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  • PTAB · Apr 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00033 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–12 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the ’888 Publication anticipates the claims.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). We may institute review, however, only upon a determination that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Applying that standard, for reasons set forth below, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

      “The test for written description support “requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The Specification must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the inventors invented what is claimed, and “reasonably” convey to those skilled in the art that the inventors “had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. The “level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Id.” slip op. at 9

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “The test for written description support “requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The Specification must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the inventors invented what is claimed, and “reasonably” convey to those skilled in the art that the inventors “had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. The “level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Id.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner

      “Even if we accept that the Examiner previously considered the effective filing date of claims 1–12, we determine that Petitioner identifies a material error by the Examiner. Id. We agree with Petitioner that “the Examiner never questioned the priority claim made by” the applicant during prosecution. Pet. 63. Further, the Examiner did not issue any rejection concerning whether the application that led to the ’564 patent supports the challenged claims. Id.; see id. at 63 n.20 (citing Ex. 1007, 489). Against that backdrop, we find Petitioner shows sufficiently that the Examiner materially erred by accepting the applicant’s priority date claim, as shown by our analysis above, and, as a result, materially erred by failing to appreciate the prior art status of the ’888 Publication, which Petitioner has demonstrated by a reasonable likelihood, on this record, anticipates the challenged claims. Id. at 63. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny review under Section 325(d) with respect to the ground that asserts anticipation by the ’888 Publication.10” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 9,823,564
  • Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.All claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Apr 6, 2020 · IPR2019-00030 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious over Ogino and Beich; claims 1–4 are also unpatentable over Ogino alone, but claim 5 is not shown unpatentable on that ground.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “We construe claim terms to the extent necessary. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “supported by the cited evidence. We are persuaded, instead, that “the image plane and the sensor are taught by the ’568 patent to be coincident,” and “[t]hus, there is no ambiguity in the ’568 patent about where the image plane is located or that TTL is measured to the image plane,” as Petitioner argues in its Reply. Reply 13 (Ex. 1026 ¶ 5; Ex. 1003, 33–35). Patent Owner acknowledges as much, noting that “as these terms[, i.e., the image plane and the sensor,] are used in the specification of the ’568 patent, the image plane is the surface of the sensor.” Sur-reply 2. We find that the ’568 patent discloses that the electronic sensor corresponds to or is coincident with the image plane and thus, the TTL could be measured with respect to either the sensor (electronic or film) or the image plane and reach the same result. Based upon the complete trial record, we maintain our construction of TTL from the ’1140IPR and the ’1146IPR3, which encompasses “the length of the optical axis spacing between the object-side surface of the first lens element and one of: an electronic sensor, film, and an image plane corresponding to either the 3 The panel authorized, and the parties filed, supplemental briefing to address this construction before it was adopted in both the related ’1140IPR and ’1146IPR, and that the parties responded to this construction in the hearing in this proceeding (with citations to the transcript). See, e.g., Paper 28 (PO’s demonstratives), 5; ’1140IPR, Paper 31; ’1146IPR, Paper 30; see also Trial Practice Guide Update 13–14 (July 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial-practice-guide-update3.pdf; Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. f’real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that the Board did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act when it adopted its own claim construction in the final decision because the parties had notice and an opportunity to be heard). electronic sensor or a film sensor.” See ’1140IPR, Paper 37, 18; ’1146IPR, Paper 37, 14.” slip op. at 14

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Even assuming, arguendo, we were to credit Patent Owner’s expert testimony as to the disjointed nature of optical lens assembly design experience and manufacturing experience, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention having only design experience would be so completely unaware of manufacturing considerations so as to preclude taking into account the very general guidance of Beich. See Reply 24–25. Beich teaches that a lens designer should have a basic understanding of the manufacturing process, which would include the limits for fabricating lens elements in an optical lens assembly. Ex. 1020, 7. We are persuaded that the information conveyed in Beich would have been understood, known, and applied by the ordinarily skilled lens designer (see Reply 4–6 (citing Ex. 2014, 4, 9, 11, Fig. 9.2)), irrespective of whether such person had manufacturing experience. Stated differently, although an ordinarily skilled designer of an optical lens assembly may not have had any real-world manufacturing experience, we are persuaded that such person would still have taken into account manufacturing concerns. Although there are differences between the definitions proposed, our conclusions rendered in this decision do not turn on selecting a particular definition for the level of ordinary skill in the art, for the reasons discussed above. We determine, on this record, that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Patent Owner is consistent with the ’568 patent and the asserted prior art. We agree with Patent Owner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill except for Patent Owner’s arguments about manufacturing discussed above. As such, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “As noted by Petitioner, The Handbook of Optics discloses that “[i]n the case of both negative and positive lens elements, it is good policy to avoid element forms wherein the center-to-edge thickness ratio exceeds three for positive elements.” Ex. 1019 § 34.15. Thus, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s fourth reason that the cited disclosure provides evidence that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have selected a particular diameter for the first lens element disclosed in Ogino in conformance with manufacturing considerations known to the ordinarily skilled artisan. We are further persuaded that, from the selection of that particular diameter, a Z1 value for the object-side surface and a Z2 value for image-side surface at the minimum usable edge of the first lens element can be obtained and, in turn, circumferential edge thickness L1e can be obtained. Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1003, 42; Ex. 1005, 15:1–3). We are further persuaded by Petitioner’s supporting reasoning that “a POSITA would understand the manufacturing benefits of maintaining the lowest possible center-to-edge thickness ratio since ‘the preferred shape of a molded element is one that has fairly uniform thickness.’” Id. at 42 (quoting Ex. 1018, 92) (citing Ex. 1003, 48). Based on our review of the complete record, we find that the record supports Petitioner’s contentions concerning claim 1. Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Ogino.” slip op. at 37

    Patent outcomesUS 9,857,568 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,857,568
  • PTAB · Jan 16, 2020 · IPR2019-00776 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Corning’s rehearing request and left institution denied for claims 1–4 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving obviousness on any asserted ground.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Request for Rehearing (Paper 16, “Rehearing Request” or “Reh’g Req.”) of our Decision denying institution of an inter partes review (Paper 15, “Decision” or “Dec.”) of claims 1–4 of U.S. Patent No. 8,488,115 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’115 patent”). In the Decision, we found that Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the choosing limitation of the claims would have been obvious over cited references in view of the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. Dec. 20, 26, 29. We, thus, found that Petitioner did not establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claims 1–4 of the ’115 patent are unpatentable as obvious on any asserted ground. Id. at 22, 23, 27–30.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “negative slopes. See Ex. 1006, Figs. 2, 3. Petitioner failed to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, without using the ’115 patent as a template, would have elected to consider only some selected data in Abbott, while ignoring other data, or would have elected to choose an optical fiber based on such consideration. See Sensonics Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“To draw on hindsight knowledge of the patented invention, when the prior art does not contain or suggest that knowledge, is to use the invention as a template for its own reconstruction—an illogical and inappropriate process by which to determine patentability.” (citing W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). Instead, Petitioner merely cited to the conclusory opinion of its expert declarant. Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 252).” slip op. at 4

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “The second part of Petitioner’s first argument is that we “committed legal error by construing claim 1” of the ’115 patent “as requiring the slope to always be negative.” Reh’g Req. 4, 6–8. We made no such construction, either expressly or implicitly. In fact, we determined that no claim term required express construction. Dec. 7. In arguing that we committed legal error, Petitioner points to statements in Patent Owner’s briefing (Reh’g Req. 6–9), but Petitioner identifies nothing in our Decision that indicates we construed the “choosing” limitation of claim 1 to require that the DMD slope always be negative. Consequently, Petitioner’s assertion of legal error is unsupported.” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,488,115
  • PTAB · Jan 16, 2020 · IPR2019-00775 · APJ Michelle N Ankenbrand · IPR · Rehearing

    Denied Corning’s rehearing request; the Board maintained its denial of institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4 were obvious on any asserted ground.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “institute an inter partes review, the Board reviews its decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2018). In pertinent part, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Request for Rehearing (Paper 16, “Rehearing Request” or “Reh’g Req.”) of our Decision denying institution of an inter partes review (Paper 15, “Decision” or “Dec.”) of claims 1–4 of U.S. Patent No. 8,351,027 B2 (“the ’027 patent,” Ex. 1001). In the Decision, we found that Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the combined teachings of the prior art would have rendered obvious the limitation of claim 1 that requires “choosing for use in a communications network those optical fibers in which the result of subtracting the peak delay at the first radius from the peak delay at the second radius is a negative number” (“the choosing step”). Dec. 23–25, 29–30, 32. We, thus, determined that Petitioner did not establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claims 1–4 of the ’027 patent would have been obvious based on any asserted ground. Id. at 25–26, 30–33.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot reached

      “negative slopes. See Ex. 1006, Figs. 2, 3. Petitioner failed to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, without using the ’027 patent as a template, would have elected to consider only some selected data in Abbott, while ignoring other data, or would have elected to choose an optical fiber based on such consideration. See Sensonics Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“To draw on hindsight knowledge of the patented invention, when the prior art does not contain or suggest that knowledge, is to use the invention as a template for its own reconstruction—an illogical and inappropriate process by which to determine patentability.” (citing W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); see also Dec. 25 (concluding that Petitioner’s argument appears to be the product of hindsight). Instead, Petitioner merely cited to the conclusory opinion of its expert declarant. Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 164).” slip op. at 4

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “legal error by construing claim 1” of the ’027 patent “as requiring the slope to always be negative.” Reh’g Req. 4, 6–8. We made no such construction. In fact, we determined that no claim term required express construction, expressly or implicitly. Dec. 7. In arguing that we committed legal error, Petitioner points to statements in Patent Owner’s briefing, see Reh’g Req. 6– 9, but does not identify anything in our Decision that indicates we construed the choosing step of claim 1 as requiring that the DMD slope should always be negative. Consequently, Petitioner’s assertion of legal error is unsupported.” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,351,027
  • Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.All claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Dec 3, 2019 · IPR2018-01140 · APJ Marc S Hoff · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1 and 13 are unpatentable as anticipated by Ogino; claims 14 and 15 are unpatentable as obvious over Ogino and Chen II.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

      “claims 1 and 13 of the ’032 Patent are anticipated by Ogino. Petitioner has also demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 14 and 15 of the ’032 Patent are unpatentable over the combination of Ogino and Chen II. The chart below summarizes our conclusion. References Claims Claims Claims 35. Shown Not shown Challenged U.S.C. Unpatent- Unpatentable able Ogino 1 and 13 1 and 13 § 102 Ogino, Chen 14 and 15 14 and 15 § 103 II 1 and 13-15” slip op. at 40

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “that Ogino and Chen II disclose substantially different lens systems. PO Resp. 36. As Petitioner points out, both Ogino and Chen II describe mobile phone camera systems with all lenses being aspheric; a first lens with a meniscus shape with positive refractive power; a second lens with negative refractive power; a third lens with a meniscus shape and with a negative refractive power; a fourth lens with a meniscus shape with positive refractive power; and a fifth lens with a meniscus shape and with a negative refractive power. Pet. Reply 22; Pet. 41–44. We agree with Petitioner that such a skilled artisan, possessing an applicable college degree, approximately three years experience in designing multi-lens optical systems, “experience in analyzing, tolerancing, adjusting, and optimizing multilens systems, and experience with lens design software such as CodeV, Oslo, or Zemax,” would have the appropriate knowledge to perform routine modifications to a lens design. Pet. Reply 24; Pet. 7; PO Resp. 12. Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Moore testified that such a skilled artisan “would be able to use the computer program [i.e. CodeV or Zemax] to optimize lens designs.” Pet. Reply 24; Ex. 1025, 29:25–30:9. Dr. Moore testified that the skilled artisan would “tell the [lens design] program that you want to vary certain parameters of a lens . . . . And then the program, through a fairly complicated algorithm, then actually goes through and varies them and determines how to make a better lens. You determine as a lens designer what you’re trying to improve.” Ex. 1025, 28:13–23.” slip op. at 38

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the skilled artisan would have understood that third, fourth, and fifth lenses also contribute to vignetting in Ogino. PO Resp. 38. We credit Petitioner’s argument that Dr. Moore’s conclusion regarding vignetting in the third, fourth, and fifth lenses is unreliable because it is based on assumptions not specified in Ogino. Pet. Reply 16; Ex. 1026 ¶ 11. For example, Ogino does not provide lens diameters or vignetting apertures for the lens assembly of Example 6 that would vignette the light beams on the third, fourth or fifth lens elements. Pet. Reply 17; Ex. 1026 ¶ 11. Additionally, Dr. Sasián testifies that vignetting is a result of the second lens. Pet. Reply 17–18; Pet. 54; Ex. 1003, 59.” slip op. at 36

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Effective Focal Length (EFL) Petitioner asserts that while the specification of the ’032 Patent does not offer an express definition for the term “effective focal length,” “its meaning is well known in the art, as exemplified in Li (Ex. 1007), which states that “[t]he focal length of a lens assembly [is] also referred to as the effective focal length [(]EFL).” Pet. 9–10 (internal parentheses omitted); Ex. 1007, 2:59–61. Patent Owner, in response, does not dispute Petitioner’s construction of “effective focal length,” stating that the Petition does not turn on the construction of the term. PO Resp. 20. Having reviewed the evidence of record, we agree with Petitioner that Li supports construing the term “effective focal length” as “the focal length of a lens assembly.” We adopt this construction.” slip op. at 10

    Patent outcomesUS 9,402,032 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,402,032
  • PTAB · Sep 16, 2019 · IPR2019-00776 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–4 obvious over any of the three asserted grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Applying that standard, and upon considering the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–4 of the ’115 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “On this record, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to set forth a sufficient basis as to how an ordinarily skilled artisan would have arrived at the choosing step from Abbott’s disclosures and the knowledge of a POSITA, relying instead on conclusory statements from Dr. Ralph to bridge the gaps in Abbott. As Patent Owner highlights, and Dr. Ralph acknowledges, Abbott does not explicitly disclose that its MMF must be chosen based on the criterion in claim 1, i.e., choosing optical fibers in which the result of subtracting the pulse delay at the first radius from the pulse delay at the second radius is a negative number. Prelim. Resp. 14; Ex. 1005 ¶ 252 (“Abbott does not explicitly teach choosing multimode optical fibers on the specific basis of calculating a negative DMD slope (or shift).”). Although Petitioner argues that such a choosing step would have been obvious, Petitioner does not direct us to sufficient evidence to support that argument.” slip op. at 20

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “On this record, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to set forth a sufficient basis as to how an ordinarily skilled artisan would have arrived at the choosing step from Abbott’s disclosures and the knowledge of a POSITA, relying instead on conclusory statements from Dr. Ralph to bridge the gaps in Abbott. As Patent Owner highlights, and Dr. Ralph acknowledges, Abbott does not explicitly disclose that its MMF must be chosen based on the criterion in claim 1, i.e., choosing optical fibers in which the result of subtracting the pulse delay at the first radius from the pulse delay at the second radius is a negative number. Prelim. Resp. 14; Ex. 1005 ¶ 252 (“Abbott does not explicitly teach choosing multimode optical fibers on the specific basis of calculating a negative DMD slope (or shift).”). Although Petitioner argues that such a choosing step would have been obvious, Petitioner does not direct us to sufficient evidence to support that argument.” slip op. at 20

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner

      “Moreover, although Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious for a POSITA to have chosen a MMF on the basis of calculating a negative DMD slope given Abbott’s disclosure, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s showing falls short on this record. Specifically, Petitioner does not direct us to a teaching or suggestion in Abbott of choosing a MMF based on the negative slope or DMD shift. Rather, Petitioner’s argument that “it would have been obvious to a POSITA to choose for use in a communications network those optical fibers in which the results of subtracting the pulse delay at the first radius from the pulse delay at the second radius is a negative number in order to obtain the optimized MMF described in Abbott (Pet. 42), appears to be the product of hindsight, coupled with Dr. Ralph’s conclusory testimony that the choosing step would have been obvious in view of Abbott’s teaching that its new MMF “has a variety of uses in the telecommunication industry.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 252 (quoting Ex. 1006, 4:1–6); see Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (in reaching a conclusion on obviousness, “the court must avoid ‘hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning’” (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (a lack of objective support for expert opinion “may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (opinion testimony that does not disclose underlying facts “is entitled to little weight”). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertion that claim 1 of the ’115 patent would have been obvious over Abbott and a POSITA’s knowledge.” slip op. at 22

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 8,488,115
  • PTAB · Sep 16, 2019 · IPR2019-00775 · APJ Michelle N Ankenbrand · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4 were unpatentable as obvious over any of the three asserted combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Applying that standard, and upon considering the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–4 of the ’027 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’027 patent would have “a working knowledge of fiber optic systems, a bachelor’s degree in Engineering or Physics or equivalent coursework, and approximately two years of professional experience or graduate studies involving optical fiber data transmission.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 20). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not propose a definition for the level of ordinary skill in the art, or otherwise dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. Petitioner’s definition appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected in the prior art, and we apply it for purposes of this decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Further, based on the information presented at this stage of the proceeding, we consider Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Ralph, qualified to opine from the perspective of an ordinary artisan at the time of the invention. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 5–11 (Dr. Ralph’s background and qualifications); Ex. 1036 (Dr. Ralph’s curriculum vitae).” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2018).7 Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Furthermore, at this stage in the proceeding, we expressly construe the claims only to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner proposes that we construe the term “peak delay” recited in claim 1 of the ’027 patent. Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction, but reserves the right to do so “at a later time.” Prelim. Resp. 10. Our resolution of the parties’ disputes does not turn on our interpretation of the term “peak delay.” Accordingly, it is not necessary to construe that term for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “forth a sufficient basis as to how an ordinarily skilled artisan would have arrived at the choosing step from Abbott’s disclosures and the knowledge of a POSITA, relying instead on conclusory statements from Dr. Ralph to bridge the gaps in Abbott. As Patent Owner highlights, and Dr. Ralph acknowledges, Abbott does not explicitly disclose that its MMF must be chosen based on the criterion in claim 1, i.e., choosing optical fibers in which the result of subtracting the peak delay at the first radius from the peak delay at the second radius is a negative number. Prelim. Resp. 13; Ex. 1005 ¶ 164 (“Abbott does not explicitly teach choosing multimode optical fibers on the specific basis of calculating a negative DMD slope (or shift).”). Although Petitioner argues that such a choosing step would have been obvious, Petitioner does not direct us to sufficient evidence to support that argument. For example, Petitioner argues that “[a]s exhibited by Figures 2 and 3 of Abbott, the preferred embodiment of Abbott would always have a negative DMD slope when measured at a 850 nm wavelength.” Pet. 43 (emphasis added). Dr. Ralph testifies similarly. Ex. 1005 ¶ 162 (“As exhibited by Figures 2 and 3 of Abbott, the preferred embodiment of Abbot would always have a negative DMD slope when measured at a 850 nm wavelength.”). However, as Patent Owner highlights with its annotation to Figure 2, some portion of Figure 2 has an upward or positive slope. Prelim. Resp. 14; see Ex. 1006, 9:44–46 (explaining that the slope is upward or positive in a certain region of the DMD curve). And Petitioner does not explain how Abbott’s Figure 3, which depicts a DMD curve at a 1300 nm wavelength, supports its negative DMD slope argument.11 See Pet. 43. Thus, the record does not support Petitioner’s assertion that Abbott’s Figures 2 and 3 show that Abbott’s DMD slope would “always” be negative. 11 Like Figure 2, Figure 3 also has a positive slope in a certain region of the DMD curve, as Patent Owner’s annotation to the figure indicates. See Prelim. Resp. 14; Ex. 1006, Fig. 3. Moreover, although Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious for a POSITA to have chosen a MMF on the basis of calculating a negative DMD slope given Abbott’s disclosure, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s showing falls short on this record. Specifically, Petitioner does not direct us to a teaching or suggestion in Abbott of choosing a MMF based on the negative slope or DMD shift. Rather, Petitioner’s argument that “Abbott teaches the desirability of optical fibers exhibiting a negative DMD slope in telecommunications systems” (Pet. 44), appears to be the product of hindsight, coupled with Dr. Ralph’s conclusory testimony that the choosing step would have been obvious in view of Abbott’s teaching that its new MMF “has a variety of uses in the telecommunication industry.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 164 (quoting Ex. 1006, 4:1–6); see Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (in reaching a conclusion on obviousness, “the court must avoid ‘hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning’” (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (a lack of objective support for expert opinion “may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (opinion testimony that does not disclose underlying facts “is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,351,027
  • PTAB · Aug 5, 2019 · IPR2018-01348 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the petition did not show a sufficient motivation to combine Parulski and Christie.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “ANALYSIS When considering a request for rehearing, we review the Decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “and Parulski’s teachings of zoom are combinable (id.) and Petitioner has not established that they are predictable variations of each other. Disparate embodiments in one reference can only be combined if they are a “predictable variation” of each other that does not “require a leap of inventiveness.” C.f. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see e.g. Apple Inc. v. Valencell, Inc., Case IPR2017- 01704, slip op. at 10 (PTAB Mar. 27, 2018) (Paper 9) (acknowledging Boston Scientific stands for the proposition that combining two embodiments from the same reference requires an obviousness analysis); LG Display Co., LLC v. Innovative Display Techs LLC, Case IPR2014-01362, slip op. at 13 (PTAB Mar. 2, 2015) (Paper 12) (“The rationale . . . that a person of ordinary skill would ‘pick and choose’ features from various embodiments of Baur, simply because they are in the same patent, is insufficient to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this challenge”). “Even when obviousness is based on a single prior art reference, there must be a showing of a suggestion or motivation to modify the teachings of that reference.” In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 4

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “fused image.” Reh’g Req. 13. The Petition proposed that “fused image” should be construed as “an output image including information from two images.” We determined that construing that term was unnecessary to resolve any controversy. Inst. Dec. 7. We maintain that determination. Petitioner provides a construction for “fused image” but not for “without fusion continuous Zoom video mode output images of the object or scene.” Id. at 9–10. We properly considered the entire claim limitation in assessing whether Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its obviousness challenge. slip op. at 12

    • BurdenDecided for patent owner

      “The burden of persuasion remains on a petitioner in inter partes review proceedings. See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner appears to now argue that, in order to understand its contentions as to the “without fusion” limitation in Parulski, we were to mine the Petition for references to “switching between Wide sensor and Tele sensor” associated with Golan. We were not required to do so. Id. (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archeologist with the record.”); c.f. Fieldpiece Instruments, Inc. v. Twin Rivers Eng’g, Inc., Case IPR2017-00362, slip op. at 4 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2017) (Paper 16)(“the portions of the Petition cited in the Rehearing Request relate only to overviews of the references”)” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,185,291
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Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.