starter with a barrel charger. Ex. 2014 ¶ 23.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 11,584,243 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,584,243 - Adc Solutions Auto LLC v. The Noco CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00577 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 32, 38, 39, 47, 52, and 54 are unpatentable as obvious over Richardson and Zhao and over Yu and Paparrizos.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, as of the claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, would have been a person with at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and at least two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience with DC power supply or battery charger design[;] . . . [l]ess work experience could be compensated for by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–42; Ex. 1014, 10–11). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’023 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’023 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits there are no formal claim constructions necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 23. Patent Owner “does not propose any terms need to be construed.” PO Resp. 18. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary to decide whether to institute, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that the skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the teachings of Richardson and Zhao to achieve the subject matter of claim 1. For example, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Richardson’s system to include the USB input circuit of Zhao to avoid the need to supply a proprietary charger or other type of AC ‘power brick’ that would be less ubiquitous or less standardized,” increase flexibility and convenience, and cater to consumer demand for USB technology. Pet 45–46 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88– 89). Petitioner further alleges that the addition of a USB input circuit would provide for an alternative where traditional charging methods are lost, damaged. or otherwise unavailable. Id. at 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 88). Thus, Petitioner has provided sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the teachings of the applied references. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. We acknowledge, but are not convinced by, Patent Owner’s arguments that the nature of Richardson requires the ability to charge a high capacity battery and rapid recharging and therefore would not have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to include Zhao’s USB charging circuit in Richardson. See PO Resp. 25–31. In particular, we are not persuaded that Richardson is limited to high capacity, rapid recharging of batteries as Patent Owner suggests. Instead, Richardson broadly describes “an apparatus and method for temporarily delivering supplemental power to the electrical system of a vehicle” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 6) where “[t]he jump starter 10 may be configured for 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42 or 48 volts” (id. ¶ 34). According to Richardson, this may be achieved by using “two or more batteries of the same or different voltage levels . . . to achieve the voltage requirements of the vehicle to be started.” Id. By way of example, Richardson states that “if the batteries 23 are both 12-volt batteries, the system may be configured for 12- or 24-volt operation” and “[i]f the batteries 23 are 12-volt batteries and a battery 25 is a 6-volt battery, 18- or 30-volt configurations may be provided.” Id. Neither Richardson’s claims nor its specification require any particular charging capacity or charging time. See generally Ex. 1005. While a single, near-final paragraph of Richardson introduces the concept of rapid charging of the jump starter batteries to charge a fleet of vehicles, Richardson characterization is permissive or optional. For example, Richardson states The charging system of the vehicle may be used to charge the capacitors 21 and jump starter batteries 22. . . . This allows the capacitors 21 and jump starter batteries 22 to be fully recharged in about 1 to 5 minutes and can therefore start many vehicles in a row without becoming discharged. Id. ¶ 55 (emphasis added). We do not view this singular occurrence as supplanting the breadth of Richardson’s complete disclosure. Furthermore, the crux of Patent Owner’s argument is that because of Richardson’s goal of charging high capacity batteries a USB charger would require significant charging time. PO Resp. 29; Sur-reply 2–14 But, nowhere does Patent Owner allege that a USB charger would not work given sufficient time.11 See generally PO Resp. and Sur-reply. And, when faced with no alternative, the person of ordinary skill in the art must balance the trade-offs and consider charging slowly, or not at all. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”); see also Winner 11 Petitioner in its Reply presents some evidence of charging times using a USB input charger. Pet. Reply 4–7; Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 6–12, Appendix A. Patent Owner disputes the accuracy of Petitioner’s calculations. Sur-reply 2–11. But, whether Petitioner’s calculations are accurate or not, Petitioner’s proposed alternative modification does not remove the faster charging path and instead adds the convenience and flexibility of a secondary charging method where the primary and faster charging path is unavailable. Ex. 1044 ¶ 12.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 11,447,023 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,447,023 - PTAB · Jul 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00308 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claim 1, finding a reasonable likelihood it would be shown obvious over Darnell and Kim; it did not reach the Dasgupta and Kim ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner describes a person of ordinary skill in the art as a person having “a bachelor’s degree in computer science and two years’ experience in cloud computing or a similar field, or a master’s degree in computer science or similar field.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 1–55, 119–122). Patent Owner describes a person of ordinary skill in the art as a person having “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and approximately 3 years of experience working with content management systems and graphical user interfaces; or a more advanced degree such a master’s or doctorate with proportionally less work experience.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner and Patent Owner’s descriptions of a person of ordinary skill are similar, although Patent Owner’s proposal is slightly more experienced. Both appear to be reasonably consistent with the subject matter of the ’068 patent. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description, which is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Martin. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 121; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). C.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Based on the current record, we credit Dr. Martin’s testimony and preliminarily determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “real time” as it is used in the context of the ’068 patent means to provide or transmit content when it is available without significant delay. This, however, does not resolve the issue of whether, as Petitioner contends, the claims require that content must be streamed in “real time” to just a “master server,” or as Patent Owner contends, content must also be streamed in “real time” to a “master webpage.”” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of aggregating and presenting multiple feed sources to a user.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 390–391). Petitioner notes, for example, that “Darnell addresses ‘[l]ooking through a dense list of content items to locate items of interest,’ which is cumbersome for a user,” and Kim “similarly addresses the problem of viewing multiple pieces of fragmented content from news sources, blog entries, email, and the like in a ‘consuming experience having significant drawbacks.’” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 391; Ex. 1004 ¶ 9; Ex. 1005 ¶ 1). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Kim’s teachings for aggregating news, blog entries, and email in a network computer and sending the feeds to a remote computer for display in a UI to be suitable for use with Darnell’s feed reader architecture, in which content feed sources are aggregated on a remote server instead of at the user device. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20–24; Ex. 1002 ¶ 391). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have also been motivated to implement Kim’s identification of “traits” and the organization of the user interface based on those traits in Darnell’s feed aggregation system. Id., ¶ 392. A POSITA would have been further motivated to implement Kim’s feed application, email application, media application, and photo application using Darnell’s server system 104 rather than on user devices, because doing so would allow users to access personalized content feeds on any user device (e.g., phone, computer, tablet, etc.) instead of only on a single user device. Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 392–395). Petitioner also asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have further understood Darnell and Kim to be compatible because they disclose content feed aggregators with a similar user experience—aggregating multiple content feeds from different sources into a unified user interface displayed on a user device. Darnell, Abstract, ¶¶ 8, 11–14, 30–32, 37–38, Fig. 1; Kim, Abstract, ¶¶ 20–23, 37, Fig. 1; Martin, ¶¶ 396-397. Thus, a POSITA would have been motivated to implement Kim’s additional feed types and feed processing on a server instead of the user device based on Darnell’s teachings.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,334,068 - PTAB · Jul 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00307 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 on all four § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Darnell and Kim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Settled expectationsDecided for patent owner
“or “Petition”), to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–18 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,729,658 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’658 patent”). On March 28, 2025, the Board issued a notice extending the deadline for discretion briefing pursuant to the bifurcated discretionary denial review process that applies to proceedings with a patent owner preliminary response due after March 26, 2025.1 Paper 10. On May 1, 2025, RazDog Holdings LLC (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Preliminary Response, Paper 12 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Patent Owner filed a request for discretionary denial. Paper 11. Petitioner filed an opposition to Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial. Paper 13. On May 16, 2025, the Acting Director issued a decision denying Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial and referring the petition to the Board. Paper 18.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Based on the current record, we credit Dr. Martin’s testimony and preliminarily determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “real time” as it is used in the context of the ’658 patent means to provide or transmit content when it is available without significant delay. This, however, does not resolve the issue of whether, as Petitioner contends, the claims require that content must be streamed in “real time” to just a “master server,” or as Patent Owner contends, content must also be streamed in “real time” to a “master webpage.”” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of aggregating and presenting multiple feed sources to users.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 146). Petitioner notes, for example, that “Darnell addresses ‘[l]ooking through a dense list of content items to locate items of interest,’ which is cumbersome for users,” and Kim “similarly addresses the problem of viewing multiple pieces of fragmented content from news sources, blog entries, email, and the like in a ‘consuming experience having significant drawbacks.’” Pat. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 146; Ex. 1004 ¶ 9; Ex. 1005 ¶ 1). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Kim’s teachings for aggregating news, blog entries, and email in a network computer and sending the feeds to a remote computer for display in a UI to be suitable for use with Darnell’s feed reader architecture, in which content feed sources are aggregated on a remote server instead of at the user device. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20–24; Ex. 1002 ¶ 146). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have also been motivated to implement Kim’s identification of “traits” and the organization of the UI based on those traits in Darnell’s feed aggregation system. Id., ¶147. POSITAs would have been further motivated to implement Kim’s feed application, email application, media application, and photo application using Darnell’s server system 104 rather than on user devices, because doing so would allow users to access personalized content feeds on any device (e.g., phone, computer, tablet, etc.) instead of only on a single device. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 147–150). Petitioner also asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have further understood Darnell’s and Kim’s compatibility because they disclose content feed aggregators with a similar user experience—aggregating multiple content feeds from different sources into a unified UI displayed on user devices. Darnell, Abstract, ¶¶ 8, 11–14, 30–32, 37–38, Fig. 1; Kim, Abstract, ¶¶ 20–23, 37, Fig. 1; Martin, ¶¶ 151–152. Thus, POSITAs would have been motivated to implement Kim’s additional feed types and feed processing on a server instead of user devices based on Darnell’s teachings.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,729,658 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00351 · APJ Beth Z Shaw · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–26 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv Order 6. That is the case here. Thus, the first Fintiv factor strongly weighs against exercising the authority to deny institution. Id. Under the second Fintiv factor, the proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision weighs against exercising our authority to deny institution because there is no trial date scheduled. Id. at 9; see Ex. 1031, 3. slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board, however, has discretion to deny a petition even when a petitioner meets that threshold. Id.; see, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”). For the reasons that follow, we grant institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68). Petitioner further states that “a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could have also met the relevant standard for a POSITA.” Id. Patent Owner submits a similar definition (see Prelim. Resp. 13–14), but states that a POSITA “would understand that . . . the subject of the patent is a software-based solution to broadcasting multimedia streams, and the skillset and expertise in hardware-based systems would not make one knowledgeable about software-based systems.” Prelim. Resp. 13–14. We determine that no express finding is necessary, on the present record, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). The difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions based on the present record. Should Patent Owner dispute Petitioner’s definition during trial, we encourage Patent Owner to explain how a software-focused definition would affect any obviousness analysis in our final written decision.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Claim 1 does not limit the “caching unit” in any way. With this in mind, we preliminarily agree that Farber discloses the subject matter of limitation 1a sufficiently to meet Petitioner’s burden on institution. b.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,140,441 - Google LLC v. Security First Innovations, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00214 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Foster; the Board did not reach the instituted Orsini anticipation or obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention of the ’609 patent, “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with three years of experience in the area of securing data from unauthorized access or use,” and that “[a] higher level of education may substitute for less experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–38).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Initially, we note that Petitioner’s challenge is based on the parties’ proposed district court constructions for “data set.” See Pet. 65–66. But neither party proposes a construction for “data chunks” in this proceeding. Notably, the 83-column Specification of the ’609 patent itself does not use the term “data chunks.” Even so, the meaning of “data chunks” is readily apparent from the plain language: the data chunks are generated “based on a data set,” and the claim defines the steps that comprise the chunk generation, including the relationship between the chunks and the data set. See Ex. 1001, 83:15–30; In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (In all aspects of claim construction, “the name of the game is the claim.” (quoting Giles Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims–American Perspectives, 21 Int’l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 497, 499 (1990))).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues, and we agree, that “it does not need to show that there was a known problem with the prior art system in order to articulate the required rational underpinning for the proposed [modification].” Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1002–03 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cited in Pet. Reply 14–15). Petitioner persuasively explains: [C]ontent-owner storage would not negate benefits of content-service providers (“CSPs”) storing Foster-encrypted content. [The skilled artisan] knew CSPs (e.g., cable-TV companies) often purchased/licensed content from content owners and then securely stored it before delivering to recipients. [Ex. 1099], 84-94. CSPs typically and beneficially encrypted and stored that content for repeated use (e.g., downloads by different customers) – rather than repeatedly encrypting it on-the-fly – and for backup purposes. Petition, 77-78 (citing EX1045, EX1050, EX1059-EX1060; [Ex. 1003], ¶¶206-213); [Ex. 1111], ¶¶102-114 (citing EX1073, [0043] (VOD “pre-encrypt[s]” and “stores the content”); EX1097, 2:31-53 (“real-time encryption [for VOD] poses much greater cost and space issues”); EX1075, 1:51-67; EX1105, [0034]-[0037]; EX1080, 2-7). Pet. Reply 15; see id. at 16–17 (“EX1060, e.g., describes prior-art VOD systems where CSP intermediary ‘servers . . . store all movies.’” (citing Ex. 1060 ¶¶ 7–8 (cited in Pet. 77)) (alteration in original)). As for Patent Owner’s allegation that Petitioner’s proposed modification to Foster would “compromise” Foster’s security, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that, “[b]eyond a conclusory expert declaration, [Patent Owner] offers no evidence that hacking risks or overall storage requirements would increase by storing content at a CSP/intermediary rather than a content owner.” Pet. Reply 17. Petitioner also argues, and we agree, “even if it required ‘increased cost and complexity’ to make CSP storage more secure, that does ‘not show that [the technique] was unknown or could not have practical applications,’ and thus does not support non-obviousness.” Id. at 17–18 (quoting In re Cree, 818 F.3d 694, 700–701 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); id. at 18 (“[I]t is a commonplace fact that design decisions entail making tradeoffs among multiple objectives.” (quoting Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 2021 WL 4944471, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 25, 2021)); see Allied Erecting and Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine [or to modify].”). Although Patent Owner disputes whether a rational reason exists to modify Foster to arrive at the subject limitation (discussed above), Patent Owner otherwise does not dispute reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See generally PO Resp. 32–56.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 11,068,609 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,068,609 - Google LLC v. Security First Innovations, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00215 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Foster and Hayhurst; the Board did not reach the anticipation and obviousness grounds based on Orsini.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with three years of experience in the area of securing data from unauthorized access or use.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–38). Petitioner also asserts that a “higher level of education may substitute for less experience.” Id. 2 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. Patent Owner submitted the Declaration of Dr. Rubin in support of its Response, and in that Declaration, Dr. Rubin accepted Petitioner’s definition. Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 20–21. For the reasons given, we apply the same level of ordinary skill in the art that we did in the Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 4.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“See Section II.C.3.a.ii supra. Although Dr. Rubin calls Hayhurst’s security benefits “ancillary” (Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 108–109, quoted in PO Resp. 40), this does not align with Hayhurst (see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 2, 7, 8, 21). For example, Hayhurst describes the security measures in the Technical Field section (id. ¶ 2) and the Summary of the Invention section (id. ¶¶ 7, 8). Hayhurst also discusses piracy deterrence in both the Summary of the Invention section (id. ¶ 8) and the invention’s detailed description (id. ¶ 21). Because Dr. Rubin does not give sufficient weight to Hayhurst’s discussion of piracy deterrence and security, we do not credit Dr. Rubin’s testimony on this issue. See Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 108–109. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that Hayhurst is reasonably pertinent to the network-security problem that the inventors were trying to solve. See Reply 5–6.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Neither party explicitly proposed constructions during trial, and we do not see the need for construing any terms in this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“3. Claim 1 a. Analogous Art “To be considered within the prior art for purposes of the obviousness analysis, a reference must be analogous.” Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Wang Lab. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland Gmbh v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 10,452,854 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,452,854 - Tableau Software, LLC v. Icharts LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01389 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–4 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability under any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’000 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Neither party proposes construing any claim term. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 36. Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“3 The parties do not dispute that a skilled artisan “would have had a B.S. degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or equivalent experience relating to computing, as well as two to three additional years of academic or industry experience related to web application development and data visualization services.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 85); Prelim. Resp. 35– 36. 4 The record does not include allegations or evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedOther
“connotes interactivity, and does not explain why a “Data Animation Effect” would be interactive.6 These aspects of Figure 53 do not appear to show interactivity. Thus, the issue is whether selecting a choice other than “Hide” for “Scroll buttons” in box 710 of Figure 53 adds to chart 840, once published, a feature that allows a user to interact with that chart via scrolling, or whether “Scroll buttons” refers to some other feature of the configuration process (such as the scroll buttons shown in Figure 53 for scrolling through the various charts in the layout). Both experts provide conclusory testimony stating how they view Figure 53. Ex. 1003 ¶ 181 (“For example, Figure 53 of Rostoker shows the ‘Configure Chart View’ toolbar, which includes multiple ‘interactive’ features, such as making the chart ‘Selectable’ (suggesting interactivity using an input device such as a mouse), including ‘Scroll buttons’ to scroll the chart, and adding ‘Data Animation[s].’”); Ex. 2001 ¶ 141 (“Schmandt relies on the ‘Configure Chart View’ toolbar of FIG. 53 of Rostoker, but he is confusing the configuration step 330 of Rostoker with the end result.”). Petitioner invites us to speculate as to the behavior of features that are depicted in Figure 53 but otherwise are not described in any meaningful detail by Rostoker. We conclude that this is insufficient to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,520,000 - Tableau Software, LLC v. Icharts LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01388 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–18 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’595 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. At most, Jou teaches that it was known to interact with charts in a Windows environment or a browser window. Ex. 1007 ¶ 34. But Rostoker already teaches that a user could interact with a chart, via a graphical user interface in a web browser, while configuring the chart. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 67–75. Petitioner does not explain persuasively why a skilled artisan, per the teachings of Jou, would have made Rostoker’s published charts interactive. Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that a skilled artisan “would have been motivated to incorporate Jou’s additional ‘interactive’ features into Rostoker’s system to enable users to better visualize and explore business data,” is not supported by his citations to Jou, at least as to whether a skilled artisan would have modified Rostoker’s published charts. Ex. 1003 ¶ 259 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 8, 9). Petitioner’s argument that Flash and Java could enable interactive features, at most, show that a skilled artisan could have implemented interactive features with Rostoker’s a reason why a skilled artisan would have made these modifications. See Auris Health, Inc. v. Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., 32 F.4th 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The motivation-to-combine inquiry asks whether a skilled artisan ‘not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations . . . of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.’” (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted))). Thus, we are not persuaded that Petitioner is likely to show that a skilled artisan would have incorporated Jou’s interactive features into Rostoker to make Rostoker’s published charts interactive.” slip op. at 35
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“client is required for display and usage of an existing QlikView document (.qvw file). While the QlikView Server is responsible for opening, hosting, and calculating the document, the clients are required for user interaction and presenting the document and its objects.” Ex. 1009, 123. Petitioner points to no persuasive evidence that a Java or AJAX object or client executing at a web browser is a website separate from the server that serves the object or client. Mr. Schmandt makes conclusory statements to that effect, but does not state the basis for his testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 338–339. Thus, Mr. Schmandt’s testimony on this point is entitled to little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (“Dr. Jones does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statement. Thus, the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and support, and is entitled to little weight.”).” slip op. at 44
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,712,595
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.