- Unified Patents Inc. v. Synchview Technologies, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · May 28, 2020 · IPR2019-00470 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and maintained denial of institution because the record lacked evidence to determine the scope of “DVR” and whether the prior art met that limitation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“In summary, the record does not include sufficient information for a determination of the claim scope of “DVR.” It is Petitioner’s burden to show, in the Petition, “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4). Without such an explanation of Petitioner’s position and supporting evidence, we cannot conduct the necessary factual inquiry for determining whether Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood in demonstrating that the prior art meets this limitation. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) (reversing the Board’s decision of obviousness because it relied on “what at best are speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In summary, the record does not include sufficient information for a determination of the claim scope of “DVR.” It is Petitioner’s burden to show, in the Petition, “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4). Without such an explanation of Petitioner’s position and supporting evidence, we cannot conduct the necessary factual inquiry for determining whether Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood in demonstrating that the prior art meets this limitation. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) (reversing the Board’s decision of obviousness because it relied on “what at best are speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims”). We are unable to conclude, therefore, that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in demonstrating the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“In summary, the record does not include sufficient information for a determination of the claim scope of “DVR.” It is Petitioner’s burden to show, in the Petition, “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4). Without such an explanation of Petitioner’s position and supporting evidence, we cannot conduct the necessary factual inquiry for determining whether Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood in demonstrating that the prior art meets this limitation. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) (reversing the Board’s decision of obviousness because it relied on “what at best are speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims”).” slip op. at 5
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 6,788,882 - PTAB · Sep 4, 2019 · IPR2017-00909 · APJ Jacqueline T Harlow · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution because the petition did not adequately show motivation to combine or a reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“ANALYSIS Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d): A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion exists where a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“In addition, there is no dispute that the annealing protocol employed by the Wu Thesis “prove[d] deleterious to the functionality of the silicon device, particularly to its infrared wavelength absorptance capabilities.” Id. at 15 (citing Pet. 21). Based on these observations, we concluded that the Petitioner did not “adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have sought to anneal the sulfur-doped spiked silicon disclosed by the Wu Thesis in view of the reference’s teachings concerning the characteristics of spiked silicon, and the limitations of annealing such devices.” Id. at 17.” slip op. at 4
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“Hamamatsu’s argument regarding the alleged limitations of passivation by hydrogenation for only healing damage appears to be new. In fact, Hamamatsu’s Petition states that “[a]nnealing typically occurs after a doping process, because the annealing is used to repair damage caused by 7 the doping process, and to ‘activate’ the dopant material in the silicon.” Pet. 4. Hamamatsu did not make a distinction between these two purposes until now, nor have they adequately explained why it matters. As explained in our Decision, the passivation by hydrogenation process as disclosed in the Wu Thesis is used to “cure the structural defects in, and improve the electrical properties of,” the silicon substrate. Decision 18. Even, assuming arguendo, that the passivation by hydrogenation process is not a “full and complete substitute for the annealing process,” this does not change the fact that the Wu Thesis does not suggest any positive effect of annealing on dopant activation or on the electrical properties of spiked silicon. Furthermore, to the extent that annealing was discussed in the Wu Thesis, it had deleterious effects on absorptance.” slip op. at 7
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,080,467 - Apple Inc. / LG Electronics, Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 9, 2019 · IPR2018-00361 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1, 2, 6-9, 12, 14, and 15 unpatentable over Riggins and Devarakonda and claim 20 not shown unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and the “request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” The burden here, therefore, lies with Patent Owner to show we misapprehended or overlooked the matter it requests that we review. We are not persuaded that Patent Owner has shown that we misapprehended or overlooked the matter raised in the Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,216,158 - Facebook, Inc. / Whatsapp, Inc. et al. v. Uniloc 2017 LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 17, 2019 · IPR2017-01428 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving intact the determination that claims 9–12, 14–17, 25, and 26 are unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“issue of claim scope was raised in connection with Patent Owner’s arguments of attaching one or more files to an “instant voice message.” Paper 8, 11−12. Similarly, in our Final Written Decision we noted that simply construing “instant voice message,” without more, does not resolve the dispute of the parties because Patent Owner raised arguments distinguishing the prior art on the basis of “attaching” a file to the data content itself. Final Dec. 18. The Board construes terms that resolve the dispute of the parties, and “attaches” was one of those terms. Id.; see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“issue of claim scope was raised in connection with Patent Owner’s arguments of attaching one or more files to an “instant voice message.” Paper 8, 11−12. Similarly, in our Final Written Decision we noted that simply construing “instant voice message,” without more, does not resolve the dispute of the parties because Patent Owner raised arguments distinguishing the prior art on the basis of “attaching” a file to the data content itself. Final Dec. 18. The Board construes terms that resolve the dispute of the parties, and “attaches” was one of those terms. Id.; see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 8,995,433 - Google LLC v. Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 1, 2018 · IPR2017-02080 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Google's rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 3–23 because the petition did not show Zydney disclosed the claimed object field.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“We have considered Petitioner’s contentions but are not persuaded of any error in our Decision. Our Decision was premised not on a rejection of Petitioner’s proposed formulation of the broadest reasonable interpretation of the “object field” limitation recited in claim 3, but instead on Petitioner’s failure to persuade us that Zydney’s “body” maps to the recited object field. A prior art reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Moreover, “[a]nticipation requires that a single reference ‘describe the claimed invention with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.’” Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “For this reason, it has long been understood that ambiguous references do not, as a matter of law, anticipate a claim.” Id. But the disclosure of Zydney relied upon by Petitioner for the object field limitation of claim 3 is, at best, ambiguous.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In our Decision, we found that there was insufficient evidence on the record to support Petitioner’s contention that Zydney’s disclosure of a message “body” expressly discloses the recited object field and, further, that Petitioner did not establish a reasonable likelihood of showing that the claimed object field is inherently anticipated by Zydney. Dec. 17. We explained, in particular, that “[a]lthough Zydney discloses that its voice container includes ‘voice data,’ . . . Petitioner has not shown that voice data necessarily would be included in an ‘object field.’” Id. We, accordingly, determined that Petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of showing that the object field limitation of claim 3 is disclosed by Zydney.” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“record to support Petitioner’s contention that Zydney’s disclosure of a message “body” expressly discloses the recited object field and, further, that Petitioner did not establish a reasonable likelihood of showing that the claimed object field is inherently anticipated by Zydney. Dec. 17. We explained, in particular, that “[a]lthough Zydney discloses that its voice container includes ‘voice data,’ . . . Petitioner has not shown that voice data necessarily would be included in an ‘object field.’” Id. We, accordingly, determined that Petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of showing that the object field limitation of claim 3 is disclosed by Zydney.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“recites, in part, “a messaging system communicating with a plurality of instant voice message client systems . . . wherein the messaging system receives an instant voice message from one of the plurality of instant voice message client systems, and wherein the instant voice message includes an object field including a digitized audio file.” Ex. 1001, 24:15–27 (emphasis added). Petitioner alleges that claims 3–8, 11, 13, and 18–21 are anticipated by Zydney1 and that claims 3–23 also are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of Zydney and certain other references (Pet. 6, 11–68), relying in each of the asserted grounds on Zydney as teaching the recited “object field including a digitized audio field” (id. at 17–19, 38).” slip op. at 3
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,724,622 - Apple Inc. / Snap Inc. et al. v. Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 6, 2018 · IPR2017-00225 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving unchanged its finding that the challenged claims were not shown unpatentable based on Abburi and Holtzberg.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and the “request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” The burden here, therefore, lies with Petitioner to show we misapprehended or overlooked the matters it requests that we review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner
“disclosures that Petitioner provided, together with the testimony of Dr. Forys in support, to reach our finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine Abburi and Holtzberg as Petitioner alleged in the Petition. Thus, we are not persuaded that we overlooked the evidence that Petitioner raises in the Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,995,433 - Apple Inc. / Facebook, Inc. et al. v. Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 6, 2018 · IPR2017-00222 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving intact its determination that claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable over Vuori and Malik.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and the “request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” The burden here, therefore, lies with Patent Owner to show we misapprehended or overlooked the matters it requests that we review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“allegedly had no opportunity to brief. However, Patent Owner was given notice in our Decision on Institution that its arguments concerning the recited “list” were arguments concerning claim scope and that Patent Owner” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Vuori did not teach transmitting a “list.” Final. Dec. 32 (noting that Patent Owner relies on language in the Specification describing Figure 8); Prelim. Resp. 13−14. Then, we made two factual determinations based on the evidence of record, in light of Figure 8, which Patent Owner raised, and in light of the description of Figure 10, which Petitioner relied on as disclosing the “list.” See, e.g., Final Dec. 31 (noting arguments by Petitioner regarding Figure 10 and paragraph 47 of Vuori). Thus, we supported our determination based on evidence of record provided by Patent Owner and Petitioner. We discussed the testimony of Mr. Easttom and ultimately did not credit it in its entirety. Id. at 33 (explaining that Mr. Easttom’s testimony of “one value at a time” “at best, appears to focus only on the SVM fetcher, which requests the ‘current’ value of some SVM presentity’s information,” and finding that Vuori does not support the testimony or Patent Owner’s narrow view of Vuori in this regard).” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“have not followed the holding in In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Req. Reh’g. 3−4. With regard to claim construction, it was Patent Owner, not Petitioner, who attempted to paint Vuori as teaching transmission of “one value at a time.” Final Dec. 31 (“Patent Owner urges that we focus on Vuori’s explanation of distributing presence information . . . ‘one value at a time’.”). We analyzed Figure 8 of Vuori because Patent Owner relied on that figure as support for its contention that Vuori did not teach transmitting a “list.” Final. Dec. 32 (noting that Patent Owner relies on language in the Specification describing Figure 8); Prelim. Resp. 13−14. Then, we made two factual determinations based on the evidence of record, in light of Figure 8, which Patent Owner raised, and in light of the description of Figure 10, which Petitioner relied on as disclosing the “list.” See, e.g., Final Dec. 31 (noting arguments by Petitioner regarding Figure 10 and paragraph 47 of Vuori). Thus, we supported our determination based on evidence of record provided by Patent Owner and Petitioner. We discussed the testimony of Mr. Easttom and ultimately did not credit it in its entirety. Id. at 33 (explaining that Mr. Easttom’s testimony of “one value at a time” “at best, appears to focus only on the SVM fetcher, which requests the ‘current’ value of some SVM presentity’s information,” and finding that Vuori does not support the testimony or Patent Owner’s narrow view of Vuori in this regard).” slip op. at 3
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,243,723 - Apple Inc. / Facebook, Inc. et al. v. Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 6, 2018 · IPR2017-00222 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving its determination that claim 3 was not shown unpatentable over Vuori or Malik unchanged.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“We have reviewed the Petition again in light of Petitioner’s arguments. And we disagree that we overlooked or misapprehended the argument or that we misapprehended Malik’s disclosures. The Petition cites the Forys Declaration (Ex. 1003) at paragraphs 157−160, and relies on Malik’s disclosures at paragraphs 8, 32, and 33, for the limitation at issue. We reviewed and specifically pointed out why none of the cited passages of Malik and the Forys Declaration persuade us that Malik discloses the limitation. Final Dec. 39−40. In short, we determined that Malik’s recording of the voice message (recited “generating”), described in paragraph 33, occurs once the sender is authorized to send a voice message. Id. at 39. We found no particular control of the method of Malik’s recording based upon connectivity status because the sender will record the voice message regardless of whether the recipient is available or not. Id. at 39−40 (citing Ex. 1019 ¶¶ 8, 32−35). We are not persuaded that these findings were incorrect. Thus, we view Petitioner’s challenge of the Board’s decision as a mere disagreement with our reading of Malik, which differs from Petitioner’s characterization of the reference.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“arguments. And we disagree that we overlooked or misapprehended the argument or that we misapprehended Malik’s disclosures. The Petition cites the Forys Declaration (Ex. 1003) at paragraphs 157−160, and relies on Malik’s disclosures at paragraphs 8, 32, and 33, for the limitation at issue. We reviewed and specifically pointed out why none of the cited passages of Malik and the Forys Declaration persuade us that Malik discloses the limitation. Final Dec. 39−40. In short, we determined that Malik’s recording of the voice message (recited “generating”), described in paragraph 33, occurs once the sender is authorized to send a voice message. Id. at 39. We found no particular control of the method of Malik’s recording based upon connectivity status because the sender will record the voice message regardless of whether the recipient is available or not. Id. at 39−40 (citing Ex. 1019 ¶¶ 8, 32−35). We are not persuaded that these findings were incorrect. Thus, we view Petitioner’s challenge of the Board’s decision as a mere disagreement with our reading of Malik, which differs from Petitioner’s characterization of the reference.” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,243,723 - PTAB · Sep 6, 2018 · IPR2017-00221 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, maintaining its construction of “local network” and “external network”; it did not revisit whether Malik disclosed those limitations.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision[,]” which party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“cannot be the differentiator between ‘local’ and ‘external’ networks” as alleged by Patent Owner.” Reh’g Req. 3. As we explained in our Final Written Decision, we construed the two terms to be relative. Final Dec. 10– 15. In other words, whether a network is “local” or “external” depends on the perspective of a particular device. We are not persuaded that Figure 5 indicates otherwise. In Figure 5, two networks are labeled “local” (i.e., network 204 and network 504), and one network (network 102) is labeled “Internet.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 5. From the perspective of IVM client 508, network 504 is local; however, from the perspective of IVM client 208, network 504 is external. This is consistent with the description of Figure 5, which states that IVM client 508 “may be located in a user’s residence and be connected to a local IP network 504,” which “can be a WiFi network or a local area network (i.e., LAN), which is also within the user’s residence.” Ex. 1001, 19:66–20:4. At the same time, the ’890 patent describes IVM client 508 as a “global IVM client.” Id. at 20:10–14. Therefore, we do not agree that our construction “yields a non-sensical understanding” of these terms. See Reh’g Req. 4.” slip op. at 4
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Owner’s proposed construction. Although Dr. Forys may have used the term “types” loosely to distinguish between local and external networks, we are not persuaded that he used that word in the same way Patent Owner is using it. See Reh’g Req. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 56 (Dr. Forys stating that “[t]he variations among the independent claims are mostly related to different types of networks.”)). The word “type” is often used to distinguish things with different characteristics, and Patent Owner does not persuade us that, in the context of this case, the word references any particular characteristic of a network. Instead, we read Dr. Forys’s testimony as using the word “type” to distinguish between networks that differ solely based on the relative locations of the different networks. This is consistent with the rest of his testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 64–70 (Dr. Forys explaining his understanding of the difference between “external network” and “local network” to be solely based on the relative location of the networks). Fourth, as explained in our Final Written Decision, we give “little weight to” the quoted testimony of Mr. Easttom, in which he states that the terms are “analogous to the terms ‘private network’ and ‘public network’” because this testimony “is not explained or supported in any way.” Final Dec. 14 (quoting Ex. 2001 ¶ 24). We are not persuaded otherwise by Patent Owner’s quotation from the next paragraph of testimony in which Mr. Easttom discusses claim differentiation. Reh’g. Req. 6–7 (quoting Ex. 2001 ¶ 25 (“A POSA would understand from this explicit claim differentiation the” slip op. at 6
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,535,890 - C&D Zodiac, Inc. v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 9, 2018 · IPR2017-01274 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied C&D Zodiac’s rehearing request and left in place its denial of institution because the hypothetical forward wall limitation did not provide ascertainable claim scope.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision[,]” which party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“In the Institution Decision, we explained that we were unable to determine the metes and bounds of the hypothetical enclosure unit limitation required by all the challenged claims. Inst. Dec. 7–12. Specifically, we found that “[a]s a whole, the claim language does not in any comprehensible way tie the relative position of the seat support to the shape of the wall, be it “substantially not flat” or, hypothetically speaking, “substantially flat.”” Inst. Dec. 10. In light of this uncertainty, we found that “Petitioner has not provided sufficient information for a determination of the scope of certain limitations, such as the ‘additional space’ and, therefore, we cannot conduct the necessary factual inquiry for determining whether the prior art meets this limitation.” Id. at 16.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In the Institution Decision, we explained that we were unable to determine the metes and bounds of the hypothetical enclosure unit limitation required by all the challenged claims. Inst. Dec. 7–12. Specifically, we found that “[a]s a whole, the claim language does not in any comprehensible way tie the relative position of the seat support to the shape of the wall, be it “substantially not flat” or, hypothetically speaking, “substantially flat.”” Inst. Dec. 10. In light of this uncertainty, we found that “Petitioner has not provided sufficient information for a determination of the scope of certain limitations, such as the ‘additional space’ and, therefore, we cannot conduct the necessary factual inquiry for determining whether the prior art meets this limitation.” Id. at 16.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructioncites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 9,365,292
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.