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  • PTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00246 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 15–29 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations; the contingent motion to amend claims 30–41 is denied for lack of written-description support.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name its corporate parent, ResMed Inc., as a real party in interest. Paper 39. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 42. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 43. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 51.” slip op. at 3

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.10 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to herein as “POSITA”) would have had: at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience working with diagnostic sensor systems and network data systems, such as networked PAP machines. Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 44); PO Resp. 4. 9 Patent Owner does not assert any objective indicia of nonobviousness. See generally PO Resp. 10 For purposes of this Decision, we apply a priority date of November 4, 2005. See supra n.4. Because the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Patent Owner does not persuade us to construe the term as “a value [or calculated value] that indicates how dire a patient’s symptoms are.” Patent Owner points to nothing in the intrinsic record that purportedly supports this construction, and we agree with Petitioner that “the patent specification’s disclosures regarding determining a level of symptom severity are broad, establishing that it can generally be derived from any sensor data and/or breathing events.” Pet. Reply 3–4; see also Ex. 1001, 3:44–46 (“Signals from the[] sensors are then analyzed to determine the level of severity of the symptoms of the subject’s sleep disorder.”). Patent Owner relies only on expert declarations to support its construction. But as indicated by the Federal Circuit, extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This is especially applicable here, where neither Dr. D’Ambrosio’s nor Dr. Schwartz’s declaration was prepared for this proceeding, and neither declarant was subject to cross examination on their opinions. Moreover, neither of the declarants was opining on claim construction; rather, they were addressing indefiniteness and/or written description issues. See Ex. 1058 at 7 (heading addressing definiteness); Ex. 2026 at 18 (heading addressing written description). Further, Dr. Schwartz appears to have been making an argument about certain patent claims (not the challenged ’333 patent) based on Patent Owner’s own statements made during prosecution of a separate patent application. See Ex. 2026 ¶ 47 (“[T]he similar term used in the ’284 patent claims (‘data of severity of sleep disorder symptoms’) does not find written description support in the specification by a disclosure of the same statistics disclosed in Wright, because CleveMed argued those statistics are not related to severity of sleep disorder symptoms.” (emphasis added)). Patent Owner has not persuaded us that Dr. Schwartz’s testimony has direct applicability to the claim term at issue here. Dr. Borkholder’s testimony is likewise unpersuasive. Aside from citing Dr. D’Ambrosio’s and Dr. Schwartz’s declarations, Dr. Borkholder cites Exhibits 2027 and 2016. These exhibits discuss indices such as AHI and RDI that are used to assess the severity of a patient’s symptoms, but Patent Owner has not adequately explained how they bear on construction of the claim term at issue here, which is not addressed in these exhibits. Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 32–33. Accordingly, we accord Dr. Borkholder’s claim construction opinions little weight, because they are unsupported by reference to objective, corroborating evidence of record. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations . . . may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, IPR2022-00624, Paper 9, 15 (PTAB 2023) (precedential) (explaining that declaration testimony that “is conclusory and unsupported” and which “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support . . . is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 23

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We find that Petitioner has the better argument. Tidal volume refers to “the volume of air that is inspired or expired during a respiratory cycle.” Ex. 2028, 13–14; PO Resp. 10. “[H]ypopnea events are defined as a reduction of ≥50 % or 74 % in tidal volume from baseline and apnea events as absence of tidal volume for at least 10s.” Ex. 2028, 13–14 (emphasis omitted). Toge teaches that a control unit analyzes collected data (e.g., the flow rate) and calculates tidal volume. Ex. 1044 (Toge) ¶¶ 34–38. The calculated tidal volume is “a quantified level of severity data based on the subject’s sleep apnea symptoms during the therapy” because it represents, e.g., the “level of airway obstruction the patient experiences during the sleep apnea treatment using the PAP device.” Pet. 15. As Dr. Chatterjee explains: Toge discloses that tidal volume Fp is a quantified level of data because Toge discloses that Fp is monitored with respect to threshold values (id., [0051]) and because Fp is a function of Ft, Fa, and Fb, which are quantitative values. Toge discloses that tidal volume Fp is severity data because Toge discloses that tidal volume is indicative of whether the patient’s breathing warrants “emergency measures” (id., [0039]) and whether to “send an alert” in “an emergency where the patient’s breathing has drastically weakened” (id., [0055]). . . . . Because Toge discloses determining tidal volume (determine a quantified level of severity data) based on Ft, Fa, and Fb (id., [0035]), which corresponds to the subject’s condition (subject’s sleep apnea symptoms) while using the device (during the therapy) (id., [0036], [0037]), Toge discloses determin[ing] a quantified level of severity data based on the subject’s sleep apnea symptoms during the therapy. Ex. 1005 (Chatterjee Decl.) ¶¶ 122–125. Patent Owner’s attempt to dismiss tidal volume as a mere “breathing metric” is unavailing. First, Petitioner correctly “notes that in the paragraph PO cites to in Dr. Schwartz’s declaration, he indicates that breathing metrics are a level of severity data.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 2026 ¶ 46 (“standard sleep disordered breathing metrics” [ ] were well validated indicators of the type and severity of sleep disordered breathing”)). Second, Dr. Kirkness explains that tidal volume represents the level of airway obstruction, e.g., apnea “is the most severe form of reduction in airflow [and] the absence of airflow results in quantified tidal volume of zero milliliters per breath.” Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶¶ 157, 159; see also PO Resp. 10–11 (Patent Owner recognizing that an apnea is defined as absence of tidal volume for at least 10 seconds). The calculated tidal volume thus indicates severity because it is used to adjust the PAP system, e.g., in the case of decreasing tidal volume, a medical professional can change the airflow settings “to counter/treat the more severe level of airway obstruction observed from the decreasing tidal volume.” Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 158; Pet. 15–16; Ex. 1044 (Toge) ¶ 39.” slip op. at 26

    Patent outcomesUS 11,857,333 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,857,333
  • PTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00247 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable under any of six obviousness grounds because Truitt did not teach or suggest the claimed severity calculation and index, and the Mumford combinations lacked the required sensor disclosures.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name its corporate parent, Resmed Inc., as a real party in interest. Paper 29. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 31. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 32. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 40.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “disorder symptoms” require a “quantitative” calculation or use of an algorithm, we also disagree. See PO Resp. 14–16. First, nothing in the language of the claims themselves describes or requires a “quantitative” calculation or an algorithm. See generally Ex. 1001, 23:6–26:59. To be sure, the ’029 patent discloses embodiments that use known algorithms to “quantify the level of severity of the subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms.” See, e.g., id. at 20:16–19. But the Specification does not require an algorithm. The Specification also indicates that quantification is merely “preferable” (i.e., not required), and is merely one embodiment. See, e.g., id. at 19:8–12 (“The signals from the one or more sensors used in various embodiments of the present invention are preferably analyzed using a processor and software that can quantitatively estimate or determine the severity of the subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms.”) (emphasis added), 4:51–59 (“Finally, in still another embodiment, the present invention includes a sleeping disorder treatment system comprising a device for diagnosing and creating a quantitative output of a level of severity of a subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Reply 5–6 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:3–59 and 19:8–12 and stating that the ’029 patent lists “numerous embodiments where only one of seven include a quantitative assessment”). Elsewhere, the Specification more generally states that signals from sensors are “analyzed to determine the level of severity of the symptoms,” without specifying that such analysis must be “quantitative” or performed by an algorithm. See Ex. 1001, 3:41–44. In view of these disclosures, Patent Owner does not persuade us to adopt its narrowing claim construction. Indeed, our reviewing court has “repeatedly warned against confining the claims” to specific embodiments disclosed in the Specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Patent Owner’s reliance on a prior Board decision in PGR2024- 00012, which related to the parent of the ’029 patent, is unavailing. See PO Resp. 15–16. We agree with Petitioner that in the cited case, “[t]he Board made no findings about the meaning of the term calculating ‘the data of a severity of the sleep disorder symptoms of the subject’ for claim construction.” Reply 8. Indeed, neither party offered any claim construction, and the Board determined that no claim construction was necessary for purposes of that decision. See ResMed Corp., PGR2024- 00012, Paper 7 at 8. The page of the decision Patent Owner cites addresses written description support in the specification for the claims challenged in that PGR, not claim construction. See id. at 16. In any event, the cited decision is a decision on institution. The Board’s statements there are, by nature, preliminary findings and conclusions based on a preliminary record, and are not binding here. For at least the above reasons, Patent Owner does not persuade us to adopt its narrowing claim construction and we find that the term “data of a severity” does not need construction because the words of the term are clear on their face.” slip op. at 31

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “skilled artisan would have incorporated only portions of Mumford’s algorithm into Truitt’s PAP (i.e., only those portions related to “the detection of sleep disordered events” and not the portions of the algorithm related to “determin[ing] sleep stage”) comes too late because this argument was not in the Petition. See, e.g., Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (rejecting petitioner’s “attempts to cure the petition’s deficiencies in its subsequent briefing to the Board”). The Petition does not discuss modifying Mumford’s sleep efficacy algorithm before incorporating it into Truitt’s PAP device or incorporating only certain features of the algorithm. Indeed, the Petition and Dr. Kirkness rely on Mumford’s ability to detect sleep arousals when mapping Mumford to the claimed “data of a severity” and “index.” See Pet. 69–70; Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶¶ 323–325. Mumford discloses that the mask electrodes detect arousals. See Ex. 1009 (Mumford) 2:4–10, 11:39–48. The same lack of disclosure plagues Petitioner’s belated Reply argument that Truitt’s ports 74 and 76 can incorporate electric sensing elements that would have functioned similar to Mumford’s electrodes. See Reply 22. The Petition did not mention ports 74 and 76 or otherwise suggest that a skilled artisan would have added functionality similar to Mumford’s electrodes to Truitt’s PAP, and we find that it is too late on Reply for Petitioner to posit this modification.” slip op. at 40

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

      “significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This is especially applicable to Dr. Jafari’s opinions. His declaration was not prepared for this proceeding and thus Dr. Jafari was not subject to cross examination in this proceeding. See Reply 6 n.3. Moreover, Dr. Jafari was not opining on claim construction; rather, he was addressing the alleged indefiniteness. See Ex. 2020 (Jafari Decl.) 12 (heading addressing definiteness), ¶¶ 41–42, 46. Additionally, paragraphs 41–42 of Dr. Jafari’s declaration discuss claim terms phrases in a different patent (US 11,375,921), which explicitly include the terms “quantified” and “quantitative.” See Reply 6–7; Ex. 2020 (Jafari Decl.) ¶ 34. For at least these reasons, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that Dr. Jafari’s testimony is applicable here. Further, regarding the portion of Patent Owner’s proposed construction reciting “the degree of deviation from the baseline characteristics of a patient without sleep disorder symptoms,” Dr. Borkholder does not do his own analysis, but instead simply states that he “agree[s] with the litigation claim construction opinions of Dr. Jafari.” Ex. 2019 (Borkholder Decl.) ¶ 53. This is insufficient, and thus we do not credit Dr. Borkholder’s testimony regarding claim construction. We instead credit Dr. Kirkness’s statement that “[s]everity data is frequently calculated as the deviation from baseline characteristics of the patient himself, not a generic person ‘without sleep disorder symptoms.’” Ex. 1071 (Kirkness Reply Decl.) ¶ 13; Reply 9. As Dr. Kirkness explains, and Patent Owner does not dispute (see generally Sur-reply), “[t]he ‘baseline characteristics of a [generic] patient without sleep disorder symptoms’ would be irrelevant to any particular patient with their own unique breathing patterns and sleep disorder symptoms.” Ex. 1071 (Kirkness Reply Decl.) ¶ 13 (second alteration in original). For at least these reasons, we reject Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction.” slip op. at 30

    Patent outcomesUS 11,872,029 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,872,029
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00189 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    Claim 16 is unpatentable because Slater anticipates it.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “undisputed limitations of claim 16 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claim 16 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claim 16. Pet. 28–30; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 106. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 28–30. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claim 16.” slip op. at 12

    Patent outcomesUS 8,529,608 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 8,529,608
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2021-01452 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    On remand, claims 6, 8, 9, 13, and 19 are unpatentable; claims 2–5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable over Slater or Slater and Weaver.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “Accordingly, for the same reasons expressed by our previous decision addressing claim 8 of the ’085 patent, and the court’s analysis in Stryker, we conclude that Slater does not anticipate claims 2–5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 of the ’716 patent because Slater deliberately describes a variable angle hole that lacks a single predetermined angle—that is, Slater describes a transfixation screw hole that does not have a central axis defining the trajectory.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “In its Petition, Petitioner contends that Weaver discloses the limitations in claim 6 and that it would have been obvious to add Weaver’s features to Slater’s plate to provide a more secure fixation between the screws and the plate. Pet. 36–39; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 188–196. Specifically, Petitioner contends that configuring Slater’s transfixation screw hole (claim 6) or at least one of Slater’s attachment points (claim 8) as a threaded screw hole to lockably engage the head of a locking screw would have been an obvious design choice “because locking screws ‘provide a high resistance to shear or torsional forces’ and reduce the incidence of screw loosening.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1009, 1:57–58); Ex. 1009, 1:46–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 191– 196. Petitioner otherwise relies on its anticipation analysis for claim 1 discussed above. Pet. 36.” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 9,763,716 mixed
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,763,716
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00191 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board held claims 15 and 21 unpatentable as anticipated by Slater.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandOther

      “Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Stryker Corp. v. OsteoMed LLC, No. 2023-1925, 2025 WL 2814019 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“Stryker”) (Paper 381), affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, vacating and remanding-in-part our Final Written Decision (Paper 35) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our finding of no anticipation as to independent claims 1, 10, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 9,763,716 B2 (“the ’716 patent,” Ex. 1001), and vacated and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether either of dependent claims 15 and 21 is unpatentable. Stryker, slip op. at 17.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claims 15 and 21 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claims 15 and 21 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claims 15 and 21. Pet. 31–33; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 124. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 31–33. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claims 15 and 21.” slip op. at 13

    Patent outcomesUS 9,763,716 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 9,763,716
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00190 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board determined claim 15 unpatentable as anticipated by Slater because Slater discloses every limitation, including the flared hips and opposing generally parabolic wings.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • BurdenUnpatentable

      “We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claim 15 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claim 15 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claim 15. Pet. 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 119. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 28–30. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claim 15.” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claim 15 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claim 15 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claim 15. Pet. 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 119. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 28–30. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claim 15.” slip op. at 13

    Patent outcomesUS 9,351,776 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 9,351,776
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2021-01450 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    On remand, claims 6, 8–10, 14, and 17 are unpatentable; claims 2–5, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable, based on anticipation by Slater and obviousness over Slater and Weaver.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandMixed

      “Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Stryker Corp. v. OsteoMed LLC, No. 2023-1925, 2025 WL 2814019 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“Stryker”) (Paper 49),1 affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, vacating and remanding-in-part our Final Written Decision (Paper 46) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our finding of no anticipation as to independent claims 1 and 11 of U.S. Patent No. 8,529,608 B2 (“the ’608 patent,” Ex. 1001), and vacated and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether dependent claims 2–6, 8–10, 12–14, and 17 (the “Remanded Claims”) are similarly unpatentable in view of Petitioner’s challenges relying on the Slater reference. Stryker, slip op. at 14–15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. We issue this Final Written Decision on Remand pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 144, 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 in an inter partes review involving Stryker Corporation and Wright Medical Technology, Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”) and OsteoMed LLC (“Patent Owner”). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the entirety of the record in light of the Federal Circuit’s directives in Stryker, we find by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 6, 8–10, 14, and 17 are unpatentable. We also conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2–5, 12, and 13 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “Accordingly, for the same reasons expressed by our previous decision addressing claim 8 of the ’085 patent, and the court’s analysis in Stryker, we conclude that Slater does not anticipate claims 2–5, 12, and 13 of the ’608 patent because Slater deliberately describes a variable angle hole that lacks a single predetermined angle—that is, Slater describes a transfixation screw hole that does not have a central axis defining the trajectory.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “limitations in claim 6 and that it would have been obvious to add Weaver’s features to Slater’s plate to provide a more secure fixation between the screws and the plate. Pet. 37–39; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 161–169. Specifically, Petitioner contends that configuring Slater’s transfixation screw hole (claim 6) or at least one of Slater’s attachment points (claim 8) as a threaded screw hole to lockably engage the head of a locking screw would have been an obvious design choice “because locking screws ‘provide a high resistance to shear or torsional forces’ and reduce the incidence of screw loosening.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1009, 1:57–58); Ex. 1009, 1:46–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 162– 163. Petitioner otherwise relies on its anticipation analysis for claim 1 discussed above. Pet. 37. Patent Owner raised no separate argument regarding the patentability of claims 6 and 8, instead relying solely on its argument that Slater does not anticipate independent claim 1, on which claims 6 and 8 depend. PO Resp. 46; Reply 4 (“Patent Owner does not challenge the combination of Slater and Weaver for claims 6 and 8.”). We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claims 6 and 8 and find that Petitioner establishes that the combination of Slater and Weaver discloses all of the limitations of claims 6 and 8, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Slater and Weaver for the reasons provided by Petitioner. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 37–39.” slip op. at 19

    Patent outcomesUS 8,529,608 mixed
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,529,608
  • PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2021-01451 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

    On remand, claims 6, 8, 9, and 13 were held unpatentable; claims 2–5, 11, and 12 were not shown unpatentable because Slater lacks the claimed central axis.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed

      “addressing the ’085 patent and by the court’s analysis in Stryker, we conclude that Slater does not anticipate claims 2–5, 11, and 12 of the ’776 patent because Slater deliberately describes a variable angle hole that lacks a single predetermined angle—that is, Slater describes a transfixation screw hole that does not have a central axis defining the trajectory.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “In its Petition, Petitioner contends that Weaver discloses the limitations in claim 6 and that it would have been obvious to add Weaver’s features to Slater’s plate to provide a more secure fixation between the screws and the plate. Pet. 36–39; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 169–74. Specifically, Petitioner contends that configuring Slater’s transfixation screw hole (claim 6) or at least one of Slater’s attachment points (claim 8) as a threaded screw hole to lockably engage the head of a locking screw would have been an obvious design choice “because locking screws ‘provide a high resistance to shear or torsional forces’ and reduce the incidence of screw loosening.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1009, 1:57–58); Ex. 1009, 1:46–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 169– 74. Petitioner otherwise relies on its anticipation analysis for claim 1 discussed above. Pet. 36.” slip op. at 17

    • RemandOther

      “Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Stryker Corp. v. OsteoMed LLC, No. 2023-1925, 2025 WL 2814019 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“Stryker”) (Paper 49),1 affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, vacating and remanding-in-part our Final Written Decision (Paper 46, “FWD”) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our finding of no anticipation as to independent claims 1 and 10 of U.S. Patent 9,351,776 B2 (“the ’776 patent,” Ex. 1001), and vacated and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether dependent claims 2–6 and 8, 9 and 11–13 (the “Remanded Claims”) are unpatentable in view of Petitioner’s challenges relying on the Slater reference. Stryker, slip op. 14– 15.” slip op. at 2

    Patent outcomesUS 9,351,776 mixed
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,351,776
  • PTAB · Mar 25, 2026 · IPR2024-01498 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over the Lesniak- and Native-based grounds; the Squatch and Sturgis ground fails because Squatch was not shown to be a printed publication.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenDecided for patent owner

      “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Squatch is a printed publication. As described above, Petitioner relies on Squatch as a “website excerpt” placed on its site at the relevant time, but has not produced a screen shot of the website to show that it ever existed. See Ex. 1059. Petitioner provides internal documents that purport to describe what would have been on Dr. Squatch’s website at the relevant time, but falls short of establishing what was on the website for the interested consumer to view. Thus, we determine that this ground fails.” slip op. at 55

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications at this stage of the proceeding. PO Resp. 10. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art. See e.g., Exs. 1003, 1004.” slip op. at 8

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a secondary wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that Lesniak teaches how to make stable compositions by including a secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Id. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Pet. Reply 6 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate deodorant stick within the parameters of claim 1.” slip op. at 25

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

      “Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claims 1, 16, and 19 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting as it provides antecedent basis for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” for each independent claim. PO Resp. 7–10. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 6–9 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 9. We agree. Petitioner does not argue to the contrary. See, e.g., Pet. 19 (arguing that Lesniak discloses a deodorant stick in the form of an antiperspirant stick).” slip op. at 8

    Patent outcomesUS 11,844,752 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,844,752
  • PTAB · Jan 28, 2026 · IPR2024-01174 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–8 and 10–23 are unpatentable: the Board found claims 1–15 anticipated or obvious over the asserted grounds and claims 16–23 obvious over the Native combination.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedOther

      “argument that the prior art fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that Lesniak teaches how to make stable compositions by including a secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Id. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 6 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32).” slip op. at 22

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–29). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications at this stage of the proceeding. PO Resp. 10. For this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposal above, which does not appear to be inconsistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

      “Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claim 1, 16, and 20 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting” as it provides antecedent basis for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” for each independent claim. PO Resp. 7–10. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 6–9 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 9. We agree. Petitioner does not provide argument to the contrary. See, e.g., Pet. 19 (arguing that Lesniak discloses a deodorant stick in the form of an antiperspirant stick). We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 8

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We find that the evidence of record fails to support Patent Owner’s argument that the prior art fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that Lesniak teaches how to make stable compositions by including a secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Id. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 6 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate deodorant stick within the parameters of claim 1. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of evidence that Lesniak anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 11,497,706 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,497,706
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