- PTAB · Feb 28, 2024 · IPR2023-01238 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 11 are obvious over Van Vliet and Cable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we institute an inter partes review.1” slip op. at 2
- BurdenMixed
“Petitioner does not fully address this limitation. In particular, the Petition does not include a discussion of how the reels are connected to be fed from a manifold. See generally Pet. 26–27. Rather, the Petition argues that the hoses are stored on reels and that the hoses “are connected via fluid outlets 22 to receive fuel from [the] manifold.” Id. at 27. The Petition does say that the hoses are connected to the reels (id.), but does not attempt to establish any type of relationship between the reels and the manifolds. We further note that although indisputably Van Vliet’s schematic diagram shows flow passages through manifolds 36, 38 and hoses 24, nowhere do we discern where or how Van Vliet definitively discloses the reels 30 are connected to be fed from a manifold, as required by claim 1. Indeed, according to Petitioner’s own expert, one skilled in the art would understand that Van Vliet’s schematic diagram “is a high-level representation and is not intended to depict the physical appearance or form” of the system’s components. Ex. 1003 ¶ 132 n.138. At most, the diagram indicates the hose’s flow passage as wrapping around the reel. And, while Van Vliet describes that “hoses 24 are preferably stored on reels 30,” nowhere does it mention or otherwise suggest that the hoses are fluidly connected to the reels. Ex. 1004 ¶ 15. To the contrary, Van Vliet explains that “each hose 24 is connected to a fuel outlet 22 by a dry connection 60 and to a cap 26 by a dry connection 62.” Id. ¶ 22. In other words, Van Vliet’s hose 24 cannot be connected to reel 30 if the ends of the hose are connected to dry connections 60 and 62, which are not part of the reel. In that case, the hose’s flow passage does not run through the reel, and thus the reels 30 are not connected to be fed from a manifold, as required by claim 1. c) Conclusion For the above reasons, the Petition does not sufficiently identify how Van Vliet teaches or suggests the limitations of independent claim 1. 3. Claims 11 and 12 Similar to claim 1, claim 11 requires “a plurality of reels in the container, each said reel individually connected with the at least one manifold.” Ex. 1001, 10:64–65. The Petition relies on the analysis of claim 1 to address this limitation. Pet. 31–32. As noted above, the Petition does not attempt to establish a relationship between the reels and the manifolds, such as arguing that a reel and manifold in Van Vliet are connected. Thus, the Petition fails to show how claim 11 and its dependent, claim 12, would be anticipated by or rendered obvious over Van Vliet.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“In this regard, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s “proposed construction ignores the[] express differences in the claim language chosen by the patentee.” Prelim. Reply 2 (citing Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[W]hen an applicant uses different terms in a claim it is permissible to infer that he intended his choice of different terms to reflect a differentiation in the meaning of those terms”) (citing Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2004))). Had the patentee desired to limit the claims to fluid connections, the patentee could have used the explicit language throughout, instead of only in choice locations. An example of this is claim 1 where the claim requires the “reels are connected to be fed from the [] manifold.” Ex. 1001, 10:21–23. “To be fed” limits the type of connection to a fluid connection between the manifold and reel, while the word “connected” alone does not infer any particular type of connection.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“the motivation to combine “does not provide any reason in particular that is directed to motivating a POSITA to modify Van Vliet to have a fluid connection to its reels as in Cable.” Id. at 35. Patent Owner is mostly correct, as the majority of the section titled “Rationale and Motivation for Combining Van Vliet and Cable” is directed to aspects of Cable relied on for the dependent claims. However, this section also includes the following: “Incorporating Cable’s . . . reel configuration into Van Vliet’s mobile fuel delivery system would merely involve combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results.” Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 1752). Petitioner’s declarant testifies that Van Vliet and Cable describe similar systems for delivering fluid from a mobile trailer via hoses to multiple destinations. Further, the elements incorporated into Van Vliet from Cable are either already present in Van Vliet (e.g., reels) or were simple elements well-known in the art at the time of the ‘955 Patent. Incorporating Cable’s . . . reel configuration into Van Vliet’s mobile fuel delivery system would merely involve combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results. Ex. 1003 ¶ 175. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s argument that using Cable’s reel configuration in Van Vliet’s system is a simple substitution that “merely involve[s] combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 175; Pet. 37.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,974,955 - PTAB · Feb 28, 2024 · IPR2023-01236 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3 are obvious over Van Vliet and Coxreels.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Coxreels amount to “conclusory statements,” “hindsight over-generalization,” and “provide[] no underlying factual basis or citation.” Prelim. Resp. 34–36. Although we tend to agree with FAS that Permian’s first reason may be all those things, Permian’s second reason nonetheless carries the day at this preliminary stage. In particular, the current record supports Permian’s assertions that one skilled in the art “designing a system of Van Vliet would have looked to commercially-available reel components like those described in Coxreels . . . as a cost-effective and readily-available option” and “would have recognized the advantage of using Coxreels reel in Van Vliet’s mobile fuel delivery system.” Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–153). For instance, Permian proffers the testimony of its expert, which is unrebutted at this stage, that one skilled in the art would have selected Coxreels’ reel as a readily-available option because “Coxreels [was] specifically market[ed] for use in the Oil industry” and provides the advantage of “a non-crimping, flat smooth hose wrap.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150– 152 (citing Exs. 1005, 1035); see also Pet. 38 (“Coxreels also describes a ‘low profile outlet riser, open drum slot design for flat smooth hose wrap’” (second emphasis added)). That evidence, at least on the current record, provides sufficient support for Permian’s reason to combine the teachings of Van Vliet and Coxreels with a reasonable expectation of success of arriving at the claimed invention. Aside from “motivation” for the asserted combination, FAS does not further dispute Permian’s showing as to how the combination of Van Vliet and Coxreels renders obvious the subject matter of claims 1–3. See Prelim. Resp. 34–39. After reviewing Permian’s showing, including Permian’s mapping of the disputed and undisputed claim elements, we find that Permian demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claims 1–3 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of Van Vliet and Coxreels. See Pet. 37–43. Thus, Permian meets the threshold for institution.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“FAS requests that we exercise discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 10–26. We decline. Contrary to FAS’s argument, we do not perceive Coxreels as “cumulative” of either Amann or Harman. Id. at 12–18. Coxreels clearly shows more details about the position of the inlet and outlet on the reel’s spindle than either of those references, which are merely cited but not relied on by the Examiner. See Ex. 2002, 25 (depicting fluid line 70 as terminating at the reel without further disclosure of whether the fluid line is connected directly to the reel or to hose 26); Ex. 2003, 2 (same). Thus, FAS does not persuade us that exercising our § 325(d) discretion is appropriate where, on their face, the asserted references do not appear to be cumulative of the references cited during prosecution.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Permian submits that one skilled in the art would have had either: (1) a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering or an equivalent field as well as at least 2 years of academic or industry experience in the oil and gas industry, including well drilling, completion, or production, or (2) at least four years of industry experience in the oil and gas industry including well drilling, completion, or production. Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 75–78). FAS responds that “at this stage of the proceeding, [it] does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 6. Accordingly, for purposes of institution, we adopt the level of skill in the art as defined by Permian.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Claim construction begins and ends with the actual words of the claim. Here, by its plain terms, the claim language contemplates that the tube and the sleeve are separate and distinct structures where one “circumscribes” the other. Tellingly, rather than address FAS’s analysis of the claim language itself, Permian resorts to attacking the extrinsic dictionary definitions cited by FAS. Pet. Reply 2. But, of course, those dictionary citations do not define a tube and a sleeve in terms of being physically separate structures. Construing a claim limitation that includes multiple elements—such as the one disputed here—is not a matter of defining each term alone. Rather, it is a matter of construing those terms together in the context of the entire claim. Permian never addresses that context, which is part of the intrinsic record. Thus, without more, we agree with FAS that the claim language “the sleeve circumscribes the tube” would be rendered meaningless if the tube and sleeve were construed as encompassing the same structure. See Prelim. Resp. 9–10. Moreover, the fact that the tube and sleeve are listed separately in the” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,815,118 - PTAB · Feb 28, 2024 · IPR2023-01237 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–22 after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Van Vliet and Cable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After reviewing the preliminary record, we determine that Permian demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of Van Vliet and Cable. Thus, Permian meets the threshold for institution.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“references, FAS never acknowledges what one skilled in the art would have understood from their respective teachings. See id. at 20–23. Thus, Permian’s expert testimony is the only evidence of record on this point. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–140, 169–173. FAS’s argument is also unavailing because there is no evidence that the differences identified by FAS are sufficiently different such that one skilled in the art would disregard Cable’s teachings. For instance, FAS argues that Van Vliet and Cable are different because they handle different fluids—for example, “fuel” versus “waste oil.” Prelim. Resp. 23–24. But FAS never explains why the type of petroleum product in each delivery hose would render the references so dissimilar that one skilled in the art would not consider them together when contemplating ease of access to the hoses. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007) (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond that person’s skill.”).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. As discussed above, Permian’s position regarding claim element 1[h] is supported by the cited testimony of its expert, which stands unrebutted at this stage. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 169–173. We find that testimony credible, at least on the preliminary record. We find unpersuasive FAS’s argument that Permian’s expert testimony should be disregarded because the expert “does not profess to be a patent attorney . . . informed about any legal standard for ‘design choice.’” Prelim. Resp. 19–20. Permian is not offering its expert as a legal expert here, and, contrary to FAS’s argument, Permian’s expert actually does profess an understanding of the underlying “considerations” used in an obviousness analysis, such as “ordinary creativity,” “predictable results,” “simple substitution,” “obvious to try,” “design incentives,” or “some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29, 34. It is the distinct role of Permian’s expert to opine on those underlying fact considerations, and they do not need to be a patent attorney to do so, as FAS mistakenly believes. Thus, at this stage, Permian sufficiently shows that the asserted Van Vliet-Cable combination discloses claim element 1[h].” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 105). FAS responds, “at this stage of the proceeding, [it] does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Permian’s proposed definition is consistent with the 1 US 2011/0197988 A1, published Aug. 18, 2011 (Ex. 1004, “Van Vliet”). 2 US 3,810,487, issued May 14, 1974 (Ex. 1005, “Cable”). 3 AFD PETROLEUM LTD., AFD Onsite Refueling Systems, http://web.archive.org/web/20150922012312/https://www.afdpetroleum.com /fuel/onsite_refuelling (Sept. 22, 2015), published Sep. 22, 2015 (Ex. 1007, “AFD”). 4 COXREELS, INC., Coxreels 1125 Series “Competitor” Hand Crank and Motorized Hose Reels, https://web.archive.org/web/20140408035634/ http://www.coxreels.com/products/hand-crank/1125-series, published Apr. 08, 2014 (Ex. 1008, “Coxreels”). 5 US 2018/0057348 A1, published Mar. 1, 2018 (Ex. 1006, “Lowrie”). problems and solutions in the ’805 patent and prior art of record. Thus, for purposes of institution, we adopt Permian’s definition of the level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,586,805 - Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 17, 2024 · IPR2022-01217 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–10 not shown unpatentable as obvious over Kato, the Tesla Roadster Manual, and Eberhard because the asserted combination did not teach the claimed scheduled charging times and processor-controlled charging.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Wilson, testifies that one skilled in the art during the relevant time frame “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or physics (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including vehicle information systems, vehicle sensors, and vehicle controllers (ECUs),” but “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 27). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s articulation of the level of skill in the art. See PO Resp. 16 (“Because the proposed level of ordinary skill does not affect the ultimate analysis, Patent Owner takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.”). We analyze the asserted prior art with respect to the level of skill set forth by Petitioner because it is consistent with the prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“According to Petitioner, “all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 10. Similarly, “for all claim terms, Patent the claim terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 14. And after institution, Petition made clear that “[t]he Parties agree the Challenged Claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning for purposes of this IPR.” Pet. Reply 1. We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“reliance on the time period that can be spent at a charging location corresponding to the recited calculated scheduled start time. Petitioner’s testimony from Dr. Wilson does little to help, as it simply parrots the contentions laid out in the Petition. And, like the contentions in the Petition, that testimony does not offer persuasive explanation as to why one skilled in teaching “computing . . . a charging schedule . . . comprising a scheduled start time and an indication of a scheduled stop time” as required by the claims. Contrary to Petitioner’s representations, we see nothing in paragraphs 53–55 of Kato teaching a specific time that is computed as a scheduled start time. Absent persuasive explanation and evidence from Petitioner, the preponderance of the evidence before us does not support Petitioner’s assertion that the beginning of an available time window for charging is a scheduled start time or that the end of that window is a scheduled stop time for charging. We note, again, that Petitioner relies on the express teachings of Kato. The Petition does not assert that it would have been obvious to employ a scheduled start time based on any modification to Kato’s teachings. Our decision is limited to the particular basis for the challenge advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 10,998,753 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,998,753 - Sharkninja Operating LLC / Sharkninja Management LLC et al. v. Bissell Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01175 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as anticipated by Beskow; the Board did not reach the additional obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art SharkNinja submits that one skilled in the art would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering (or an equivalent discipline) or equivalent work experience, and at least one year’s worth of experience in research, design and/or development related to vacuum cleaners (or other comparable industrial design).” Pet. 14. Bissell does not dispute SharkNinja’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, and we see no reason to question it. Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill in the art as defined by SharkNinja.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“must be a separate and distinct component from the base. Although we agree that “provided on the base” may be construed to mean that the suction nozzle assembly is a separate and distinct component positioned on, or attached to, the base, we also conclude that “provided on the base” may be construed more broadly to mean that the suction nozzle assembly is part of the base or included in the base. That broader meaning comports with the specification of the ’455 patent and the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “provided on.”” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“assembly is not “provided on the base,” as claimed. See PO Resp. 7–10, 17–21. That is because Bissell’s assertion that the suction nozzle assembly, as claimed, must be a physically separate component from the base relies on an improper claim construction. As discussed above, we construe “a suction nozzle assembly provided on the base” to encompass not only a suction nozzle assembly that is “positioned on” the base, as Bissell asserts, but also one that it is “part of” the base or “included in” the base.” To that end, Beskow discloses that “debris and fluid inlets 724, 726 may be formed entirely or partially as a removable inlet tray 730” and “may be separately removable from the cleaning head 102, integral to or not removable from the inlet portions of Beskow’s suction nozzle assembly are removably attached to Beskow’s cleaning head 102 (i.e., the claimed “base”) necessarily means they are “positioned on” and “included in” the base under the proper construction of “provided on the base.” Indeed, Beskow’s disclosure is no different than the preferred embodiment of the ’455 patent, where suction nozzle assembly 580 “is configured to be received in the upper cover 542,” which indisputably is part of “base 14.” Ex. 1001, 10:48–50, Fig. 8 (emphasis added); see also id. at 8:9–10 (“Upper cover 542 can be configured to releasably receive the suction nozzle assembly 580.”). Thus, we find that Beskow satisfies the claim limitation of “a suction nozzle assembly provided on the base.”” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,925,455 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,925,455 - Sharkninja Operating LLC / Sharkninja Management LLC et al. v. Bissell Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01194 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Xia, Conrad, and Kitsukawa because their combined teachings establish the challenged limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, explaining that “[t]he definitions offered by the parties appear, for practical purposes, to be compatible. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition at this stage of the proceeding because it cites, and is supported by, evidence and appears reasonable upon reviewing the ’383 patent and the cited prior art.” Inst. Dec. 6–7. In its Response, “Patent Owner applies the skill level adopted by the Board for the purposes of institution.” PO Resp. 8. The analysis in this Decision also applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, which appears to be consistent with the ’383 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence do not support a conclusion that the claim language “rearwardly of the recovery tank” means “behind substantially the entirety of the recovery tank.” PO Resp. 8–12; Pet. Reply 2–6; PO Sur-reply 1–3. We start with the claim language itself. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Patent Owner does not cite persuasive evidence for its assertion that the proposed construction captures the claim language’s ordinary and customary meaning. See PO Resp. 10. To the contrary, as Petitioner argues, Patent Owner undermines its position by citing the dictionary definition of “rearward” as meaning “directed toward the back.” PO Resp. 12; Pet. Reply 5–6. This definition suggests that the plain meaning of the claim language “rearwardly of the recovery tank” is significantly broader than Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Contrary to Patent Owner’s view, the cited portions of the Specification and drawings also fail to support Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction. See PO Resp. 10–12. Assuming Patent Owner is correct that Figure 34 shows an exemplary embodiment in which a battery is located “behind substantially the entirety of the recovery tank,” we cannot arbitrarily limit the claim to that embodiment. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). And Patent Owner does not cite persuasive evidence of the Specification or drawings emphasizing or even ascribing significance to having a battery “behind substantially the entirety of the recovery tank.” PO Resp. 8–12; PO Sur-reply 1–3. For the foregoing reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of claim 1’s recitation of “rearwardly of the recovery tank.” Instead, we find more persuasive Petitioner’s proposed construction: “at or near the rear of the recovery tank.” Pet. Reply 6. 2. “the rechargeable battery configured to selectively supply power to the” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, Petitioner persuades us that a “battery housing provided on a rear side of the frame” would have been obvious in view of the prior art. Pet. 18–19, 23–24, 33–44; PO Resp. 19–23; Pet. Reply 13–18; PO Sur-reply 6–8. As Petitioner notes, Xia discloses mounting components, including clean tank assembly 300 and dirty tank assembly 400, to body assembly 200, which is part of the upright body’s frame 18. Pet. 23–25; Pet. Reply 14; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39, 44–45, 53–54; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54, 96–97. Additionally, although we agree with Patent Owner that the text of Conrad does not expressly mention a “frame,” we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Conrad’s disclosure the way Mr. Jones does, specifically that “the battery pack 168 is provided on the frame of the upright body of Conrad’s surface cleaning apparatus.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 118; In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (a reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably been expected to draw therefrom). As Petitioner notes, Xia demonstrates that prior-art surface cleaning apparatuses with the same conventional configuration as Conrad’s had components of an upright body portion mounted to the upright body portion’s frame. Pet. 18–19, 23–25; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 34, 38–39, 44–45, 53–54, Fig. 1; Ex. 1005, 32:59–33:8; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79, 94–97. Logically, then, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have inferred that the components of Conrad’s upright body portion, including battery pack 168, would be provided on a frame of the upright battery pack, consistent with Mr. Jones’s testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶ 118. Moreover, even if none of the references individually discloses a battery on a frame of a surface cleaning apparatus’s upright body, Petitioner’s arguments and evidence persuade us that such a configuration would have been obvious in view of the references, collectively. Mr. Jones testifies that it would have been obvious to place a battery in Xia’s cleaner where Conrad expressly discloses one should place a battery on a surface cleaning apparatus, specifically “toward the rear of cleaning unit” below a supply tank, as shown in Mr. Jones’s modified version of Xia’s Figure 2, reproduced below. Mr. Jones’s modified version of Xia’s Figure 2 illustrates the location in which Mr. Jones testifies that Conrad teaches placing a battery like the one used in Xia’s surface cleaning apparatus. Ex. 1003 ¶ 123. So placed, the battery is on the frame of the surface cleaning apparatus’s upright body, as Patent Owner recognizes. Pet. Reply 13–14; Tr. 30:10–11. On the whole, Petitioner has demonstrated that it would have been obvious to place a battery housing “on the frame” of Xia’s upright body. Pet. 18–19, 23–25, 33–44; Pet. Reply 13–18. Even if accurate, Patent Owner’s argument that neither reference expressly discloses locating the battery on the frame does not undermine Petitioner’s showing of obviousness. E.g., PO Sur-reply 6, 8. An obviousness “analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Similarly, even if accurate, Patent Owner’s suggestion that there may have been other obvious places to locate a battery in Xia’s cleaner does not undermine Petitioner’s showing of obviousness. E.g., PO Resp. 19; see also Fleming, 28 F.4th at 1223–1224 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“[T]he Board correctly explained that the obviousness inquiry does not require that the prior art combination is ‘preferred, or the most desirable’ configuration.”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 10,973,383 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,973,383 - Sharkninja Operating LLC / Sharkninja Management LLC et al. v. Bissell Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01195 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–6, 8, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Xia, Conrad, and Kitsukawa; claim 20 is also unpatentable over those references and Onda.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, explaining that “[t]he definitions offered by the parties appear, for practical purposes, to be compatible. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition at this stage of the proceeding because it the ’426 patent and the cited prior art.” Inst. Dec. 7. In its Response, “Patent Owner applies the skill level adopted by the Board for the purposes of institution.” PO Resp. 9. The analysis in this Decision also applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, which appears to be consistent with the ’426 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence do not support a conclusion that the claim language “rearwardly of the selectively removable recovery tank” means “behind substantially the entirety of the selectively removable recovery tank.” PO Resp. 9–12; Pet. Reply 2–6; PO Sur-reply 1–3. We start with the claim language itself. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Patent Owner does not cite persuasive evidence for its assertion that the proposed construction captures the claim language’s ordinary and customary meaning. See PO Resp. 10. To the contrary, as Petitioner argues, Patent Owner undermines its position by citing the dictionary definition of “rearward” as meaning “directed toward the back.” PO Resp. 12; Pet. Reply 5. This definition suggests that the plain meaning of the claim language “rearwardly of the selectively removable recovery tank” is significantly broader than Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Contrary to Patent Owner’s view, the cited portions of the Specification and drawings also fail to support Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction. See PO Resp. 11. Assuming Patent Owner is correct “behind substantially the entirety of the selectively removable recovery tank,” we cannot arbitrarily limit the claim to that embodiment. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). And Patent Owner does not cite persuasive evidence of the Specification or drawings emphasizing or even ascribing significance to having a battery “behind substantially the entirety of the selectively removable recovery tank.” PO Resp. 9–12; PO Sur-reply 1–3. For the foregoing reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of claim 8’s recitation of “rearwardly of the selectively removable recovery tank.” Instead, we find more persuasive Petitioner’s proposed construction: “at or near the rear of the selectively removable recovery tank.” Pet. Reply 6.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable
“dirty tank assembly 400, to body assembly 200, which is part of the upright body’s frame 18. Pet. 22–23; Pet. Reply 8; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39, 44–45, 53–54; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 58, 95–96. Additionally, although we agree with Patent Owner that the text of Conrad does not expressly mention a “frame,” we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Conrad’s disclosure the way Mr. Jones does, specifically that “the battery pack 168 is provided on the frame of the upright body of Conrad’s surface cleaning apparatus.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 137; In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (a reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably been expected to draw therefrom). As Petitioner notes, Xia demonstrates that prior-art surface cleaning apparatuses with the same conventional configuration as Conrad’s had components of an upright body portion mounted to the upright body portion’s frame. Pet. 18–19, 22–23; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 34, 38–39, 44–45, 53–54, Fig. 1; Ex. 1005, 32:59–33:8; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83, 93–96. Logically, then, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have inferred that the components of Conrad’s upright body portion, including battery pack 168, would be provided on a frame of the upright battery pack, consistent with Mr. Jones’s testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶ 137. Moreover, even if none of the references individually discloses a battery on a frame of a surface cleaning apparatus’s upright body, Petitioner’s arguments and evidence persuade us that such a configuration would have been obvious in view of the references, collectively. Mr. Jones testifies that it would have been obvious to place a battery in Xia’s cleaner where Conrad expressly discloses one should place a battery on a surface cleaning apparatus, specifically “toward the rear of cleaning unit” below a reproduced below. Mr. Jones’s modified version of Xia’s Figure 2 illustrates the location in which Mr. Jones testifies that Conrad teaches placing a battery like the one used in Xia’s surface cleaning apparatus. Ex. 1003 ¶ 127. So placed, the battery is on the frame of the surface cleaning apparatus’s upright body, as Patent Owner recognizes. Pet. Reply 7–8; Tr. 30:10–11. On the whole, Petitioner has demonstrated that it would have been obvious to place a battery “on a rear side of the frame” of Xia’s upright body. Pet. 18–19, 22–23, 35–40, 43–44; Pet. Reply 6–9.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,147,426 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,147,426 - Sharkninja Operating LLC / Sharkninja Management LLC et al. v. Bissell Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01177 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as anticipated by Beskow; the Board did not reach the additional obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“SharkNinja submits that one skilled in the art would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering (or an equivalent discipline) or equivalent work experience, and at least one year’s worth of experience in research, design and/or development related to vacuum cleaners (or other comparable industrial design).” Pet. 14. Bissell does not dispute SharkNinja’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, and we see no reason to question it. See PO Resp. 1–9. Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill in the art as defined by SharkNinja.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Despite that exchange, Bissell still presents no evidence as to the meaning of “selectively provided,” aside from asserting the term is “ambiguous” while at the same time arguing that the term requires more than simply showing that Beskow’s agitator “can” or “cannot” be mounted on the base. Notably, however, Bissell never elaborates on why Beskow must disclose “when” the agitator can be removed, as opposed to simply disclosing it can be removed. In contrast, SharkNinja presents Beskow’s Figures 1A and 7A to show that agitator 110 is removable. Thus, without more from Bissell, we fail to see why we should construe “selectively provided” any more narrowly than simply requiring that the agitator “can” or “cannot” be mounted on the base, as SharkNinja proposes. To that end, we find that Beskow’s agitator, as depicted in Figures 1A and 7A, clearly falls within the meaning of “selectively provided on the base,” as properly construed.” slip op. at 9
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“We disagree that SharkNinja’s proposed construction of “selectively” in its reply is untimely or not supported by the evidence. At the outset, we note that Bissell did not provide any meaningful construction of the term in the Patent Owner Response. See PO Resp. 2–5. By opening the door in its Response to the meaning of “selectively” and by disputing that Beskow teaches this limitation, Bissell cannot reasonably fault SharkNinja for proposing its own construction of the term in its Reply. This is especially true given Bissell’s refusal to construe the term itself, despite recognizing some ambiguity in the claim’s use of that term. See Hrg. Tr. 46 (Bissell’s counsel explaining that “the word selectively is ambiguous” and that “[i]n the Patent Owner’s response we pointed out the ambiguities.”); see also id. at 49 (“[PTAB JUDGE]: Okay. So it’s your position that it’s an ambiguous term then? [BISSELL’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.”). Thus, in the absence of any construction of “selectively” from Bissell in contending that Beskow lacks this claim limitation, SharkNinja was fully within its right to propose its own construction in its Reply to support of its assertion that Beskow teaches this limitation. As such, we reject the notion that SharkNinja’s proposed construction was untimely or otherwise not properly within the scope of its Reply.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
Patent outcomesUS 11,096,542 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,096,542 - Sharkninja Operating LLC / Sharkninja Management LLC et al. v. Bissell Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01176 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as anticipated by Beskow; the Board did not reach the additional obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“SharkNinja submits that one skilled in the art would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering (or an equivalent discipline) or equivalent work experience, and at least one year’s worth of experience in research, design and/or development related to vacuum cleaners (or other comparable industrial design).” Pet. 14. Bissell does not dispute SharkNinja’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, and we see no reason to question it. Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill in the art as defined by SharkNinja. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Bissell that, as claimed, the suction nozzle assembly must be a separate and distinct component from the base. Although we agree that “provided on the base” may be construed to mean that the suction nozzle assembly is a separate and distinct component positioned on, or attached to, the base, we also conclude that “provided on the base” may be construed more broadly to mean that the suction nozzle assembly is part of the base or included in the base. That broader meaning comports with the specification of the ’541 patent and the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “provided on.”” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We find unpersuasive Bissell’s assertion that Beskow’s suction nozzle assembly is not “provided on the base,” as claimed. See PO Resp. 7–10, 17– 21. That is because Bissell’s assertion that the suction nozzle assembly, as claimed, must be a physically separate component from the base relies on an improper claim construction. As discussed above, we construe “a suction nozzle assembly provided on the base” to encompass not only a suction nozzle assembly that is “positioned on” the base, as Bissell asserts, but also one that it is “part of” the base or “included in” the base.” To that end, Beskow discloses that “debris and fluid inlets 724, 726 may be formed entirely or partially as a removable inlet tray 730” and “may be separately removable from the cleaning head 102, integral to or not removable from the cleaning head 102.” Ex. 1004, 20:6–7, 29–32. That the debris and fluid inlet portions of Beskow’s suction nozzle assembly are removably attached to Beskow’s cleaning head 102 (i.e., the claimed “base”) necessarily means they are “positioned on” and “included in” the base under the proper construction of “provided on the base.” Indeed, Beskow’s disclosure is no different than the preferred embodiment of the ’541 patent, where suction nozzle assembly 580 “is configured to be received in the upper cover 542,” which indisputably is part of “base 14.” Ex. 1001, 10:52–54, Fig. 8 (emphasis added); see also id. at 8:12–13 (“Upper cover 542 can be configured to releasably receive the suction nozzle assembly 580.”). Thus, we find that Beskow satisfies the claim limitation of “a suction nozzle assembly provided on the base.”” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“SharkNinja also challenges claims 1–20 as being rendered obvious by either Beskow alone or the combined teachings of Beskow and Li. See Pet. 25–26. Bissell responds that SharkNinja’s showing for these challenges fails “for the same reasons discussed with respect to Ground 1.” PO Resp. 33. Because we determine that claims 1–20 are unpatentable as anticipated by Beskow, we need not address whether those same claims are unpatentable under SharkNinja’s additional grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018) (holding that petitioner “is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged”); Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. Appx 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (recognizing that the “Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding” and, thus, has “discretion to decline to decide additional instituted grounds once the petitioner has prevailed on all its challenged claims”).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 11,096,541 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,096,541 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-00865 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 14 are obvious over Carr and Lauka.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that at least claims 1 and 14 of the ’465 patent are unpatentable as obvious over Carr and Lauka. And because Instacart demonstrates that at least one claim of the ’465 patent meets the threshold for institution, we institute an inter partes review of all claims as challenged in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a),(c); SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–19 of the ’465 patent is instituted; and” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Consumeron responds that one skilled in the art would have been “someone with a background in electrical engineering, computer science, or the like” and that “industry experience can make up for a lack of technical training, and more education can make up for a lack of industry experience.” Prelim. Resp. 29. Consumeron’s definition appears to overlap significantly with Instacart’s definition. Accordingly, for purposes of institution, we adopt the level of skill in the art as articulated by Instacart.” slip op. at 5
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“product ordered by the customer is available and does not contemplate a scenario where the product is unavailable or otherwise describe the action to be taken if the product is unavailable. See Pet. 17–22. We agree, at least based on the preliminary record. In particular, with reference to Figures 2 and 3, the ’848 parent application describes a method where (1) a customer chooses “a store where a desired product is being sold” (step 105), (2) the customer selects a delivery agent and sends an “acquisition request” to the delivery agent (steps 108, 109, 110), and (3) “the selected delivery agent travels to the store location . . . and finds the desired product to be acquired” (step 113). Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 17, 20, 23 (emphasis added). “The delivery agent then communicates to the customer that the product has been identified, and the customer has the option of inspecting the product in real-time” (step 117). Id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added). “Next, the customer either approves or rejects acquisition of the inspected product” (steps 119, 120, 122). Id. ¶ 24 (emphasis added). That description in the ’848 parent application clearly presumes that the product ordered by the customer has been located and is available for inspection, which is at odds with the additional requirements of claims 1 and 14 of “failing to locate an identified product” and “determining that the identified product is not available.” Ex. 1001, 11:20 (claim 1), 12:30 (claim 14) (emphases added). To the extent Consumeron argues otherwise, we are not persuaded at this preliminary stage. According to Consumeron, the customer’s rejection of the product means that “the agent fails to locate a product that is satisfactory.” See Prelim Resp. 11. But nowhere do we discern that the ’848 parent application hinges the identity and availability of a product on whether it is satisfactory to the customer. That a product might not meet a customer’s satisfaction does not negate the description in the ’848 parent application that the agent locates and identifies the product in the first instance before giving the customer the option to inspect and reject the product. Indeed, because the customer placed the online order with a store advertising the product, the presumption is that the advertised product is available and satisfactory to the customer.8 And, while conceivably the purchase of a product cannot be fulfilled in the event the product is unavailable, it would seem to be improper hindsight to derive written description support by “[w]orking backward from a knowledge of the claims.” Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed. It extends only to that which is disclosed.” Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Thus, based on the preliminary record, the ’848 parent application does not provide sufficient written description for the terms noted above. As such, we find that Instacart demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in showing that the asserted references are prior art to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“and Lauka. See Pet. 30–44, 47–49. We begin with Instacart’s challenge of method claim 1. Instacart provides a detailed mapping of how Carr satisfies all the recited limitations of claim 1, except limitation [1.0.3], for which Instacart points to Lauka. See id. at 35–44. In particular, Instacart cites the following evidence in support of its contentions that Carr and Lauka, when combined, teach or suggest each of the recited limitations of claim 1: Limitation 1.0.1—“A method for remote acquisition and delivery of goods through one or more agents of a service provider” (Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 36, 39, 43, 45, 92, Figs. 1, 3, 6;; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 97–100)); Limitation 1.0.2—“each agent having a mobile agent system in communication with at least one remote server,” (Pet. 35–37 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 2, 6, 40–43, 53, Fig. 1 (annotated); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 101–104)); Limitation 1.0.3—“with each mobile agent system including: a digital image capture device and a communication device, said method comprising:” (Pet. 37–38 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 74, 88, 94, 122; Ex. 1006, 3:19–28, 3:49–57, 4:10–21; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 105– 109)); Limitation 1.1—“receiving, through the at least one remote server, a first acquisition request from a customer for a first set of one or more goods;” (Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 9, 60, 73, Fig. 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 110–112)); Limitation 1.2—“contacting, through the communications device, the one or more agents;” (Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 57, 74; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 113–115)); Limitation 1.3—“upon failing to locate an identified product of the set of one or more goods, electronically transmitting information on a replacement product for the identified product of the set of one or more goods to the customer using the digital image capture device of the agent, including:” (Pet. 38–40 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 90, 95, 96, 105, 107, ; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 116– 119)); Limitation 1.4—“obtaining a bar or QR code of the replacement product;” (Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 95, 107; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 120– 122)); Limitation 1.5—“determining the information from the bar or QR code, wherein the information includes at least one image of the replacement product; and” (Pet. 40–42 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 95–96, 116; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 123–127)); Limitation 1.6—“sending the information for the customer to approve the purchase of the replacement product based on the information determined from the bar or QR code; and” (Pet. 42– 43 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 51, 96–99, Fig. 12; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 128– 130)); and Limitation 1.7—“upon receiving approval of the purchase from the customer, acquiring the replacement product, via the agent.” (Pet. 43–44 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 99, 101; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 131–132)); Instacart also provides a reason why one skilled in the art would have combined the teachings of Carr and Lauka with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 31–34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 86–96); see also id. at 37 (“In view of the teachings of Lauka, a POSITA would have recognized that it was obvious to implement the UPC scanner functionality of Carr’s handheld device using an ‘imaging device’ such as that taught by Lauka, which specifies that the ‘imaging device 206 can comprise a video or still camera’ and ‘can be used to capture images.’ Ex.1006, 3:49-57; Ex.1003, ¶¶105- 107.”).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,238,465
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.