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  • PTAB · Dec 22, 2021 · IPR2021-01055 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5 and 9–19 on five § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’766 Patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–5 and 9–19 of the ’766 Patent on the grounds of unpatentability raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “For a reference to qualify as a printed publication, “before the critical date the reference must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “When there is an established publisher there is a presumption of public accessibility as of the publication date.” VidStream LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 981 F.3d 1060, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, Case IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential) (determining that, based on the totality of the evidence, a reference bearing a copyright date, a printing date, and an ISBN date all earlier than the critical date of the challenged patent, and the reference was a “textbook from an established publisher” provided sufficient indicia at the institution state).” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “configuration error” With respect to the limitation “configuration error,” Patent Owner asserts that configuration error means “either (1) the condition that occurs when ‘a rule or series of rules is not properly defined and produces an undesired effect’ or (2) ‘a series of improperly defined rules causes a part to be in more than one state at the same time.’” Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:54–61; Ex. 2001 ¶ 40). At this stage of the proceeding, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is supported by the ’766 Patent specification, and adopt Patent Owner’s proposed meaning of “configuration error,” with the following remarks with respect to Patent Owner’s additional arguments regarding the claim construction. Patent Owner, however, also argues that “the specification concerns errors internal to the configuration engine and not ‘errors’ that prevent product configurator users from making their desired but impermissible selections.” Prelim. Resp. 10. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because the first part of the construction, namely rules not being properly defined and “produc[ing] an undesired effect,” does not specify anything about an error being “internal” to the configuration engine. The specification provides that such a configuration error “may occur when a rule or series of rules is not properly defined and produces an undesired effect, such as the exclusion of a part that should be selectable” (Ex. 1001, 1:54–61, emphasis added), but the latter clause provides only one example of the undesired effect. We are not persuaded, based on our review of the Specification of the ’766 Patent that “an undesired effect” should be limited to the exclusion of a part. Thus, although Patent Owner argues that “a configuration error is not a condition that occurs when a user attempts to make a choice that is prohibited by a rule” (Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 43)), at this juncture, we are not persuaded that such a condition would not be an undesired effect, according to the adopted construction. Therefore, we do not further limit the construction of “configuration error.” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “II. ANALYSIS Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Wood’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer or Electrical Engineering, Engineering Science, an engineering major with a significant computational component, or a similar discipline, or with at least two years of research or experience in configurable systems including testing.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 53–55). Patent Owner argues that “[t]here may be some differences between this and the correct level of skill in the art but those differences will not affect this case at this stage,” such that Patent Owner applies the proposed level of skill in the art without agreeing to it. Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 35–37). At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), and, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 6

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,836,766
  • PTAB · Dec 15, 2021 · IPR2021-01161 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Philipp and QT60161.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Givargis Declaration (Ex. 1003), which Patent Owner does not address at this stage, we are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates, for purposes of this Decision, that the combination of Philipp and QT60161 teaches each claim limitation recited in claim 1 and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of the references in the manner set forth in the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner has demonstrated, on this record, a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable over Philipp and QT60161. 4. Claims 2–20 Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’251 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (indicating that a decision whether to institute an inter partes review “requires a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every” slip op. at 18

    • Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner

      “Parallel Petitions Challenging the Same Patent. Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. Two or more petitions filed against the same patent at or about the same time (e.g., before the first preliminary response by the patent owner) may place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). CTPG, 59. Nonetheless, the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide recognizes that “more than one petition may be necessary, including for example, . . . when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Id. The present circumstance is consistent with the exception referenced in the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide because there is a potential dispute about the effective filing date of the ’251 patent, which may require arguments to be made under multiple prior art references. See Paper 3, 2–3. Moreover, Patent Owner has not requested that we exercise our discretion to only consider, at most, one petition. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny this Petition under § 314(a). E.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “implement these functions with a touch screen and to trigger the claimed time duration from detecting a ‘key touch on a/the touch screen’ pursuant to the touch screen teachings of QT60161.” Pet. 36.9 More specifically, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to apply the timed features of Philipp “to a ‘touch screen’ and to trigger the claimed time duration from detecting a ‘key touch on a/the touch screen.’” Id. at 29. According to Petitioner, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have made such a combination because (1) “the primary timer-based functions described and claimed in the ’251 Patent are not only compatible with the touch screen described in QT60161, but are expressly discussed in QT60161” (id. at 30; see also id. at 3031 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:61– 7:2; Ex. 1017, 7)), 9 The Petition emphasizes the names of prior art references. The emphasis is omitted throughout this Decision. (2) QT60161 and Philipp “are compatible with the same sensor technology” (id. at 31; see also id. at 31–32 (citing Ex. 1017, 5, Figs. 1-1, 1-2; Ex. 1024 ¶ 48, 49; Ex. 1003 ¶ 52; Ex. 1028, Figs. 1b, 7)), (3) both the ’251 patent and QT60161 are directed to saving power after the passage of time (id. at 32–33 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:55–65, 10:41–13:59; Ex. 1017, 11; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 97– 103)), and (4) implementing Philipp “with QT60161’s touch screen would have yielded predictable results” (id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 97–103)). After reviewing Petitioner’s arguments and information, including the Givargis Declaration (Ex. 1003), which Patent Owner does not address at this stage, we are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates, for purposes of this Decision, that the combination of Philipp and QT60161 teaches each claim limitation recited in claim 1 and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of the references in the manner set forth in the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner has demonstrated, on this record, a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable over Philipp and QT60161.” slip op. at 17

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

      “In evaluating the effective filing date of the ’251 patent, we first address the parties’ respective burdens. In an inter partes review, Petitioner bears the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding unpatentability, which never shifts to patent owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Dynamic Drinkware also establishes that Petitioner has the initial burden of production to show a reference is prior art. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379. However, the burden of production then shifts to Patent Owner to refute Petitioner’s argument by either showing the prior art does not actually render the claims unpatentable or does not qualify as prior art. Id. at 1380. The burden of production then shifts back to Petitioner to respond to Patent Owner’s argument. Id. The Board then evaluates all of the evidence and determines whether Petitioner has satisfied its burden of persuasion regarding unpatentability. Id. We apply the same framework when considering whether the parties have met their respective burdens at this stage of the proceeding. (2) Application of Dynamic Drinkware Based on the current status of the proceedings, we are sufficiently persuaded that Petitioner satisfied its initial burden of production under Dynamic Drinkware. Specifically, Petitioner identifies two claim terms— “touch screen” and “key touch on a/the touch screen”—that are recited in each of the independent claims and were added to the ’274 application. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002, 38–41); see also id. at 11–17. Additionally, as discussed below, Petitioner has also sufficiently shown that the combination of Philipp and QT60161 teaches each of the limitations of the claims of the ’251 patent. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.2d at 1379 (finding Petitioner satisfied its initial burden of production by arguing that the prior art rendered the claims unpatentable). Because Petitioner satisfied its initial burden of production, the burden of production now shifts to Patent Owner to argue or produce evidence that either (1) the prior art does not render the claims unpatentable or (2) that Philipp is not prior art because the asserted claims of the ’251 patent are entitled to the benefit of a filing date (constructive or otherwise) prior to Philipp. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380. Because Patent Owner—as is its right—chose not to file a Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, for purposes of institution only, Patent Owner did not meet its burden of production to show that the ’251 patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than Philipp.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,749,251
  • PTAB · Dec 15, 2021 · IPR2021-01160 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” PTAB Rules of Practice for Instituting on All Challenged Patent Claims and All Grounds and Eliminating the Presumption at Institution Favoring Petitioner as to Testimonial Evidence, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,120, 79,129 (Dec. 9, 2020) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2021)).” slip op. at 2

    • Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner

      “Parallel Petitions Challenging the Same Patent. Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. Two or more petitions filed against the same patent at or about the same time (e.g., before the first preliminary response by the patent owner) may place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). CTPG, 59. Nonetheless, the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide recognizes that “more than one petition may be necessary, including for example, . . . when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Id. Because there is a dispute about the effective filing date of the ’251 patent, which may require arguments to be made under multiple prior art references, the present circumstance is consistent with the exception referenced in the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide. See Paper 3, 2–3. Moreover, Patent Owner has not requested that we exercise our discretion to only consider, at most, one petition. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny this Petition under § 314(a). E.” slip op. at 11

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have been a person having at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of human-machine interfaces such as touch sensors and the firmware or system software that govern said interfaces, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22). Patent Owner does not address this issue. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art that Petitioner proffers, except that we delete the qualifiers “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of education and practical experience. The qualifiers expand the range indefinitely without an upper bound, and thus precludes a meaningful indication of the level of ordinary skill in the art.7 C.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner proposes constructions for two terms. See Pet. 11–16. Because no express construction is needed to resolve any dispute in this proceeding, we do not construe any of the claim limitations. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D.” slip op. at 10

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,749,251
  • PTAB · Dec 13, 2021 · IPR2021-01128 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5–12, and 14–19 on all petitioned grounds, after finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the § 103 grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner proposes the same articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art that the Administrative Law Judge adopted in the related ITC proceeding, which is as follows: one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of touch sensors, human-machine interaction and interfaces, and/or graphical user interfaces, and related firmware and software, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 6; Ex. 1008, 8. Dr. Bederson agrees with it. See Pet. 6, Bederson Decl. ¶ 30. This articulation of the level of ordinary skill is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’173 patent and the prior art of record. Therefore, we adopt the proposed articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Although a number of ’173 patent claim terms have been construed in the related ITC proceeding, Petitioner contends that we do not need to explicitly construe any claim terms. Pet. 6–7. In particular, the constructions for the selected terms in the related ITC proceeding are as follows, according to Petitioner. Term Construction a sensing element that com-a physical electrical sensing element prises a sensing path that com-made of conductive substances that prises a length comprises a path for sensing that is determined for each use that com-prises a length object either an inanimate object, such as a wiper, pointer, or stylus, or alterna-tively, a human finger or other ap-pendage any of whose presence ad-jacent the element will create a lo-calized capacitive coupling from a region of the element back to a cir-cuit reference via any circuitous path, whether galvanically or nongalvanically displacement distance and direction of movement Pet. 6−7. Petitioner does not dispute these constructions (id.), which we find reasonable at this juncture. Therefore, we preliminarily adopt these constructions for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “At our discretion, we may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Applying that standard, we institute an inter partes review of all asserted grounds and all challenged claims of the ’173 patent for the reasons explained below. This is a preliminary decision, and we will base our final written decision on the full trial record, including any timely response by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Further, to the extent the range of parameter values is not expressly or inherently taught by Trent, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to set a parameter to an initial value within a range that is associated with the length of the sensing path. Id. Relying on testimony of Dr. Bederson, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the volume control knob of Trent’s Figure 36 (reproduced above in our overview of Trent) with functionality that sets the volume to an initial value as disclosed in Trent’s paragraph 92. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3, 4−11; Bederson Decl. ¶¶ 91–93). Petitioner also argues that Trent identifies, as part of the prior art “solutions” to the problem of the invention, a two-dimensional sensor in which users can slide their fingers to generate scrolling actions. Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 11). According to Dr. Bederson, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that such a sensor would set a parameter to an initial value as recited in the claims. See Bederson Decl. ¶ 93. We find Petitioner’s arguments, and Dr. Bederson’s supporting testimony on the above points, sufficiently persuasive at this preliminary stage to show by a reasonable likelihood that Trent discloses or teaches the Setting Parameter Limitation.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,432,173
  • PTAB · Dec 7, 2021 · IPR2021-01004 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on claims 1–30 because Google did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged obviousness ground.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any claim of the ’196 patent. The Petition is denied.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found

      “Nonetheless, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has sufficiently articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings for the proffered combination, as required by KSR. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, it is not the case that “the identification technique disclosed in Hancock necessarily includes a determination of whether the device type is fixed or mobile.” Pet. 15. Rather, each separate embodiment of a portable computing device used in the Hancock system has an automatic location identification (ALI) device that is specifically designed for that device. Ex. 1005, 23:51–24:4 (describing “ALI Example I” and “ALI Example II” for cellular devices, and an additional example for land-line telephone devices). There is no suggestion of providing, for any of Hancock’s devices or server, the capability to determine whether the device is fixed or mobile, and Hancock suggests no reason to have that capability. Each device has its own ALI that is specifically designed for that device. Because we find insufficient factual support for Petitioner’s basic premise, that “the identification technique disclosed in Hancock necessarily includes a determination of whether the device type is fixed or mobile,” the rationale for the combination fails scrutiny. Even though Karp discloses a step in which a server determines whether a communicating device is a cell device, there is no persuasive reason in the present record why one of ordinary skill would have considered that pertinent to Hancock.” slip op. at 18

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Either proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). On this record, the level of ordinary skill is neither in dispute nor dispositive of any challenge. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s articulation.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner states, “[n]o claims need be expressly construed.” Pet. 2. Patent Owner does not propose any constructions of the claims for purposes here. Prelim. Resp. 3–4. For purposes of this Decision, we do not construe any claim terms. D.” slip op. at 9

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,918,196
  • PTAB · Dec 1, 2021 · IPR2021-00943 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 5–9, 11, 12, 16–20, and 22 based on a reasonable likelihood that the combination of the 300 reference, the 321 reference, and Ericsson renders claim 12 obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “Petition is not materially different from the prior art presented to the Examiner because the basis for the sole challenge in the Petition is a combination of references listed in the IDS. Pet. 3–4. Thus, we determine that the Petition uses “the same or substantially the same” art compared to what was previously presented to the Office, which satisfies part one of the framework. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. 2. Part Two of the Advanced Bionics Framework Under part two, we must determine “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Id. at 8. For the reasons discussed in this section,” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Yet Patent Owner does not provide a basis for its definition. By contrast, Petitioner’s definition is supported by the Min declaration. See Pet. 12 (citing Min Decl. ¶ 34). Also, Patent Owner does not specifically explain how its proposed definition affects Petitioner’s obviousness analysis. See Prelim. Resp. 36. Rather, Patent Owner argues “even under Samsung’s proposal, the level of ordinary skill in the art does not comport with Samsung’s assertion of obviousness.” Id. Considering the types of problems and solutions described in the ’120 Patent and the cited prior art, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 12. During trial, however, the parties are encouraged to explain how the differences between Patent Owner’s proposed definition and Petitioner’s affect the obviousness analysis.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

      “Rather, Petitioner’s “only when” construction is adequately supported on this record. Pet. 12–13. Specifically, we preliminarily agree that the first “transmitting” step appears to be independent of the later three “transmitting” steps. Id. at 13. The later three steps cover the potential scenarios other than the first transmitting step in which the UL Grant is that the claimed user equipment must transmit one of the Msg3 buffer data or new data—not both. See id. In this way, the claim language adequately supports Petitioner’s assertion that the “when” clause in the first transmitting step introduces a necessary condition, at this stage and on this record. See id. at 13–14. Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s “only when” construction for the purpose of determining whether to institute. See id.” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Motivation foundInstituted

      “Patent Owner’s argument, though, does not fully address Petitioner’s obviousness rationale, which relies on the 321 reference as well as other teachings from several other sources. See Pet. at 32–37. At this stage, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner that the 321 reference does not state what happens if a UE receives two uplink grants during an ongoing random access procedure. Id. at 31. Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to transmit Msg3 only when there was Msg3 data to transmit and the UE had received an uplink grant in a random access response. Id. at 33. To be sure, Patent Owner does address Petitioner’s obviousness rationale by arguing that it is based on improper hindsight. Prelim. Resp. 34– 37. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s “suggestion that a POSITA would find the solution to the problem of improper transmission of Msg3 data obvious in view of the then-existing draft of the LTE standard is incorrect.” Id. at 34. Patent Owner argues that “[b]y claiming that there was no problem to be solved and that the draft LTE standard already addressed the potential for erroneous Msg3 data transmission, [Petitioner] essentially argues that the inventors and the LTE Working Groups did not know how the standard and based on improper hindsight. Id. at 36–37. At this stage, we determine that Petitioner’s obviousness rationale is adequately supported by the preliminary record: The 321 reference states, “If the UE receives both a grant for its RA-RNTI and a grant for its C-RNTI, the UE may choose to continue with either the grant for its RA-RNTI or the grant for its C-RNTI.” Ex. 1003, § 5.4.1, quoted in Pet. 32. The 321 reference calls the RA-RNTI grant an uplink grant in a random access response and calls the C-RNTI grant the uplink grant in a PDCCH. See, e.g., id. §§ 3.1 (“UE shall monitor the PDCCH after the uplink message containing the C-RNTI MAC”), 4.5.2 (“RA-RNTI for Random Access Response on DL-SCH”), cited in Min Decl. ¶ 99. In at least this way, the 321 reference supports Petitioner’s reasoning. See Pet. 32. Petitioner’s obviousness rationale is further supported by the 300” slip op. at 21

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,517,120
  • PTAB · Dec 1, 2021 · IPR2021-00983 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim under the asserted anticipation or obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “(a) THRESHOLD.—The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s assertion (see generally Prelim. Resp.). The prior art itself demonstrates the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). in light of Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, we determine an ordinarily skilled artisan is: an individual who had (1) a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in the field of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science, or in an equivalent field that includes network engineering as a topic of study (hereinafter, “technical study”), plus at least one year of industry technical experience in the computer network field, such as serving as an engineer for an Internet service provider performing network design, development, or configuration tasks, or as a software developer for network communications software or related utility software, or (2) three years of full-time technical experience in the field of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science or in an equivalent field that includes network engineering or network communications software (hereinafter, “technical fields”), or (3) an equivalent combination of academic study in technical study and work experience in the technical fields.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “Proxy Rotator’ as ‘a system coupled of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting’” (Prelim. Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:4–7)). of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting” (id. at 5:4–7). In accordance with the Specification’s “general terminology description,” we construe the term “Smart Proxy Rotator” as a system coupled of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “construed as “‘the portion of all proxy requests received by the SPR during a time period that the SPR will refer to a particular proxy provider,’ which may be equal to the weight assigned to that particular proxy provider divided by the sum of weights assigned to all proxy providers during the same time period” (Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 56)). Patent Owner’s definition requiring a “utilization threshold” to be a “portion of all proxy requests received by the SPR during a time period that the SPR will refer to a particular proxy provider” is too narrow. The ’948 Patent does not expressly define the term “utilization threshold,” and, instead, describes utilization thresholds using an example (id. at 8:1–8). The ’948 Patent states [o]ne of the usage examples can be the following: if one provider has a weight equal to 10, and the other provider has a weight equal to 20, the proxy rotator should use the second provider 66.6% of the time and the first provider 33.3% of the time, when no changes to the default providers’ weights have been introduced. These percentages are the utilization thresholds of each provider. threshold is a goal amount of use, not an actual amount of use. A utilization threshold may represent a desired maximum percentage (i.e., proportion), of proxy requests to be referred to a particular proxy provider. Based on the Specification’s use of a “utilization threshold,” we construe the term to mean “a maximum percentage of use assigned to a particular proxy provider that is equal to a weight for the particular proxy provider divided by the sum of respective weights assigned to all proxy providers during the same time period.”” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,601,948
  • PTAB · Nov 23, 2021 · IPR2021-00883 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9, 11–20, 22–28, and 30 based on the §103 ground over Ji, Sarafa, and Oh.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and the associated evidence, for the reasons described below, we institute inter partes review of all the challenged claims on all the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the relevant time (early 2017) would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or information systems and at least two years’ industry experience in designing and/or implementing user interfaces, or equivalent education and experience. Cockburn Decl. ¶ 31. Alternatively, a skilled artisan could substitute 3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), revised 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’192 patent issued was filed after that date, with no benefit claim prior to that date, the AIA version of § 103 applies. 4 Ji et al., Chinese Patent Application Publication No. CN 105553834 A, published May 4, 2016 (Ex. 1005 (original publication), Ex. 1006 (certified English translation), “Ji”). 5 Sarafa et al., Published U.S. Patent Application No. 2018/0159812 A1, published June 7, 2018 (Ex. 1007, “Sarafa”). 6 Oh et al., Published U.S. Patent Application No. 2014/0143684 A1, published May 22, 2014 (Ex. 1008, “Oh”). directly relevant work experience with a higher level of education, e.g., an advanced degree such as a master’s of computer science. Id. Pet. 13. At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We find Petitioner’s proposed definition reasonable and consistent with the prior art before us. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (determining that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences did not err in concluding that the level of ordinary skill in the art was best determined by the references of record). Accordingly, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which also comports with the testimony of Dr. Cockburn (Ex. 1003 ¶ 31).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “For the reasons explained in Sections II.C and II.D, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing obviousness of the challenged claims, regardless of which party’s arguments about the meaning of “reference” are more correct. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim language. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). At the same time, we find one aspect of Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the construction of “reference” warrants some discussion. To the extent that Patent Owner views the term “reference” as coextensive with the term “link,” we have reason to believe the scope of the term “reference” may differ from the scope of the term “link.” As Patent Owner observes, the ’192 patent discloses “[b]y ‘reference’ what is meant is that there is a connection between the second message and the first message. The connection may be for example a link.” Ex. 1001, 4:25–27; Prelim. Resp. 14. Even if this disclosure indicates that a link is a type of reference, it does not say that every reference is a link. Indeed, the ’192 patent’s disclosure of “a (reference) object . . . that links or otherwise references a chat message” may suggest the terms “link” and “reference” are not coextensive. Ex. 1001, 3:26–29. For example, this disclosure may suggest that a reference can be but need not be a link. The parties are asked to address this observation during the trial.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Additionally, we find Petitioner has shown sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation and a reasonable expectation of success for modifying Ji’s system to use a reference in the manner disclosed by Sarafa. Pet. 14–18, 20–24, 50–53. Similarly, we find Petitioner has shown sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation and a reasonable expectation of success for combining the cited portions of Oh’s disclosure with the disclosures of Ji and Sarafa. Id. at 18–20, 24–26, 38–44. At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute that it would have been obvious to combine the cited portions of the disclosures of Ji, Sarafa, and Oh. Furthermore, we find a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will establish that the allegedly obvious combination of Ji’s, Sarafa’s, and Oh’s disclosures would have resulted in a messaging system implementing a reference in all the ways recited in the challenged claims. At this stage, our review of the record does not reveal an apparent distinction between the challenged claims and a system that would have resulted from combining the disclosures of Ji, Sarafa, and Oh in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Here again, Patent Owner does not address Sarafa, Oh or the proposed combination of their disclosures with Ji; Patent Owner only argues Ji does not disclose a reference. In sum, based on the proposed combination of the references’ teachings, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its obviousness assertions, even if Ji does not disclose a reference.” slip op. at 37

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,728,192
  • PTAB · Nov 23, 2021 · IPR2021-00882 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–23 on both obviousness grounds: Ji and Sarafa, and Ji, Sarafa, and Oh.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing that each of the challenged claims would have been obvious over Ji and Sarafa. At this stage, Petitioner has provided sufficient arguments and evidence that (1) a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation and a reasonable expectation of success for the proposed combination of the references’ disclosures and (2) the proposed combination would meet all limitations of each challenged claim.” slip op. at 30

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the relevant time (early 2017) would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or information systems and at least two years’ industry experience in designing and/or implementing user interfaces, or equivalent education and experience. Cockburn Decl. ¶ 31. Alternatively, a skilled artisan could substitute directly relevant work experience with a higher level of education, e.g., an advanced degree such as a master’s of computer science. Id. Pet. 12–13. At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We find Petitioner’s proposed definition reasonable and consistent with the prior art before us. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (determining that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences did not err in concluding that the level of ordinary skill in the art was best determined by the references of record). Accordingly, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which also comports with the testimony of Dr. Cockburn (Ex. 1003 ¶ 31).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “For the reasons explained in Sections II.C and II.D, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing obviousness of the challenged claims, regardless of which party’s proposed construction of “link” is more accurate. Additionally, there is presently no dispute regarding the claim language “changing display of information.” Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim language. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing that each of the challenged claims would have been obvious over Ji and Sarafa. At this stage, Petitioner has provided sufficient arguments and evidence that (1) a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation and a reasonable expectation of success for the proposed combination of the references’ disclosures and (2) the proposed combination would meet all limitations of each challenged claim.” slip op. at 30

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 9,860,198
  • PTAB · Oct 28, 2021 · IPR2020-00923 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–17 were held unpatentable as obvious over BOP California, Wodjenski, and Winters; the revised motion to amend proposing claims 19–35 was denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

      “1 The Petition requested review of claims 1–18, but Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claim 18. Pet. 3; Ex. 2001; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“The patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. 253(a) in compliance with § 1.321(a) of this chapter, disclaiming one or more claims in the patent. No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018). claims on which we instituted trial. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) claims 1–17 of the ’143 patent are unpatentable; and (2) Patent Owner’s proposed substitute claims 19–35 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “B. Testimony of Mr. Anderson Patent Owner contends that the testimony provided by Petitioner’s” slip op. at 16

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the” slip op. at 18

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

      “D. Claim Construction The Board uses “the same claim construction standard that would be” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 9,207,143 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,207,143

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.