- Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00491 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Beel and Dinka, with or without Christison; the Kaplan, Van de Laar, and Christison ground fails for lack of motivation to combine.
In the decision…John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). The Supreme Court explained in KSR that [o]ften, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge…
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’972 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Rather than addressing Petitioner’s proposals, Patent Owner states “the claims of the ’972 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Our decision in this matter does not turn on resolving any particular differences between the parties’ constructions. Therefore, because only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy, we determine that no claim term requires express construction in this proceeding and that the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms apply. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“device. The ’972 patent expressly defines endpoints broadly “as data sources or sinks.” Ex. 1001, 7:64–67. And the ’972 patent admits that Beel’s Figure 11 discloses the same endpoints depicted in the ’972 patent’s own Figure 4. Id. at 4:28–33, 16:44–67. Beel’s Figure 11 and accompanying description disclose a “[m]ass storage device 12,” a “USB audio device 14,” and a “USB HID device 13” on the peripheral device. Ex. 1005, Fig. 11, ¶¶ 320–323. Patent Owner’s own declarant conceded that a mass storage device is “a type of endpoint” (Ex. 1034, 43:19–21), and that “audio devices are endpoints” (id. at 57:5–61:4). We give reduced weight to Patent Owner’s contrary position to the extent it rests on the premise that a reference cannot disclose an endpoint unless it uses the word “endpoint” (Ex. 2030 ¶ 94; Ex. 1034, 43:19–44:16, 72:18–73:12); a premise that is inconsistent with the ’972 patent’s own broad definition and with the ’972 patent’s admission regarding Beel’s Figure 11. As additional support not separately emphasized by the parties in this connection, we note Dr. Almeroth’s technical explanation that, for data to pass from a functional device to a peripheral device, “both the functional device and the peripheral device must have ‘endpoints’”—a data source and a data sink—reasoning consistent with the ’972 patent’s definition. Ex. 1002 ¶ 125.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“First, we agree with Patent Owner that, under the ordinary meaning of the claim language, the endpoint is an endpoint of the peripheral device, and that it must be “a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device.” Ex. 1001, 23:11–17. The limitation thus identifies a structure—an endpoint, residing on the peripheral device, that is a source or sink and that corresponds to (is “of”) the functional device—through which the communication recited in subsequent element (g) is carried out. By its terms, it imposes no requirement as to the direction in which data flows; it requires only that the endpoint be a data “source” or a data “sink” that is able to “store or emit” data. The operative transmit-and-receive communication “from the functional device to the processing device via the . . . endpoint” is recited in subsequent element (g), which we take up separately below. The disputed question under this limitation is therefore the structural one: whether Beel discloses, on the peripheral device, an endpoint that is “of the functional device.” Because the inquiry is structural and non-directional, we are not persuaded that the audio-out orientation of Beel’s described embodiment, on which Patent Owner relies, is dispositive of this limitation. device. The ’972 patent expressly defines endpoints broadly “as data sources or sinks.” Ex. 1001, 7:64–67. And the ’972 patent admits that Beel’s Figure 11 discloses the same endpoints depicted in the ’972 patent’s own Figure 4. Id. at 4:28–33, 16:44–67. Beel’s Figure 11 and accompanying description disclose a “[m]ass storage device 12,” a “USB audio device 14,” and a “USB HID device 13” on the peripheral device. Ex. 1005, Fig. 11, ¶¶ 320–323. Patent Owner’s own declarant conceded that a mass storage device is “a type of endpoint” (Ex. 1034, 43:19–21), and that “audio devices are endpoints” (id. at 57:5–61:4). We give reduced weight to Patent Owner’s contrary position to the extent it rests on the premise that a reference cannot disclose an endpoint unless it uses the word “endpoint” (Ex. 2030 ¶ 94; Ex. 1034, 43:19–44:16, 72:18–73:12); a premise that is inconsistent with the ’972 patent’s own broad definition and with the ’972 patent’s admission regarding Beel’s Figure 11. As additional support not separately emphasized by the parties in this connection, we note Dr. Almeroth’s technical explanation that, for data to pass from a functional device to a peripheral device, “both the functional device and the peripheral device must have ‘endpoints’”—a data source and a data sink—reasoning consistent with the ’972 patent’s definition. Ex. 1002 ¶ 125. Third, we find that the endpoint Beel discloses is a data source or a data sink that is “able to store or emit data, of the functional device.” We begin with the words of the limitation. The endpoint need only be “able to store or emit data”—language of capability, not a requirement that particular data actually traverse the endpoint in operation, and still less in a particular direction. And the endpoint is defined by the character of the data it handles: it is “a data source or a data sink,” which the ’972 patent instructs An audio endpoint, so understood, is characterized as an audio source or sink; its structure is not tied to any single instance of an audio device. On that understanding, Beel’s disclosure establishes the required capability directly. Beel discloses that “audio data is captured through a virtual sound card interface added as a logical device over the physical interface provided in the peripheral device,” Ex. 1005 ¶ 43, that the peripheral device “acts as a composite device comprising for instance a (virtual) audio speaker device,” id. ¶ 317, and that “audio data is captured at this interface . . . internally in the peripheral device 32” and streamed over the communications network, id. ¶ 319. Beel thus shows the endpoint on the peripheral device actually storing and emitting audio—and, correspondingly, video—data, which is the very type of data produced and consumed by the audio/visual functional devices connected to the base unit, including the microphones, cameras, speakers, and displays. Id. ¶ 120. An endpoint shown to store or emit audio and video data is necessarily one that is “able to store or emit” such data; the capability the limitation requires is thus established by Beel’s disclosure.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 10,684,972 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,684,972 - Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com Services LLC et al. v. Soundclear Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00565 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Amazon showed they are anticipated by Shin; the Board did not reach Amazon’s contingent obviousness ground over Shin.
In the decision…1–5 of the ’337 patent are unpatentable under (1) 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1)/102(a)(2) as anticipated by Shin or (2) 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the teachings of Shin. Pet. 8–35. Amazon contends that Shin discloses the subject matter of each challenged claim and, only with respect to the…
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenOther
“Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of claims 1–5 of the ’337 patent. For the reasons we identify below, we hold that Amazon has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that these claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,069,337 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,069,337 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01439 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 and 13–21 are unpatentable under § 103 based on Ono and Corbett and Uchida and Grimshaw; the Board did not find Ichieda unpatentable.
In the decision…(1966). The Supreme Court explained in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. that [o]ften, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge…
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with . . . five years of work experience in computer science and embedded systems, or Master’s Degree in Computer Science with . . . five years of work experience in electrical and computer engineering and embedded systems. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience. level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 10. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’951 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“determine that none of the claim terms the parties provide constructions for require an express construction in this proceeding. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The parties do appear to disagree on the meaning of “trigger,” however. Although neither party actually identifies that term as needing interpretation and neither party actually provides a claim construction analysis to support its respective position, the parties do dispute whether the evidence presented shows a “trigger,” both presumably giving that term its plain and customary meaning. In other words, while both parties appear to agree “trigger” carries its plain meaning, in application, the parties’ dispute regarding the particular limitations including that term appears to turn, not over what the evidence discloses, but only on whether the disclosure satisfies the plain meaning of “trigger” (see infra § II.E.2). Accordingly, while we apply the plain meaning of “trigger” in this proceeding, and in doing so, we address which party has properly applied the plain meaning and, in doing that, we address the scope properly afforded to “trigger.” That analysis, however, is done below in the context of the limitation in which this issue arises (see id.).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“has now been developed, and in view of both parties’ arguments, we find Petitioner has persuasively shown that modifying Ono’s peripheral device (i.e., communications module 44) to include an input device/physical actuator like the one described for Ono’s remote controller 69 to control the display of image data from a particular user’s computer would have been obvious to a skilled artisan at the time of the invention. More specifically, Petitioner has shown persuasively Ono shows that the use of an input device/physical actuator to send a signal that causes a participant’s computer to transmit and control the image data presented on a shared display in an image display system was a known technique (see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7, 44–48, 66– 71, 77–78, 80–89, 144, Figs. 3, 6, 8, 9; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 85–100, 121–127) and available location for such an input device/physical actuator to initiate the transmission of data (see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 6, 18, 20, 22–23, 26, 28, 46, Fig. 1; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 92–100). Petitioner has also persuasively shown that a skilled artisan recognized benefits to giving a participant the ability to locally control the display of their computer’s image data. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 87–91; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 4, 19–20, 27–28; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 10–13, 39–10, 70–72. When Ono and Corbett are considered together as a whole from the perspective of a skilled artisan, therefore, it is clear that applying a similar input device/physical actuator to Ono’s peripheral device would have been recognized to result in the benefit of providing a participant with the same ability to send a signal that causes a participant’s computer to transmit and control the image data presented on a shared display from their computer within an image display system. As a result, a motivation has been established because the combination is an application of a known technique to derive a known benefit using prior art elements according to their established functions. Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“that, from their perspective, the plain meaning of the term “trigger” does not exclude intervening steps between a user’s action on an input device and the ultimate transfer of the user selected arbitrary media content. Pet. Reply 11– 12 (indicating that “trigger” encompasses “a process that begins with and thus is triggered by a user pressing a button followed by an ‘image transfer’ from a PC to a projector”). For its part, Patent Owner maintains (at least implicitly) that intervening steps are excluded from the plain meaning. Neither party addresses with more specificity why, or why not, the scope of “trigger” supports their positions, however. Having now the complete record before us, we find that out preliminary assessment was wrong because the plain meaning of the term “trigger” does not exclude intervening steps between the cause-and-effect relationship of the trigger and the result it is intended to cause. Take, for example, a simple gun. Pulling the “trigger” to fire a gun necessarily includes intervening steps to occur: the trigger releases a hammer that, in turn, contacts a blasting cap within a bullet casing, which is what actually causes the gunpowder to ignite (i.e., fire) and expel the bullet. And there is no evidence in this record to suggest that this customary understanding of the word “trigger” is any different in the electrical arts, other than the trigger and result are generally electrical in nature, rather than mechanical. We find no clear disavowal of claim scope within the intrinsic record of the ’951 patent to indicate that the term “trigger” was intended to be understood any differently to exclude any intervening steps between a user’s action on an input device and the resulting transfer of user selected arbitrary media content. intervening steps would exist because the input device does not actually do the transferring of the media content; instead, the claims recite the transferring is “from the transmitter to the wireless communications network and [then] to the base node.” See Ex. 1001, 11:3–48, 27:62–28:1 (claim 1), 28:62–67 (claim 9), 29:42–46 (claim 16), 30:36–44 (claim 21) (emphasis added). A skilled artisan would have recognized that there would be intervening steps between the input device being acted upon and the content being displayed by base node’s display. See Ex. 1083 ¶¶ 11–12. In the claims, the input device is analogous to a gun’s trigger, the user carrying out a user action on the input device is analogous to pulling a gun’s trigger, and the transfer of user selected arbitrary media content is analogous the gun expelling a bullet. In both cases, there can be, and usually are, intervening steps, moreover, in both cases, inadvertent things can happen that may prevent the intended result (e.g., in the case of a gun, the hammer can jam; in the case of an input device, a connection can be rejected). Nevertheless, in both cases, the trigger is the thing that initiates an automated process that leads to a particular result, unless a conditional error occurs.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 11,422,951 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,422,951 - Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01192 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of the Lorex Manual or Lorex Video with the identified references.
In the decision…Lorex Manual. To the extent the Agreement mentions cloud connectivity and P2P solutions, the Petition relies on Kim ’941, not the Lorex Manual for teaching this subject matter. Pet. Reply 7. Moreover, the Agreement fails to evidence that any subject matter disclosed pursuant to the Agreement was…
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute any of Petitioner’s contentions as to the effective filing date, stating in agreement with Petitioner’s asserted Effective Filing Date of the Challenged Claims that “[t]he ’916 Patent claims a priority of a provisional application 61/924,240 filed on January 7, 2014.” PO Resp. 8. Given that the parties are in agreement on the January 7, 2014, effective filing date, we similarly use January 7, 2014, as the effective filing date of the challenged claims for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Vlad Kardashov, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’916 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two 7 US 2012/0198040 A1, published August 2, 2012 (Ex. 1011, “Kuo”). 8 The subject ’916 patent claims priority to Kuo as a continuation-in-part of that earlier filed application. Ex. 1001, code (63). 9 Lorex Technology Inc., “How to set up remote access for DVR using - Lorex Stratus Connectivity” (June 18, 2013), available at https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=fMPRi9WFuTM (Ex. 1012, the “Lorex Video”). 10 US 2012/0113265 A1, published May 10, 2012 (Ex. 1013, “Galvin”). years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 12–14). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’916 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving controversies in this proceeding.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011), Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 Fed. Appx. 946, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Petitioner states “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303; 37 C.F.R. § 42.100). Patent Owner presents no proposed claim constructions. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner
“that Patent Owner fails to demonstrate that the Lorex Manual was based on a disclosure made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. The Lorex Manual is relied on under Ground 1A, exclusively or in the alternative to or in combination with Kim, for all claim elements. Pet. 9– 31. Patent Owner fails to demonstrate that this subject matter was disclosed to Lorex by ThroughTek, much less by one of the inventors of the ’916 Patent.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 9,774,916 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,774,916 - Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. And Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01193 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7–13, 15–19, and 23–25 are unpatentable: claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 as anticipated by Zhang; all challenged claims also as obvious over at least one …
In the decision…than at end user 406. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 61, 62; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 112–1195). Petitioner contends that this combination provides an alternative teaching of claim limitations 1c, 11c.iv, and 19f. Id. at 40–41, 45–46. Specifically, Petitioner argues that, in this combination, Zhang’s server 404…
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’448 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownMixed
“construction of “feature flag” is inconsistent with the language of claim 8, which states that “the feature flag indicates that the running state of the second apparatus is the sleep state.” Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposal is not supported by claim 24, which depends from claim 23 and states that “the feature flag is located at a header of the sleep login packet.” Id. at 3. We agree with Petitioner. The plain language of claim 8 states what a feature flag indicates. Claim 24 recites where the feature flag is located. Neither claim suggests any of Patent Owner’s additional limitations.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“[A] prior art reference will anticipate if it ‘disclose[s] each and every element of the claimed invention . . . arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration by Federal Circuit)). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Id. (quoting Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration by Federal Circuit); In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). For the reasons explained below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 are anticipated by Zhang. slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 10,602,448 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,602,448 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVInstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00597 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–22 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–22 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka.
In the decision…20, 2010 1011 Petitioner also relies on alleged Applicant Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) to demonstrate how a skilled artisan would have understood the teachings of the prior art. Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:35–41, 7:66–8:3, 8:53–67, 17:65–18:3). Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of Kevin…
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In sum, on the current record, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka. f) Claims 2–22 The parties present their arguments for independent claim 11 along with those for claim 1. Pet. 44–45; Prelim. Resp. 19, 23. Claims 2–10 and 22 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Claims 12–21 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 11. Patent Owner does not present separate arguments for claim 11 or the dependent claims. We have analyzed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for claims 2–22 (Pet. 36–46) and, on the current record, conclude that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that claims 2–22 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and alleged admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this time.” Prelim. Resp. 6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’346 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionNo construction neededOther
“Patent Owner accepts the Petition’s claim construction for the purposes of” the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 5–6. In light of Patent Owner’s acceptance, and because the proposed constructions are, on this record, consistent with the evidence cited by Petitioner, we, too, accept Petitioner’s proposals for “providing simulations or translations, as required,” and “data transformations,” as recited in claim 1, for purposes of this Decision. Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any other claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Dr. Almeroth does not provide a reason why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 117, 132. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,966,346 - PLR Worldwide Sales Limited v. Flip Phone Games, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00132 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Hays; claim 6 is also unpatentable over Hays and van Datta.
In the decision…Id. (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 58–59). 32 IPR2024-00132 Patent 9,731,202 B2 In its “objective indicia” arguments, Patent Owner recasts these arguments as a teaching away, arguing that “the prior art taught away from providing ‘updated video-game content to a mobile communication device for use in a mobile…
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We see very little difference between the parties’ respective proposals. We adopt Patent Owner’s more specific proposal because it is consistent with the level of skill evidenced in the ’202 patent and the applied prior art, but we agree with Patent Owner that this does not affect our analysis; we would reach the same conclusions under Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The claim language itself suggests no such restrictions. Rather, the claim language simply recites video-game content that is usable in the video game. The claim language does not specify who or what must use the content or how it must be used. Thus, the claim language itself is broad and includes none of the restrictions Patent Owner would place on it. As Petitioner points out (Reply 5), the specification directly refutes Patent Owner’s position. The ’202 patent’s Figure 2A (reproduced above) is instructive. In this example, “several items 210, 220, 225, 230, and 235 are shown within scene 200,” and virtually any of these items may be changed by receiving updated content on the mobile communication device. For instance, the shirt 230 might be updated to include a logo associated with third party X (as shown). The poster 225 might advertise an upcoming movie for third party Y, and chalk board 220 may contain a handwritten advertisement for third party Z (as shown). Ex. 1001, 6:42–50. When an advertising contract changes, “the mobile communication device may thereafter download updated content reflecting a new graphic, shirt, or entirely new object, to place at 230.” Id. at 6:55–57. These are examples of updated video-game content (updated advertisements on posters, T-shirts, and chalk boards) that are usable (e.g., by the game or mobile communication device executing the game) in a video game that already exists on the mobile communication device. These are also examples of what Patent Owner argues are “skins” that correspond to existing ad units and that do not alter any function of the game. Patent Owner’s construction, then, would exclude the ’202 patent’s preferred embodiment. “Such an interpretation is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Patent Owner argues that “[e]ach of Hays and Choi is only a ‘printed publication’ under § 311(b) as of the date it became available to the public—i.e., after the June 26, 2007, priority date of the ’202 Patent.” PO Resp. 56. Patent Owner argues that a prior art reference under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) is a printed publication under Section 311(b) only as of its publication date and not as of its filing date. Id. at 56–58. The Federal Circuit has rejected this argument, holding that a published patent application is, by its literal terms, a “printed publication.” So, when § 311(b) permits IPR challenges based upon “prior art . . . printed publications,” it includes within its literal scope challenges based upon a published patent application. And, by virtue of § 102(e)(1), a published patent application—this specific type of “printed publication”—is deemed prior art as of its filing date. Therefore, the plain language of §§ 311(b) and 102(e)(1) permits IPR challenges based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Thus, Petitioner asserts permissible grounds of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) by arguing that claims 1–9 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) on the basis of Hays or Hays and Choi, which are prior art printed publications.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner and Dr. Akl misunderstand Hays. In the soft drink example, “the advertisement management service system may send bots or electronic agents into the game as advertising units or real characters in the game.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 79. Thus, the service system inserts more than a skin; it inserts a bot or agent that was not part of the game before its insertion. Because Dr. Akl’s testimony (Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 63–64, 72–73) is inconsistent with Hays’s disclosure, we do not credit it. See Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e must disregard the testimony of an expert that is plainly inconsistent with the record . . . .”).” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 9,731,202 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,731,202 - Western Digital Technologies, Inc. v. Longitude Licensing Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 15, 2025 · IPR2023-01200 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14–19, and 25–27 are unpatentable as obvious over Lee alone or Lee and JEDEC.
In the decision…as to Independent Claim 1 We have considered Petitioner’s uncontested evidence and arguments that the limitations of claim 1 are met by the teachings of Lee. Based on the complete record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the…
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have had a working knowledge of the memory system art that is pertinent to the ’369 patent, including memory systems and memory controllers. A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or an equivalent, and approximately two years of professional experience relating to field of memory systems. Lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s description of someone of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 12; see also Ex. 2003 ¶ 21. The parties agree on a description of a person of ordinary skill in the art, and this description appears consistent with the subject matter of the ’369 patent and the asserted prior art. We, therefore, continue to use the same description that we adopted in our Institution Decision, as it is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther
“Petitioner contends that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003). Patent Owner agrees that no express construction of any claim term is necessary. PO Resp. 12. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). We therefore use the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention. D. Prior Art References” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Here, Petitioner expressly identifies in the Petition a specific reason to combine the Lee and JEDEC references: higher bandwidth capabilities. Pet. 60–61. Petitioner explains that “[s]ynchronous memory—using a clock signal for sampling information—provides the benefit of higher bandwidth capabilities.” Pet. 60–61. Petitioner cites to page 5 of the Prince reference (Ex. 1006) to support this assertion. Id. at 61. Prince is a textbook entitled “High Performance Memories—New architecture DRAMs and SRAMs evolution and function.” Ex. 1006, cover. Page 5 of Prince is in Section 1.2 titled “New Memory Architectures to Improve Bandwidth.” Id. at 5. Page 5 of Prince states: New interface architectures are also being used to improve the bandwidth of the RAMs. The most common is the synchronous interface. Making a memory synchronous puts it under the control of the system clock. “Wait states”, during which the processor must wait for the output data from the RAM, can be reduced or eliminated. With a synchronous RAM the input addresses can be latched into the memory, freeing the processor to perform other tasks until the data is available after a known number of cycles. While the intrinsic speed of the RAM does not increase by the addition of a synchronous interface, the effective speed in the system increases since the processor no longer waits for the RAM to operate. Id. (emphasis added).” slip op. at 60
Patent outcomesUS 7,697,369 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,697,369 - PTAB · Aug 29, 2024 · IPR2024-00577 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 32, 38, 39, 47, 52, and 54 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Richardson–Zhao challenge.
In the decision…that excludes USB input circuits having bidirectional capabilities . . . [and is] contrary to the Petition’s interpretation of Paparrizos as teaching a USB input circuit.” Prelim. Resp. 19–20 (citing Ex. 2009, 25– 33; Pet. 65). Patent Owner contends that the proposed construction in the ITC…
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, “as of the claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, would have been a person with at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and at least two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience with DC power supply or battery charger design[;] . . . [l]ess work experience could be compensated for by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39– 42; Ex. 1014, 10–11). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 20. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’023 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’023 patent and the prior art. We will make any final determination pertaining to the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, on the full trial record.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner submits there are no formal claim constructions necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 23. Patent Owner responds that “denial of institution [does] not require addressing the construction of claim terms.” Prelim. Resp. 19. However, Patent Owner also notes that “during the related ITC investigation[, Petitioner] proposed a specific construction for ‘USB input circuit’ that excludes USB input circuits having bidirectional capabilities . . . [and is] contrary to the Petition’s interpretation of Paparrizos as teaching a USB input circuit.” Prelim. Resp. 19–20 (citing Ex. 2009, 25– 33; Pet. 65). Patent Owner contends that the proposed construction in the ITC investigation is “contrary to the Petition’s interpretation of Paparrizos as teaching a USB input circuit, and is therefore clearly germane to this proceeding.” Id. at 25 (citing Pet. 65). Patent Owner’s argument regarding purported inconsistent positions by Petitioner may have some merit. But, on this record, Patent Owner’s argument is not fully developed. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary to decide whether to institute, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,447,023 - Apple Inc. / Google LLC v. Spacetime3d, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 2, 2024 · IPR2023-00578 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 103 over Anthony and Hanggie, alone or in combinations with Matthews and Robertson.
In the decision…Petitioner’s Proposed Combinations of Anthony and Hanggie In its proposed combination of Anthony and Hanggie, Petitioner relies on Anthony for its teaching of displaying a timeline depicting a plurality of items in focal groups. Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1007, Fig. 4).6 6 As discussed above,…
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“3. Remaining claim terms Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“does not generate the claimed images because it displays active applications in 3D space, where “the user can interact with the control buttons on the window, [thus] the window (object) is not an image.” PO Resp. 41, 46. Both parties agree that the language of claim 1 (limitation [1d-1]) requires interacting with an image in order to prompt the replacement of the image in 3D space with objects within 2D space. See Tr. 46:25–47:3; Pet. 55–56. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument that Hanggie cannot teach the claim limitation because there is interaction with an image runs contrary to the plain meaning of the claim language and Patent Owner’s view of that language. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner’s arguments that the disclosures of the ’868 patent support the claimed interactivity of the images in the 3D space. Pet. Reply 2–5. In particular, Petitioner refers to the ’868 patent’s explanation that “the 3D GUI runs as an Active X control within the Internet Explorer web browser,” and “once [a] file, document, application or desktop is added to the virtual space 300, it is fully interactive and functional and appears no different from, or close to, the original way the program functions when it was not in the 3-D Cartesian space 300.” Id. at 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:33–44, 21:12–28, 21:29–43; Ex. 1033 ¶¶ 11–12). Petitioner asserts, and we agree, that the Specification provides support that the images in 3D are interactive and function in a similar manner to those as corresponding objects in 2D. Id.” slip op. at 56
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“use of items in 2D space and difficulties in finding files, this argument is based on Anthony’s prior art discussion offered to identify the need for improvements that are solved by its 3D invention. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 6, 8. But the issue identified as the problem with 2D items, that is, difficulties in finding 2D files, is not at issue in the combination of the prior art that Petitioner proposes. As discussed, in the combination that Petitioner asserts, with the selection of a maximize button on a 3D window, the window would be displayed in 2D and would occupy all or most parts of the screen—so in that combination, difficulties in finding the 2D files would not be an issue. Pet. 57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 111). Further, Petitioner offers the advantages that this presentation in 2D space would conserve power and allow certain users to interact with an application in a 2D environment. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66, 69. Accordingly, we credit Dr. Fuchs’s testimony that Petitioner’s proposed “specific experience [of the combination] would not deter a user from replacing images in 3D space with an object in 2D space.” Ex. 1033 ¶ 48. We also do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s argument that Anthony’s approach is different from the claimed invention because its method for” slip op. at 65
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner
“suggested to one skilled in the art, objective evidence of nonobviousness (so called “secondary considerations”) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). “[E]vidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record.” Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983). “[T]o be accorded substantial weight in the obviousness analysis, the evidence of secondary considerations must have a ‘nexus’ to the claims, i.e., there must be ‘a legally and factually sufficient connection’ between the evidence and the patented invention.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). “The patentee bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists.” WMS” slip op. at 66
Patent outcomesUS 9,696,868 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,696,868
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.