- PTAB · Mar 4, 2025 · IPR2024-01180 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–16 were unpatentable, chiefly because Rao did not teach blocking network access.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) held at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) had three to five years of experience with networking, power consumption of networked computing devices, and/or wireless digital communications systems.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 24–26). Petitioner further argues that “[m]ore related education would compensate for fewer years of work experience (and vice versa).” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 24–26). Patent Owner “does not challenge the Petition’s proposed definition.” Prelim. Resp. 8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of a person having ordinary skill in the art, which is not disputed and consistent with the invention claimed in the ’076 patent.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Patent Owner argues that the term “disallow[]” should be given the same construction the parties agreed upon during the district court proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 9. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“However, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain where Rao teaches “allow[ing] or disallow[ing]” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 13–18, 25–30. To the extent Petitioner and Dr. Bims cite to Rao, they reference paragraphs 191 through 193, which discuss how Rao’s filter 322 is used to implement prioritization. See Pet. 15; Ex. 1003 ¶ 65. More specifically, those paragraphs recite using prioritization to place the network packets in different queues based on their priority. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 191–193. We see nothing in Rao that teaches or suggest that the network packets would be disallowed, as opposed to simply delayed, based on priority. Id. And, as Patent Owner argues, this finding is consistent with factual findings made by a different panel considering the teachings of Rao in an inter partes review of a related patent. See Prelim. Resp. 16–18 (citing Samsung Elecs. Co v. Headwater Research LLC, IPR2023-01361, Paper 8 (PTAB Mar. 29, 2024) (Decision Denying Institution)). Even if one reads the Petition as arguing that a person having ordinary skill would have modified Rao to include Araujo’s blocking—which we do not—we would not be sufficiently persuaded by that argument. Although Petitioner explains why a person having ordinary skill in the art would want to consider power usage along with whether the application is in the foreground or background, Petitioner does not explain why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have changed prioritization to blocking. See Pet. 13–18. Indeed, such a modification appears to be one that would render Rao “inoperable for its intended purpose.” In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,198,076 - Amphenol Corp. v. PPC Broadband, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 19, 2025 · IPR2023-01363 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 10–13 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations of Holmberg, Battey, Blankenship, and Cowen.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and at least 1 year of experience related to communication networks or the equivalent.” Pet. 7. Petitioner further contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–31). Dr. Eldering agrees that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and at least one year of experience related to communication networks or the equivalent.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 24. According to Dr. Eldering, “[a] person with less relevant practical experience but with additional experience would also qualify.” Id. Patent Owner contends that” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Although Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s construction, it contends “the Board need not resolve this claim construction dispute because Petitioner’s proposed grounds 1-5 are all insufficient under either construction.” PO Resp. 19. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the prior art of record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For example, we discuss below in Section III.G why we do not reach the claim construction issue presented by Petitioner.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We find that Holmberg expressly contemplates using its wall box within multi-dwelling units, notes that multi-dwelling wall boxes in the prior art were “typically provided” on every floor, and discloses that the multi-dwelling wall boxes would contain optical couplings for each resident on a given floor. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 7, 34; Pet. Reply 8–10. In view of these disclosures, we credit the testimony of Dr. Kiaei that one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to use Holmberg’s wall box in multi-dwelling units and would have seen a need to access the area behind spice tray 230 to connect and disconnect subscribers. Ex. 1003 ¶ 92; Ex. 1033 ¶¶ 7–8. Moreover, even if Holmberg were limited to mid-span locations and distributing drop cables, as opposed to distribution cables for individual subscribers, as asserted by Patent Owner, Patent Owner does not dispute that a technician would still need periodic access to the area behind splice tray 230 in these mid-span devices. Tr. 38:3–39:1 (counsel agreeing that one would need to access the area behind splice tray 230 in Holmberg, albeit in “rare occasions”); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 90–92; Ex. 1033 ¶¶ 7–8. Thus, whether used in the manner contemplated by Petitioner or Patent Owner, Petitioner persuasively demonstrates that access to the space behind splice tray 230 in Holmberg would be necessary. With access behind splice tray 230 required, Petitioner persuasively demonstrates that one of ordinary skill in the art would have seen a benefit to replacing Holmberg’s fasteners or screws with a hinged connection, such as that disclosed in Battey, to allow easier access to the area behind the splice tray. Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 39 (disclosing that a rotatable splice tray or shelf would “provide[] full and convenient access to the splice tray”)). First, Petitioner and Dr. Kiaei persuasively demonstrate that once the fibers of Holmberg are routed from behind splice tray 230 and the distribution cables spooled on this tray, a technician could not reasonably access fiber optic cables stored behind splice tray 230 without releasing or opening splice tray 230. Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing Ex. 1023, 60:20–61:15); Ex. 1033 ¶¶ 31–32. Second, Petitioner persuasively demonstrates that without a hinged connection, the technician would have to either hold the splice tray of Holmberg with one hand while performing the necessary routing and splicing steps, two screws would need to remain in place (essentially replicating a hinge), or the tray would have to be left to dangle, supported only by the routed and spliced fibers. Pet. Reply 19–20.” slip op. at 22
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Allegedly New Arguments on Reply Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s arguments regarding the benefits of a hinged connection when performing the splicing and routing steps should be dismissed or ignored because they were improperly raised for the first time on reply. Sur-reply 19–20. We disagree. The Petition asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to add a hinged connection, such as that disclosed in Battey, in Holmberg and would have seen a benefit to so doing. Pet. 40–44. Petitioner did not change its proposed combination or its stated rationale in its Reply. Rather, in response to Patent Owner’s counter-arguments, Petitioner expands upon the benefits of its proposed combination, i.e., the substitution of a hinged connection in place of fasteners. Pet. Reply 15–21. This is permissible, as a reply may properly expand on or extend previously raised arguments relating to the motivation to make the proposed changes to the prior art. See Rembrandt Diagnostics, LP v. Alere, Inc., 76 F.4th 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (explaining that the reply arguments properly relied on the same legal ground, the same prior art references, and same legal argument—the motivation to make the proposed changes to the prior art reference).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 9,008,483 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,008,483 - Meta Platforms, Inc. / ROKU, Inc. et al. v. Almondnet, Inc. And Intent Iq, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00666 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 6–23 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required determination that access occurred during a predetermined period.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and two years of work experience in the field of network-based computer systems, such as systems for sending and receiving information over local networks and wide area networks (such as the Internet or World Wide Web).” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 10–14). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 26 (adopting Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art for the purposes of this proceeding). We are persuaded that Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s description.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner “does not believe claim construction is necessary at this time.” Pet. 7. “Patent Owner does not contend that any terms in the challenged claims require express construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition’s invalidity grounds.” PO Resp. 7. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“date of Provisional Application No. 60/858,204 (Ex. 1004, “’204 Provisional”), and is prior art to the ’878 Patent under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Pet. 9. Petitioner asserts that the ’204 Provisional provides support for the disclosure of Baig and provides § 112 support for at least one claim in Baig. Id. Petitioner asserts that there are no material differences between Baig and the ’204 Provisional. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 43 (citing Ex. 1005 (redline comparison of Ex. 1003 and Ex. 1004))). Petitioner further contends that the ’204 Provisional includes 17 claims that are identical to the claims in Baig, and, therefore, provides written description support for the corresponding claims in Baig. Id. Petitioner also asserts the ’204 Provisional provides enablement. Id. Patent Owner has not challenged the status of Baig as prior art. See PO Resp. Based on our review of the complete record, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Baig is entitled to the earlier effective filing date of the ’204 Provisional Application.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires there to be a determination that devices accessed the LAN during the predetermined period of time. The claim language recites that the determining of limitation (a) (which recites the determination of an association between the identifiers) is done using the stored association-detection information (which is alleged to be the cookies and session table of the cited art) “to determine” that the mobile devices have separately accessed the internet through a LAN “during a predetermined period of time.” See Ex. 1001, 24:29–49. Thus, we read this language to require that a determination be made that the required access occurred during a predetermined period of time. This reading of the claim language is accord with the opinion expressed by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt, at his deposition.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,715,878 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,715,878 - Meta Platforms, Inc. / ROKU, Inc. et al. v. Almondnet, Inc. And Intent Iq, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00701 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 6–23 were not shown unpatentable because the prior-art combinations did not establish a determination that devices accessed the Internet during a predetermined period.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and two years of work experience in the field of network-based computer systems, such as systems for sending and receiving information over local networks and wide area networks (such as the Internet or World Wide Web).” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 10–14). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 26 (adopting Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art for the purposes of this proceeding). We are persuaded that Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s description.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner “does not believe claim construction is necessary at this time.” Pet. 7. “Patent Owner does not contend that any terms in the challenged claims require express construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition’s invalidity grounds.” PO Resp. 7. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“date of Provisional Application No. 60/858,204 (Ex. 1004, “’204 Provisional”), and is prior art to the ’878 Patent under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Pet. 9. Petitioner asserts that the ’204 Provisional provides support for the disclosure of Baig and provides § 112 support for at least one claim in Baig. Id. Petitioner asserts that there are no material differences between Baig and the ’204 Provisional. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 43 (citing Ex. 1005 (redline comparison of Ex. 1003 and Ex. 1004))). Petitioner further contends that the ’204 Provisional includes 17 claims that are identical to the claims in Baig, and, therefore, provides written description support for the corresponding claims in Baig. Id. Petitioner also asserts the ’204 Provisional provides enablement. Id. Patent Owner has not challenged the status of Baig as prior art. See PO Resp. Based on our review of the complete record, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Baig is entitled to the earlier effective filing date of the ’204 Provisional Application.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires there to be a determination that devices accessed the LAN during the predetermined period of time. The claim language recites that the determining of limitation (a) (which recites the determination of an association between the identifiers) is done using the stored association-detection information (which is alleged to be the cookies and session table of the cited art) “to determine” that the mobile devices have separately accessed the internet through a LAN “during a predetermined period of time.” See Ex. 1001, 24:29–49. Thus, we read this language to require that a determination be made that the required access occurred during a predetermined period of time. This reading of the claim language is accord with the opinion expressed by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt, at his deposition. Q So is it your opinion that the – the limitation 1B requires that the system determines whether or not the accesses by the -- the two electronic devices occurred within a predetermined period of time? A Yes.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,715,878 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,715,878 - Meta Platforms, Inc. / ROKU, Inc. et al. v. Intent Iq, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 19, 2025 · IPR2023-01281 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 6–23 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations did not establish a determination that devices accessed the Internet during a predetermined period.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at critical time. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The resolution of this question is important because it allows us to “maintain[] objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu–Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 3 U.S. Pat. Pub. 2008/0113674 A1, published May 15, 2008 (Ex. 1003, “Baig”). 4 U.S. Pat. Pub. 2004/0128547 A1, published July 1, 2004 (Ex. 1006, “Laidlaw”). 5 U.S. Pat. No. 6,427,170 B1, issued July 30, 2002 (Ex. 1007, “Sitaraman”). 6 Harley Hahn, The Internet Complete Reference (2d ed. 1996) (Ex. 1008, “Hahn”). 7 U.S. Pat. No. 7,730,030 B1, issued June 1, 2010 (Ex. 1009, “Xu”). 8 U.S. Pat. Pub. 2006/0282328 A1, published Dec. 14, 2006 (Ex. 1010, “Gerace”). 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Generally, it is easier to establish obviousness under a higher level of ordinary skill in the art. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A less sophisticated level of skill generally favors a determination of nonobviousness . . . while a higher level of skill favors the reverse.”). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and two years of work experience in the field of network-based computer systems, such as systems for sending and receiving information over local networks and wide area networks (such as the Internet or World Wide Web).” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 10–14). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 26 (adopting Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art for the purposes of this proceeding). We are persuaded that Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s description.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. 42.100(b) (2023). Our rule adopts the same claim construction standard used by Article III federal courts, which follow Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), and its progeny. Under this standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Petitioner “does not believe claim construction is necessary at this time.” Pet. 7. “Patent Owner does not contend that any terms in the challenged claims require express construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition’s invalidity grounds.” PO Resp. 7. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires there to be a determination that devices accessed the LAN during the predetermined period of time. The claim language recites that the determining of limitation (a) (which recites the determination of an association between the identifiers) is done using the stored association-detection information (which is alleged to be the cookies and session table of the cited art) “to determine” that the mobile devices have separately accessed the internet through a LAN “during a predetermined period of time.” See Ex. 1001, 24:29–49. Thus, we read this language to require that a determination be made that the required access occurred during a predetermined period of time. This reading of the claim language is accord with the opinion expressed by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt, at his deposition.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,715,878 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,715,878 - Apple Inc. v. RJ Technology LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01350 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 5–10 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11–14 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish the claimed capacity retention after 400 cycles.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have held a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or chemical engineering, with at least 4 years of experience in cell design, electrochemical techniques, and battery materials development.” Pet. 4. Petitioner further contends that a “Master’s Degree can substitute[] for some of the relevant experience,” and “[e]quivalent training with battery specific experience can accommodate other degreed fields.” Id. 9 The parties here do not address objective evidence of nonobviousness. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. PO Resp. 20. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’641 patent, the prior art of record, and the parties’ arguments.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties agree that the term “charge cut-off voltage” is “the maximum voltage to which the battery is configured to be charged.” PO Resp 21–22; Pet. Reply 1. The parties dispute, however, whether the “charge cut-off voltage” is a “battery property” or “the voltage applied to the battery during charging.” PO Resp. 21–24; Pet. Reply 1–6. We need not resolve the precise meaning of “charge cut-off voltage” because there is no dispute that Yamaki discloses this limitation under either party’s interpretation of the claim term. Upon review of the prior art and the parties’ arguments, we determine that no terms of the ’641 patent require express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))); Pet. Reply 1 (asserting that the challenged claims are unpatentable under either parties’ construction of “charge cut-off voltage”).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Patent Owner’s arguments do not persuasively undermine Petitioner’s position. Sakamoto expressly discloses setting the ratio of negative to positive electrode active material in the range of 1.05 to 1.30. Ex. 1005 ¶ 8. Sakamoto also explains why this range is preferable, i.e., if the ratio is roughly equal “the charge-discharge cycle performance is insufficient due to significant deterioration from charging and discharging,” and if the ratio is 10 Citations to the prosecution history of Yamaki are to the page numbers added to the lower right corner of the document. too high “too much of the compound does not participate in charging and discharging.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. These disclosures are sufficient to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to select the ratios disclosed in Sakamoto in Yamaki. Id. ¶ 8 (providing a secondary battery with a capacity ratio between 1.05 and 1.30 and noting that by setting the ratio within this range the resulting secondary lithium battery is “safe due to low risk of heat being generated and an explosion occurring”). We also disagree that Sakamoto teaches away from elevated voltages or from increasing the amount of lithium in circulation. See PO Resp. 29. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Sakamoto provides no general teaching against using a charge cut-off voltage above 4.2 V, or against increasing the level of lithium in circulation. Nor does Sakamoto “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the claimed invention. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rather, Sakamoto warns against setting the reversible capacities of the positive and negative electrode substantially equal as this may result in excess lithium plating on the surface of the electrode. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6, 8. We agree with Petitioner that this disclosure would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to design a battery with a higher capacity in the negative electrode active material than the positive electrode active material. Pet. 11–12.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“We also disagree that Sakamoto teaches away from elevated voltages or from increasing the amount of lithium in circulation. See PO Resp. 29. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Sakamoto provides no general teaching against using a charge cut-off voltage above 4.2 V, or against increasing the level of lithium in circulation. Nor does Sakamoto “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the claimed invention. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rather, Sakamoto warns against setting the reversible capacities of the positive and negative electrode substantially equal as this may result in excess lithium plating on the surface of the electrode. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6, 8. We agree with Petitioner that this disclosure would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to design a battery with a higher capacity in the negative electrode active material than the positive electrode active material. Pet. 11–12.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 7,749,641 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,749,641 - PTAB · Feb 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01139 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–7, 9, and 14–51 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the TML6–Fandrianto combination renders at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“predict how the district court in the related district court litigation will proceed because the court may determine whether or not to stay any individual case . . . based on a variety of circumstances and facts beyond our control and to which the Board is not privy.” Sand Revolution II LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp., IPR2019-01393, Paper 24, 7 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative, designated July 13, 2020). We decline to speculate here. Thus, the first Fintiv factor is neutral.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“presented art includes art listed on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) and “art made of record by the Examiner.” Id. at 7–8. Here, the Petition’s challenges are based on TML6 and Fandrianto. Pet. 2. TML6 is substantially the same as art previously presented to the Office because the ’469 patent discusses TML6. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 8:43–53, 11:33–13:29. Fandrianto was made of record by the Examiner. Ex. 1002, 310; Ex. 1001, code (56). Thus, the first part of the framework is satisfied, and we must proceed to the second part.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelOther
“We need not resolve this dispute at this stage because the decision here would be the same under either definition. If the parties believe that the level of skill in the art would affect the outcome in this case, the parties must brief that issue. The failure to describe how a different level of skill in the art regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, then the parties are also encouraged to submit evidence, other than conclusory expert testimony, that supports their position.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“D. Claim Construction The Board is required to construe only those terms that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party argues that the Board needs to construe any terms to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See Pet. 11; Prelim. Resp 26. On the current record, no terms are in controversy. Thus, no claim term needs to be construed in this decision.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,950,469 - PTAB · Feb 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01140 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–51 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20, 22–42, and 44–51 are obvious over TML6 and Fandrianto, and claims 21 and 43 over those references …
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Absent specific evidence, the Board typically “will not attempt to predict how the district court in the related district court litigation will proceed because the court may determine whether or not to stay any individual case . . . based on a variety of circumstances and facts beyond our control and to which the Board is not privy.” Sand Revolution II LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp., IPR2019-01393, Paper 24, 7 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative, designated July 13, 2020). We decline to speculate here. Thus, the first Fintiv factor is neutral.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“Even assuming that evaluating the summary of TML6 in the challenged patent’s background were the same as evaluating the TML6 code, Petitioner has shown under Becton, Dickinson factors (e) and (f) that the Office erred by overlooking the TML6-Fandrianto combination for the reasons discussed below in the analysis of Petitioner’s challenges. See infra Section II.E. That is, we disagree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden. Prelim. Resp. 36–37. Thus, none of Becton, Dickinson factors (c), (e), and (f) weigh in favor of denying the Petition under § 325(d). 4. Conclusion We do not exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under § 325(d).” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelOther
“Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would be an electrical and/or computer engineer with one to two years of experience relating to video coding hardware and/or software.” Prelim. Resp. 26. We need not resolve this dispute at this stage because the decision here would be the same under either definition. If the parties believe that the level of skill in the art would affect the outcome in this case, the parties must brief that issue. The failure to describe how a different level of skill in the art is determinative will be a forfeiture of that argument. If there is a dispute regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, then the parties are also encouraged to submit evidence, other than conclusory expert testimony, that supports their position.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“D. Claim Construction The Board is required to construe only those terms that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party argues that the Board needs to construe any terms to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See Pet. 11; Prelim. Resp 27. On the current record, no terms are in controversy. Thus, no claim term needs to be construed in this decision.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,280,599 - Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com Services LLC v. Nokia Technologies OYInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00920 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 22–24, 26, 29–33, 35, or 38 were unpatentable over the asserted Koga-based grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in proving the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’991 patent. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s request and do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a (1) bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study, and (2) approximately two to three years of practical experience with video and/or image processing or coding.” Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–63). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditonal experience can substitute for the level of education, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–63). Petitioner also identifies knowledge that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have. Id. at 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). Patent Owner states that it “has applied Petitioner’s [person having ordinary skill in the art] for the sake of this Response.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’991 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Based on the ordinary meaning of the phrases, “spatial samples” and “spatial information” must refer to different information. Because the “spatial samples [are] decoded into spatial information,” the decoded “spatial information” must be different than the coded “spatial samples.” If “spatial information” were the same as “spatial samples,” then there would be nothing to decode. That construction is consistent with the claim construction rule that different terms are presumed to have different meanings. See MicroStrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects Ams., 238 F. App’x 605, 609 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”); Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he use of two terms in a claim requires that they connote different meanings . . . .”)). Here, we see no evidence that the claim phrases have the same meaning. To the contrary, the ’991 patent uses the term spatial samples to refer to the image’s pixel values. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:65–67 (“the prediction error signal for a single image block is constructed using both transform basis functions and spatial samples (i.e., pixel values)”) (emphasis added); id. at 4:21–26 (same). The spatial information, however, refers to the result of decoding. See, e.g., id. at 3:29–30 (“the plurality of spatial samples are decoded into decoded spatial information”) (emphasis added); id. at 6:53–55 (“the decoded spatial information and reconstructed prediction of the image block are added together to form the decoded representation of the image block”) (emphasis added); id., Fig. 5, 520 (showing “Decoded Spatial Info”). This is consistent with the claim’s plain language. See id. at 10:1–2 (claim 22 reciting “decoding, by a processor, the plurality of spatial samples into decoded spatial information”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, “spatial samples” and “spatial information” do not refer to the same thing.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. Petitioner maps both spatial samples and spatial information to the residual of the prediction error. Compare Pet. 37 (referring to spatial samples as the residual of the prediction error), with id. at 44 (referring to spatial information as the residual of the prediction error). However, because spatial samples and spatial information cannot refer to the same thing, they cannot both be the residual of the prediction error. See Section II.C.1 supra. Accordingly, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that claim 22, along with dependent claims 23, 24, 26, and 30 would have been obvious over Koga. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[D]ependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious.”); Pet. 47–63 (relying on the analysis of claim 22 for the spatial samples and spatial information limitations). With regard to independent claim 31, along with dependent claims 32, 33, and 35, Petitioner relies on the same arguments discussed above for limitation 22a and 22c to show that Koga teaches commensurate limitations 31c and 31d. See Pet. 54 (“As explained above, Koga teaches the shared substantive limitations of [22a]–[22d] (supra §§VI.A.1) that correspond to limitations [31b]–[31e].”). Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above for claim 22, we are not sufficiently persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that independent claim 31, along with dependent claims 32, 33, and 35 would have been obvious in view of Koga.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,077,991 - PTAB · Feb 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00921 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–3, 5–15, 17–21, and 39 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority, acting on the designation of the Director, to determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a (1) bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study, and (2) approximately two to three years of practical experience with video and/or image processing or coding.” Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–63). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditonal experience can substitute for the level of education, and vice-versa.” Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–63). Petitioner also identifies knowledge that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). Patent Owner states that it “has applied Petitioner’s [person having ordinary skill in the art] for the sake of this Response.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’991 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.7” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. Spatial Coding Petitioner argues that “spatial coding” means “coding in the spatial domain.” Pet. 28. According to Petitioner, the specification of the ’991 patent “describes spatial coding as the coding (e.g., quantizing and entropy coding) of pixel values in the spatial domain ‘without transform,’ but without limiting it to a particular algorithm or technique.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 5:6–23, Fig. 4). “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s construction for the sake of this [Patent Owner Preliminary Response], but reserves the right to challenge this construction in the event of institution.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed construction.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“3. “The Difference Signal” (Claims 13 and 14). Petitioner argues that claims 13 and 14 “contain a drafting error that recites ‘the difference signal,’ without antecedent basis.” Pet. 29. According to Petitioner, a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have understood ‘the difference signal’ in these claims to mean ‘a difference signal representing differences between sample values of a predicted block of data and values for an original input block’ as recited in limitation [1a] of claim 1.” Id. For purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner “agree[d] with Petitioner’s construction of ‘the difference signal’ in Claims 13 and 14.” Prelim. Resp. 24. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed construction.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,077,991
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.