- PTAB · Jan 16, 2025 · IPR2024-01088 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail on its § 103 challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’758 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 7 (internal citations omitted) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–53). For the purposes of institution, Patent Owner did not dispute this level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 6 (“Patent Owner does not necessarily agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, but does not believe that resolving that level is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this preliminary response.”) The portion of the definition proposed by the Petitioner requiring “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers” appears to be consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’758 patent and prior art of record and is supported by declarant testimony. We adopt this as the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of this Decision. We note that since it is unclear whether the bachelor’s degree in the proposed definition is considered by Petitioner to be “an advanced-level degree” we do not adopt the portion of the definition relating to the substitution of years of experience for a degree at this time. Additionally, we do not herein adopt Petitioner’s proposed additional requirement that one of ordinary skill “would have possessed extensive background knowledge and understanding of the pertinent technologies employed by the ’758 patent.” Pet. 7.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner also notes that in the pending District Court Litigation, Petitioner contends that eight claim terms found in the challenged claims are indefinite: “performing an operation [in connection with / on] the first application icon,” “application-launch criteria,” “action-option-display criteria,” “operation criteria,” “movement criteria,” “action options,” “action option objects,” and “evaluating the first single-finger touch input against at least one of a plurality of criteria, including evaluating a duration of the first single-finger touch input against at least one of: one or more application-launch criteria, one or more action-option-display criteria, or one or more operation criteria, and further including evaluating a movement of the first single-finger touch input against one or more movement criteria.” Prelim. Resp. 6–7 (citing Ex. 2003, 9–75). Patent Owner further notes that, contrary to its position in the pending District Court Litigation, Petitioner does not assert that any of these terms are indefinite in this proceeding. Id. For institution and on our present record, we determine that none of these claim terms require construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 3. Other Terms For institution and on our present record, no other claim terms require construction. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We determine that, on this record and for the purposes of institution, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing regarding motivation for its proposed combination of Chaudhri, Martyn, and Griffin. For the combination of Chaudhri and Martyn, we determine, on the present record and for the purposes of institution, that Petitioner has sufficiently shown support for the use of Martyn’s snap-shot menu with Chaudhri’s user interface. We acknowledge Patent Owner’s declarant’s examples of instances in which devices that incorporated “popular user interface features . . . did not achieve the same level of success because of poorly articulated design implementation.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 127 (cited at PO Resp. 23). However, on the present record, this evidence does not specifically address whether one of ordinary skill would have found such examples significant enough or relevant enough to the proposed combination to dissuade one of ordinary skill from considering such a combination to be reasonably likely to succeed, especially in light of the testimonial evidence before us that similar menus were often incorporated into GUIs similar to Chaudhri’s, which is adequately supported by reference to numerous examples. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–48, 64–65 (cited at Pet. 16). Additionally, we find compelling that Chaudhri describes a pop-up dialogue sub-menu for a different purpose (modifying the user interface object). See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 274, 317, Figure 5LLL; Pet. 18–19; Ex. 1003 ¶ 69. On the present record, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found the use of the similar snap-shot menu from Martyn (offering different functionality) to be further prompted by this sub-menu, and not to have been redundant or “already solved” in Chaudhri, as Patent Owner argues (PO Resp. 26–27). See Pet. 18–19; Ex. 1003 ¶ 69. introduced to the combination of Chaudhri and Martyn to address a conflict that arises because Petitioner proposes a combination of Chaudhri and Martyn that “create[s] a conflict of assigning two functions to the same gesture.” PO Resp. 20. However, Petitioner provides a number of rationales to combine, and Petitioner’s argument that one of ordinary skill would have sought details from Griffin to implement Chaudhri’s teachings describing different user functionality being launched by user touches of different user durations (Pet. 19–21) adequately supports the use of the material from Griffin in the proposed combination. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 217, 218; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 70–73, 75; see also PO Resp. 24 (describing “multiple types of gestures” used Chaudhri). While the proposed combination of Chaudhri and Martyn would, as Petitioner asserts, result in “three distinct operations invoked by duration-based touch gestures at an application icon” (Pet. 21), two of these distinct operations are found in Chaudhri’s teachings, and thus, on the present record, the motivation to look to Griffin does not arise only from the proposed combination of Chaudhri with Martyn. On the present record and for the purposes of institution, we determine that Petitioner has adequately shown that one of ordinary skill would have looked to Griffin to supply additional information regarding implementation of Chaudhri’s (and the Chaudhri and Martyn combination’s) use of parameters of a user’s touch, including duration, to enable different functionalities. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 40, 53, Fig. 7; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 70–73, 75. With respect to the use of the “press-and-hold” feature from Martyn, rather than other possibilities from Martyn for triggering its snap-shot menu and rather than adding a second touch point as Patent Owner suggests (PO Resp. 27–28, 32, 33 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 142–143, 156, 166, 172–173)), on to have been a suitable option. Pet. 15–16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 49–53, 63–64; Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 799–800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (determining that a showing of the obviousness in “predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions” (as per KSR, 550 U.S. at 417) requires only a showing that the combination be a suitable option, rather than a showing that it is the best option).” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,656,758 - PTAB · Jan 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01087 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13, 15–35, and 37–43 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would show at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We determine Petitioner’s showing discussed above regarding Limitations [1.i–1.l] to be sufficient for institution. Petitioner’s showing in large measure relies on Hackborn’s straightforward description of changing the appearance of grass displayed in “live” wallpaper in response to a finger swipe in combination with Westerman’s disclosures of interpreting user input on touch screens as swipes. See, e.g., Pet. 22–23; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 28, 33; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 18–19. With regard to the contested Limitations [1.i and 1.k], we note particularly that Petitioner’s combination relies on Westerman’s disclosure of interpreting user inputs that exceed various thresholds as “a swipe event.” This showing is sufficient for institution to show the threshold determination required by Limitation [1.j]. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19; Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 19). Petitioner’s combination relies on Hackborn’s animation of the grass on the wallpaper “that makes the grass blades look as if the finger is actually contacting them as it drags across the screen of the device.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 33; see Pet. 23 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 33). On this preliminary record, Petitioner’s position that “the farther the swipe, the more extreme the grass movement expected from Hackborn” naturally follows from Hackborn’s description. Pet. 23. As such, we determine Petitioner’s showing that the proposed combination of Hackborn and Westerman changes the grass appearance based at least in part of the magnitude of the swipe to be sufficient for institution for Limitation [1.k].” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a related field, and would have had at least two years of relevant work experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof.” Pet. 9 n.2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26); Ex. 1003 ¶ 26. Dr. Cockburn also indicates that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education and vice versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 26.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage, we agree with the parties that no terms need to be construed expressly. We discuss claim interpretation to the extent necessary in the context of analyzing the asserted grounds.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Hackborn’s mobile device with a touch screen able to display “live” wallpaper and Westerman’s techniques for interpreting swipe gesture inputs, including distinguishing between tap and swipe gestures using predetermined thresholds. Pet. 9–11, 12–13; see Pet. 9–14 (describing Petitioner’s “Hackborn-Westerman Combination”). Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA reviewing Hackborn would have naturally looked to Westerman to better understand how to implement Hackborn’s teachings, for example, how to discern between different user inputs (e.g., tap or swipe).” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 52). Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the references in the manner Petitioner proposes. Pet. 13–14. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that, because “recognizing predetermined touch inputs was known, and Hackborn and Westerman both describe the use of touchscreen devices and would have reasonably understood the combination of Hackborn and Westerman to be successful with no unexpected results.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 53; Ex. 1004 ¶ 28, Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 18, 19, 25, 41, 59, 61–64).” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,656,755 - PTAB · Jan 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01091 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 27, 30, 32, 34, 59, 62, and 64 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“d. Conclusion Regarding Asserted Obviousness over Kim In sum, for the reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s showing regarding claim 1 is sufficient for institution. Accordingly, having reviewed the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence cited therein, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that Kim renders obvious claim 1. As such, Petitioner’s showing is sufficient to institute an inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). Notwithstanding, we address other claims and other grounds below, particularly in response to Patent Owner’s preliminary arguments.” slip op. at 29
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a related field, and would have had at least two years of relevant work experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof.” Pet. 10 n.4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26); Ex. 1003 ¶ 26. Dr. Cockburn also indicates that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner indicates it “does not necessarily agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, but does not believe that resolving that level is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this preliminary response.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Dr. Surati indicates that his opinions provided in his declaration in support of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response are “provided from the perspective of the POSITA” proposed by Dr.Cockburn. Ex. 2001 ¶ 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). consistent with the prior art of record. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“standards for finding lexicography in a specification are exacting. Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning and must clearly express an intent to redefine the term.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). As Patent Owner correctly notes, the specification states: In various embodiments, the contact pressure level may be represented by a touch state. In the context of the present description, a touch state refers to a predefined subset of the range of measurable contact pressures. For example, in one embodiment, contact pressure levels may be represented as one of four predefined touch states: no touch, light touch, medium touch, and heavy touch. Ex. 1001, 19:35–41; Prelim. Resp. 27 (quoting Ex. 1001, 19:35–41). Patent Owner, however, has not identified any words of manifest exclusion or restriction in that passage that indicate an intent to redefine the claim term. Rather than indicating the claims are to be restricted, the specification indicates how that the term “touch state” is to be understood in the descriptions presented in the specification. Ex. 1001, 19:36–37.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“would have been obvious over Kim and Bowens to be sufficient for institution. Petitioner generally relies on Kim’s description as discussed above. Pet. 62–68. Specifically, in its combination, Petitioner relies on Kim’s hold event and scaling operation for Limitations [1.g and 1.h]. Pet. 64–67. Petitioner additionally relies on Bowen as providing details on recognizing and acting on specific gestures on a user interface. See, e.g., Pet. 55. Petitioner provides reasons one of ordinary skill would have combined the references in the manner proposed by Petitioner. See, e.g., Pet. 53–62. Petitioner also provides reasons one of ordinary skill would have reasonable expectation of success in combining the references in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Pet. 60–61.” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,936,114 - Mianyang Boe Optoelectronics Technology Co., Ltd. / Wuhan China Star Optoelectronics Semiconductor Display Technology Co., Ltd. et al. v. Samsung Display Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01075 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner failed to show claims 1–6, 10, 12, 17–19, 21–23, 40–47, 51, and 52 unpatentable because the cited art did not teach or suggest a pixel defining layer.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we again adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Pattison, and appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). We find Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill to be imprecise, because Patent Owner does not specify the amount of experience possessed by an ordinarily skilled artisan. The unbounded reference to “experience” is vague and overly broad, as it could mean 1 year of experience or over 30 years of experience, for example. In addition, the ’578 patent is directed to “a pixel arrangement structure of an (OLED) [organic light emitting diode] display” (Ex. 1001, 1:22–23), whereas Patent Owner’s proposed experience is tied to “active-matrix displays.” PO Resp. 5. Given that the field of OLED displays includes both passive and active matrix designs (see generally Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 40–56), we see no reason to restrict the relevant experience to active matrix displays. For these reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner has failed to show that the cited art teaches or suggests a “pixel defining layer” as recited. Neither party in this proceeding or in the ITC Investigation argued that “pixel defining layer” as recited in the challenged claims required construction, and neither party presented any arguments regarding the construction or meaning of this term.6 Pet. 13; PO Resp. 4–5. 5 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) requires that a petition contain a statement identifying how a challenged claim is to be construed. 6 In our Decision instituting trial, we stated that “[i]f either party contends that explicit claim construction is necessary in order to make a final determination whether or not any challenged claim is unpatentable based on the arguments and evidence presented, it should clearly explain why during We give the term “pixel defining layer” as recited its plain and ordinary meaning. For purposes of this decision, we determine that no aspects of the challenged claims require explicit construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Petitioner Has Not Shown That the Cited Art Teaches or Suggests All the” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“or suggestion in Matthies of a pixel defining layer, because there is none.” PO Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 187); see also PO Sur-reply 15–17. Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA would have understood that Matthies employs (or at least could obviously employ) the claimed ‘pixel defining layer.’” Pet. 23. An allegation that a skilled artisan would have understood that the prior art “could obviously” be modified to include an element of the claimed invention does not establish that the prior art teaches or suggests such recited element. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“require for the same reasons set forth above.”). And, in discussing motivation to combine the teachings of Matthies and Yamada, Petitioner articulates no reasoning to support modifying Matthies’ structure based on Yamada to yield a “pixel defining layer.” See Pet. 69–75. Patent Owner argues that “[t]he Petition failed to identify any teaching or suggestion in Matthies of a pixel defining layer, because there is none.” PO Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 187); see also PO Sur-reply 15–17. Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA would have understood that Matthies employs (or at least could obviously employ) the claimed ‘pixel defining layer.’” Pet. 23. An allegation that a skilled artisan would have understood that the prior art “could obviously” be modified to include an element of the claimed invention does not establish that the prior art teaches or suggests such recited element. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,594,578 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,594,578 - PTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00687 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4 and 7–12, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4 and 9 are anticipated by Winkler.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we conclude that the information presented shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’017 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“contends a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience working with electrical circuits or electrical connectors, including power connectors. Additional relevant work experience can compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 24–26). At this juncture, Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art as articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, it is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’017 patent and prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that the open-ended language “at least” expands the range of education and experience indefinitely with no upper bound. Therefore, we do not adopt this aspect of Petitioner’s formulation.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“At this juncture, we preliminarily agree with Patent Owner’s proffered claim construction. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the insulating barriers would be unable to be configured to “block[] substantially all through-air arcing paths between the first and second electrical contacts,” as claimed, unless they were electrically insulating. See Ex. 1001, 4:36–44. Moreover, as Patent Owner avers, our interpretation of “insulating” as it applies to the first and second insulating barriers should be the same as for the first and second housings. See Digital Biometrics, 149 F.3d at 1345 (“whatever interpretation we assign [to a word used in a claim] should encompass both uses because the same word appearing in the same claim should be interpreted consistently” (citation omitted)). Although “a patent’s written description can set forth more than one definition of a claim term,” we do not discern that to be the case here. See Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1310. The portions of the Specification of the ’017 patent that Patent Owner cites use “insulating” and its associated tenses to mean suppressing electrical arcing and protecting from electrical burns, i.e., electrically insulating. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, code (57), 1:58–2:3, 2:42–44, 3:2–6, 3:30–40, 3:63–4:10, cited in Prelim. Resp. 12–14. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we interpret “insulating” as recited in the claims to mean “electrically insulating.”” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Petitioner’s reliance on the modified Figure 2 diagram not explicitly shown in Winkler is not per se improper, so long as the skilled artisan would have reasonably understood that that is what Winkler discloses. See Acoustic Tech., Inc. v. Itron Networked Solutions, Inc., 949 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“In an anticipation analysis, the dispositive question is whether a skilled artisan would ‘reasonably understand or infer’ from a prior art reference that every claim limitation is disclosed in that single reference. . . . Expert testimony may shed light on what a skilled artisan would reasonably understand or infer from a prior art reference.” (citations omitted)). Dr. Eldering testifies that the diagram was “created based on FIG. 2 of Winkler and developed by taking the components of each half of the connector and recreating them in a separated state.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 80. On the current record, Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Eldering’s testimony or that Petitioner’s diagram reflects what the skilled artisan would have reasonably understood by looking at Figure 2 of Winkler. See generally Prelim. Resp.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,808,017 - Zebra Technologies Corporation v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00883 · APJ Larry J Hume · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Zebra did not show Dammann was a publicly accessible printed publication, so it was unavailable as prior art for either obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“institute review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2024).” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“As our reviewing court has held, “public accessibility” requires more than technical accessibility. Acceleration Bay, 908 F.3d at 773. “A reference is considered publicly accessible if it was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” Id. at 772. Because there is no evidence of record that Dammann was actually physically disseminated to the public, such as at the conference site, our inquiry is focused on whether an interested skilled” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“presented. For the reasons explained above, including Patent Owner’s arguments, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the subject matter of claims 1, 3, 7–10, 13, 14, and 16 would have been obvious over Dammann and Hervin in view of the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We reach this conclusion because, under our case law discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Dammann is a printed publication. Accordingly, Dammann is not available in this proceeding as prior art to the claims of the ʼ439 patent. Because all of” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
“b) Hervin’s Status as Analogous Art Patent Owner contends the Petition fails to show that Hervin is analogous art. Prelim. Resp. 38–40. The Petition does not address whether Hervin is analogous art to the invention claimed in the ʼ439 patent. See generally Pet. For purposes of our decision declining to institute trial, we need not reach a determination as to whether Hervin is analogous art to the claimed invention. See, e.g., Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that an administrative agency “is at perfect liberty” to reach a decision based on a “single dispositive issue”); Bos. Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (non-precedential) (recognizing that the “Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding”).” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,623,439 - PTAB · Nov 7, 2024 · IPR2024-00605 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 9–14, 23–28, and 30 on all petition grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.§ 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Upon consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record before us, we conclude Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’714 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’714 patent on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“Based on the foregoing arguments, which lack specifics and do not sufficiently map the particular teachings from Rusert relied on by Petitioner to the disclosures of Han, Tai, and Huang, we do not find Rusert to be cumulative of these references. Further, even if all of Rusert’s teachings 13 Han, Woo-Jin, et al., Improved Video Compression Efficiency Through Flexible Unit Representation and Corresponding Extension of Coding Tools, 20 IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology 1709 (2010). 14 Tai, Shen-Chuan, et al., A Multi-Pass True Motion Estimation Scheme with Motion Vector Propagation for Frame Rate Up-Conversion Applications, 4 Journal of Display Technology 188 (2008). 15 Huang, Ai-Mei, et al., A Multistage Motion Vector Processing Method for Motion-Compensated Frame Interpolation, 17 IEEE Transactions on Image Processing 694 (2008). relied on by Petitioner can be found in Han, Tai, and Huang as a collection of separate partial teachings from each, that still does not demonstrate Rusert as a cumulative reference. The quality of disclosure simply is not the same if three references have to be combined to yield what Rusert itself discloses. Patent Owner also does not explain how it combines Han, Tai, and Huang to provide the same teachings relied on from Rusert by Petitioner.16” slip op. at 65
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“Although we do not think 30 claims are too numerous for one petition to cover, many claims in the ’714 patent are extraordinarily lengthy and include numerous limitations. For example, claim 6, which depends from claim 5 which depends from claim 1, is more than one column long in the ’714 patent. The length of claim 20, which depends from claim 19, which depends from claim 15, also is more than one column long in the ’714 patent. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that the subject matter of the ’714 patent is complex. We further agree with Petitioner that the division of claims among the two petitions, i.e., encoder claims in IPR2024-00604 and decoder claims in IPR2024-00605, is a structured division which helps to facilitate the handling of two petitions. Patent Owner has not presented arguments urging that the filing of two petitions by Petitioner against the ’714 patent is excessive. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the filing of two petitions by Petitioner against the ’714 patent is reasonable under these circumstances. We decline to exercise discretion to deny either petition on the ground of the Petitioner filing an excessive number of petitions against the ’714 patent.” slip op. at 69
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Citing testimony from Dr. Creusere, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art (hereinafter “POSITA”) “would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study such as physics, and (2) approximately two to three years of practical experience with video encoding/decoding.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 57–59). Patent Owner states that it “has applied Petitioner’s POSITA for the sake of this Response.” Prelim. Resp. 31. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Creusere and not 11 The record does not include any evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). C.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,536,714 - PTAB · Nov 7, 2024 · IPR2024-00604 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–8, 15–22, and 29 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim based on the Rusert grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.§ 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Upon consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record before us, we conclude Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’714 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’714 patent on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“Based on the foregoing arguments, which lack specifics and do not sufficiently map the particular teachings from Rusert relied on by Petitioner to the disclosures of Han, Tai, and Huang, we do not find Rusert to be cumulative of these references. Further, even if all of Rusert’s teachings relied on by Petitioner can be found in Han, Tai, and Huang as a collection of separate partial teachings from each, that still does not demonstrate Rusert as a cumulative reference. The quality of disclosure simply is not the same if three references have to be combined to yield what Rusert itself discloses.” slip op. at 63
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“Although we do not think 30 claims are too numerous for one petition to cover, many claims in the ’714 patent are extraordinarily lengthy and include numerous limitations. For example, claim 6, which depends from claim 5, which depends from claim 1, is more than one column long in the ’714 patent. The length of claim 20, which depends from claim 19, which depends from claim 15, also is more than one column long in the ’714 patent. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that the subject matter of the ’714 patent is complex. We further agree with Petitioner that the division of claims among the two petitions, i.e., encoder claims in IPR2024-00604 and decoder claims in IPR2024-00605, is a structured division which helps to facilitate the handling of two petitions. Patent Owner has not presented arguments urging that the filing of two petitions by Petitioner against the ’714 patent is excessive. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the filing of two petitions by Petitioner against the ’714 patent is reasonable under these circumstances. We decline to exercise discretion to deny either petition on the ground of the Petitioner filing an excessive number of petitions against the ’714 patent.” slip op. at 67
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Creusere and not 11 The record does not include any evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). C.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,536,714 - Zhejiang Lingdi Digital Technology Co., Ltd. v. Clo Virtual Fashion, IncInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00970 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1–11 because the petition did not sufficiently explain why a skilled artisan would combine TUKATECH’s features with EZBRUSH.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standards Used in the Merits Analysis “In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective evidence of non-obviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s expert provides no citation for his “smooth seam” or “pleated or ruffled effect at the seam” rationales. Indeed, Petitioner’s expert does not indicate that he has expertise regarding clothing, let alone seam formation on clothing. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 3–13. As our Rules make clear, “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); see also Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fab. Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Testimony proffered by a witness lacking the relevant technical expertise fails the standard of admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 702.”). Petitioner’s expert does not cite evidence in support of his statements, nor does he provide evidence that he has a background that indicates that he would intrinsically know such things to be true. On this record, we afford Petitioner’s expert’s testimony on the “length selection” rationales for providing a “smooth seam” and/or “pleated or ruffled effect at the seam” no weight. Ex. 1003 ¶ 61. For this reason, Petitioner’s obviousness position is untenable. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s expert provides no citation for his “smooth seam” or “pleated or ruffled effect at the seam” rationales. Indeed, Petitioner’s expert does not indicate that he has expertise regarding clothing, let alone seam formation on clothing. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 3–13. As our Rules make clear, “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); see also Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fab. Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Testimony proffered by a witness lacking the relevant technical expertise fails the standard of admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 702.”). Petitioner’s expert does not cite evidence in support of his statements, nor does he provide evidence that he has a background that indicates that he would intrinsically know such things to be true. On this record, we afford Petitioner’s expert’s testimony on the “length selection” rationales for providing a “smooth seam” and/or “pleated or ruffled effect at the seam” no weight. Ex. 1003 ¶ 61. For this reason, Petitioner’s obviousness position is untenable. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). Similarly, Petitioner asserts that adding “TUKATECH’s suggested techniques” to EZBRUSH “would be merely the application of known techniques to a known system ready for improvement to yield predictable results.” Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 62). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have recognized that applying the suggested user interface improvement from TUKATECH to EZBRUSH’s CAD system would have led to predictable and helpful results with a reasonable expectation of success.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 62). Similar to the discussion above, we have reviewed the cited paragraph of Petitioner’s expert’s declaration and find insufficient credible evidence supporting Petitioner’s naked assertions regarding what was an “application of known techniques to a known system ready for improvement to yield predictable results.” Pet. 43; Ex. 1003 ¶ 62. To the extent Petitioner is arguing that obviousness can be established merely by showing that EZBRUSH and TUKATECH are in the same field of endeavor (e.g., Pet. 43 (“both [are] directed toward CAD systems”)), we disagree. We are not aware of any authority supporting such an argument. Petitioner has not sufficiently explained why or how it would have been obvious to apply the length comparison information from the table of TUKATECH’s size reshaping feature to EZBRUSH in a manner that meets each step of the claim. Thus, Petitioner’s additional reasons for modifying EZBRUSH to implement TUKATECH’s sizing table are also untenable.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), we apply the claim construction standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). That is, “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning’ . . . that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1312–13. We do not need to construe any claim terms to reach a decision in this proceeding. Realtime, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms. . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,733,773 - Zhejiang Lingdi Digital Technology Co., Ltd. v. Clo Virtual Fashion, IncInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00967 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show why a skilled artisan would have combined Niterra’s wire-length features with EZBRUSH’s clothing design software.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standards Used in the Merits Analysis “In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective evidence of non-obviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“The expert provides no citation for his “smooth seam” rationale. Moreover, Petitioner’s expert, who has extensive knowledge in CAD drawing systems (e.g., id. ¶ 3), does not indicate that he has expertise regarding clothing, let alone seam formation on clothing. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 3–13. As our Rules make clear, “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); see also Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fab. Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Testimony proffered by a witness lacking the relevant technical expertise fails the standard of admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 702.”). Petitioner’s expert does not cite evidence in support of his statement, nor does he provide evidence that he has a background that indicates that he would intrinsically know such things to be true. On this record, we afford Petitioner’s expert’s testimony on the “smooth seam” rationale no weight. For this reason, Petitioner’s obviousness position is untenable. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“asserts that it would have been obvious to add these features from Niterra’s circuit board designer into the clothing designer of EZBRUSH. Pet. 45–50. Petitioner asserts that the reason to do so is because “it would have been desirable to select the sewing segments to be equal in length when seeking a clean, smooth seam that prevents bunching or unintended stretching of the material.” Id. at 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). Petitioner then goes on to explain various benefits from adding these “smooth seam” features. Id. at 46–50. Patent Owner argues that “[Petitioner’s] rationale is completely rooted in hindsight” because nothing in the prior art describes a desire to seek a smooth seam. Prelim. Resp. 69. Turning back to the Petition, we see that Petitioner’s “smooth seam” rationale is underpinned by a citation to its expert declaration. Pet. 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). The expert, in turn, repeats the language from the Petition, but provides no explanation as to the underlying facts or data on which his opinion is based. He states: A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have known that when using the resulting CAD system (EZBRUSH as modified by Corel and Thoemmes (detailed above)) to digitally “sew” two garment patterns together, selecting the sewing segments to be equal in length would have been desirable when seeking a clean, smooth seam that prevents bunching or unintended stretching of the material. Ex. 1003 ¶ 64.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelNot reached
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that: A person of ordinary skill in the art as of the Critical Date (“POSITA”) would have had a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in an engineering, computer science, graphic design, or a related field plus 2–3 years of work and/or research experience in the field of computer aided design (CAD) software. [Ex. ]1003, ¶23. Graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Id. Pet. 21. Patent Owner proposes a different standard: A [person of ordinary skill in the art] to which the ’355 Patent pertains would have had a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, textile engineering, computer engineering, computer science, graphic design, or an equivalent degree, with at least 2–3 years of experience in software design for the creation of digital or virtual clothing. EX2001, ¶56. Prelim. Resp. 33. Notably, Patent Owner argues that the level of ordinary skill in the art includes experience specific to digital or virtual clothing and that Petitioner has omitted this critical aspect. Id. at 32. We need not define explicitly the level of ordinary skill in the art because Petitioner would fail to meet its evidentiary burden regardless of the definition of the level of skill adopted.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,410,355
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.