PTAB
Advanced fields
13 decisions · 442msnewest first
  • PTAB · Oct 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00710 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–7, 9, 13, and 16–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Schneier and over Schneier with Okita; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable under either ground.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not contradicted and is consistent with the technology and descriptions in the ’294 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner indicates that “[t]his Petition establishes that the prior art meets each of the claim limitations under any reasonable construction. Thus, no express construction is required.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 86). In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that no constructions are necessary “because under any reasonable construction of the claim terms, the prior art fails to disclose or suggest the claimed features.” PO Resp. 4–5. Because there is no dispute between the parties as to any particular claim term and because the claims, as a whole, are reasonably clear on their face, no specific claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “rather than 10 credits, does not have a temporal component. Ex. 1008, 63:31–34. Rather, it describes an option for the user or player to obtain a discount at a particular point in time if the player is willing to purchase 20 rather than 10 credits. Id. Petitioner’s citations to this embodiment do not 9. Pet. 31; Pet. Reply 3–7 (citing Ex. 1008, 63:31–34). In this embodiment the $0.30 and $0.50 multipliers are constant, and the user is simply choosing between two existing options at a particular time to potentially take advantage of a $0.20 discount on credits. Comparatively, the $0.30 and $0.50 multipliers are different, but they are not “variable over time,” as required by claim 9. Ex. 1001, 47:38–40.” slip op. at 17

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “and reliance on Figure 19 do not in any way explain how updating game costs by meter 502 with a new Cost_Table is relevant to a credit multiplier or even a multiplier being varied over time. Ex. 1003 ¶ 155. Considering this evidence, we determine that Petitioner and Mr. Crevelt’s reliance mainly on snippets from Schneier’s “Updating Cost Information protocol” embodiment does not sufficiently explain why or how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood updating game cost to encompass varying a multiplier of credits over time. We also note that during his deposition, Mr. Crevelt was given opportunity to clarify his testimony as to Figure 19 and explain the cost updating embodiment in Schneier, and mostly demurred. See Ex. 2004:158:4–182:6. Explaining his reliance on Figure 19, Mr. Crevelt stated: A: And whatever latest price from that updated cost information coming from the central site is -- is variable, it’s variable as time proceed[s]. It’s a – it’s a, much of a complicated section, and -- but the information is in the Schneier patent and shows that it could have -- it should change over time. Id. at 158:23–159:5. Mr. Crevelt further stated that: A: . . . for a metered play where you’re buying so much time or so many credits or so many games on a specific game and when it runs out, then have you to buy more, and that variable can change over time. relates Schneier’s “updated cost,” with the claimed “multiplier” and “variable,” and does not adequately explain how they are equivalent or interconnected. See, e.g., id. at 160:16–23 (Mr. Crevelt testifying that “we can go from the description of figure 19, which starts at basically the top of column 56 in the Schneier patent, and . . . describes this process in detail of how the information is transferred from one place to the other and updated.”). Mr. Crevelt concludes that Schneier’s description is “complicated,” and from Figure 19 asserts the cost somehow includes a credit multiplier that “could” or “should” change over time. Id. at 158:23– 159:5. Overall, this testimony fails to sufficiently explain or point to persuasive evidence in Schneier as to how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the Figure 19 cost updating embodiment discloses a time-variable multiplier as required in claim 8.” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS 10,825,294 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,825,294
  • PTAB · Oct 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00709 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 14–18, 21–23, 25, 27, and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Schneier and over Schneier with Okita; claim 9 was not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner states it “does not dispute Petitioners’ proposed level of skill, and under any level of skill a POSITA would not understand the asserted Grounds to raise any unpatentability issue.” PO Resp. 4. Patent Owner states further that “this [Patent Owner Response] and supporting declarations apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” Id. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not contradicted and is consistent with the technology and descriptions in the ’635 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner indicated in the Petition that “[t]his Petition establishes that the prior art meets each of the claim limitations under any reasonable construction.[] Thus, no express construction is required.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 85). In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that no constructions are necessary “because under any reasonable construction of the claim terms, the prior art fails to disclose or suggest the claimed features.” PO Resp. 4–5. Because there is no dispute between the parties as to any particular claim term and because the claims, as a whole, are reasonably clear on their face, no specific claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “We also note that during his deposition, Mr. Crevelt was given opportunity to clarify his testimony as to Figure 19 and explain the cost updating embodiment in Schneier, and mostly demurred. See Ex. 2004, 158:4–182:6. Explaining his reliance on Figure 19, Mr. Crevelt stated: A: And whatever latest price from that updated cost information coming from the central site is -- is variable, it’s variable as time proceed[s]. It’s a – it’s a, much of a complicated section, and -- but the information is in the Schneier patent and shows that it could have -- it should change over time. Id. at 158:23–159:5. Mr. Crevelt further stated that: A: . . . for a metered play where you’re buying so much time or so many credits or so many games on a specific game and when it runs out, then have you to buy more, and that variable can change over time. Id. at 161:2–6. These explanations are unpersuasive because the testimony relates Schneier’s “updated cost,” with the claimed “multiplier” and “variable,” and does not adequately explain how they are equivalent or interconnected. See, e.g., id. at 160:16–23 (Mr. Crevelt testifying that “we can go from the description of figure 19, which starts at basically the top of column 56 in the Schneier patent, and . . . describes this process in detail of how the information is transferred from one place to the other and updated.”). Mr. Crevelt concludes that Schneier’s description is “complicated,” and from Figure 19 asserts the cost somehow includes a credit multiplier that “could” or “should” change over time. Id. at 158:23– 159:5. Overall, this testimony fails to sufficiently explain or point to in the art would have understood that the Figure 19 cost updating embodiment discloses a time-variable multiplier as required in claim 9.” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “Discount Credit Pricing Structure The $0.20 discount described by Schneier for purchasing 20 credits, rather than 10 credits, does not have a temporal component. Ex. 1008, 63:31–34. Rather, it describes an option for the user or player to obtain a discount at a particular point in time if the player is willing to purchase 20 rather than 10 credits. Id. Petitioner’s citations to this embodiment do not address the idea of a time component, i.e., “over time,” as required by claim 9. Pet. 31; Pet. Reply 3–7 (citing Ex. 1008, 63:31–34). In this embodiment the $0.30 and $0.50 multipliers are constant, and the user is simply choosing between two existing options at a particular time to potentially take advantage of a $0.20 discount on credits. Comparatively, the $0.30 and $0.50 multipliers are different, but they are not “variable over time,” as required by claim 9. Ex. 1001, 47:38–40.” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 10,650,635 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,650,635
  • PTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00629 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Final written decision

    Original claim 12 is not unpatentable; substitute claim 37 is added, while substitute claims 21–28 and 30–36 are denied as obvious.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “F.3d at 1279–80, we begin our analysis with the Specification of the ’711 Patent. The Specification indicates when a UAV (such as the recited “reference aerial vehicle”) navigates autonomously, it flies without manual control, and can, for example, track and fly to a target using information captured onboard the vehicle itself. See Ex. 1001, 3:24–28 (“[I]t may not be desirable to manually control the interceptor aerial vehicle to follow the target UAV. In some embodiments, the interceptor aerial vehicle is able to autonomously track and fly to the target UAV using machine vision based on images captured by a camera of the interceptor aerial vehicle.”). The Specification also indicates that “autonomous” means more than just “automatic flight,” and clarifies that autonomous navigation occurs when a UAV that previously received a target location from an external source subsequently turns and flies itself towards the received location. See, e.g., id. at 4:15–17 (disclosing that the detected location of a target may be provided to an interceptor “to allow it to automatically and autonomously fly toward the direction of the detected location”); 15:64–16:3 (automatic and autonomous navigation occurs when an interceptor’s navigation component and/or flight controller receive the location of a target, and adjust the interceptor “to turn and fly towards the received location . . . based on the received location”); 16:49–60 (“For example, a flight direction and/or speed of an interceptor aerial vehicle are automatically and autonomously adjusted based on a location and size of the target within the captured image. . . . This allows the flight path of the interceptor aerial vehicle to be dynamically adjusted to track and follow a moving target.”).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “have had reason to combine Beard and Laufer in the manner proposed by Petitioner, the combination would not satisfy the Autonomous Navigation limitation required by claim 12 because Laufer’s autopilot commands are generated by and transmitted from a remote command center (i.e., Laufer’s central controller 115). PO Resp. 15–16. In its Reply, Petitioner does not dispute that Laufer’s autopilot commands are generated by Laufer’s central controller 115, which is remote from the aircraft being controlled. See Reply 13–17. Petitioner asserts, however, that the combination still satisfies the Autonomous Navigation limitation because these autopilot commands are generated without human input. See id. Based on the complete trial record, Patent Owner’s arguments are persuasive. See PO Resp. 15–16; PO Sur-reply 42, 1–6; Ex. 2025 ¶¶ 84–87. The flight of Beard’s UAV 100 under the control of Laufer’s autopilot commands does not satisfy the Autonomous Navigation limitation of claim 12, as we have construed that limitation, because Laufer’s autopilot commands are generated at a location that is remote from UAV 100 (Laufer’s central controller 115.) See, e.g., Ex. 1010 ¶ 40 (“Central controller 115 uses autopilot command module 440 to generate autopilot aircraft commands”), ¶¶ 26, 30 (clarifying that central controller 115 and the controlled interceptor aircraft are separate devices that may communicate through a “wireless connection”), Fig. 4 (depicting “aircraft control commands 475” being generated externally from the depicted “Interceptor Aircraft”); see also Ex. 2025 ¶¶ 95–95. Petitioner never disputes that, in the proposed combination, Laufer’s central controller 115 would remain external to Beard’s UAV 100. See Reply 13–17. Instead, Petitioner relies on its proposed construction of the Autonomous Navigation limitation, which would have encompassed such an arrangement. See id. Our construction of the Autonomous Navigation limitation, which did not adopt Petitioner’s claim construction position, is dispositive of Petitioner’s argument. We thus determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 12 would have been obvious over Beard and Laufer.” slip op. at 15

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

      “the legal requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4, 7–8. For the reasons that follow, we determine that Patent Owner has satisfied this burden. 1. Proposal of a Reasonable Number of Substitute Claims A motion to amend must “propose a reasonable number of substitute claims.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1)(B); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(3) (“A motion to amend may cancel a challenged claim or propose a reasonable number of substitute claims.”). “There is a rebuttable presumption that a reasonable number of substitute claims per challenged claim is one (1) substitute claim.” Lectrosonics, IPR2018-01129, Paper 15 at 4; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(3). Patent Owner has shown it proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims by proposing a single substitute claim for each of challenged claims 1–4, 8–11, and 13–20. MTA 1–2, Claims App. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. See generally MTA Opp. We determine that Patent Owner meets this requirement. 2. Amendments Respond to a Ground of Unpatentability “A motion to amend may be denied where … [t]he amendment does not respond to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(2)(i). Patent Owner has responded to the grounds of unpatentability involved in this proceeding by amending the claims in response to the Petition’s asserted prior art. See MTA 2, 25, Claims App. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. See generally MTA Opp. We determine that Patent Owner meets this requirement. 3. No Enlargement of the Scope of the Claims An amendment may not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.121(b)(1)–(b)(2). Patent Owner asserts that the amendments in the Motion do not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent because each proposed substitute claim “retains all of the limitations of the corresponding challenged claim, and each proposed independent substitute claim adds further limitations.” See MTA 2, Claims App. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. See generally MTA Opp. We determine that Patent Owner meets this requirement. 4. No Introduction of New Matter An amendment may not introduce new matter. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3);” slip op. at 22

    • 112 supportDecided for patent owner

      “Having considered the evidence and argument cited by both parties, we determine there is sufficient written description support for the disputed portions of limitations [37.e1], [37.e3,] and [37.e4]. The ’452 application discloses selecting between groups of processing schemes (e.g., algorithms) depending on a confidence level, where the groups are, for example: high cost, high robustness algorithms; medium cost, medium robustness algorithms; and low cost, low robustness algorithms. See Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 146–147. These schemes or algorithms may be neural networks. See, e.g., id. ¶ 50 (including neural network as a type of algorithm); see also id. ¶¶ 109–110); see generally MTA Opp 1 (not disputing that schemes may be neural networks). Specifically, the ’452 application describes “algorithms that process video frames of one or more video data streams,” and “produce a prediction of objects within the video f[r]ame, as well as a confidence number that is a measure of quality for that prediction.” Id. ¶ 141. The ’452 application also discloses the concept of switching between neural networks based on confidence levels. In particular, the ’452 application discloses that a “process cycles through the processing schemes to produce a detection of an object,” for example, where “if the confidence number is higher than an activation number, an action is performed to stop or change a running group (i) and select or switch to group (ii).” Id. ¶ 146. More particularly, “a processing scheme from the group of (i) High cost (low refresh rate), high robustness algorithm[s] can select a cheaper processing scheme from the group of (ii) Medium cost, medium robustness algorithms.” Id. The ’452 application additionally discloses that schemes or algorithms (e.g., neural networks) are applied to individual video frames, and that the confidence levels that determine which neural network will be applied in the future are also derived from individual video frames. For example, as discussed above, the ’452 application describes that “[t]he processing schemes produce a prediction of objects within the video f[r]ame, as well as a confidence number that is a measure of quality for that prediction.” Ex. 2019 ¶ 141 (emphases added). The ’452 application also describes selecting and applying an individual neural network, rather than only selecting and applying a group of processing schemes. For example, as highlighted above, the ’452 application describes that “a processing scheme from the” “High” group “can select a cheaper processing scheme from the” “Medium” group. Id. ¶ 146 (emphases added). In our view, these disclosures, read together, would reasonably convey to one skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the disputed subject matter described above. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.” slip op. at 24

    Patent outcomesUS 10,514,711 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 10,514,711
  • PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00044 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–16, 18–20, and 23–30 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4 and 17 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not establish expected Fab binding.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner contends that based on Patent Owner’s implicit construction in the district court litigation “that the term ‘the ligand comprising at least two polypeptides’ refers to a multimeric ligand (such as a tetramer) comprised of multiple polypeptides, each of which is a monomer.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 41, 50, 58, 62, 74, 87).” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, and C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number—five (5)—SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation, but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that [s]tructural relationships may provide the requisite motivation or suggestion to modify known compounds to obtain new compounds. For example, a prior art compound may suggest its homologs because homologs often have similar properties and therefore chemists of ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate making them to try to obtain compounds with improved properties. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 37

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “Neither claim 1 nor claim 14 recite a need to bind the Fab region of an antibody or that the target molecule is Fab. All that is required by these claims is that they adsorb a target molecule and that you can elute the target molecule from the matrix. The target molecule, therefore, can reasonably encompass IgG. Petitioner’s articulated rationale is that there was an expectation that the composition binds antibodies, including monoclonal antibodies, and therefore, would be useful in a process of for isolating antibodies. Petitioner contends that: A POSA would have also reasonably expected such a combination to achieve a process for isolating one or more target compounds using the recited affinity chromatography matrix given the well-known fact that each individual SPA domain, including the C domain, has affinity for antibodies (Ex. 1004, [1]) as well as Abrahmsén’s confirmation that a G29A mutation on SPA “would not interfere with folding [of SPA] or binding to [antibodies]” (Ex. 1005, 5:13-16). (Ex. 1002 ¶131.) Pet. 25; Reply 8 (“‘A POSA would not have been motivated only by Fab-binding ability, as even Dr. Bracewell agreed that ‘a POSA would have understood that it was desirable to purify monoclonal antibodies for therapeutic use in 2006.’(Ex. 1057, 75:17-76:4, 113:23-114:11, 157:24- 158:9; Ex. 1061 ¶29)”). The law does not require that the teachings of the reference be combined for the reason or advantage contemplated by the inventor, as long as some suggestion to combine the elements is provided by the prior art as a whole. In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1304 (CCPA 1976); see In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430” slip op. at 44

    Patent outcomesUS 10,343,142 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,343,142
  • PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00041 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–16, 18–20, and 23–30 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4 and 17 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not establish expected Fab binding.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “According to the Specification, “the present invention . . . relates to a multimeric chromatography ligand (also denoted a ‘multimer’) comprised of at least two Domain C units, or a functional fragments or variants thereof.” Ex. 1001, 7:27–30. The Specification additionally recites that a multimer containing only domain C units can, however, include linkers. Id. 7:39–41. In addition, the Specification describes that “the multimer comprises one or more additional units, which are different from Domain C.” Id. 7: 44–45. Based on these disclosures in the Specification, a multimer is composed of at least two or more monomers. Because Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the ’142 patent’s express construction of the term, and because Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s construction, we apply it here.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, and C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number—five (5)—SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation, but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that” slip op. at 37

    • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesUnpatentable

      “Here, the teachings of Linhult, Abrahmsén, and Hober suggest mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine in any one of the IgG binding domains of E, D, A, B, or C of SPA in order to avoid protein degradation. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 5:4–9. We, therefore, agree with Petitioner that the art expressly suggests that the glycine codon can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 99–111). Attaching any one of SPA mutated IgG binding domains E D A B or C to a matrix using “known ligand-construction methods to yield a predictable result[] (e.g., the claimed affinity chromatography matrix)” would have been obvious. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 130). As the Federal Circuit has explained, “[w]here a skilled artisan merely pursues ‘known options’ from ‘a finite number of identified, predictable solutions,’ the resulting invention is obvious under Section 103.” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Linhult Abrahmsén, and Hober expressly suggests mutating the glycine codon for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 99–111). We also agree that the cited art teaches using these mutant SPA domains in column chromatography for the isolation of antibodies.” slip op. at 36

    Patent outcomesUS 10,343,142 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,343,142
  • PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00045 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10, 12–14, 16–28, 30–32, and 34–37 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11 and 29 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not establish expected Fab binding.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here. C.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “support, the ligand capable of binding the one or more target compound(s) and comprising at least two polypeptides.” Ex. 1001, 15:46–49; 17:28–31. Petitioner argues that “‘the ligand comprising at least two polypeptides’ refers to a multimeric ligand (such as a tetramer) comprised of multiple polypeptides, each of which is a monomer.” Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 43–45). Petitioner argues that this construction is consistent with Patent Owner’s implicit construction in the Delaware litigation between the parties. Id. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s claim construction. See generally PO Resp. According to the Specification, “the present invention . . . relates to a multimeric chromatography ligand (also denoted a ‘multimer’) comprised of at least two domain C units, or a functional fragments [sic] or variants thereof.” Ex. 1001, 7:35–38. The Specification additionally recites that a multimer containing only domain C units can, however, include linkers. Id. at 7:39–41. In addition, the Specification describes that “the multimer comprises one or more additional units, which are different from Domain C.” Id. at 7:52–53. Based on these disclosures in the Specification, a multimer is composed of at least two or more monomers. Because Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the ’007 patent’s express construction of the term, we apply that construction for the purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “Petitioner’s articulated obviousness ground is premised on the knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, or C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number – five (5) – SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that” slip op. at 38

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “(c) No Teaching Away We are also not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that the art teaches away from the G29A substitution because it interferes with Fab binding. See PO Resp. 39–42; Sur-reply 9; Ex. 2009 at 2; Ex. 2010 at 25; Ex. 2012 at 25–26; Ex. 2029 at 7. None of claims 1, 2, or 20 recite a need to bind the Fab region of an antibody or that the target molecule is Fab. All that is required by these claims is that they adsorb a target molecule and that you can elute the target molecule from the matrix. The target molecule, therefore, can reasonably encompass IgG.” slip op. at 44

    Patent outcomesUS 10,875,007 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,875,007
  • PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00042 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10, 12–14, 16–28, 30–32, and 34–37 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11 and 29 were not shown unpatentable because Fab binding was not predictable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here. C.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “According to the Specification, “the present invention . . . relates to a multimeric chromatography ligand (also denoted a ‘multimer’) comprised of at least two domain C units, or a functional fragments [sic] or variants thereof.” Ex. 1001, 7:35–38. The Specification additionally recites that a multimer containing only domain C units can, however, include linkers. Id. at 7:39–41. In addition, the Specification describes that “the multimer comprises one or more additional units, which are different from Domain C.” Id. at 7:52–53. Based on these disclosures in the Specification, a multimer is composed of at least two or more monomers. Because Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the ’007 patent’s express construction of the term, we apply that construction for the purposes of this decision. Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, we determine that the express construction of any other claim term is unnecessary to resolve the disputed issues in this matter. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “Petitioner’s articulated obviousness ground is premised on the knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, or C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number – five (5) – SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that [s]tructural relationships may provide the requisite motivation or suggestion to modify known compounds to obtain new compounds. For example, a prior art compound may suggest its homologs because homologs often have similar properties and therefore chemists of ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate making them to try to obtain compounds with improved properties. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 38

    Patent outcomesUS 10,875,007 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,875,007
  • PTAB · Jan 11, 2023 · IPR2021-01215 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 11–15, 17, 18, and 21–24 are unpatentable over Yoshimura-based grounds; claims 6, 9, 10, 16, 19, and 20 were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “B. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner offers an assessment as to the level of skill in the art as of the time the ’655 patent was filed. Pet. 9. For purposes of this proceeding, Petitioner and Petitioner’s declarant “adopt the [following] definition for the person of ordinary skill in the art”: “a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering or Computer Engineering, and has either received academic credits for an ASIC design course or completed at least one year of work experience in the VLSI design, electronic design automation for VLSI, or ASIC design fields.” Id. at 9–10; Ex. 1003 ¶ 78 (Robins Declaration). Patent Owner applies the same definition. Resp. 5. To the extent necessary, we accept this definition because it is supported by the Robins Declaration and consistent with the ’655 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “Although the phrase “separate from,” is not found in the claims, we look to the language of the claims, the description in the patent disclosure, and the prosecution history to determine what type of separateness is required by the claims. We start with the relied-upon Figure 4 of the ’655 patent, which illustrates a box labeled “Multi-Scenario ECO Database 426” that is near, but not overlapping with or surrounding, boxes labeled “Image 424” through “Image 422” and “Image 420.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 4. The ’655 patent also describes a storage device 408 as “storing scenario images 420– 424 that correspond to different scenarios,” and “can additionally store multi-scenario ECO database 426,” which “can include circuit information for multiple scenarios that can be used to estimate the impact of ECOs in multiple scenarios.” Ex. 1001, 5:9–11, 5:18–21.” slip op. at 9

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “determin[e/ing . . . ] an ECO to fix one or more design requirement violations, wherein said determining includes identifying an ECO to fix a design requirement violation in the scenario and checking that ECO against at least some of the multiple scenarios by estimating parameter values based on parameter values stored in the scenario image and the multi-scenario ECO database. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2001, 21-24). In reviewing the term, the District Court explained that the multi- scenario ECO database “stores parameters and allows for a quick estimation of an ECO’s impact across multiple scenarios.” Ex. 2001, 19. The District Court further summarized the ’655 patent as describing that a scenario image is “[f]irst” loaded, and if there is a design requirement violation, an ECO is determined for that scenario, and then subsequent scenarios are loaded to check whether the ECO from the first scenario will create new, or exacerbate existing, design violations. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 4:21–33). However, as recognized by the Court, the process at the cited section is described in the ’655 patent as an “approach [that] may take an impracticably long time to fix design requirement violations in multiple scenarios” due to the long time that is required to load a scenario image. Id. at 24; Ex. 1001, 4:43–47. The Court reasoned that in order to determine an ECO to fix a violation, “determine” must involve “identifying” a possible fix and “checking” whether that fix is suitable. Id. at 23. Thus, the District Court’s construction requires both identifying and checking as part of the claimed determining step. Id. at 23–24. We agree with the District Court’s reasoning, and apply their construction in this proceeding.” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Petitioner assertion that Yoshimura’s estimation in step S5 is performed to check an identified ECO is supported by the record. In determining the change to be made (the ECO), Yoshimura uses estimated parameters for the third and fourth corner conditions, calculated in step S5 through the “Hold Margin” equation. Ex. 1007, 6:63–67. Those third and fourth corner conditions are then used to check potential layouts identified in step S6. Id. at 7:18–20 (“In step S6, the automatic EC device 16 searches for a layout that does not cause a timing error under any one of the first to fourth comer conditions from the analysis results of step S4 and step S5.”). In this manner, step S5 sets an initial third corner condition having estimated parameter values that is included, as the initial step, in checking an identified ECO at steps S6–S8. Thus, Yoshimura’s determination of a change to satisfy the corner conditions is, to use Dr. Edward’s phrase, “based on” its third and fourth corner conditions having parameters estimated in step S5. For this reason, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Yoshimura discloses the claimed limitation.” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS 8,407,655 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,407,655
  • PTAB · Jan 4, 2022 · IPR2020-01113 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4 are unpatentable as obvious over Misselbrook, CN ’588, and JP ’902; claims 7–12 were not shown unpatentable because the grounds did not establish motivation to add a disintegrating agent.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “relevant to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include the type of problems encountered in the art and prior art solutions to those problems. See Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The prior art itself may also reflect an appropriate level of skill. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for patent owner

      “We also adopt the parties’ position that the preamble of claims 1 and 7 is not limiting beyond the term “granule.” Claims 1 and 7 each recite “[a] chemically stable dry flow, low compact, dust free soluble phosphoramidothioate granule consisting of” the set of ingredients recited in body of those claims. Ex. 1001, 7:44–45, 8:19–20. While the wherein clause describing the dimensions of “said granule” relies on “granule” in the preamble for antecedent basis, none of the other preamble language appears to be necessary to breathe life and meaning into the claim, and the claim body recites a structurally complete invention. See Catalina Marketing Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that a preamble is limiting if it is “necessary to give live, meaning, and vitality to the claim,” but “is not limiting where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body”) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, we agree with the parties, and the district court in the related litigation, that the preamble language other than “granule” is not limiting.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “Moreover, we agree that the transitional phrase “consisting of” in claims 1 and 7 creates a “very strong presumption that the claim element is ‘closed’ and therefore exclude[s] any elements, steps, or ingredients not specified in the claim.” Pet. 5; Resp. 12 (both quoting Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Neither party seeks to overcome that presumption, nor do we see any basis for doing so based on the record before us. Accordingly, we construe the challenged claims to be limited to granule compositions containing only those ingredients recited in the claims. There are no other terms that need to be construed to resolve the issues presented in this proceeding. Therefore, we do not construe any additional terms. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

      “demonstrating that the “general conditions” regarding the use of these ingredients in such compositions was known. In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that any overlap between the claimed and disclosed ranges serves to disclose the “general conditions” of the claim). “Such overlap itself provides sufficient motivation to optimize the ranges.” Id. Moreover, we credit Mr. Geigle’s testimony that a POSITA would have understood because the concentration of acephate was increased the concentration of the other ingredients would necessarily decrease and that a POSITA would have been able optimize these amounts using standard techniques and testing. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–113. Thus, Petitioner has demonstrated that these ingredient concentrations are result-effective variables that would have been obvious to optimize through routine experimentation.” slip op. at 24

    Patent outcomesUS 7,473,685 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,473,685
  • PTAB · Oct 12, 2021 · IPR2020-00825 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9 are unpatentable over Bezama or Bezama and Chiang; claims 13–15 were not shown unpatentable over Kang or Anderson.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “the 2007 Provisional describes the material of which plate 240 is made, much less indicates that the inventor had possession of an invention including a manifold body (i.e., plate 240) defining a pair of compliant surfaces. See generally Ex. 1005.” slip op. at 24

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Bezama discloses all limitations of claims 1 and 9. See Pet. 23–39; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65–86. Patent Owner’s attempt to disqualify Bezama as prior art fails because claims 1 and 9 are not entitled to a priority date earlier than July 27, 2011. See supra § II.E. On this record, and considering all of the evidence and arguments put forth by the parties, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 9 are unpatentable as anticipated by Bezama. G.” slip op. at 31

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “teach or suggest each limitation recited in claims 2, 4, and 5, and these contentions are supported by testimony from Dr. Tilton. See Pet. 54–66; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–137. Petitioner additionally identifies rationales for why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Bezama and Chiang to arrive at the inventions recited in those claims. See id.” slip op. at 31

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “bifurcated flow limitation of claim 13. Resp. 46–52. In particular, Patent Owner asserts, with support from Dr. Pokharna, that the fluid entering any of Kang’s inlet channels 44 would mix with fluid from adjacent inlet channels, and that the bulk of the fluid from any inlet channel would exit through adjacent outlet channels, rather than traveling to the outer-most outlet channels as Petitioner suggests. Id. at 47–48; Ex. 2038 ¶¶ 105–114. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive and supported by well-reasoned testimony from Dr. Pokharna. For example, Dr. Pokharna correctly points out that Dr. Tilton has admitted that microchannels have high flow resistance. Ex. 2038 ¶ 112 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158). We agree with Dr. Pokharna that because of this high flow resistance, fluid entering a microchannel through any inlet channel 44 would tend to exit through the path of least resistance (i.e., the nearest outlet channel 47) rather than traveling to each end of the microchannel and exiting through the most distant outlets. See id. ¶ 112. contention that in Kang that the bulk of any fluid entering a microchannel would exit through the closest outlet channel 47. See Reply 17–18. Instead, Petitioner contends that at least some portion of the fluid will reach each end of the microchannel. See id. This argument is not persuasive because claim 13 recites that the flow that enters each channel through the one aperture “bifurcates into two sub flows,” and requires that each of the recited outlet regions receives “one of the two sub flows” or “the other of the two sub flows.” This claim language is not satisfied by an outlet region that receives only a portion of one of the two recited sub flows. Claim 13 requires that each outlet region receive one of the same two sub flows that originally entered the microchannel. See also Ex. 2038 ¶ 108. Petitioner neither proposes a claim construction that would encompass such an embodiment, nor offers any persuasive evidence that a POSITA would read claim 13 to encompass such an embodiment. Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Kang teaches or suggests a flow of heat exchange fluid that is bifurcated into two sub flows within each of the microchannels, wherein each of these two sub flows is received by one of the two outlet regions adjacent to the opposing ends of the microchannels, in the manner required by claim 13.” slip op. at 36

    Patent outcomesUS 10,274,266 mixed
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,274,266
Page 1 of 2
← Previous12Next →

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.