- First Solar, Inc. v. Rovshan SadeInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 16, 2023 · IPR2023-00881 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was unpatentable over Wattsun, RayTracker, or their combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Relying on the declaration testimony of Edward C. Kern, Jr., Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’17,546 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent with 2–3 years of experience involving design, development, and manufacturing of support and mounting structures for solar trackers, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34). Patent Owner does not dispute this definition of a person of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’17,546 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits the claims be interpreted “according to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)” and that no terms require explicit construction. Pet. 16. Patent Owner does not “believe that any claim terms require express construction in order to deny institution.” Prelim. Resp. 10. Patent Owner also asserts “that providing a construction of the claims at issue is the duty of Petitioner, and the Petitioner has failed to comply.” Id. Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“d) Analysis We observe that Patent Owner’s arguments in connection with its challenge to Wattsun as prior art do raise meaningful questions, on this record, as to Wattsun’s status as a printed publication before the priority date of the challenged patent. In particular, we take note of Patent Owner’s contention (see Prelim. Resp. 20–21) that Petitioner has failed to present sufficient evidence or argument that an interested party exercising reasonable diligence would have located Wattsun. See Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,917,546 - First Solar, Inc. v. Rovshan SadeInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 16, 2023 · IPR2023-00827 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
Institution denied for claims 5 and 6 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of success on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner 1 The ’57,546 patent is the parent of U.S. Patent No. 9,917,546 B2 (“the ’17,546 patent”). A Petition challenging claim of the ’17,546 patent (IPR2023-00881) was filed on the same day as this IPR2023-00827 proceeding. would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any challenged claim of the ’57,546 patent. Accordingly, we deny institution of the Petition for inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Relying on the declaration testimony of Edward C. Kern, Jr., Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’57,546 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent with 2–3 years of experience involving design, development, and manufacturing of support and mounting structures for solar trackers, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34). Patent Owner does not dispute this definition of a person of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’57,546 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits the claims be interpreted “according to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)” and that no terms require explicit construction. Pet. 15. Patent Owner does not “believe that any claim terms require express construction in order to deny institution.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Patent Owner also asserts “that providing a construction of the claims at issue is the duty of Petitioner, and the Petitioner has failed to comply.” Id. at 8–9. Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“a) Legal Standards for Public Accessibility “[T]he burden is on the petitioner to identify with particularity evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent, and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 16 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The determination of whether a document was publicly accessible “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In certain situations, such as for manuscripts or dissertations stored in libraries, courts may inquire whether a reference was sufficiently indexed, catalogued, and shelved. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (manuscript became publicly accessible once it was placed in a searchable database). Analogously, electronic documents may be publicly accessible if they were indexed or catalogued, or if there were other tools for customary and meaningful research. See SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). “[I]ndexing is no more or less important in evaluating the public accessibility of online references than for those fixed in more traditional, tangible media.” Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,057,546 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00643 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–7 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Willner and Park.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. In our previous decision in the 1197 IPR, we exercised our discretion to deny institution under § 314(a) based on our consideration of the Fintiv factors. 1197 IPR, Paper 13, 23. The decision in the 1197 IPR noted that although “there does appear to be some strength to the merits of Petitioner’s challenges,” this determination was based particularly on the fact that “the ’393 patent’s claims share some of the same claim limitations addressed by the Board previously in the ’119 patent’s IPRs.” See id. at 20–21. Therefore, we did not fully address the substantive merits of any of Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability. 10 We also are not persuaded that the changes between the Petition in the 1197 IPR and the present Petition demonstrates “ample evidence” of road-mapping. Instead, we agree with Petitioner that “[t]hese changes are not road-mapping because they are unrelated to the record in the earlier [1197] IPR.” Pet. Reply 2–3. And, as we explained above, our earlier decision did not fully address the substantive merits of any of Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability, nor did we address the substantive merits of any of Patent Owner’s counterarguments. See General Plastic, Paper 19, 17 (warning against allowing “petitioners the opportunity to strategically stage their prior art and arguments in multiple petitions, using our decisions as a roadmap.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at fn.14 (citing Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, IPR2014-00581, Paper 8, 12–13 (PTAB Oct. 14, 2014) (criticizing petitioner’s use of “our prior decision as a roadmap”) (emphasis added). In addition, Patent Owner acknowledges that the present Petition challenges “the same claims 1–7 based on identical prior art references and substantially similar grounds.” Prelim. Resp. 1 (emphasis omitted). Thus, we find Patent Owner’s “road-mapping” concerns to be minimized based on the similarity of the unpatentability challenges between those raised in the 1197 IPR Petition and the present Petition. For these reasons, we agree with Petitioner that factors 1–3 weigh in favor of institution. See Code200, Paper 18 at 5 (“Where the first-filed petition under factor 1 was discretionarily denied or otherwise was not evaluated on the merits, factors 1−3 only weigh in favor of discretionary denial when there are ‘road-mapping’ concerns under factor 3 or other concerns under factor 2.”).” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“based on the related district court matters identified above. Prelim. Resp. 17–27; see Fintiv, Paper 11, 12 (holding that PTAB has discretion to deny institution in certain circumstances where there are parallel district court proceedings). Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memo”). Pursuant to the Director’s Memo, we “will not discretionarily deny institution . . . where a petitioner presents a [Sotera] stipulation.” Director’s Memo at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Because Petitioner has offered a stipulation like in Sotera, i.e., to “not pursue the same invalidity grounds against the challenged claims of the ’393 patent in the parallel litigation [or] any 14 grounds that could have been reasonably raised in this petition” (Pet. 85)7, we do not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“At the outset, we note that the exercise of discretion in Advanced Bionics did not turn on mere citation in an IDS of the art asserted in the petition. Rather, the Board’s exercise of discretion in that case turned on the Examiner’s application and discussion of that art. Specifically, the Board 18 found in Advanced Bionics that the asserted art, Zimmerling, “is the same art previously presented to the Office” because “the Examiner rejected [the claims] as anticipated by Zimmerling” and “Zimmerling was discussed during prosecution.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6, 13. In other words, the criteria adopted by the Board for denying the petition in Advanced Bionics included not only the fact that the art was made of record, but also the fact that it was applied and discussed during prosecution. Anything less disregards the express reasoning behind the Board’s exercise of discretion in that case. Here, Patent Owner has not shown that any Petitioner’s cited art (i.e., Willner, Park, Schoenith, Kessler, Hirschman) was applied by the Examiner or discussed during prosecution. Instead, during examination of the ’393 patent, the record shows that the Examiner allowed the pending claims over “Wu (2006/0252537) in view of Willis (2014/0274394).” Ex. 1009, 26–29. In doing so, the Examiner stated that a “[g]ame controller with structural bridge is well known in the art” (id. at 27), but found that “Wu in view of Willis is silent on” the subject matter claim 1. See id. at 27–28 (quoting the subject matter of independent claim 1 in its entirety). However, on this record, Petitioner demonstrates that the Examiner overlooked the combination of Willner and Park’s teachings of the limitations that were the basis for allowing the challenged claims. Id. As discussed in more detail below, Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that at least independent claim 1 of the ’393 patent is unpatentable over the combination of Willner and Park. See Pet. 19–41 (citing Exs. 1002, 1003, 1004).” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“4. Conclusion for Claim 1 Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Willner and Park teaches all limitations of claim 1. Petitioner also has put forth sufficient reasons for combining these references with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 133–139, 150–157; Ex. 1003 ¶ 50; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–46). For example, Petitioner asserts that “Park’s adjustable bridge ‘would greatly expand the number of devices that [Willner’s] product would support, leading to the predictable result of having a larger base of customers.’” Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1011, 19; Ex. 1018, 185 Ex. 1003 ¶ 138). Based on the present record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Willner and Park.” slip op. at 37
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,391,393 - Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 16, 2023 · IPR2023-00745 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4 and 8–22 for all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ recitations are similar in scope. Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is somewhat broader in both education and proposed work experience. This proposed work experience is somewhat vague and potentially outside the scope of the claimed invention. For example, the requirement that the person of ordinary skill in the art have experience with the “capture and processing of data or information, including but not limited to physiological information,” would seemingly encompass data processing areas that do not relate to the scope of the claimed invention. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with both the scope of the claimed invention and the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that our decision would be the same adopting either proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner proposes constructions for the terms “embedded” (recited in claims 1, 9, and 15), “lead” (recited in the independent claims), “pad” (recited in claim 1 and some of its dependent claims), and “pocket” (recited in dependent claim 8). Pet. 7–12. Patent Owner, at this time, “discerns no need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on analyses of Masimo’s asserted grounds, and would not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties.” Prelim. Resp. 6.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenOther
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s citation to Mills (Ex. 1006, 5:18–19), which is “[y]et another VLSI chip . . . SRAM chip 38,” does not necessarily disclose a processor standing alone. Petitioner’s position, however, does not rely just on SRAM chip 38, but instead a VLSI comprising other circuit components, including a distinct processor. See Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1006, 2:3–6). Petitioner first cites to Mills column 2 to support its position that “housing 12 comprises a very-large scale integrated (VLSI) circuit chip that includes an ‘ECG signal and abnormal event detection circuitry, analog-to-digital (AD) and digital-to-analog (DA) conversion circuitry, memory and processor circuitry.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1006, 2:3–6). Petitioner next relies on Mills’ disclosure that “microprocessor and associated electronics, including firmware executed thereby, employs a digital bandpass filter reliably to detect ECG signals.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1006, 2:20–23). Petitioner next cites to Mills (Ex. 1006, 4:55–5:3), which describes “circuitry shown schematically in FIG.4, including on [PCB 50’s] bottom side a microcontroller (with integral ROM) chip 42.” Pet. 31. It is unclear from this citation whether Petitioner is relying on microcontroller 42 (on PCB 50’s bottom side) as a processor because Petitioner then quotes Mills’ discussion of SRAM chip 38, which states “that the VLSI is surface-mounted on the top side of printed circuit board (PCB) 50.” Pet. 31 (quoting Ex. 1006, 5:18–19). We understand Petitioner’s position as relying on the “very-large scale integrated (VLSI) circuit chip that includes” several components, including “memory and processor circuitry.” Pet. 31 (quoting Ex. 1006, 2:3–6). Notably, this section of the specification is labeled, “Background and Summary of the Invention,” and the paragraph describing this VLSI circuit chip is “summarizing the invention.” Ex. 1006, 1:7–8, 1:60. This VLSI circuit chip does not appear to us to be the same as VLSI SRAM chip 38, which is characterized by Mills as “[y]et another VLSI chip.” Ex. 1006, 5:18. Mr. Oslan testifies that “the VLSI is a processor coupled to the heart sensor (first and second electrodes 14 and 16, respectively) and is configured to receive and process the detected cardiac signal.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 65. Mr. Oslan relies on Mills’ disclosure of a microprocessor and associated electronics, including firmware employing a digital bandpass filter for detecting ECG signals. Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 2:20–23). This cited sentence of Mills further discloses characterizing ECG signals (processing) based on QRS complexes or pacer and defibrillator pulses, but ignoring noise and motion artifacts. Ex. 1006, 2:20–25. Patent Owner makes additional arguments, such as alleging that the” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,076,257 - Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 5, 2023 · IPR2023-00734 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Masimo would prevail on claims 1, 7, and 14 as obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework in determining whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’491 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’491 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner proposes constructions for certain terms concerning the cover material—“a cover formed from a dielectric material,” “a transparent substrate,” and “a cover comprising a non-conductive material”—and window terms such as “defines at least one window” and “window defined.” Pet. 7–10. Patent Owner states: “While not agreeing with Petitioner’s proposed constructions (or lack thereof) for certain claim terms . . . , solely for purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not object to the constructions proposed by Petitioner at this time.” Prelim. Resp. 24. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,942,491 - Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 27, 2023 · IPR2023-00774 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Masimo did not show a reasonable likelihood that the claimed design of claim 1 was unpatentable under any of its three obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner that the claimed design includes such a feature. We note that there is some potential ambiguity in Petitioner’s construction as to that feature of an outermost continuous circle as between the three colorized figures reproduced on pages 12 and 13 of the Petition (and also reproduced above in § I.C.1). It would seem, however, that the colorized figure on page 13 of the Petition appears to suggest an outer circle in identifying the “Chamfered Edge” and the “Vertical Edge” as claimed features. See Pet. 12. Because we think that the “outermost continuous circle” is a claimed feature of the ’279 patent, we adopt the claim construction that is advanced by Patent Owner as clearly noting the presence of such a feature. See, e.g., supra § I.C.2. We note, however that the outcome of this proceeding would ultimately be the same even were we to adopt Petitioner’s claim construction. That is so because (1) Petitioner’s construction also appears to recognize the outermost continuous circle, and (2) for reasons that are discussed at length below, we conclude that Patent Owner has identified sufficient deficiencies in Petitioner’s proposed grounds that preclude institution irrespective of any claim construction.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In assessing the parties’ views as to level of skill of a designer of ordinary skill in the art, we conclude that they are effectively the same. Indeed, the parties do not identify any material difference between the parties’ proposed assessment. Nevertheless, for clarity and completeness, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed assessment. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“those portions. For instance, as noted by Patent Owner (see, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 30–33) the arc-shaped portions of the ’279 patent design are thinner than those of Paulke’s Figure 1G, and the spacing of the arc-shaped portions in the ’279 patent is noticeably smaller than in Paulke. That enlarged spacing in Paulke eliminates any appearance of an outer continuous circle formed by the outer ring of the arc-shaped portions, which is present in the design of the ’279 patent. In that respect, we find credible Patent Owner’s argument that “Paulke’s features provide an appearance of two separate, opposed shapes that differs prominently from the ’279 patent’s arches that evoke an overall concentric circle appearance.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 64). Additionally, the orientation of the arc-shaped portions in Paulke is rotated 90 degrees from that of the ’279 patent.5 In our view, the above-noted differences in overall appearance as between Paulke and the ’279 patent convey that Paulke is not “basically the same” as the claimed design of the ’279 patent so as to be regarded as a proper Rosen reference. See In re Rosen, 673 F.2d at 391.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We find persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments, and the authority underlying those arguments, in casting doubt as to the propriety of the reasoning for combining Mendelson and Chung with Paulsen that are divorced from consideration of ornamental or visual appearance.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness - Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 27, 2023 · IPR2023-00702 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that the sole design claim was unpatentable under any of its three obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“1, “Pet.”) requesting inter partes review of U.S. Patent No. D947,842 S (“the ’842 patent,” Ex. 1001). Patent Owner, Apple Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 8, “Prelim. Resp.”). We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In assessing the parties’ views as to level of skill of a designer of ordinary skill in the art, we conclude that they are effectively the same. Indeed, the parties do not identify any material difference between the parties’ proposed assessments. Nevertheless, for clarity and completeness, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed assessment. We note, however, that even if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same. C. Proposed Obviousness Ground of Unpatentability Based on Paulke and” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“constructions of the ’842 patent, e.g., that the claimed design incorporates two arc-shaped portions residing on a rear face of an electronic device and a central circular array of rectangles. We discern, however, that one point of disagreement centers on the proposed presence of an “outermost continuous circle” as is advanced by Patent Owner. See Prelim. Resp. 5. Careful review of the figures of the ’842 patent, particularly Figure 4, does appear to bear out the conclusion that the arc-shaped portions do incorporate a continuous circle as urged by Patent Owner.2 Additionally, we question Petitioner’s assertions that the “sidewall” of the arc-shaped portions does not appear to be a claimed feature. Petitioner’s own claim construction reproduced above suggests that, with respect to the arc-shaped portions said 2 We note that Patent Owner makes reference to Exhibit 2002 as constituting “supplemental drawings filed with the USPTO on December 14, 2021.” Prelim. Resp. 5 n.1. As the ’842 patent issued on April 5, 2022, it is not apparent why the supplemental drawings do not appear in the patent. We note that the supplemental drawings, specifically Figure 4 (see Ex. 2002, 4), are clearer in showing that the noted design includes an outermost continuous circle. Regardless, we conclude that it is also sufficiently apparent that the drawings of the ’842 patent, e.g., Figure 4, show such an outermost continuous circle. by Petitioner to be part of the ’842 patent claim and shown in gray (see Pet. 11), there is gray shading of the sidewalls of the arc-shaped portions. Accordingly, we adopt the claim construction that is advanced by Patent Owner as better supported by the ’842 patent. See, e.g., supra § I.C.2. We note, however, that even if we were to adopt Petitioner’s claim construction, the ultimate outcome of this proceeding would be the same. That is so because, for reasons discussed below, we conclude that Patent Owner has identified sufficient deficiencies in Petitioner’s proposed grounds that preclude institution of inter partes review irrespective of any claim construction.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Paulke, when properly viewed as a complete article embodying the design, including the external elements, does not depict such a rectangle as being visible with any external components. See Prelim. Resp. 22; see also id. at 26–27 (“[t]he purported photodiode, even if present, would have been hidden behind Paulke’s depicted openings through sensor 124” (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 54–55)). Petitioner proceeds, however, to extrapolate from that apparent interior rectangular structure an altered version of Paulke’s Figure 1G that is said be “Composite with FIG. 2A.” Pet. 55. We find Petitioner’s approach in that regard as unavailing in establishing in Paulke any semblance of a visual impression of a rectangle appearing in conjunction, for instance, with Paulke’s Figure 1G. In that regard, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not “explain[] why a DOSA would have understood Paulke to have an appearance of a rectangular shape that deviates from Paulke’s illustrated appearance.” Prelim. Resp. 28. Moreover, and significantly, the presence of any interior circular arrangement of rectangular shaped objects is entirely absent from Paulke. Furthermore, although both figures include a central portion with arc-shaped portions, there are some significant differences in the appearance of those portions. For instance, as noted by Patent Owner (see, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 30–33), the arc-shaped portions of the ’842 patent design are thinner than those of Paulke’s Figure 1G, and the spacing of the arc-shaped portions in the ’842 patent is noticeably smaller than in Paulke. That enlarged spacing in Paulke eliminates any appearance of an outer continuous circle formed by the outer ring of the arc-shaped portions, which is present in the ’842 patent design. In that respect, we find credible Patent Owner’s argument that “the Paulke opposed shapes have the appearance of two separate features rather than the ’842 patent’s unified circular appearance of arches.” Prelim. Resp. 32 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 63–65). Additionally, the orientation of the arc-shaped portions in Paulke is rotated 90 degrees from that of the ’842 patent.5 In our view, Patent Owner credibly argues that the above-noted differences establish sufficient visual dissimilarities to remove Paulke from being considered a proper Rosen reference. Nevertheless, even were we to assume that Paulke is a proper Rosen” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness - Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 25, 2023 · IPR2023-00634 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 9, and 15 are obvious over Kotanagi and Honda.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework in determining whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’783 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’783 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner proposes constructions for “a ceramic cover,” “biosensor module,” and “ceramic cover defines a [first/second] opening to [transmit/receive] the light.” Pet. 13–16 (alterations in original). Patent Owner states: “While not agreeing with Petitioner’s proposed constructions (or lack thereof) for certain claim terms (see Petition, 13–16), solely for purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not object to the constructions proposed by Petitioner at this time.” Prelim. Resp. 17. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,627,783 - Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 20, 2023 · IPR2023-00664 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success at least for claims 1, 9, and 17.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A POSITA [person of ordinary skill in the art] of the ’352 patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to human-computer interaction, such as Human Factors, Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years of experience working with touchscreen user interfaces. More education could substitute for less work experience, and vice-versa. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 34). Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Although we see no error in Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions, we do not believe it necessary to adopt them because the surrounding claim language sufficiently defines the scope for each of the respective “user interface” limitations.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner next addresses the claim term “input that is directed to a portion of” a user interface. Pet. 24–25. Petitioner explains that “[n]umerous claims recite navigational actions invoked by ‘input that is directed to a portion of’ the current screen,” such that “the input is directed to part of the screen, rather than a physical button, keyboard, or other input device external to the screen.” Pet. 24. According to Petitioner, “[t]he claim language does not require the input to be directed to a predefined location on the screen, such as a location marked by a virtual home button or other indicator.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 53). Referring to Figure 5GC of the Specification, Petitioner notes that “a user navigates from a wake screen to a home screen by an upward swipe ‘at location that corresponds to home affordance 552, as indicated by focus selector 5244.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 53:4–10). Petitioner next relies on other embodiments, which describe the swipe gestures being directed to a part of the screen without regard to a predefined location. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1001, 79:64–80:22) Considering Petitioner’s supporting arguments and evidence, and based on the limited record before us, we construe “input is directed to a portion of” the screen to mean the user input is directed to part of the screen (but not necessarily at a predefined location) rather than through another physical input device external to the screen. See id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 54).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,106,352 - Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00635 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable, principally because Rothkopf did not disclose an electrode positioned on the carrier member.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (to anticipate a patent claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “a single prior art reference must expressly or inherently disclose each claim limitation”). Moreover, “[b]ecause the hallmark of anticipation is prior invention, the prior art reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Whether a reference anticipates is assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“‘[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching’ that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference.” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991))). slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“member.” On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for patent owner
“Independent claim 1 recites “a carrier member formed from a transparent material.” Ex. 1001, 56:13. Independent claim 9 recites “a carrier member having a circular carrier profile and positioned over the circular rear opening.” Id. at 57:20–21. Independent claim 15 recites “a carrier member protruding outward from an external surface of the housing member.” Id. at 58:10–11. None of these phrases is written in the form of a “means for” performing a function, the Petition does not identify a recited function,5 and Petitioner does not address the issue of whether the overall limitation recites adequate structure for performing any such function. See 5 On the conference call, Petitioner represented that “the Petition identifies carrying or supporting electrodes to be the function of the carrier member.” Ex. 1051, 49:3–10 (citing Pet. 10–12). The cited section of the Petition quotes the Specification, not the claim. Pet. 10. However, the focus of a means-plus-function analysis is the function recited in the claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). And, the Petition associates the function of supporting the electrodes with “carrier assembly” not “carrier member.” See Pet. 10–11 (“Petitioner interprets the claim term ‘carrier assembly’ according[ly] to mean any appropriate structure that supports the electrodes and, optionally, optical components.”). Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The first step is to determine whether a claim limitation is drafted in means-plusfunction format, which requires us to construe the limitation to determine whether it connotes sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.”). Additionally, regardless as to whether “Courts have construed ‘member’ style claim terms as nonstructural” under the particular facts before those courts, it was incumbent upon Petitioner—particularly in light of the “carrier” modifier—to demonstrate that “carrier member” is a nonce term under the facts of the case before us, i.e. whether the term is a generic placeholder that a person of ordinary skill in the art of wearable electronic devices/watches would not recognize as a name for sufficiently definite structure. Pet. 11; Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348 (“In making the assessment of whether the limitation in question is a means-plus-function term subject to the strictures of § 112, para. 6, our cases have emphasized that the essential inquiry is . . . whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”); see id. at 1350 (explaining that a nonce word is a generic term “that reflect[s] nothing more than verbal constructs [that] may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means’ because they ‘typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure’ and therefore may invoke § 112, para. 6.”); see also Kyocera, 22 F.4th 1380 (the court, in Petitioner’s cited case, determining, as part of its analysis, that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the claimed ‘lifter member’ to have ‘a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for a structure.’”). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not shown persuasively that “carrier member” is a means-plus-function term.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable
“We find to be persuasive Patent Owner’s argument that “the Petition fails to cite anything in Rothkopf that describes electrodes attached to the ‘rear cover 608.’” Prelim. Resp. 23. Rothkopf discloses several embodiments of varying configurations. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 4–27. Petitioner, in the block quoted contention above, stitches together several statements from various points in the Specification that individually are correct descriptions of an aspect of a particular embodiment or example but, together, fail to constitute a disclosure of an embodiment having electrodes positioned on the rear cover. For example, Rothkopf, in the paragraph 148 cited by Petitioner, states that “[i]n some embodiments, the biosensor module 710 includes the rear cover 608” and, “[a]s described in more detail . . . with respect to FIG. 16, the biosensor module 710 may include one or more light sources, one or more photodetectors, and one or more electrodes or conductive elements.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 148 (emphasis added). Thus, the biosensor module (mapped to the carrier assembly, not the carrier member) might include a rear cover and might include an electrode. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the electrode, when present, is positioned on the cover (mapped to the carrier member). Petitioner points to Rothkopf’s paragraph 201 as support for the proposition that “Rothkopf describes an embodiment where the electrodes are positioned on the cover 608.” Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 201). That paragraph provides that, “[a]s described above with respect to FIG. 6, in some embodiments, the biosensors are disposed relative to or attached to a rear cover 608 that is formed from an optically transparent material and is configured to be positioned with the opening of the housing 601.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 201. The paragraph does not describe an electrode as an exemplary biosensor in such embodiments. Rather, the paragraph goes on to describe the rear cover’s use with light sources 1611–1613 and detector 1614, i.e. optical sensor components. See id. (“The convex curved area of the rear cover 608 may include one or more windows or apertures that provide operational access to one or more internal components located within the housing. For example, the rear cover 608 may include an array of windows, each window including an aperture or opening for a respective light source 1611–1613 and/or the detector 1614.”). This description is consistent with Figure 16, which is relied on by Petitioner, where those optical sensor components are positioned on or under rear cover 608 (shaded orange in Petitioner’s annotated figure above) while electrodes 1601 and 1602 are positioned on the rear face of the housing (shaded in red) and thereby contact the user’s skin. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 190, 196 (“In this example [of Figure 16], a first electrode 1601 and second electrode 1602 are disposed on the rear face of the device 100. The first 1601 and second 1602 electrodes may be configured to make contact with the skin of the user’s wrist when the device is being worn.”). We determine that Petitioner has not shown adequately that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand Rothkopf to disclose an electrode positioned on the carrier member, as recited in independent claims 9 and 15 and, by extension, claims 13 and 14, which depend from independent claim 9. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its anticipation challenge (Ground 1).” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,987,054
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.