- Qualcomm Incorporated v. Network System Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01081 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 6, and 9–16 are unpatentable as obvious over Goossens2003 and Drake; the Board did not reach the Goossens2002 and Drake challenge.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“3. WHETHER AN ORDINARILY SKILLED ARTISAN WOULD HAVE BEEN MOTIVATED TO COMBINE THE TEACHINGS OF” slip op. at 54
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Qualcomm”) filed a petition in IPR2024-01081 challenging claims 2, 6, and 9–16 in the ’449 patent on substantively identical grounds to those asserted in Samsung’s Petition. Qualcomm Incorporated v. Network System Technologies, LLC, IPR2024-01081, Paper 1 (“Pet.”).2 Concurrently with filing the petition in IPR2024-01081, Petitioner filed a motion for joinder, seeking joinder as a party in this proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). IPR2024-01081, Paper 3. slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“IV. JOINDER AND THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR IN § 315(b) Regarding joinder, § 315(c) permits joinder as a party and states:” slip op. at 157
- ExcludeOther
“In our analyses above, we do not rely on any of the evidence that Petitioner seeks to exclude. See, e.g., supra §§ III.C–III.E. Hence, we dismiss Petitioner’s motion to exclude evidence as moot. See, e.g., Netflix, Inc. v. GoTV Streaming, LLC, IPR2023-00757, Paper 39 at 135 (PTAB Nov. 5, 2024) (dismissing motion to exclude evidence as moot); Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. v. Spero, IPR2023-00335, Paper 40 at 24 (PTAB July 15, 2024) (dismissing motion to exclude evidence as moot).” slip op. at 159
Patent outcomesUS 7,373,449 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,373,449 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Qualcomm Incorporated v. Network System Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00338 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 6, and 9–16 are unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Goossens2003 and Drake.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“Accordingly, “the teachings of Drake apply directly to systems on” slip op. at 82
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“In October 2024, the Board (1) instituted an inter partes review in IPR2024-01081, (2) granted Petitioner’s motion for joinder in IPR2024- 01081, and (3) joined Petitioner as a party in this proceeding. Paper 16 (“Qualcomm Inst. Dec.”), 50–51; IPR2024-01081, Paper 14 at 50–51. The next day, based on a settlement between Samsung and Patent Owner, the Board granted in part a joint motion to terminate filed by Samsung and Patent Owner and terminated Samsung as a petitioner in this proceeding. See Paper 14 (Joint Motion); Paper 17 (Order).” slip op. at 3
- ExcludeOther
“In our analyses above, we do not rely on any of the evidence that Petitioner seeks to exclude. See, e.g., supra §§ III.C–III.E. Hence, we dismiss Petitioner’s motion to exclude evidence as moot. See, e.g., Netflix, Inc. v. GoTV Streaming, LLC, IPR2023-00757, Paper 39 at 135 (PTAB Nov. 5, 2024) (dismissing motion to exclude evidence as moot); Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. v. Spero, IPR2023-00335, Paper 40 at 24 (PTAB July 15, 2024) (dismissing motion to exclude evidence as moot).” slip op. at 159
Patent outcomesUS 7,373,449 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,373,449 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Monarch Networking Solutions LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00175 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7, 9–11, 13, 14, 16, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Biswas and Kumar; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–64). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579. On this record, the level of ordinary skill is neither in dispute nor dispositive of any challenge. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s articulation.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The parties submit that no claim construction is necessary. Pet. 14; PO Resp. 15. We have not been presented with the need to construe any claim terms for this Decision. D.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We determine that Petitioner has provided sufficiently articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings for the proffered combined teachings of Biswas and Kumar. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s declarant’s testimony that one of ordinary skill would have known to use the masking techniques exemplified by Kumar to implement the disclosed operation in Biswas of edge routers providing hosts with port number ranges. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77, 97–101. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Biswas and Kumar.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“This disclosure is inconsistent with any suggestion that the Fangman system, when routing a telephone call to its destination, identifies the private IP address of the destination telephone by determining the port range to which the port number of the destination telephone belongs. When Fangman describes the NAPPT process, it does not indicate that port ranges are used, but rather repeatedly states that port numbers are used: The [service gateway] receives a data packet from the IP device, including a public destination IP address . . . a destination port number . . . and source information, NAPPTs the data packet, using the [public destination IP address] and the [destination port number] to identify the [IP telephone] . . . . Ex. 1024, code (57). Performing NAPPT on the data packet received from the destination may include using the public destination IP address and the destination port number to uniquely identify the IP telephone, and changing the public destination IP address to a private source IP address of the IP telephone while leaving the destination port number unchanged. Ex. 1024, 4:28–33. The SG 170 may maintain a table of semi-permanent mappings of the external IP address and ports to the internal hosts and ports. Ex. 1024, 8:49–51.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 8,693,369 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,693,369 - PTAB · Oct 1, 2024 · IPR2024-01081 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 2, 6, and 9–16 on all petition grounds and granted Qualcomm’s motion to join the Samsung IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“§ 42.101(b) does not apply under the circumstances here. See Mot. Reply 3, 5. Referencing § 315(b)’s one-year time bar, the Federal Circuit has explained that § 315(b) “includes a specific exception to the time bar” because “[b]y its own terms, ‘[t]he time limitation . . . shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).’” Facebook, 973 F.3d at 1333 (alterations in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)). Consistent with § 315(b) and § 315(c), the Board’s rules provide that “[a]ny request for joinder must be filed, as a motion under § 42.22, no later than one month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). The Board’s rules also provide that § 42.101(b)’s one-year time bar “shall not apply when the petition is accompanied by a request for joinder.” Id. We instituted an inter partes review in the Samsung IPR on June 21, 2024. Samsung Inst. Dec. 1. That same day, Petitioner filed the Petition and the Motion for Joinder. Pet. 77; Mot. 12. Under § 42.122(b), Petitioner timely filed the Petition and the Motion for Joinder. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“If a petitioner believes that a claim term requires an express construction, the petitioner must include a statement identifying a proposed construction of the particular term and where the intrinsic and/or extrinsic evidence supports that meaning.” PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide at 44 (Nov. 2019) (“CTPG”).3 “On the other hand, a petitioner may include a statement that the claim terms require no express construction.” Id. In the petition in the Samsung IPR, Samsung contended that “the Board does not need to construe any claim term for purposes of evaluating the prior art,” i.e., that “the claim terms require no express construction.” Samsung Pet. 15. In the Samsung IPR Institution Decision, we determined that “no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether [Samsung] satisfies the ‘reasonable likelihood’ standard for instituting trial.” Samsung Inst. Dec. 23. slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“roadmap, until a ground is found that results in the grant of review.” Id. But roadmapping concerns are “minimized” when “a petitioner files a later petition that raises unpatentability challenges substantially overlapping with those” in an earlier petition and “the later petition is not refined based on lessons learned from later developments.” Code200, UAB v. Bright Data Ltd., IPR2022-00861, Paper 18 at 5 (Vidal Aug. 23, 2022) (Director decision) (precedential) (“Code200”); see Expedia, IPR2022-00785, Paper 16 at 9. Here, Petitioner presents substantively identical challenges to claims 2, 6, and 9–16 in the ’449 patent based on the same prior art and the same unpatentability theories as Samsung presents in the Samsung IPR. Compare Pet. 16–71, with Samsung Pet. 15–68; see Mot. Resp. 1. And as discussed above, copying a previously instituted petition is “common in the joinder context” and “an accepted approach.” Expedia, IPR2022-00785, Paper 16 at 7–9; see supra § III.C.1. Further, any differences between the Petition and Samsung’s petition did not result from roadmapping to correct a deficiency in Samsung’s petition because the Board instituted review in the Samsung IPR. See Code200, IPR2022-00861, Paper 18 at 5; Gen. Plastic, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 17; Samsung Inst. Dec. 87. For these reasons, factor (3) does not favor discretionary denial.” slip op. at 35
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,373,449 - Qualcomm Incorporated / Zyxel Communications Corporation v. Unm Rainforest InnovationsSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 15, 2022 · IPR2021-00734 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6, and 7 are unpatentable over Talukdar and Li; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable over Talukdar and Nystrom. The motion to amend was granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“7. Conclusion Patent Owner has shown: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the proposed substitute claims are supported in the original disclosure; (3) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; and (4) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter. Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 44–47, 49, and 50 are unpatentable. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend is granted.” slip op. at 82
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Owner’s Motion to Exclude because Dr. Roy’s testimony should not be excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. Rule “702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable,’” which is a “basic gatekeeping obligation.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The policy considerations for excluding expert testimony, such as those implemented by Daubert’s gatekeeping framework, are less compelling in bench proceedings such as inter partes reviews than in jury trials because, unlike a lay jury, the Board has significant experience in evaluating expert testimony. Accordingly, the danger of prejudice in this proceeding would be considerably lower than in a lay jury trial and the wholesale exclusion of a witness’s declaration is rarely called for in a proceeding before the Board.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable
“testimony (Ex. 1002), we are persuaded that Petitioner has set forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Talukdar’s hybrid frame that includes a first section with data configured in 802.16(e) format for 802.16(e) fixed remote units and a second section that includes data configured in 802.16(m) format for faster moving 802.16(m) mobile remote units, because it would have provided the benefit of enabling the hybrid frame to accommodate data for a greater range of remote units within Talukdar’s wireless system. See Pet. 40–42; KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.” slip op. at 43
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“considerations before reaching our conclusion on obviousness as to the subject matter of claim 1. See WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Patent Owner asserts that there is evidence of commercial success and licensing of the ’096 Patent to industry leaders in the wireless chip industry. See PO Resp. 53–54 (citing Exs. 2007–2010; IPR2020-01576, Ex. 1028 (confidential patent license agreement filed under seal)). Exhibit 2007 is a notice regarding withdrawn claims entered in UNM Rainforest Innovations v. Dell Technologies, Inc., No. 6:20-cv-00468-ADA (W.D. Tex.). Exhibit 2008 is a notice regarding withdrawn claims entered in UNM Rainforest Innovations v. ASUSTek Computer, Inc., No. 6:20-cv- 00142-ADA (W.D. Tex.). Exhibits 2009 and 2010 are a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice, and an order of dismissal, respectively, entered in UNM Rainforest Innovations v. Apple Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00351 (W.D. Tex.). A copy of IPR2020-01576, Ex. 1028 has not been entered in the record of” slip op. at 49
Patent outcomesUS 8,265,096 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,265,096 - Qualcomm Incorporated / Zyxel Communications Corporation v. Unm Rainforest InnovationsSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 15, 2022 · IPR2021-00375 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6, and 7 are unpatentable over Talukdar and Li; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable over Talukdar and Nystrom.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Owner’s Motion to Exclude because Dr. Roy’s testimony should not be excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. Rule “702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable,’” which is a “basic gatekeeping obligation.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The policy considerations for excluding expert testimony, such as those implemented by Daubert’s gatekeeping framework, are less compelling in bench proceedings such as inter partes reviews than in jury trials because, unlike a lay jury, the Board has significant experience in evaluating expert testimony. Accordingly, the danger of prejudice in this proceeding would be considerably lower than in a lay jury trial and the wholesale exclusion of a witness’s declaration is rarely called for in a proceeding before the Board.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“testimony (Ex. 1002), we are persuaded that Petitioner has set forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Talukdar’s hybrid frame that includes a first section with data configured in 802.16(e) format for 802.16(e) fixed remote units and a second section that includes data configured in 802.16(m) format for faster moving 802.16(m) mobile remote units, because it would have provided the benefit of enabling the hybrid frame to accommodate data for a greater range of remote units within Talukdar’s wireless system. See Pet. 40–42; KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.” slip op. at 43
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“considerations before reaching our conclusion on obviousness as to the subject matter of claim 1. See WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Patent Owner asserts that there is evidence of commercial success and licensing of the ’096 Patent to industry leaders in the wireless chip industry. See PO Resp. 53–54 (citing Exs. 2007–2010; IPR2020-01576, Ex. 1028 (confidential patent license agreement filed under seal)). Exhibit 2007 is a notice regarding withdrawn claims entered in UNM Rainforest Innovations v. Dell Technologies, Inc., No. 6:20-cv-00468-ADA (W.D. Tex.). Exhibit 2008 is a notice regarding withdrawn claims entered in UNM Rainforest Innovations v. ASUSTek Computer, Inc., No. 6:20-cv- 00142-ADA (W.D. Tex.). Exhibits 2009 and 2010 are a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice, and an order of dismissal, respectively, entered in UNM Rainforest Innovations v. Apple Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00351 (W.D. Tex.). A copy of IPR2020-01576, Ex. 1028 has not been entered in the record of” slip op. at 49
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Talukdar and Nystrom (i.e., because Talukdar teaches the pilot density for 802.16(e) and 802.16(m) sections of a frame could be different, Nystrom teaches pilot structures for different scenarios, and obvious to try denser pilot symbols) are outside the scope of a proper reply because they were not presented previously in the Petition. Compare Pet. Reply 18–19, with Pet. 60–68. Although Petitioner is permitted in its Reply to address issues discussed in an institution decision, Petitioner may not submit new arguments that it could have presented earlier to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability. See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide18 (“CTPG”) 73. The opportunity to address issues discussed in an institution decision does not mean to proceed in a new direction with a new approach compared to the position taken in the Petition. See id. at 74. Furthermore, a reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. Accordingly, we decline to consider Petitioner’s belated Reply arguments and evidence asserting new reasons why a person of ordinary skill in the art” slip op. at 60
Patent outcomesUS 8,265,096 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,265,096 - Gaf Materials LLC v. Kirsch Research And Development, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 24, 2022 · IPR2021-00192 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–33 are unpatentable: claims 1, 8–12, and 19 are anticipated by Lou; the remaining claims are obvious over the stated Lou-based combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“patent. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315–17. The term “extrusion lamination” does not appear anywhere in the ’482 patent outside of issued claim 1, but our understanding is supported by the prosecution history of the ’482 patent. Claim 1 as originally filed in the application that issued as the ’482 patent recited, in relevant part, “a reinforcing scrim of interwoven strands for supporting tensile forces in multiple directions; and at least one layer of thermoplastic material affixed to a side of the reinforcing scrim for providing a weather-resistant barrier.” Ex. 1002 (’482 patent prosecution history), 33. In response to a rejection of the claims as anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,523,357 to Peterson, describing a rubber mill calendering process, the applicant amended claim 1 to add the phrase “by extrusion lamination.” Id. at 71, 76. We find nothing to suggest that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that amendment to add a requirement of an additional layer of thermoplastic material, separate and apart from the “at least one layer of thermoplastic material” already recited in the original claim, to serve as a binder between the scrim and the original layer of thermoplastic material. The applicant explained in remarks accompanying the amendment, “Peterson fails to disclose forming a thermoplastic layer over the reinforcing scrim by an extrusion lamination process.” Id. at 71 (italics, underlining, and capitalization omitted). We, thus, find that the added phrase specifies how the recited “thermoplastic material” must be “affixed” to “the side of the reinforcing scrim,” but does not alter the recited function of the thermoplastic material, namely, “for providing a weather-resistant barrier.” Although the applicant’s remarks further state that “[c]ontrarily [to the rubber mill calendering process of Peterson], the roofing underlayment of the present invention is formed by an extrusion lamination process which bonds the various layers together, including the pre-formed films, reinforcement scrim, and slip-resistant material” (id.), claim 1 does not recite “pre-formed films” or “slip-resistant material”; such additional layers are recited in dependent claims 5 (“metallized film”) and 2 (“layer of slip-resistant material”), respectively (Ex. 1001, 6:29, 6:37). Looking finally to the extrinsic evidence of record, including the testimony of the parties’ experts and other exhibits filed by the parties, we find no persuasive evidence to show that the recitation of extrusion lamination requires an additional layer in addition to the recited scrim and the at least one layer of thermoplastic material affixed to a side of the scrim. In that regard, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s contentions, we are not persuaded that “extrusion lamination” and “extrusion coating” are mutually exclusive. Rather, we credit Mr. Kaczkowski’s testimony that extrusion coating would also be considered “extrusion lamination” if, for example, it “results in the extrudate being permanently bonded to the substrate.” Ex. 2020, 28:17–20. While Patent Owner argues that Mr. Kaczkowski’s statement “is nothing more than restatement of the extrusion coating process,” and “[t]o think otherwise would require believing that ‘extrusion coating’ involves a thermoplastic layer that is extruded, and thus coated, onto a substrate with the result being that it is not permanently bonded, i.e., it will delaminate from the substrate” (PO Sur-reply 5), we disagree with Patent Owner’s further contentions that “[s]uch a product makes no sense” and “[u]nder Petitioner’s theories, the [prior art] would not work” (id.). Although there could indeed be extrusion coating processes that would result in coatings that are not permanently bonded, it does not follow that the cited prior art used such processes. Further, although a laminate may be affixed to substrate by an adhesive or other binder, we find no persuasive evidence in the record that the binder must be a separate layer from the laminate.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“the “reinforcing scrim of interwoven strands” recited in claim 1 and Lou’s polypropylene polymer 2 to the recited “thermoplastic material.” Id. at 22– 23. Petitioner further contends that Lou discloses “affixing the thermoplastic material by extrusion lamination,” citing Lou’s disclosures that “[e]xtruder 20 supplies polypropylene polymer 2 through a slit orifice to deposit a thin continuous coating on the surface of sheet 1” and that coated sheet 3 is pressed by a calendaring nip formed by heated and unheated rolls. Id. at 23 (quoting Ex. 1005, 2:34–44) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19; Ex. 1005, 2:45– 49).” slip op. at 34
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Having considered the parties’ respective arguments, we find that Petitioner’s contentions are supported by the evidence of record, and we find that Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings (including support both from the cited prior art and from Mr. Kaczkowski’s testimony) to combine the relevant teachings of Lou and Goodacre. We disagree with Patent Owner’s suggestion it is insufficient that Mr. Kaczkowski opined that a person of ordinary skill would have evaluated the proposed combination based on the combined teachings of the asserted references. As the Supreme Court has explained, When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under §103. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Patent Owner does not dispute Goodacre’s teachings or that combining those teachings with Lou would increase the tensile strength of Lou’s underlayment, but appears instead only to fault Mr. Kaczkowski for not determining whether those solutions would be less expensive than other alternatives. Such arguments are not persuasive. Although, as cited above, Petitioner alleges in the Petition that a skilled artisan would have recognized cross-lamination as “a simpler, less costly way to manufacture a nonwoven reinforcing scrim . . . consistent with Lou” (Pet. 37), we find that is only one among several reasons identified by Petitioner and Mr. Kaczkowski for the combination (see, e.g., id. at 34–35 (additionally identifying increased tensile strength as a well-known benefit of orienting polyolefin fabric)), each of which is independently persuasive.” slip op. at 53
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“Motion to Exclude. Federal Rule of Evidence 801 defines “hearsay” as a “a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying in the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is offering Dr. Reitman’s testimony for its truth. As Petitioner points out, Dr. Reitman’s testimony is presented in the Patent Owner Response in alleged support of Patent Owner’s argument. See Reply Mot. Excl. 1 (citing PO Resp. 22 (“Maureen Reitman recognized that ‘extrusion coating’ and ‘extrusion lamination’ were two different processes”; “[A]s Ds. [sic] Reitman recognized, a POSITA would understand ‘extrusion coating’ to be different than ‘extrusion lamination.’”)). Further, Rule 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. Fed. R. Evid. 802. We agree with Petitioner that no exception or exclusion applies in this case. Mot. Excl. 1. Although, as Patent Owner contends, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides that “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed,” and that “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted,” we are not persuaded that opinions of others offered in litigation are the sort of “facts or data” that experts in the field of roofing underlayments would reasonably rely on in forming their own opinions.” slip op. at 64
Patent outcomesUS 6,308,482 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,308,482 - Facebook, Inc. / Whatsapp Inc. et al. v. Uniloc 2017 LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 16, 2019 · IPR2017-01667 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 6–8, 10–35, 38, and 39 are unpatentable; claims 4 and 5 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeOther
“Response in each case. IPR2017-01667, Paper 17 (“1667 PO Resp.”); IPR2017-01668, Paper 16 (“1668 PO Resp.”). Petitioner4 then filed Replies. IPR2017-01667, Paper 24 (“1667 Reply”); IPR2017-01668, Paper 22 (“1668 Reply”). Patent Owner also filed a Motion to Exclude as Paper 21 in each case (“Mot. Excl.”), and Petitioner filed an Opposition as Paper 24 in each case (“Opp’n”). We held a consolidated oral argument in both proceedings, as well as in related proceeding IPR2017-01428, on August 30, 2018. A transcript of the oral hearing (“Tr.”) has been entered into the record of IPR2017-01667 as Paper 31 and into the record of IPR2017-01668 as Paper 29.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“01668, Paper 6 (“1668 Prelim. Resp.”). We instituted inter partes review pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314 as to all challenged claims. IPR2017-01667, Paper 8 (“1667 Dec. on Inst.”); IPR2017-01668, Paper 8 (“1668 Dec. on Inst.”). During the pendency of the proceedings, Huawei Device Co., Ltd. and LG Electronics, Inc. filed a petition and motion for joinder requesting to join IPR2017-01667, which we granted. IPR2017-01667, Paper 12. Similarly, Apple Inc. filed petitions and motions for joinder requesting to join IPR2017-01667 and IPR2017-01668, which we also granted. IPR2017- 01667, Paper 29; IPR2017-01668, Paper 27.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“1. Instant Voice Message Independent challenged claims 3, 27, and 38 recite the term “instant voice message.” In particular, claim 3 recites a messaging system that “receives an instant voice message” from one of a plurality of instant voice the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,” 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). message client systems, “wherein the instant voice message includes an object field including a digitized audio file.” Claims 27 and 38 recite a client platform system for “generating an instant voice message and a messaging system for transmitting the instant voice message.” Claim 27 further requires an “instant voice messaging application” that “includes a document handler system for attaching one or more files to the instant voice message.” Certain of the challenged dependent claims recite additional limitations concerning, for example, additional fields included in the instant voice message (claims 4–8), storage, deletion, or retrieval of instant voice messages (claims 10, 14, 17, 28, 31), the generation of the instant voice messages (claims 13, 18, 32), encryption/decryption of instant voice messages (claims 19, 33), compression/decompression of instant voice messages (claims 20, 34), effects indicating receipt of instant voice messages (claims 23, 35), and display of instant voice messages (claim 30). Our Institution Decision in IPR2017-01667 noted Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the “instant voice message” centered on the scope of the term. 1667 Dec. on Inst. 18, 22–23. Patent Owner had argued an implied construction in which “instant voice message” encompasses only the voice message. Id. at 19, 23. The parties were invited to brief the claim construction during trial. Id. at 19–20, 23. In its Response in IPR2017-01667, Patent Owner proposed that an “instant voice message” is “an audio file recording voice data.” 1667 PO Resp. 11–13, 15. In particular, Patent Owner relied on the specification’s use of “i.e.” to indicate lexicography in equating the “instant voice message”” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 8,724,622 mixedClaim constructioncites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,724,622 - Symantec Corp. / Blue Coat Systems LLC v. Finjan, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 15, 2017 · IPR2015-01892 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 6 are unpatentable over Swimmer under § 103; claims 5, 10, 11, 14, and 15 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“consideration of the Preliminary Response (Paper 7) of Patent Owner, Finjan, Inc., we instituted a trial pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) with respect to claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 14, and 15 and subsequently joined Case IPR2016-00890 with the instant case. Paper 9 (“Decision on Institution” or “Dec. on Inst.”); see also Paper 30 (copy of decision instituting inter partes review in Case IPR2016-00890 and granting motion for joinder; also filed as IPR2016-00890, Paper 8).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“1 Case IPR2016-00890 has been joined with the instant proceeding.” slip op. at 1
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We determine that the differences in the declarants’ assertions are negligible and that both assessments are consistent with the ’494 patent and the referenced prior art. For the purposes of the analysis below, we adopt Dr. Medvidovic’s assessment.” slip op. at 22
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“As explained in Section III.B.4.a.i, supra, we are persuaded by Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony that Swimmer was publicly available at least as early as December 1995 and is, accordingly, prior art at least under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a),6 as well as that Exhibit 1005 represents an authentic 6 As further mentioned in Section II.B, supra, we determined in our Decision on Institution in Case IPR2016-00159 that the ’494 patent is not entitled to any earlier priority date than the November 6, 1997, filing date of the ’388 application, based on the record then before us in that case. See IPR2016- 00159, slip op. at 10–13 (PTAB May 13, 2016) (Paper 8). Because that date is more than one year after December 31, 1995, Swimmer would also be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) based on the December 1995 publication date. copy of Swimmer and Exhibit 1010 represents an authentic copy of the Virus Bulletin Proceedings within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 901. Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Both the Federal Circuit and the Board have recognized that there is a “low threshold for relevancy.” See, e.g., OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Laird Techs., Inc. v. GrafTech Int’l Holdings, Inc., Case IPR2014-00025, slip op. at 44 (PTAB Mar. 25, 2015) (Paper 45). There is no question on this record that Swimmer is relevant to the patentability of the challenged claims in this case. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to Exhibits 1005 and 1010.” slip op. at 62
Patent outcomesUS 8,677,494 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,677,494
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.