- Cisco Systems, Inc. / Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 22, 2024 · IPR2023-00401 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–31 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over Bruckman; the Board did not reach the additional grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that the ’740 Patent Specification disavows “any configurations where the user port is fixedly assigned to a specific backplane trace” from the full scope of the claim. Patent Owner’s citations to disclosures in the ’740 Patent Specification do not disparage the prior art, but merely contrast the configurations of the user ports and backplane traces disclosed in the ’740 Patent to “some known network element configurations” and “some conventional network elements.” See Ex. 1001, 1:66–2:4, 5:13–21. We find that the comparison of the disclosed configurations of user ports and backplane traces to that of the prior art in the ’740 Patent Specification does not constitute a clear disavowal of the first physical link fixedly assigned to the second physical link. See Continental Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[C]omparing and contrasting the present technique to that of the prior art does not ‘rise to the level of a clear disavowal’ of claim scope.”). Accordingly, we decline to construe “selecting, in a single computation based on at least one of the frame attributes, a first physical link out of the first group and a second physical link out of the second group” as requiring “the first physical link is not fixedly assigned to the second words of the claim their ordinary and customary meanings.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“For the purpose of resolving the controversy before us, we need not construe the phrase “arranged in parallel.” We do not agree with either of the proposed constructions for that seek to define “arranged in parallel” in relation to “relevant endpoints,” “a common relevant endpoint,” “a second relevant endpoint,” or “between a user node and a communication network.” Claim 1 already includes a description of endpoints for the second group of second physical links arranged in parallel: “each of the one or more interface modules” and “a communication network” because claim 1 recites “coupling each of the one or more interface modules to a communication network using a second group of second physical links arranged in parallel.” Ex. 1001, 11:4–6. Independent claims 4, 5, 13, 17, 19, 20, and 28 each recite identical or similar limitations. See Ex. 1001, 11:28–15:28. Other Claim Terms and Phrases As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not construe any other claim terms or phrases. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“C. Principles of Law A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) if in evidence, so-called secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).6 6 The parties do not present evidence or arguments regarding secondary considerations.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s substantive arguments. We agree with Petitioner that, in the flow of data from the core network to the network nodes 24, 26, 28 in Bruckman, there is a selection of a trace 52 out of the group of four traces 52 in order to send data to the appropriate line card 34, link 30, and node 24, 26, 28. We have reviewed Petitioner’s analysis addressing dependent claim 11 (see Pet. 58–63) and find that this selecting a trace 52 out of the group traces 52. For these same reasons, we also do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that “given that Bruckman discloses a system in which the trace is ‘determined’—and not selected—by the selection of a link 30, a POSITA would understand that Bruckman does not disclose the claimed selections in ‘a single computation.’” PO Resp. 53. More particularly, the analysis addressing claim 11, cited by Petitioner, provides additional explanation that Bruckman’s equipment 22 is a two-level demultiplexer structure with concentrators 50 acting as a first level demultiplexer to select one of four links 30 and switching core 40 acting as a second-level demultiplexer by distributing data frames from the input channel among four separate traces 52. See Pet. 58–59 (reproducing Ex. 1005, Fig. 2 (with Petitioner’s added annotations); citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 137; Pet. 23–27). The cited analysis further explains that Bruckman’s equipment 22 shown in Figure 2 includes a control line from controller 42 to the switching core 40 and control lines to each of the concentrators 50. See Pet. 59–60 (reproducing Ex. 1005, Fig. 2 (with Petitioner’s added annotations); citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 138). According to Petitioner, “[g]iven this well-known, two-level structure, a POSITA would have found it obvious for Bruckman’s [e]quipment 22 to be controlled in a manner consistent with well-known two-level demultiplexer control techniques.” Pet. 59 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 138). The cited analysis further explains that “[b]ecause each of the demultiplexing devices (switching core 40 and concentrators 50) in [Bruckman’s] Fig. 2 has one input and four outputs, a POSITA would have found it obvious to control each with a two-bit command signal.” Pet. 60 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 139). According to Petitioner, switching core (second-level demultiplexer) to select a trace 52. A different two-bit signal would be used to control the concentrators (first-level demultiplexers) to select a link 30, consistent with known techniques for controlling two-level demultiplexers. Such techniques . . . would have been in the background knowledge of a POSITA. Pet. 61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 139; Pet. 33); see Pet. 62–63 (reproducing Ex. 1007, Fig. 5.17(a) (with Petitioner’s annotations added); citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 139–141).” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 7,545,740 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,545,740 - PTAB · Oct 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00728 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Taniguchi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018). For the reasons below, we determine the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’430 patent, and we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“The ’430 patent describes its field of endeavor as inductor design in a VCO. Ex. 1001, 1:19–22. Patent Owner does not specifically state what Patent Owner considers the field of endeavor of the ’430 patent to be, but Patent Owner highlights portions of the ’430 patent specification that describe implementations on a single semiconductor chip. Prelim. Sur-reply 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:59–61). Even though portions of the ’430 patent refer to semiconductor die or chip applications (e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:27–61), neither the specification nor the claims are limited to such specific applications. Also, Patent Owner acknowledges a relatively broad field of endeavor with its proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, arguing that a person of ordinary skill would have had “two years of experience working in the wireless communications industry.” See Prelim. Resp. 15–16. Thus, on the present record, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner that the ’430 patent’s field of endeavor is inductor design. See Prelim. Reply 1–2. Similarly, although parts of Taniguchi describe an RFID system, on the current record, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that a person of ordinary skill would understand Taniguchi’s teachings to be applicable to the design of inductors generally. See Prelim. Reply 4–5. Among other things, on the present record, Petitioner sufficiently shows that the electromagnetic field created by a structure is not dependent upon it being labeled an antenna or an inductor. Prelim. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–93), 4–5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 69–73, 138–166, 203). Further, on this record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments that Taniguchi teaches away from the claimed invention; notwithstanding the reference’s discussion of specific applications in RFID systems, the structures depicted and described in Taniguchi are similar to those described and claimed in the ’430 patent, as discussed further below. Notably, the ’430 patent attributes many of the characteristics of the EM field to the symmetrical, 8-shaped inductor having current flowing in opposite directions in each of the inductor’s loops (Ex. 1001, 4:5–32), which is structurally similar to the structures depicted in Taniguchi, e.g. Figures 3, 7, and 8.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“¶¶ 85–93), 4–5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 69–73, 138–166, 203). Further, on this record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments that Taniguchi teaches away from the claimed invention; notwithstanding the reference’s discussion of specific applications in RFID systems, the structures depicted and described in Taniguchi are similar to those described and claimed in the ’430 patent, as discussed further below. Notably, the ’430 patent attributes many of the characteristics of the EM field to the symmetrical, 8-shaped inductor having current flowing in opposite directions in each of the inductor’s loops (Ex. 1001, 4:5–32), which is structurally similar to the structures depicted in Taniguchi, e.g. Figures 3, 7, and 8. Next, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments that Taniguchi does not teach or suggest a first inductor having a reduced far field. See Prelim. Resp. 23–26. As cited by Petitioner (Pet. 15–16), Taniguchi states that the “remote electromagnetic-field intensity” is suppressed with its two-loop 8- shaped antenna (e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 94). Similarly, we are currently persuaded that Taniguchi teaches or suggests that the magnetic field emanating from the second loop tends to cancel the magnetic field emanating from the first loop as a result of the current flowing through the loops in opposite directions. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 116, 122, 123; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 55–57, 73–75. At this stage, Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary (e.g., Prelim. Resp. 26– 27) do not substantively undermine Taniguchi’s teachings regarding suppression of the “remote” electromagnetic field. See Ex. 1001, 4:5–27 (describing characteristics of the EM field emanating from a symmetrical, single-turn, 8-shaped structure).” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 13, 17. Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill would have had “a master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, or similar discipline and at least two years’ experience in designing integrated circuits or inductors or a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, or a similar discipline and at least four years’ experience in designing integrated circuits or inductors.” Pet. 2–3. Petitioner also states that additional education might compensate for less experience and vice versa. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill and states that a person of ordinary skill “would have had a bachelor’s 6 US 2005/0077992 A1; published Apr. 14, 2005. Ex. 1008. 7 US 2001/0030591 A1; published Oct. 18, 2001. Ex. 1009. 8 Brooks, Douglas, “Signal Integrity Issues and Printed Circuit Board Design,” Prentice Hall Modern Semiconductor Design Series (2003). Ex. 1010. degree in electrical engineering, physics, or a similar discipline, and either a master’s degree in one of these fields of study or a minimum of two years of experience working in the wireless communications industry.” Prelim. Resp. 15–16 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 24). On the current record, Patent Owner’s reference to “experience working in the wireless communications industry” (Prelim. Resp. 16; Ex. 2002 ¶ 24) appears potentially overbroad, as compared to Petitioner’s reference to “experience in designing integrated circuits or inductors” (Pet. 2–3), which appears to better reflect the subject of the ’430 patent and asserted prior art. At this stage, we apply Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, but our Decision would not change under Patent Owner’s articulation. See Ex. 2002 ¶ 25 (Dr. Prucnal stating that his opinions would not change under Petitioner’s proposed articulation).” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,151,430 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 8, 2024 · IPR2023-00714 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7–16, 18–22, and 24–26 are unpatentable as obvious over Vink and Patrick, with or without AAPA; claims 6, 17, and 23 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, or approximately two years of experience working in the field of information technology and networking . . . . Lack of professional experience can be substituted by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59–60). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 19. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions addressed in the ’904 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues “that ‘subscriber lines’ should be construed as ‘communication lines to users of subscription-based network services.’” Id. Petitioner does not dispute this construction directly, but rather argues that no construction is necessary. Reply 6. We determine that no terms need to be construed. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Here however, we have found that it was known to connect LANs to external networks. See Ex. 1014, 6:23–28, Fig. 1; Ex. 1015, 1:6–9; Ex. 1016, 1:22–25; Ex. 1017, 1:7–11. We further agree with Petitioner’s uncontested point that “[t]echniques to further allow the communication system to access external networks by connecting the master to an external network were well-known in the art, as evidenced by Patrick and/or AAPA.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–88). The Petition focusses on combining the “communication systems” of Vink, Patrick and/or AAPA, as opposed to relying on a particular type of LAN. Thus, in contrast to Forest Lab’ys, we determine that the general or “generic” benefit of providing “access to a wider array of information,” where it was already known to provide external network access (e.g., the internet) to LANs,5 does provide a motivation to combine Vink and Patrick, with or without AAPA. See Intel Corp. v. Pact XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“There is a motivation to combine when a known technique ‘has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way.’” (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 417)).” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner also argues that Vink “teaches against” hierarchical addressing because “doing so would eliminate the purported advantages associated with using a non-hierarchical system.” PO Resp. 36 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 69 (Patent Owner’s declarant making the same statement)). Patent Owner does not further discuss the reasoning behind this statement, identify the “purported advantages,” or even identify the relevant disclosure relied on in Vink. We decline to speculate as to Patent Owner’s position in this regard. We further note that “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006).” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 6,680,904 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,680,904 - Vicor Corporation v. Delta Electronics, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 2, 2024 · IPR2024-00706 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims and grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“The Board has indicated that “one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.” Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 59 (Nov. 2019) (“CTPG”).6 But “the Board recognizes that there may be circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.” Id. Here, although there is overlap in the prior art asserted, there are clear differences in the limitations in the respective claim sets in each case, which requires different analysis. The issues related to a potentially different priority date for claims in the -715 case also support the need for two petitions. Additionally, under these circumstances, it is not apparent there has been a substantial benefit afforded to Petitioner by filing two petitions. Thus, we determine that Petitioner’s filing of two parallel petitions does not weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution in this particular case.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art and its definition appears to be similar to that of Petitioner’s definition. Prelim. Resp. 10. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’534 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “[t]he invalidity issues raised in this Petition may be resolved without any formal claim construction.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner offers no claim construction. Prelim. Resp. 9–10. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,877,534 - Vicor Corporation v. Delta Electronics, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 2, 2024 · IPR2024-00704 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because neither Ground 1 nor Ground 2 showed a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018). For the reasons below, we determine the information presented in the Petition does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’580 patent, and we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“interpretations are appropriate. Controlling law requires construing claims in an inter partes review using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2021). “In determining the meaning of [a] disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). The Petition does not even purport to apply this controlling law with its Ground 1. In fact, Petitioner acknowledges that its Ground 1 does not apply a “proper” claim construction, describing Ground 1 in contrast to Ground 2 as follows: “Ground 1 is essentially based on what we read their infringement contentions to be, . . . Ground 2 [applies] what we view as the proper construction of the patent.” Ex. 1022, 7:17–8:16. Accordingly, based on this record, we determine Petitioner has not supported the claim interpretations on which its Ground 1 relies, and Petitioner therefore has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in its challenge asserted as Ground 1.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“But Petitioner states that in the combination presented in Ground 2, “a skilled artisan would have set the current limit threshold based on the current-handling capability of the VTM to protect the VTM from over-current.” Pet. 49–50. “In this circumstance, the PRM would never reach an over-current condition. Rather, the PRM would operate within its normal range.” Pet. 50 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 144) (emphasis added). But Petitioner’s description of the proposed combination—in which “the PRM would never reach an over-current condition”—cannot be reconciled with Petitioner’s showings for the “over-current” limitations, which require, e.g., “when the resonant converter generates the over-current” (limitation [1c]). For example, for limitation [1c], Petitioner states “when the VTM exceeds its normal operating current, the PRM (with a duty cycle current limiter as taught by Hwang) would reduce its duty cycle, which would reduce its output voltage and output current, and thus reduce the input voltage and current to the VTM.” Pet. 55–56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158). But Petitioner and its declarant both state that in the combination proposed in Ground 2, “the PRM would never reach an over-current conduction.” Pet. 50; Ex. 1003 ¶ 144; see Pet. 59 (addressing similar language in limitation [1c]), 61 (addressing limitation [13c]), 63 (addressing limitation [17d]). Petitioner does not explain how those positions can be reconciled, nor does Petitioner adequately explain, much less support, a claim interpretation that would be satisfied by a proposed combination in which the resonant converter never generates an over-current. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in the challenges presented as Petitioner’s Ground 2.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 13, 17. Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill would have had “(1) at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in the field of power engineering.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–42). Patent Owner does not specifically address the level of ordinary skill. At this stage, Petitioner’s proposal appears consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’580 patent and prior art of record and is supported by expert testimony. We note, however, that the open-ended language “at least” expands the ranges of education and experience indefinitely with no upper bound. Upon this preliminary record and for the purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill with the exception that we delete the words “at least.”” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,711,580 - Vicor Corporation v. Delta Electronics, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 2, 2024 · IPR2024-00715 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Vicor had not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“The Board has indicated that “one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.” Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 59 (Nov. 2019) (“CTPG”).7 But “the Board recognizes that there may be circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.” Id. Here, although there is overlap in the prior art asserted, there are clear differences in the limitations in the respective claim sets in each case, which requires different analysis. The issues related to a potentially different priority date for claims in this case also support the need for two petitions.8 Additionally, under these circumstances, it is not apparent there has been a substantial benefit afforded to Petitioner by filing two petitions. Thus, we determine that Petitioner’s filing of two parallel petitions does not weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution in this particular case.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in power engineering” as of the date of the invention and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 47–48). 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. 8 We address the merits of the priority issue below. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art and its definition appears to be similar to that of Petitioner’s definition. Prelim. Resp. 9. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’534 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “[t]he invalidity issues raised in this Petition may be resolved without any formal claim construction.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner offers no claim construction. Prelim. Resp. 9. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,877,534 - PTAB · Oct 1, 2024 · IPR2024-00705 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6 under all five grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability based on Zeng-014 and Vinciarelli-218.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“whether to institute an inter partes review. Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we grant Petitioner’s request and institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“the first electronic component’ for the first connection part is a structural feature or relationship.” Prelim. Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 52–54). Here, claim 1 requires a structure in which the first connection part comprises a first terminal at one end coupled to a surface of a carrier such as a circuit board, and a second terminal at the other end attached to a surface of the first component, such that the first connection part has mechanical support of the first electronic component. See Ex. 1001, 15:31–37. We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that “this claim language connotes sufficient structural characteristics that preclude a product-by-process.” Prelim. Resp. 9.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“B. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). There is no requirement that the prior art must use the same words to describe a claim element in order to teach or disclose that claim element. Identity of terminology is not required for a claim element to be anticipated by the prior art without resorting to obviousness. See In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“The Federal Circuit has repeatedly warned that there has to be evidence of “glue” to make this specific combination, and not just the use of the claim as the roadmap for making the combination of prior art. See, e.g., InTouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGO Communications, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Dr. Yanco’s testimony was nothing more than impermissible hindsight; she opined that all of the elements of the claims disparately existed in the prior art, but failed to provide the glue to combine these references.”). Here, Petitioner’s alleged motivations to modify the modules Vinciarelli-218 to use the “connection part by curving a piece of metal against an electronic component” of Zeng-014 (Pet. 69) reflect impermissible hindsight bias.” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,819,263 - Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 25, 2024 · IPR2022-01223 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 5 were not shown unpatentable over Yegoshin, Bernard, Johnston, and Preiss under § 103 because the evidence did not establish multiplexing signals.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“communication device for multiplexing signals.” Ex. 1001, 12:2–3 (emphasis added). The language in the preamble does not support adopting Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of “multiplexing” to mean that “the connections may be used simultaneously or sequentially for combining multiple data paths into a single path,” because signals are being multiplexed, not connections or data paths. Pet. Reply 10. No connection is recited in the preamble with regard to multiplexing.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 (file history of the ’075 patent), 12; Ex. 2003 (Defendants’ Opening Claim Construction Brief from related litigation), 40–41; Ex. 2023 (Claim Construction Order from related litigation), 7). “Petitioner does not dispute that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting.” Pet. Reply 9 (citing PO Resp. 9–10; Ex. 2003, 45–46). Based on the full record, we adopt the parties’ agreement that the preamble is limiting. See also Ex. 2003, 45–46; Ex. 2023, 7.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“show by a preponderance of the evidence that Yegoshin teaches or would have been understood to reasonably suggest “multiplexing signals” and that Bernard “includes or operates as a multiplexer for combining the data packets.” See Pet. 32–40. Because Petitioner does not show multiplexing signals in any of the asserted references, Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that its proposed combination of Yegoshin, Bernard, Johnston, and Preiss would have rendered obvious “[a]n IP-enabled communication device for multiplexing signals,” as recited by claim 1. Also, because Petitioner fails to show Yegoshin teaches or would have been understood to reasonably suggest multiplexed signals and fails to show that Bernard “includes or operates as a multiplexer for combining the data packets,” Petitioner’s asserted motivation to modify Yegoshin in view of Bernard for “multiplexing signals” lacks rational underpinning. Weighing the underlying factual determinations, a preponderance of the evidence does not persuade us that claim 1 of the ’075 patent is unpatentable over Yegoshin, Bernard, Johnston, and Preiss. Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361.” slip op. at 44
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We do not credit Petitioner’s cited testimonial evidence because, for the reasons above, Yegoshin and the full record do not support it. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79, 80. We, instead, credit Patent Owner’s cited testimonial evidence because Yegoshin and the full record better support it. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 50, 51, 55–56, 58–61; see also Ex. 2025, 65:19–66:4.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 9,319,075 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,319,075 - PTAB · Sep 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00702 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–6 and 8–16 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Nair and Forsberg combination renders at least claim 1 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The Board has authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be authorized unless the information in the Petition and any preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’817 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, citing Dr. Bims’s declaration, asserts that, “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the subject matter of the ’817 patent would have had a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science, or equivalent and at least three years of experience in the field of telecommunications or wireless systems,” and that “[a]dditional education might compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 22). Patent Owner asserts that one of ordinary skill would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science with (1) at least three years of experience in the field of telecommunications or wireless systems; and/or (2) an advanced degree in field of telecommunications or wireless systems.” Prelim. Resp. 16. We do not discern a meaningful difference between the two parties proposals. Petitioner’s proposal appears consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’817 patent and prior art of record and is supported by expert testimony. We note, however, that the open-ended language “at least” expands the range of experience indefinitely with no upper bound. Upon this preliminary record and for the purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill with the exception that we delete the words “at least.”” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Neither party makes a claim construction proposal or indicates that any claim requires construction. Pet. 11; see generally Prelim. Resp. We note that an argument was raised that presents an implicit construction question regarding whether a flag which “only identifies if encryption [is] ‘on’ or ‘off’” (Prelim. Resp. 24) teaches or suggests “an encryption scheme identifier that identifies an encryption scheme used by the UE to encrypt the subscription identifier in the SUCI” (as recited in limitation 1d of claim 1 and identically in claims 9, 10, and 15). We address that argument below, in Sections II.D.3.c.ii and iii of this Decision. With that exception, we do not discern that any claim terms require construction at this point in the proceeding for the purpose of institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“i. Nair Provisional’s Support for a Claim in Nair Patent Owner argues that the Petition is deficient because it does not show that the disclosure in the Nair Provisional supports at least one claim in Nair, even though Nair is subject to the AIA and Patent Owner concedes that the Board’s precedential opinion in Penumbra concludes we do not need to make such a determination regarding support for at least one claim to reach a prior art determination under the AIA. Prelim. Resp. 23–24 n.6; Penumbra, 2023) (precedential). Following that precedent, we decline to require a showing of support in the Nair Provisional for at least one claim in Nair and instead only require that the ministerial requirements for claiming priority were met. See Penumbra, Paper 34 at 32–33. Petitioner argues that the “ministerial requirements” described in Penumbra have been met. Pet. 4–5 (noting that Nair contains a priority claim to the Nair Provisional, was filed within 12 months of the Nair Provisional, and includes a common inventor). Patent Owner does not contest that these requirements have been met, and upon our examination, we agree that they appear to have been met. Ex. 1004, codes (22), (60), (72); Ex. 1008, 1, 4, 38. Thus, on the present record and for the purposes of institution, the disclosures of Nair are prior art, to the extent that the relied-upon disclosures are included in the Nair Provisional. ii. Nair Provisional’s Date for Cited Portions of Nair Patent Owner also argues that the Petition relies on material in Nair that was added after the filing of the Nair Provisional, and that this material cannot be properly relied on as prior art. Prelim. Resp. 19–23. We address these specific arguments regarding material Petitioner references from Nair (and the Nair Provisional) below, in our analysis with respect to the respective limitations of claim 1 these citations relate to.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,425,817 - Cisco Systems, Inc. / Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2024-00037 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9, 12–24, and 27–31 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not prove either asserted obviousness combination taught the claimed controller or packet-applicable criterion.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA): would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience, and a POSA would have had a working knowledge of hardware and software for packet-switched networking. EX1004, ¶¶48-49. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education and vice versa. Id., ¶48. Pet. 5. “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 16. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’111 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Both parties agree that the ultimate analysis “remains the same” under either construction. Id. at 2; PO Sur-reply 2. We likewise agree that we do not need to decide between the two constructions. At the same time, consistent with parties’ positions, we construe “controller” to mean an entity that is either 1) configured to 2 Though Patent Owner does not provide a citation in support, Petitioner does not disagree that this is consistent with what occurred in the parallel district court proceeding. See Reply 1. perform deep packet inspection on packets, or 2) that is capable of controlling deep packet inspection. We determine that no other terms need to be construed. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Though Petitioner asserts that there are a “limited number of design options” and that it would have been obvious to combine the different components of Lin, Petitioner does not establish that a controller configured to perform DPI analysis on packets was a known solution, and thus one of the limited design options. As discussed in KSR: When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that is was obvious under § 103. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Besides asserting the combination would have been “obvious to try,” Petitioner provides no other analysis or reason why one of skill in the art would have modified the teachings of Lin to obtain the claimed controller. Thus, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the teachings of Lin render obvious all of the features of claim 1.” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Further, we find the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant more persuasive based at least on his consideration of Swenson as a whole and his more detailed analysis and explanations. For example, Patent Owner’s declarant explains in detail why, “[i]n the context of a HTTP GET request and response, as disclosed in Swenson, the message does not constitute a single packet but a flow of packets:” Furthermore, Swenson discloses that the steering device 130 “sends an ICAP request message 516 comprising [a] HTTP GET request header and a portion of the [HTTP] response payload to the network controller 140, which inspects the message to determine whether to monitor the flow or optimize the video.” Ex. 1007 [0065]. In the context of a HTTP GET request and response, as disclosed in Swenson, the message does not constitute a single packet but a flow of packets. The reference to a HTTP request and response “header” and “payload” are thus not references to the header and payload of a packet. A POSA would know that despite common parlance references to “HTTP packets,” HTTP does not pertain to individual packets, whereas packet transmission is governed by the TCP protocol. HTTP utilizes TCP to exchange data such that information may be used by an end user (e.g., a video or audio stream). Even assuming that Swenson’s controller were analyzing the header and payload of an HTTP request/response, a POSA would understand that this analysis is not at the packet but at the flow level and thus does not constitute deep packet inspection. Ex. 2025 ¶ 69. Petitioner’s declarant merely responds by reiterating what was previously stated: Swenson is explicit in stating that its inspection techniques include inspection of “a portion of the [HTTP] response payload.” . . . A POSA would have understood the analysis of the “response payload” to be DPI by a DPI-capable controller, as DPI refers to monitoring the payload of a packet.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,652,111 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,652,111
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.