- PTAB · Mar 25, 2026 · IPR2024-01380 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
The Board cancelled original claims 1–10 and granted substitute claims 11–19 because Petitioner did not prove claim 11 obvious over Torrence and Piepho.
RulingsFinal written decision- 112 supportGranted
“relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “[T]he hallmark of written description is disclosure.” Id. “[T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.” Id. “In order to satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.” Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Ind. Co., Ltd. v/ Int’l Trade Com’n, 535 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “[T]he level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (citing Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). “This inquiry . . . is a question of fact.” Id. (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Further, inventions in the mechanical and electrical-based arts usually involve predictable factors and can be more predictable than other fields, such as chemistry and biology. See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (CCPA 1970);” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including: “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Best Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“D. Claim Construction We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“[c]ombin[e] the tapered region of Piepho with the shaft of Torrence, the tapered region would extend from an uppermost extremity of the shaft.” RMTA Opp. 9. But, Petitioner concedes that neither reference discloses a tapered region extending from the uppermost extremity. Petitioner argues that Torrence’s shaft is straight (Amended RMTA Sur-reply 9) and that “[t]he tapered region of Piepho does not extend to the extreme end of the shaft.” RMTA Opp. 11 (emphasis added). Because neither Torrence nor Piepho discloses a shaft with a tapered region that “extends from an uppermost extremity of the shaft,” we find that the combination of Torrence and Piepho does not teach limitation 11[a]. We now analyze whether Petitioner provides reasoning with a rational underpinning why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Torrence with Piepho to extend Torrence’s taper from the upper extremity of its shaft. slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,827,568 - Google LLC / Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Ericsson ABAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00003 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 10, 12, 14, and 16–20 are unpatentable under § 103; the Board denied Patent Owner’s revised motion to amend.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[W]ould have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and 2–3 years of practical engineering experience relating to information security systems that employ cryptographic keys to encrypt/decrypt digital data. Additional education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s expert regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. RMTA 19. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Villasenor, notes that “obviousness must be viewed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the field of information security using cryptographic keys for encryption and decryption of digital data, and my opinions are rendered on the basis of the definition of the ordinary artisan set forth in the Petition in view of that further clarification.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 19. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’178 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyOther
“In reply, Patent Owner substantially repeats its arguments against Petitioner’s reliance on Peterka for the claim 1 content encryption key identifiers requirements. Reply RMTA 8–9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 121; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 89, 93–95); see RMTA 14–15. We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons discussed in Section III.D.2.e)(2) above.” slip op. at 65
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that there was no motivation to combine Peterka with Suzuki because Petitioner has argued that “Peterka can already identify content keys by using the allegedly unique sequence numbers or time stamps assigned to each message carrying a single content key.” PO Resp. 41–42 (citing Pet. 25). Patent Owner also challenges motivation to combine Suzuki because it “is not directed to a pay-by-time, pay-per-view, or subscription distribution model, in which a content key grants access to content that different clients must individually decide to purchase in discrete units or increments.” Id. at 36–37. Petitioner responds that, because Peterka disclosed alternative embodiments that did not use sequence numbers or time stamps to identify EMM/ECM messages, one of ordinary skill would have been motivated specifically assign identifications to individual keys as taught in Suzuki. Reply 22 (citing Pet. 26). Petitioner also argues that whether Suzuki was directed to unpurchased content was irrelevant, because Suzuki is cited to show multiple key responses were conventional. Id. at 19–20. Patent Owner does not otherwise specifically address the issue of motivation to combine Peterka, Suzuki, and Bocharov. See generally PO Resp. Nonetheless the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378. We find, based on the record, that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Peterka, Suzuki, and Bocharov as proffered by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 45
- ScopeMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“We agree with Petitioner that the substitute claims are broadening. Because the amended wording only requires the key request to be made “in response to detecting” the boundary, rather than “ahead of” the boundary, the request can occur before or after the boundary. This is not a fanciful or unlikely possibility — such delayed requests are specifically contemplated by the ’178 patent: [I]f the packager 104 is unable to obtain a new content encryption key from the WFM 102 prior to the expiration of the current content encryption key, the packager 104 will continue to use the current content encryption key until such time as it is able to obtain a new key from the WFM 102. Ex. 1001, 6:32–37. It should be noted that the fixed period duration for key rotation may be viewed as a "target" period, as the packager 104 may not expire a key on the exact boundary. Ex. 1001, 8:9–11. The key expiration time from the WFM 102 may be viewed as a "suggested" expiration time, as the packager 104 may not be able to expire the key at the exact specified time.” slip op. at 56
Patent outcomesUS 9,313,178 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,313,178 - PTAB · Mar 17, 2026 · IPR2025-01487 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director instituted review of claims 1–21 and bound Petitioner to its district court construction of “clock output signal” for claims 4, 5, and 19.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–21 of the ’381 patent is instituted; FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall be bound by its proposed district court construction of the term “clock output signal” in its analysis of claims 4, 5, and 19 of the ’381 patent; and” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–21 of the ’381 patent is instituted;” slip op. at 4
- Prior constructionTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner
“positions in the district court that are inconsistent with those presented in the Petition and fails to sufficiently explain why those different positions are warranted. Prelim. Resp. 3–4, 9 (citing Revvo Techs., Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Techs., Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 (Director Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential) (“Revvo”)). In particular, Patent Owner notes that in District Court, Petitioner has proposed a construction of the term “clock output signal” in dependent claims 4, 5, and 19 as being “a periodic signal that synchronizes system operations.” Id. at 9 (quoting Ex. 2007, 12). In the Petition, however, Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require a formal construction for purposes of addressing the grounds in this Petition.” Pet. 2.” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 9,972,381 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Harbor Island Dynamic, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00954 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3 and 8–19 are unpatentable: claim 3 is anticipated by Yu and obvious over Okashita, Okashita and Yu, and Burgener and Okashita; claims 8–19 are obvious over Burgener and Okashita, with or without Yu.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“ORDER For the foregoing reasons, ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Unopposed Motion to Amend (Paper 19) is granted, and claims 1, 2, and 4–7 are canceled;” slip op. at 37
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of ordinary skill, arguing that a bachelor’s degree, not a master’s degree, is all that is required because that is the “target audience for the ’886 Patent.” PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner does not otherwise dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Id. We used Petitioner’s proposed definition in the Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 13. Neither party argues any issue as dependent on the level of ordinary skill or the differences between the proposals. Accordingly, the issues here are not dependent on the level of ordinary skill and the result is the same regardless of which definition is adopted. On this record, there is no reason to change from Petitioner’s definition used in the Institution Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“transistors” as a term that might require construction during trial. Inst. Dec. 17–18. At the hearing, the Petitioner argued that “cascaded transistors” means “[ar]ranged in a series of or in succession of stages so that each stage derives from or acts upon the product of the preceding [transistor]” and that there is no dispute that the limitation is taught by the prior art. Tr. 9:15–22. Patent Owner takes no position as to whether or not the prior art discloses “cascaded transistors.” Id. at 33:13–21 (“For the remainder of this proceeding, post institution, we have not taken any position regarding the scope of the cascaded transistors or the disclosure of the cascaded transistors in any of the prior art. We have not disputed that.”). Because Patent Owner takes no position on the issue, there is no dispute that “cascaded transistors” are shown in the prior art, construction is not necessary. Realtime, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. original)). 2. “isolated island” Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contention that the prior art teaches or suggests claim 3’s recitation of “said plurality of cascaded transistors is situated within an isolated island.” Pet. 35–36; PO Resp. 16–17. Although the parties dispute whether an “isolated island” is shown in the prior art, neither party proposes a construction for the term “isolated island.” We agree that the arguments presented do not require construction of “isolated island.” The issues can be determined on the plain meaning of the term in view of the arguments made. See Section II.D below.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“We find that Petitioner has sufficiently shown Yu is analogous art to Okashita. Both references are directed to the manufacture of semiconductors, which we find to be the field of endeavor. Ex. 1004, 1:47– 58; Ex. 1005, 1:16–26. More specifically, we agree with Petitioner and find that both references are in the same field of endeavor because they relate to SOI configuration. Pet. Reply 6 (citing Pet. 7–8, 39–40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–80, 90–91). Because we find the references relied upon are in the same field of endeavor, we need not reach whether they are reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,745,886 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,745,886 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Harbor Island Dynamic, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 16, 2026 · IPR2024-01402 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 3 and 8–19 unpatentable: claim 3 was anticipated by Yu and obvious on the stated grounds, and claims 3 and 8–19 were obvious over Burgener and Okashita, with or without Yu.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–19 of U.S. Patent No. 7,745,886 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’886 patent”). Petitioner filed a Declaration of Dr. Scott E. Thompson, Ph.D., in support of the Petition. Ex. 1002 (“Thompson Dec.”). Harbor Island Dynamic, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). On April 4, 2025, we instituted this inter partes review as to the Challenged Claims and all grounds presented in the Petition. Paper 9 (“Inst. Dec.”). Following institution, Patent Owner filed a Response to the Petition (“PO Resp.”) limited to the patentability of the challenged claims. Paper 18. In support of the Patent Owner’s Response, Patent Owner filed a Declaration of John Berg. Ex. 2006. Patent Owner also filed an Unopposed Motion to Amend, cancelling claims 1, 2, and 4–7. Paper 19 (“Mot.”). We grant the motion. This proceeding is therefore limited to the patentability of claims 3 and 8–19 (“challenged claims”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of ordinary skill, arguing that a bachelor’s degree, not a master’s degree, is all that is required because that is the “target audience for the ’886 Patent.” PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner does not otherwise dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Id. We used Petitioner’s proposed definition in the Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 13. Neither party argues any issue as dependent on the level of ordinary skill or the differences between the proposals. Accordingly, the issues here are not dependent on the level of ordinary skill and the result is the same regardless of which definition is adopted. On this record, there is no reason to change from Petitioner’s definition used in the Institution Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“transistors” as a term that might require construction during trial. Inst. Dec. 17–18. At the hearing, the Petitioner argued that “cascaded transistors” means “[ar]ranged in a series of or in succession of stages so that each stage derives from or acts upon the product of the preceding [transistor]” and that there is no dispute that the limitation is taught by the prior art. Tr. 9:15–22. Patent Owner takes no position as to whether or not the prior art discloses “cascaded transistors.” Id. at 33:13–21 (“For the remainder of this proceeding, post institution, we have not taken any position regarding the scope of the cascaded transistors or the disclosure of the cascaded transistors in any of the prior art. We have not disputed that.”). Because Patent Owner takes no position on the issue, there is no dispute that “cascaded transistors” are shown in the prior art, construction is not necessary. Realtime, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. original)). 2. “isolated island” Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contention that the prior art teaches or suggests claim 3’s recitation of “said plurality of cascaded transistors is situated within an isolated island.” Pet. 35–36; PO Resp. 16–17. Although the parties dispute whether an “isolated island” is shown in the prior art, neither party proposes a construction for the term “isolated island.” We agree that the arguments presented do not require construction of “isolated island.” The issues can be determined on the plain meaning of the term in view of the arguments made. See Section II.D below.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successAnalogous artMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We find that Petitioner has sufficiently shown Yu is analogous art to Okashita. Both references are directed to the manufacture of semiconductors, which we find to be the field of endeavor. Ex. 1004, 1:47– 58; Ex. 1005, 1:16–26. More specifically, we agree with Petitioner and find that both references are in the same field of endeavor because they relate to SOI configuration. Pet. Reply 6 (citing Pet. 7–8, 39–40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–80, 90–91). Because we find the references relied upon are in the same field of endeavor, we need not reach whether they are reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor. We also find that Petitioner has shown rational underpinnings for combining Okashita and Yu. Pet. 43–44. That the references have differences is not the test. Rather, the test is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation to combine them. We find there is sufficient motivation. Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 1005, 2:4–17; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 177– 178). 3. Conclusion on Ground 3 Patent Owner does not argue any other reason that Ground 3 has not been sufficiently shown. Based on the full record, we determine that Okashita and Yu teach or suggest all the limitations of claim 3 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success. We thus determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 3 would have been obvious over the combination of Okashita and Yu.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,745,886 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,745,886 - Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01311 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 16–30 are unpatentable: claims 16–30 as obvious over Ellis and Spivey, claims 21, 22, 27, and 28 as anticipated by Herzog, and claims 25, 26, and 30 as obvious over Herzog and Ellis.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends that the relevant artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 12. Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of the relevant artisan because, based on the record, this proposal is most consistent with the ’218 patent and the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of both Dr. Wicker and Dr. Rubin (see Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 96–98). We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed plain meanings of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 32–33) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 12. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoints,” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed plain meaning of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:10–12. Based on the foregoing, we construe each of “socket” and “event socket” to have its plain and ordinary meaning, where the relevant artisan would have understood “socket” to mean “a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server,” and “event socket” to mean “a socket where information about one sporting event is provided to a viewer client device (VCD).” 2 We further address these terms below in Section III.D.3. 2 During Oral Argument, Patent Owner argued, for the first time, that the District Court’s construction of “event socket” “should be applied equally here.” Tr. 73:13–76:24 (referring to Ex. 1069). The Court adopted Petitioner’s (Defendant’s) proposed definition of “event socket” as “a socket dedicated to a particular event” (Ex. 1069, 11–15), although in its summary of constructions, labeled “event socket” as being “a socket dedicated to a single event” (i.e., “single” event versus “particular” event) (id. at 26). Regardless, in the context of this case and this Decision, we find no meaningful difference between these articulations and Petitioner’s plain” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“As Petitioner explained during Oral Argument, Ellis “relates to the ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” whereas Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–8. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to make the necessary modifications and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 40–41. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 23–26. In particular, Spivey discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”).” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner
“Considering the totality of the evidence, we find Patent Owner has not demonstrated that a long-felt but unresolved need existed for the claimed invention. See Apple v. Samsung, 839 F.3d at 1056. As Petitioner points out, although Patent Owner argues that there is a long-felt need for a system that “allows broadcasters to deliver synchronized, low-latency video and audio content” (PO Resp. 65), Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s showing that Ellis also discloses “a video streaming system that provided event information over a separate channel, which is not hard embedded in the video stream.” Pet. Reply 25. Further, as Petitioner points out in the context of “representative claim 12,” the claim “simply requires ‘receiv[ing] the first copy via a first video communication channel between at least one media source and the first client device,’” and “[i]n no way does that claim language relate to any synchronized, low-latency, scalable, flexible, or new and improved video streaming technique.” Pet. Reply 22. In fact, during Oral Argument, although Patent Owner argues that its invention is “the synchronization and the latency improvements through that one-to-many socket architecture,” Patent Owner conceded that the claims “could be broader than that.” Tr. 44:24–46:16. We find availing Petitioner’s argument that the “claim language” does not “relate to any synchronized, low-latency, scalable, flexible, or new and improved video streaming technique.” Pet. Reply 22. Petitioner argues that we should give “no weight” to Patent Owner’s alleged “evidence” of any long-felt but unresolved needs. Pet. Reply 22. In particular, Patent Owner merely provides conclusory statements that, prior to the claimed invention, “conventional video streaming systems” included “hard-embedded event information,” and that “[t]he claimed invention satisfied the long-felt need for an innovative system.” PO Resp. 64–65. Thus, considering the totality of the evidence, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has failed to establish that there was a long-felt but unresolved need for the claimed invention.” slip op. at 51
Patent outcomesUS 11,039,218 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,039,218 - Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01310 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 are unpatentable: claims 12–15 over Ellis and Spivey, and claims 1–11 over Ellis, Spivey, and Herzog; the other grounds were not proven.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Relying on Dr. Wicker’s testimony, Petitioner contends that the relevant artisan would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, and one to two years of experience in networking environments, including at least some experience with live-streaming network architecture.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education or experience in related fields could compensate for deficits in the above qualifications.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner contends that the relevant artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 96). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of the relevant artisan because, based on the record, this proposal is most consistent with the ’218 patent and the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of both Dr. Wicker and Dr. Rubin (see Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 96–98). We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed plain meanings of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 26) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 12. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoints,” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed plain meaning of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:10–12. Thus, we give each of “socket” and “event socket” its plain meaning, where the relevant artisan would have understood “socket” to mean “a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server,” and “event socket” to mean “a socket where information about one sporting event is provided to a viewer client device (VCD).” 4 We address such terms below in Section III.D.3. After considering the arguments and information presented during trial, we determine that we do not need to otherwise expressly construe any terms in order to resolve the dispute between the parties. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“We find Petitioner’s contentions with Dr. Wicker’s supporting testimony persuasive. In particular, we find Petitioner’s reliance on Spivey for disclosing “event socket” is supported by Spivey’s disclosures that a topic queue’s address “may resemble a uniform resource locator (URL)” and that user interface 900 “allow[s] an operator 108 of a client device to view and select . . . topics available from a message queue server.” Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 82, 84, Fig. 9. In Spivey, the message flow begins “when message queue server . . . pushes data payloads to subscribers of the topics in [the] message.” See Ex. 1017 ¶ 134. As Petitioner explains, in Spivey, “the address for connecting a topic queue may resemble a URL, and client devices can select from a list of available topics and subscribe to those queues, after which the MQSD pushes the relevant data payloads to the subscribed devices.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 82–84, 134). As Petitioner explains, and as supported by Dr. Wicker’s testimony, Spivey’s “topic label may be . . . ‘gamecenter.nfl.ravensteelers,’ and client devices use these topic label text strings to connect and subscribe to the MQSD’s topic queues.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 353–354). We find availing that, in Spivey, since the “client devices ‘request a live data connection’ by selecting or entering the address or connection information which ‘may resemble a uniform resource locator (URL),’” Spivey’s topic queues “are not only logically but also actually implemented as uniquely addressable communication endpoints.” Id. at 9 (citing Ex. 1064 ¶¶ 11–14). We find that Dr. Rubin’s testimony that the only potential “communication endpoint” in Spivey that is “uniquely addressable” is the live data access server (Ex. 2001 ¶ 233) merely addresses particular embodiments in Spivey. That is, Dr. Rubin does not address sufficiently Spivey’s teachings as a whole as understood from the perspective of the relevant artisan, which would include other embodiments. See Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1361 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“What a prior art reference discloses or teaches is determined from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art.”); In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that when evaluating claims for obviousness, “the prior art as a whole must be considered”). Dr. Rubin does not address Spivey’s disclosure that the system “may include” the LDAS (Ex. 1017 ¶ 38), but, as Petitioner points out, merely acknowledges that “there are examples in Spivey using the language [‘may’].” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1063, 62:8–13). As Petitioner points out, in his deposition, Dr. Rubin acknowledges” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“As Petitioner explained during Oral Argument, Ellis “relates to the ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” whereas Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–8. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to make the necessary modifications and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 40–41. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 20–22. In particular, Spivey discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”). We find Patent Owner’s arguments that Petitioner fails to “explain the modifications necessary to combine such teachings” are inconsistent with the evidence of record. PO Resp. 40–47. For example, Patent Owner’s argument that the proposed combination would be inoperable because the combination “does not include the LDAS” (id. at 43–44) is not consistent with the evidence of record that Spivey does not require the LDAS to serve as intermediary between the MQSD and the user equipment. See Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 38, 46. As discussed above, Spivey states that the system “may” include an LDAS (Ex. 1017 ¶ 38), supporting Petitioner’s contention that, in Spivey, the LDAS is “optional” wherein “the MQSD may be ‘accessible to clients over the network directly.’” Pet. Reply 3. As discussed above in Section III.D.3.a, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that Spivey’s MQSD may push data from topic queues to the subscribers of the topics corresponding to those topic queues, which indicates that “the MQSD can deliver data directly to clients without the necessity of an LDAS.” Id. (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 46).” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 11,039,218 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,039,218 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Power2b, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2021-01266 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 29, 36–38, 44–46, 48, 49, and 56–58 unpatentable as obvious over Reime, with additional grounds also supporting the challenged claims.
RulingsRemand decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“In addition, Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude certain of Petitioner’s evidence (Paper 32) and Petitioner filed an Opposition (Paper 33). We denied this motion. See Final Dec. 58–61.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“transmission paths. See Pet. Reply 14–15; PO Sur-reply 15. And we agree with both parties that the light that is transmitted directly through the plate to the sensor element does not have intervening reflections—such is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of “directly to.” See PO Resp. 31–32; Pet. Reply 14–15; PO Sur-reply 15. Nothing in claim 48’s language, however, requires that all of the reflected light be transmitted directly to the sensor element, which Patent Owner argues. Ex. 1001, 70:32–35; PO Resp. 31–32; PO Sur-reply 14–16. Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the claim language “merely requires that some light reflected by the object goes ‘directly to’ at least one sensor element once it is transmitted through the viewing plane defining plate.” Pet. Reply 14. We also agree that “none of these dependent claims purport to be exclusive of one another.” Id. at 15. Rather, claims 46–48 simply require some light be transmitted (or propagated) for their particular transmission path, without reciting all light. See Ex. 1001, 70:24–35.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We find Petitioner’s arguments based on Reime alone insufficient. Thus, we find that Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 49 is rendered obvious by Reime alone.” slip op. at 52
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesUnpatentableUnpatentable
“And in view of the above, we find persuasive Dr. Bederson’s testimony that “[c]hoosing a multi-element detector or a single-element detector would have been a simple design choice using commercially available detectors.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 117. Accordingly, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious for Reime’s receivers to be implemented using discrete single-element detectors. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.”). We find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that “Petitioner relies on expert testimony to gap-fill missing elements regarding Reime’s failure to disclose or suggest the different claim arrangements of detector elements in a ‘detector assembly.’” PO Resp. 78 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 111–119; Ex. 2056 ¶ 171). Rather, in light of Reime’s teachings, coupled with the general knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, it would have been obvious to employ discrete single-element detectors for Reime’s receivers. See Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Google LLC, 948 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding obviousness can rely on supported expert testimony to supply an element of a claim). We appropriately consider such evidence of the knowledge that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had as part of our obviousness analysis. See Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Moreover, “AAPA can be important evidence of general background knowledge, and general knowledge can be used to supply a missing claim 1371, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Here, Petitioner relies on the cited AAPA as evidence of one of ordinary skill in the art’s general knowledge at the time of the ’093 patent, and the AAPA is not the basis for this ground. See Pet. 4, 42–43; Pet. Remand 4–5. As Shockwave Med. explains, Federal Circuit “case law has long recognized numerous permissible uses for general background knowledge in an IPR such as, ‘for example, furnishing a motivation to combine, or supplying a missing claim limitation.” 142 F.4th at 1378–79 (quoting Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc., 24 F.4th 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Randall Mfg., 733 F.3d at 1362; Koninklijke, 948 F.3d at 1337–38)).” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 9,569,093 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,569,093 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Power2b, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2021-01239 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 17, 18, 21, 22, 26, and 30 unpatentable as obvious over Reime, with claims 17, 18, 21, 22, and 30 also obvious over Reime and Hinckley.
RulingsRemand decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“In addition, Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude certain of Petitioner’s evidence (Paper 28) and Petitioner filed an Opposition (Paper 34). We denied this motion. See Paper 41, 47–50.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’850 patent: one who “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and . . . years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of touch and/or proximity sensors, human-machine interaction and 3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the ’850 patent issued from an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply the pre-AIA version of the statutory basis for unpatentability. 4 US 2003/0034439 A1, published Feb. 20, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Reime”). 5 US 2002/0021278 A1, published Feb. 21, 2002 (Ex. 1011, “Hinckley”). Petitioner lists the combination of Reime and Hinckley as a separate asserted ground for claim 26. We combine these two asserted grounds into one as they rely on the same combination. additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Final Dec. 8–9. This definition for one having ordinary skill was not the subject of appeal, and we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision on Remand. Moreover, it is consistent with the ’850 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“PO Resp. 17–29; Pet. Reply 8–15; PO Sur-reply 6–11. We construed this term in the Final Written Decision. Final Dec. 10–24. In particular, we concluded that (i) “detector assembly” means “two or more detector elements that detect electromagnetic radiation,” and (ii) a detector assembly is not required to be physically separate from (i.e., not interspersed with) a pixel array. Id. at 20, 22. The Federal Circuit found the first part of our construction erroneous. Appeal Dec. 7–10. In particular, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he element.” Id. at 8. In addition, to guide the Board’s analysis on remand, the Federal Circuit construed “the terms ‘at an edge’ and ‘at least one edge’ [to] require a detector assembly to be arranged along one or more edges of a viewing plane defining plate.” Id. at 10–11. In other words, the Federal Circuit “clarif[ied] that arranging a detector assembly ‘at,’ ‘along,’ or ‘about’ ‘at least one edge’ or ‘an edge’ does not limit the detector assembly to being arranged entirely on ‘one edge.’” Id. at 12.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“the Federal Circuit already has concluded that claim 15 is obvious in view of Reime. Appeal Dec. 9–10. Claim 17 further recites “wherein the detector assembly comprises: a support substrate, and an arrangement of detector elements.” Ex. 1001, 67:15–18. We agree with Petitioner and find that Reime teaches these further limitations. Pet. 34–35; Pet. Remand 2–4; Pet. Resp. Remand 1–3. First, as we found in the Final Written Decision, Reime’s receivers 30 and 32 are two detector elements that detect electromagnetic radiation (i.e., light), and Reime’s receivers 30 and 32, collectively, comprise a detector assembly. Final Dec. 27–28 (citations omitted). Moreover, Reime’s two receivers 30 and 32 comprise a detector assembly having multiple detector elements (e.g., two receivers) to teach “an arrangement of detector elements.” Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 73, 86, Figs. 9A–9C; Ex. 2060,7 127:17–18; Pet. 32–33; Pet. Reply 20; Pet. Remand 3. In addition, as we found in the Final Written Decision, Reime teaches that each of receivers 30 and 32 are centered on opposite edges of the plate. 7 Deposition Transcript of Dr. Benjamin Bederson (Apr. 7, 2022). Ex. 1010, Fig. 6A, ¶ 82) (affirming that Reime teaches having one light receiver (e.g., 30 or 32) on each side of a four-sided touch pad). In further support, we agree with Petitioner and find that Reime teaches that receivers 30 and 32 “are mounted in the peripheral area surrounding the LCD 92.” Pet. 32–33; Ex. 1010 ¶ 86; see also id. at Figs. 9A–9C (showing that the receivers are positioned at the edge of the LCD screen); infra annotated Fig. 9E (showing receivers 30 and 32 along edges of the LCD). Accordingly, we find Reime’s detector assembly that comprises receivers 30 and 32 is arranged along two edges (one edge for each receiver) of the LCD, which meets the Federal Circuit’s construction for being arranged at at least one edge. See supra Section III (concluding “at least one edge” means “arranged along one or more edges”) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 8,624,850 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,624,850 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Harbor Island Dynamic, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01405 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–20 over Torii, claims 1–3, 9, 11–13, and 19 over Ide, and claims 1–7, 10–17, and 20 over Gambino with Conn, with Ding for claims 10 and 20.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“of the substrate is based on Dr. Thompson’s testimony. In his first declaration, Dr. Thompson relies on Conn’s paragraphs 31 and 35 to support the annotated version of Figure 2 in the Petition. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83–84. As discussed above, paragraphs 31 and 35 do not disclose that the anchor vias 14 are located in the corner of the substrate. The second annotated Figure 2 shown in Petitioner’s Reply does not appear in either of Dr. Thompson’s declarations (See Ex. 1003, Ex. 1034). It appears to be mere attorney argument not evidence. Dr. Thompson testified in his deposition that the second annotated version is based on his interpretation of Conn. Ex. 2009, 45:2–46:9. Because Dr. Thompson’s testimony is not adequately supported by the disclosure of Conn, we find that his testimony on the point of whether Conn discloses anchor vias located in the corner of the substrate is entitled to little, if any, weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Therefore, because Petitioner has the burden of proof, we find that Petitioner has not shown that Conn discloses this limitation.” slip op. at 27
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“J. Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Petitioner moves to exclude Exhibits 2007 and 2008. MTE, 1. Petitioner argues that the Exhibits are in violation of FRE 401, 402, 403, and 901. Id. We do not rely on either Exhibit 2007 or 2008 in this Decision. Consequently, we deny Petitioner’s MTE as moot.” slip op. at 72
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the differences between the parties’ proposed levels of skill in the art are immaterial for the purposes of this Decision. We apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’826 patent and the prior art. Further, our determination in this case would not be affected if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Claim 1 uses the term “comprising” which is open-ended and normally does not exclude additional, unrecited elements. See Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This is in contrast to the phrase “consisting of.” See Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (there is an “exceptionally strong presumption that a claim term set off with ‘consisting of’ is closed to unrecited elements.”). The use of comprising in claim 1, thus, weighs against a construction limiting claim 1 to direct contact between the backside metal layer and the bottom surface of the semiconductor substrate. Additionally, we note that claim 1 does not recite that the backside metal layer is “directly on” or “formed on” the bottom surface or similar language that would suggest “direct contact” may be required. For these reasons, we determine that the language of claim 1 does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 9,245,826 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,245,826
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.