- PTAB · May 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00032 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10, 19, and 28 are obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“At least because of the material differences in Ferro compared to Hafner ’174 and the reliance on Donnelly and Letendre, which were not before the Office, we find that the same or substantially the same art was not previously presented to the Office.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“We disagree with Patent Owner. It is true that Oyobe focuses on alerting a vehicle user to a low state of charge by raising a physical indicator on the exterior of the vehicle (i.e., the “informing apparatus 102) when the battery is low. Ex. 1005 ¶ 40. Oyobe explains: even in such a case where the vehicle user exit from the vehicle without checking the SOC of main battery B on the console panel, informing apparatus 102 disposed at a location where it can easily be seen outside the vehicle by the vehicle user allows the vehicle user to easily recognize the necessity of charging main battery B. Id. However, Oyobe’s focus on raising a physical indicator on the vehicle as a reminder does not detract from Oyobe’s unambiguous disclosure that its vehicle also includes position detecting apparatus 108 that uses wireless communication to “sense that the vehicle is parked at the location where charging equipment is installed.” Id. ¶ 142. Oyobe’s ability to sense whether a vehicle is parked next to a charger allows Oyobe’s system to remind the user to charge the battery by raising low battery indicator 102 while the vehicle is located next to a charger but not “where charging cannot be performed.” Id. ¶¶ 143–145. Accordingly, regardless of the reason that Oyobe provides for including its vehicle position detecting apparatus, Oyobe undeniably describes a vehicle sensor that can provide “information indicative of a presence of an electric vehicle in a parking space” near a charging station. And, we find that Petitioner has sufficiently explained why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to use Oyobe’s sensor in Ferro’s electric vehicle to “advantageously allows a user to instruct charging without exiting the vehicle and physically interacting with a charging station.” Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–152).” slip op. at 20
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Third, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner violates Rule 42.6(a)(3) by improperly incorporating arguments from Mr. Andrews’s Declaration into the Petition to establish that Oyobe teaches sensing the presence of a vehicle in a “parking space” as recited in limitation 1e. Prelim. Resp. 42–43 (citing Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 178–181)). Patent Owner contends that Mr. Andrews’s citation of four references that are not expressly cited in the Petition, Exhibits 1018, 1053, 1057, and 1059, implicitly demonstrates that the Petition incorporates arguments by reference. Id. Not only do we find Petitioner’s reliance on Mr. Andrews’s testimony to be persuasive, but we also find that Mr. Andrews’s citations to Exhibits 1018, 1053, 1057, and 1059 provide strong support for his testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand that Oyobe teaches that its vehicle is in a parking space when Oyobe’s apparatus 108 detects that “the vehicle is parked” near charging equipment. Far from improperly incorporating arguments by reference, we find Mr. Andrews’s citation to objective evidence to support his opinions on how an ordinarily skilled artisan would read Oyobe’s disclosure to be preferred and highly persuasive.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,563,338 - Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCInstitutedPTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Julia Heaney · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–17 and 22–28 and all asserted grounds, finding a sufficient likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Further, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion not to institute review. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther
“On this record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed experience level of at least five years in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction to be supported. As to the necessity of experience in textile engineering and fiber science, Patent Owner’s position, although not supported by declarant analysis of the factors listed above, is consistent with the disclosure of the ’854 patent, which describes features of a mesh layer in textile and fiber terms. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:17–11:14, 12:65–13:8, 14:20–24. On the whole, however, we do not discern on this record how specific experience in textile engineering and fiber science of a person of ordinary skill would materially alter the outcome at this stage of the proceeding. For purposes of this decision only, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, except for the requirement of five years of experience in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction. The level of skill in the art remains an open issue in this proceeding. Further submissions by the parties may include argument and evidence that would assist in the resolution of this issue at the close of trial.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 10; Reply 1, 4. Patent Owner contends the terms “mesh layer” and “coefficient of friction” require construction. Prelim. Resp. 14–16; Sur-reply 2–5. We have considered the parties’ arguments and discuss them below with regard to each of the terms Patent Owner contends should be construed. Because our determination that Petitioner demonstrates at least one challenged claim meets the threshold for institution (see SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60) is not based on construing the term “mesh layer” or “coefficient of friction,” we determine we need not construe either claim term at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). As further discussed below, we invite the parties to address claim construction at trial.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the ’854 patent specification does not include clear and explicit lexicography or a disclaimer that would support requiring “coefficient of friction” to be determined by a specific ASTM test method. The portion of the specification Patent Owner asserts as a definition of “coefficient of friction” (see Ex. 1001, 11:31–42) is a description of an embodiment; we find it does not express patentee intent to redefine the term. Further, the statement that “the coefficient of friction … may be determined using the … ASTM D1894 standard test method” (id. at 11:32–35) indicates that use of that specific test method is optional. Accordingly, in the absence of patentee lexicography or disavowal, we do not limit the scope of the term “coefficient of friction” to require that it be measured by a specific ASTM standard. Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Absent lexicography or disavowal, we do not depart from the plain meaning of the claims.”); In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). We note that the ’854 patent specification sets forth a definition for the coefficient of friction between the surfaces of the mesh material and the slide surface. Ex. 1001, 4:38–46. As stated above, however, we do not expressly construe any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. Should the parties address the construction of “coefficient of friction” at trial, we will make a determination after the close of evidence and any hearing.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,998,854 - SAP America, Inc. v. Cyandia, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Apr 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01433 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–7, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 23, 29, 35, and 36 based on the PCT publication and Austin-Lane under § 103.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation will eliminate the overlap between this proceeding and invalidity at the district court. Unlike the other, related IPRs for which we discretionarily deny review (e.g., IPR2024-01432, -01495, & -01496), this proceeding does not involve references that fundamentally convey the same information as may be presented as system art in the Texas litigation. In light of the stipulation and nature of the asserted ground, we conclude that this ground strongly favors institution.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We conclude that the claim language reads on Austin-Lane’s disclosure of determining “a presentation method of the notification” such as “using an instant message to the notebook computer” (Ex. 1105 ¶¶ 39, 46), in combination with teachings regarding the device to which the notification is sent and the protocol used to deliver it. We further conclude that Petitioner has provided an adequate reason that skilled artisans would have looked to Austin-Lane’s teachings and combined them with the system described in the PCT publication, as discussed. We have further reviewed the uncontested aspects of the challenge to claim 1 (Pet. 43–58) and determine that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail proving obviousness of claim 1. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to unpatentability of at least one claim. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review of claims 1–7, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 23, 29, 35, and 36 of the ’948 patent is instituted on the grounds raised in the Petition; and” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of filing “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or equivalent, with two or more years of experience developing and implementing graphical user interfaces for controlling server-based applications, including handling asynchronous notifications generated by those applications and web services, such as portal systems, or an equivalent amount of relevant work or research experience” and “would have been familiar with common approaches for presenting information on a graphical user interface, including various layouts for presenting multiple elements, such as icons, widgets, windows, etc.” Pet. 14–15. Petitioner describes further capabilities that such a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had. Id. at 15–16. Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or the like, and/or four or more years of experience in server-based applications” and that “[a]dditional experience may make up for a lack of education and vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the challenged patent and prior art, we adopt it and use “skilled artisans” to refer to people with such skill at the time the invention was filed. We do not perceive a substantive distinction between the parties’ definitions, but note that Petitioner’s definition provides more detail about the capabilities of skilled artisans. Should either party believe that the definition of ordinary skill in the art affects a disputed issue in the trial, it should point out how and identify any potential dispute about the level of skill.” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree. Petitioner notes that certain disclosures added to the April 2011 CIP application describe a “notification manager” to “determine the best alert notification method.” Pet. 27 (quoting Ex. 1110 ¶ 131; citing id. ¶¶ 90–93, 130–132, 145–147, 160). That does not mean that Petitioner construes the claim language to require determining the best method, only that disclosing a mechanism that “determine[s] the best alert notification method” provides written-description support for a requirement to “determin[e] a notification method.” Petitioner is clear in its position that the May 2009 application “does not describe how to determine a notification method or how to use ‘session data’ in the manner required by this claim limitation.” Pet. 27–28. Patent Owner asserts that the May 2009 application discloses “determining a notification method” through a channel alert server that can “determine the active devices of the subscriber . . . to provide a visual or auditory alert in the channel.” Prelim. Resp. 32 (quoting Ex. 1106 ¶ 39). That disclosure appears to address the claim language requiring an alert “based on the current state of the at least one external device indicated by the session data.” It does not, however, address the claim language “determining a notification method.” Patent Owner recognizes that Petitioner asserts disclosures in the prior art for “determining which devices to send the alert to, the protocols used to send the alert, and how alerts are presented.” Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted). But when Patent Owner asserts that the May 2009 application discloses determining how alerts are presented, it points to paragraphs that do not support the assertion. Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1106 ¶¶ 23, 39). The first, paragraph 23, states that a “trigger may cause the information channel to change its appearance or to take other actions that may be implemented by the developer” and that “one action that may be implemented is to provide a notification to the user.” Ex. 1106 ¶ 23. Nothing about that indicates the system determines how an alert is presented. The second, paragraph 39, states that the channel alert server may “provide a visual or auditory alert in the channel” and that the “alert can appear as defined on other platforms.” Nothing about that indicates the system determines how an alert is presented. Patent Owner has not shown how the May 2009 application discloses a determining a notification method, as claimed. In Patent Owner’s view, Petitioner admits that the May 2009 application (which is the same as the asserted PCT publication) describes determining a delivery mechanism because Petitioner compares it to Austin-Lane, stating that the PCT publication “already includes a channel alert server that determines the active devices of the user and delivers an alert to the user’s device” and “discloses setting the same type of alert (stock alert) and presenting it in the same way (visually) as Austin-Lane.” Prelim. Resp. 35 (quoting Pet. 54) (emphasis omitted). But simply delivering an alert does not necessarily mean the notification method for that alert was determined. We conclude that Petitioner’s statement does not show the PCT publication discloses “determining a notification method” as claimed.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,751,948 - Silicon Motion Inc. v. K.Mizra, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01241 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–2 and 4–15 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 2, 4–7, and 9–15 are obvious over Johnson or Stubbs.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons provided below, and based on the present record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or a related field, and 2-3 years of experience in memory system design,” or, alternatively, “a Master’s degree in one of those fields and 1-2 years of relevant experience.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–29). Patent Owner “does not contest Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, but it reserves the right to do so in the event that trial is instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 7. There being no present dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “that no construction is necessary for any terms for the purposes of this Petition as the challenged claims are invalid under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner states that “the Board need not construe any claim term in a particular manner to arrive at the conclusion that the Petition is substantively deficient.” Prelim. Resp. 7. 5 At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. In view of the parties’ positions, we determine that we need not expressly construe any terms for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“to combine Johnson and Moss is inadequate. See Prelim. Resp. 20–24. We tend to agree. In the “Motivation to Combine Johnson and Moss” section, the Petition first asserts that “Johnson and Moss are in the same field of endeavor,” which is insufficient without more to provide a motivation. See, e.g., Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 82 F.4th 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2023). The Petition then asserts that “[t]o provide enhanced flexibility, [one of ordinary skill in the art] in possession of Johnson would look to Moss to incorporate a plurality of delay elements to the data strobe signal.” Pet. 22. This is not persuasive because (a) Petitioner argues that Johnson already provides a plurality of delay elements, (b) Petitioner fails to explain where or how additional delay elements from Moss would be added to Johnson, and (c) Petitioner fails to explain how or why the modification would “provide enhanced flexibility,” or even what “enhanced flexibility” might mean in 9 “a first sampling circuit to sample the first delayed data signal based on the strobe signal” 10 “a second sampling circuit to sample the second delayed data signal based on the received strobe signal” this context. Petitioner also argues that “Moss further discloses that the size of the data path – i.e. the number of data pins in each data path – is a design choice well within the knowledge and ability of a POSITA, and expressly recites examples of 4, 8, and 16-bit wide data paths.” Pet. 23. We agree that varying the width of the data path would have been within level of ordinary skill and would have depended on the particular application, but the Petition fails to explain how or why that would have made it obvious to incorporate various elements of Moss into Johnson.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,111,608 - Silicon Motion Inc. v. K.Mizra LLC.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01240 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 based on all asserted challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Meaney and Meaney-Greeff obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’466 patent based on all the challenges presented.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or a related field as well as at least two years of academic or industry experience in design and implementation of high-speed digital communication systems.” Pet. 13. Petitioner further asserts that “[a]n individual with an advanced degree in a relevant field, such as computer or electrical engineering, would require less experience in the design and implementation of high-speed digital communication systems, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner “does not contest Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, but it reserves the right to do so if trial is instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 7. There being no present dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). That standard involves construing claims in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate the termination circuitry disclosed in Greeff with the system of Meaney to achieve enhanced system performance and reliability.” Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1002, app. A at 82). As support, Petitioner asserts that “Greeff’s termination circuitry ensures proper signal integrity and reduces reflections in high-speed data transmission systems.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 1:28–31, 4:10–12, 8:3–5; Ex. 1002, app. A at 82). Petitioner further asserts that “Meaney’s calibration techniques, when applied to the termination resistance and transistor drive strength of Greeff, would ensure that these parameters remain optimal throughout system operation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, app. A at 82); see also id. at 54 (“A POSITA would have found it obvious to apply Meaney’s calibration process to Greeff’s termination circuitry in order to optimize the termination resistance and drive strength of the termination circuitry.”). Petitioner adds that “[a] POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Meaney and Greeff.” Id. at 54. According to Petitioner, “[t]he integration of Greeff’s termination circuitry into Meaney’s system would have been straightforward and cost-effective,” any “required modifications are minimal, and the results of the combination are predictable, given the complementary nature of the technologies.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, app. A at 82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s analysis for this limitation. See Prelim. Resp. Based on Petitioner’s argument and evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that its proposed combination of Meaney and Greeff teaches or suggests the recited “circuitry” of limitation 17a. We also are persuaded that Petitioner’s proffered reasoning for modifying Meaney’s system to include Greeff’s termination circuitry, namely, to ensure proper signal integrity and reduce reflections, is sufficient to support institution. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,160,466 - Head Sport GmbH v. Vermont Safety Developments LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01099 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show that the prior art met the claims under the Board’s construction of “release logic.”
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aNot reached
“Thus, based in part on the “relatively minimal proceedings” in the District Court, and the “[t]he possibility of significant simplification” for the District Court from our claim construction of the term “release logic,” we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to discretionarily deny the petition. Moreover, we need not address Patent Owner’s contentions concerning discretionary denial because, as discussed below, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits in demonstrating unpatentability of any challenged claim of the ’953 patent. See MillerKnoll, Inc. v. Aaron DeJule, IPR2023-01428, Paper 8, 10 (PTAB March 22, 2024).” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We now turn to the merits of Petitioner’s asserted Grounds of unpatentability. Analysis of Claims We focus our analysis on the term “release logic,” which appears in all the challenged claims. As we explained above, we determined that the term “release logic” along with its recited functions should be construed under Section 112 ¶ 6 to cover “corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof,” that perform the recited functions. Petitioner did not identify how the asserted prior art described those structures or their equivalents. Instead, as discussed above, Petitioner relied on Patent Owner’s preliminary construction in the District Court, which Patent Owner identified in wholly functional terms as a “specific sequence of actions.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1010; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 52–53); Prelim. CC Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1010, 5). Thus, Petitioner’s analysis fails to address how the prior art meets the limitations set forth in the claims as we have interpreted those claims. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to establish a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. Thus we deny institution of an inter partes review. See Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Cobblestone Wireless, LLC, IPR2024-00319, Paper 16, slip op. 16–23 (PTAB Jun. 24, 2024) (holding that because Petitioner’s obviousness showing was based on an incorrect claim construction, Petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that a claim limitation was disclosed by, or would have been obvious over, the cited reference).” slip op. at 49
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“be persuasive, we conclude that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have understood “release logic” to refer to, or to have a definite meaning as the name for structure. Accordingly, we find that any presumption that the claims at issue do not invoke § 112, ¶ 6 is overcome, and we conclude that “release logic” introduces claim language that is properly interpreted under § 112, ¶ 6. Dr. Hull’s testimony in the District Court appears to address only the embodiment disclosed in Figures 9–11 of the ’953 patent. He did not opine on the other embodiments disclosed in the patent, such as the embodiment in Figures 22–24 disclosing electronic third-quadrant release-logic binding system 2204. However, his testimony that the words of the claim would not be understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan to have definite meaning as the name for structure remains persuasive.” slip op. at 48
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“sophistication of the technology; and (5) educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. ¶ 30. Dr. Hull fails to state whether these factors were relied upon in forming his opinion, and if so, he also fails to state the underlying facts or data relating to these factors on which the opinion is based. There is no evidence to support why an “advanced degree” in mechanical engineering and five years of relevant experience is required. His opinion is supported only by his statement that he is “familiar with the technology at issue here and the state of the art at the time the application leading to the ’953 patent was filed.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 31. Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Here, based on Dr. Hull’s extensive experience, we give his testimony some, but little, weight. Patent Owner states that “for purposes of this Preliminary Response only, VSD does not now dispute the definition of the POSITA as set forth by Dr. Hull.” Prelim. Resp. 7. We note that Patent Owner’s position is based on Dr. Hull’s full testimony, not the excerpt asserted by Petitioner. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, and based on the limited record before us, we determine, based on Dr. Hull’s testimony, the cited prior art, and Patent Owner’s qualified agreement with Dr. Hull’s testimony, that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant technology would have had an advanced degree in mechanical engineering or a related discipline and five years of experience in either ski binding design, manufacture, or testing; research concerning ski bindings and related equipment; or the development of standards concerning ski bindings or related equipment. This level of skill is approximate, and more experience would compensate for less formal education, and vice versa.” slip op. at 25
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,523,953 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00861 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 11, 13, and 15–17 because Abbott showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 15–17 are unpatentable over Aspel and Gutekunst.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(xii) Conclusion for Claims 1 and 15–17 Petitioner has shown sufficiently why a skilled artisan would have known to combine Aspel and Gutekunst with a reasonable expectation of success, and how that combination discloses or suggests each limitation of claims 1 and 15–17. Accordingly, we determine that the Petition establishes there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing that claims 1 and 15–17 of the ’541 patent are unpatentable in view of Aspel and Gutekunst.” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Because Aspel and Gutekunst are both directed to systems for “remote monitoring of health parameters,” Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan “would have recognized Gutekunst discloses devices for monitoring and gathering a ‘user’s medical information’ that would complement the Aspel system” and would have had a reasonable expectation of success integrating Gutekunst’s disclosed device into Aspel’s monitoring system “to provide physiological parameters.” Id. at 31–32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 94–100; Ex. 1005 ¶ 188; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 85, 91, 93, 112–113, 189). Integrating Gutekunst into Aspel, Petitioner contends, “would have involved combining prior art elements (i.e., a glucose monitor sensor and mobile application on a user device) according to known methods to yield predictable results (i.e., receiving glucose data as taught in Gutekunst and providing it to the Aspel system, e.g., the Data Center). Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 101). Patent Owner notes that “in describing its Aspel-Gutekunst combination, [Petitioner] does not describe any modification to Aspel’s “server system” or “remote monitor” other than to work with Gutekunst’s glucose sensor and receiver to allow remote monitoring of Gutekunst’s glucose monitor.” Prelim. Resp. 16. Other than observing that Petitioner’s proposed modification involves a bodily incorporation of Gutekunst’s disclosed glucose monitoring device into Aspel’s monitoring system, Patent Owner does not appear to dispute a skilled artisan would have known to combine Aspel and Gutekunst in the manner proposed. See generally Prelim. Resp 14–18. After studying the evidence and arguments from both parties, we find Petitioner’s contention for why a skilled artisan would have known to combine Aspel and Gutekunst in the manner proposed sufficient for this stage of the proceeding.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesInstituted
“After studying the evidence and arguments from both parties, we find Petitioner has carried its burden for this stage of the proceeding to establish that a skilled artisan would have recognized that the system Aspel discloses allows the wireless mobile remote monitor to send a user acknowledgment prior to the user accessing at least some of the analyte concentration sensor data associated with the alert being acknowledged. Patent Owner’s contrary position is unavailing because it rests solely on attorney argument that, at this stage of the proceeding, has no evidentiary support. Patent Owner offers no evidence from either an expert or the cited references to support the underlying premise––namely, absent an express statement by Aspel that a user accesses data for an alert after deciding to remove it from the report, a skilled artisan would not have found it obvious for Aspel’s disclosed system to have that functionality. However, Patent Owner does not dispute: (1) Aspel discloses a remote monitor that provides an acknowledgment of a received alert associated with analyte concentration sensor data of a host; and (2) Aspel discloses the remote monitor accessing that host data associated with the alert from the server system. See Prelim. Resp. 36–37. Again, recognizing that a skilled artisan is of “ordinary creativity” and “not an automaton,” Petitioner’s contention and cited evidence demonstrates sufficiently at this stage of the proceeding that allowing a remote user of Aspel’s system to access the data associated with an alert after deciding to remove the alert from the report is simply an arrangement of old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’541 patent and the asserted prior art, but we set the level to two years of experience because the qualifier “or more” is unnecessary. Otherwise, we accept and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,801,541 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00840 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–3, 5, 11–13, 16–20, 24–26, 28, 34–36, and 39–43 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“DexCom, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“35 U.S.C. § 282(b) “including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). When applying that standard, we interpret the claim language as it would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party identifies any claim language requiring express interpretation, and we currently discern no such claim language. The parties are free to expressly address the meaning of any claim language during the trial. B. Legal Standards” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“likelihood of proving that Brauker describes the subject matter recited in the preamble of claim 1 and limitation 1a. 10 We do not consider the issue of whether Brauker “expressly state[s]” that its predetermined threshold is non user settable to be dispositive of whether Brauker describes step 1b in an anticipation context. Rather, we seek to determine at trial what Brauker describes to an ordinarily skilled artisan. “An anticipating reference must describe the patented subject matter with sufficient clarity and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“claim 1 except for the requirement in limitation 1b that the second function determines whether a “predicted glucose value” meets a criterion that is not set by a user. Pet. 60–66. For this aspect of limitation 1b, Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to incorporate Brauker’s function of determining whether a predicted glucose level meets a threshold into the STS Guide’s second function comparing a glucose level to non user settable criteria. Id. at 62–65. Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have known the advantages of using a predicted low glucose alarm in addition to a real time low glucose alarm, because a predicted low glucose alarm in advance of potential hypoglycemia helps prevent hypoglycemia by giving the user more time to act, for example, by eating sugar.” Id. at 63 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 146; Ex. 1007, 1149; Ex. 1011, 932). Petitioner also contends that prior art establishes the advantages of using alarms based on both real time and predicted glucose values. Id. at 64 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 11, 15; Ex. 1010, 68). Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been particularly motivated to add a predicted, non user settable low glucose alarm because [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would have known that non user settable criteria tied to hypoglycemia often relate to clinical danger, [Ex. 1013, 725] (“The user should never go below 50 mg / dL at any time without an alarm.”), and that it is particularly beneficial to have an advance warning of a clinical danger. [Ex. 1003 ¶ 147.] Pet. 64 (internal footnote omitted). Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably expected to successfully modify the system described in the STS Guide as proposed because the STS Guide and Brauker both relate to alerts to reduce the severity of hypoglycemia and delivering alarms due to low predicted glucose levels was well known before the alleged invention of claim 1. Id. at 65 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 149; Ex. 1005 ¶ 15; Ex. 1010, 68; Ex. 1007, 1150; Ex. 1020; Ex. 1021).” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,119,528 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00797 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 14–16 and 18–20 on both asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We conclude that the record demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to challenged claims 14–16 and 18–20 for the following reasons.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that A POSITA as of the claimed priority date would have had a Bachelor’s degree in biomedical engineering, electrical or computer engineering, computer science, or a related or equivalent field and two or more years of experience researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating (or supervising the same) in wireless communication related to medical devices or equivalent experience. A person with less or different education but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard. The prior art also evidences the level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We determine that “authentication” and “identification” are well- understood and widely used terms in communications (including wireless), and these terms do not require any specialized constructions for this proceeding. The ordinary and customary meaning of “authentication” is verifying the identity of communicating devices or users, or, in other words, determining that a device or user is what or who they represent themselves to be. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30, 32; Ex. 2002, 175.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that “Yarger and Love are analogous art because they are both related to aspects of securely communicating analyte measurements over wireless links in CGM systems.” Id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1005, code (57); Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1003 ¶ 69; In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325–27 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions that Yarger and Love are analogous, and that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine them with a reasonable expectation of success. See generally Prelim. Resp. We determine that Petitioner shows sufficiently that Yarger and Love are analogous and that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine them with a reasonable expectation of success. Specifically, Yarger and Love are directed to similar glucose monitoring systems and are thus in the same field of endeavor and address the same problems. See, e.g., Pet. 20– 21; Ex. 1005, codes (54, 57), ¶ 1; Ex. 1006, codes (54, 57), ¶ 2. Since Yarger already monitors and displays glucose levels, including clinically significant conditions such as hypoglycemia or hyperglycemia, adding Love’s teaching to generate alarms and notifications for such conditions would improve Yarger’s similar system in the same way as taught by Love. See, e.g., Pet. 19–21; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3, 17; Ex. 1006, codes (54, 57), ¶¶ 70, 78. Since this modification merely requires “routine programming” adding logic to compare glucose levels and generate an alarm when a clinically significant threshold is exceeded, a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the modification. See, e.g., Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 73. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,375,222 - Weber, Inc. v. Provisur Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 21, 2024 · IPR2020-01557 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 1–4 and 8–11 were held obvious; claims 5–7 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish claim 5’s drive-roller limitation.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandFwd mixedMixed
“Specifically, the Federal Circuit “reverse[d] the Board’s finding that Weber’s operating manuals do not qualify as printed publications.” Weber, 1 Patent Owner also submitted redacted versions of its Preliminary Response, Response, and Sur-Reply. Papers 8, 24, 48. The redactions relate to information subject to our Protective Orders. Papers 13, 57. 92 F.4th at 1069. The Federal Circuit further held that the prior art disclosed the “disposed over” limitation of claim 1 as properly construed, as well as the “stop gate” limitation of claim 1. Weber, 92 F.4th at 1069–1072. In addition, the Federal Circuit indicated it had considered Petitioner’s remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. Weber, 92 F.4th at 1072. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated our determinations that Petitioner failed to establish unpatentability of claims 1–11 of the ’812 patent, and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Weber, 92 F.4th at 1072.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in mechanical engineering (or a similar field) and at least two years of experience working on food processing and/or packaging systems (or in a similar field)” or “(2) at least seven years of experience working on food processing and/or packaging systems (or in a similar field).” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition or provide its own proposal. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal because Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill demonstrated in the cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“disposed over the food article loading apparatus.” The Federal Circuit reversed the construction set forth in the prior FWD and held that the “disposed over” limitation “requires only that the feed apparatus be generally positioned above the loading apparatus.” Weber, 92 F.4th at 1070. We follow the Federal Circuit’s construction of “disposed over” in this decision. We need not provide an express construction for any other claim terms to resolve the dispute before us. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). We note, though, that in reaching our conclusion, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning to all claim terms. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the preamble of claim 1 is disclosed by each of the slicing machines disclosed in 2006 904 Operating Manual, Lindee, and Sandberg. Thus, we need not and do not decide whether the preamble is limiting.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 10,639,812 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,639,812
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.