• Prime Time Toys LLC / Prime Time Toys Ltd. et al. v. Spin Master, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2023-01461 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 13, and 15–20 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish a sufficient motivation to combine Peev and Spitballs, including with Moorhouse.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties do not address the adopted level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Based on the full record, we maintain and affirm that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or equivalent, with at least one year of relevant experience designing projectile launching systems but would also be a member of a team, which would include a person with a chemical engineering), or has at least one year experience working with materials for use in consumer products and that “equivalent work experience may substitute for educational experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 21–22 (quoting Ex. 1015, 7–8); see also Ex. 1016 ¶ 55 (stating that “Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s definitions of the [person of ordinary skill in the art] are similar, and my opinions in this Declaration would not change if I used Patent Owner’s definition of the [person of ordinary skill in the art] rather than Petitioner’s definition”). We find that the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’255 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes any interpretation for any claim term. Pet. 23; see PO Resp. Petitioner notes that the ALJ in the ITC proceeding construed two terms used in the ’282 and ’683 patents, specifically “super absorbent polymer” and “a firing mechanism that directly applies a force to the ammunition.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1015, 12, 14). Based on the full record, we determine that no term requires express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed

    “we give little weight to the opinion of Dr. Courtney on whether Spitballs would have been considered liquid filled by one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. Reply 15–16; PO Sur-reply 18; Ex. 1037 ¶ 55; Ex. 2121, 61:12–13; see also PO Sur-reply 14–15 (arguing that Dr. Courtney does not meet the adopted level of ordinary skill in the art). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s list of “rubber, cork, foam, and soft plastics, such as SAPs” “does not exclude all of the other types of materials Petitioner failed to address—e.g., the gelatin materials used to make paintballs.” PO Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 2117, 1). The “openended” list “has no meaningful evidentiary support” because the cited paragraphs from its declaration “make no reference at all to potential airsoft ammunition.” Pet. 38; PO Resp. 24; Ex. 1016 ¶ 77; Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 36–39, 46– 48. Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Reitman also “acknowledged that airsoft considerations are beyond the scope of her testimony.” Ex. 2030, 117:17– 118:20. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s list would include “countless distinct polymers.” PO Resp. 25; Ex. 2120, 27–28.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “In other words, Petitioner does not squarely address the testimonial evidence that the softness of Spitballs would not have been equated with safety, because of its higher weight and kinetic energy. Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 44–55. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not assert fragmentation and deformation would have overcome the greater kinetic energy of the heavier Spitballs, and that Petitioner’s declarant admitted such calculation was not done. PO Sur-reply 7 (citing Ex. 2121, 48:11–49:7); Ex. 2121, 48:11–49:7 (Petitioner’s declarant testifying that calculations of how much kinetic energy is absorbed when Spitballs bounce or explode were not done). Petitioner’s declarant also identified that back splatter can create an additional safety concern. Ex. 2121, 101:14–104:4. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner failed to discuss the deformation and fragmentation of Spitballs in its Petition and declarations. PO Sur-reply 6 (citing Pet. Reply 10–11; Ex. 1037 ¶ 43). We also agree that Petitioner did not explain how one of ordinary skill in the art could have reliably assessed the safety of Spitballs and airsoft rounds. Id.; see also Ex. 2121, 47:1–48:10 (Petitioner’s declarant testifying that experimentation would be the best way to quantify how much kinetic energy is absorbed through deformation and fragmentation of a given projectile). focused on the mass and diameter calculations provided by Petitioner’s declarant, and Petitioner has the burden to analyze a projectile other than the one disclosed in Spitballs, not Patent Owner. PO Sur-reply 10–11 (citing Pet. Reply 13; Ex. 1017 ¶ 67; Ex. 2015 ¶ 59). Petitioner failed to do such an analysis of a 6mm Spitball or SAP projectile. Regarding Petitioner’s reliance on deposition testimony from the ITC proceedings, as argued by Patent Owner, its declarant agreed that making ammunition softer would make injury less likely, if all other parameters were equal, not larger and heavier like a substitution with Spitballs. PO Resp. 16–17 (citing Pet. 37; Ex. 1004, 531:25–532:9; Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 60–61); Ex. 1017 ¶ 67 (Petitioner’s declarant opining that Spitballs can “grow up to 200 times their original size” to reach a mass of 1.844g); Ex. 1037 ¶ 39 (Petitioner’s declarant agreeing that “when all other variables are held constant, heavier is less safe, meaning injury potential is increased”); Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 54–59 (Patent Owner’s declarant opining that heavier and softer ammunition can pose more injury risk); Ex. 2016, 11 (indicating that airsoft ammunition typically comes in weights from 0.12g to 0.25g). We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to prove that” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,596,255 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,596,255
• Google LLC / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Headwater Research LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00943 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2–23, 26, 41–60, 63, 64, 91–152, and 155–171 are unpatentable; Rao anticipates some claims, and the stated Rao combinations render the remaining claims obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to computer software development and/or computer networking.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Petitioner further argues that “[w]ork experience can substitute for education, and additional education can substitute for work experience.” Id. at 2–3 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’541 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner (see PO Resp.), we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner states “[n]o terms require construction to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not propose any claim constructions. See PO Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “preponderance of the evidence that claim 3 was anticipated by Rao.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 8,589,541 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,589,541
• Google LLC / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Headwater Research LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00942 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2–23, 26, 41–60, 63, 64, 91–152, and 155–171 are unpatentable; Rao anticipates some claims, and Rao-based combinations render the others obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to computer software development and/or computer networking.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Petitioner further argues that “[w]ork experience can substitute for education, and additional education can substitute for work experience.” Id. at 2–3 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’541 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner (see PO Resp.), we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner states “[n]o terms require construction to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not propose any claim constructions. See PO Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “157, and 171 are anticipated by Rao. Pet. 1, 19–39, 42. Petitioner’s arguments are supported by citations to the prior art and the testimony of Dr. Wolfe. See id. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, agree with them, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as our own.” slip op. at 26

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “anticipated by Rao. Pet. 1, 30–31, 33–42. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments for each of those dependent claims. See Pet. 30–31, 33–42. For each of those dependent claims, the Petition appears to only argue a theory of obvious. That is, the Petition never states that the additional limitation is disclosed by Rao. See id. For example, claim 26 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the policy is based on a background service class.” Ex. 1001, 112:49–52. We reproduce Petitioner’s arguments directed to claim 26 below: Rao’s policies 520 may “define prioritization” for network packets “based on whether an application is running in the foreground or the background.” [Ex. 1002] ¶ 182; id. ¶¶ 38–43, 180, 182, 188–89, 193, Figs. 5A, 5B. Each packet “may be placed and arranged in a priority order respective to all other . . . packets to provide a packet by packet prioritization across all applications 338a-338n and . . . network packets.” Id. ¶ 191. It would have been obvious to determine and apply a policy assigning a specific priority to packets associated with background applications, supra [1e]-[1f], and Rao thus discloses or renders obvious assigning a priority to network communications based on whether they are characterized as background services (class of services associated with application(s) running in the background of client 105), EX-1015 ¶¶195-96; supra [1e], [1f]. Pet. 33–34. Although the Petition sets forth why the claim limitation would have been obvious, there is no discussion as to how the additional limitation of claim 26—policy based on background class—is disclosed in Rao. See id. Similar arguments are presented for the other claims. See Pet. 30–31, 35–42. Because the Petition does not sufficiently show how the additional limitations recited in claims 20, 26, 58, 64, 165, and 169 were disclosed by Rao, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 20, 26, 58, 64, 165, and 169 were anticipated by Rao.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 8,589,541 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,589,541
• BTL Industries, Inc. v. Inmode Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00703 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–58 were not shown unpatentable: the Edwards, Ingle, and Mosher combination fails to establish key limitations, and Ollivier was not shown to be a prior art printed publication.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition, as it appears consistent with the field of the ’511 patent and the prior art and is consistent with testimony of Dr. Poulos and the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Berenholz. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355, (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the level of ordinary skill in the art may be reflected in the prior art itself); Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 35–39; Ex. 2005, 55:5–17, 57:17–58:19. In our view, however, Petitioner’s proposed definition is not so different that our decision would change if we were to apply Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner’s argument are persuasive. We agree with Patent Owner that a plain reading of the wherein clause requires the treating to begin at the introitus and extend at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. This construction is consistent with the ’511 patent’s Specification, which states: In typical embodiments, the length of the energy delivery element is about 1 to about 3 cm in length, in other embodiments it may be as long as about 4 cm. This is a length well adapted to treating the lower aspects of the vagina, wherein treatment by the method comprises contacting the vaginal epithelium in a region that extends from the introitus inward to a position about 3 to 4 cm inward from the introitus. In some embodiments of the invention, the method can b[e] practiced with a single row of parallel contract sites immediately inside the introitus. In other embodiments, the method may include deeper rows, or rows that overlap an initial row, while keeping the contact sites within the lower portion of the vagina. Ex. 1001, 3:28–40 (emphasis added); see also id. at 14:47–57. The ’511 patent Specification also states: “the portion of the vagina to be treated is a region between the introitus and a position located no further than about 3 to about 4 cm inward from the introitus.” Id. at 11:48–51 (emphasis added). Given the plain language of claim 1, consistent with the ’511 patent’s Specification, we construe “heating a portion of the vagina extending from the introitus inwardly to a location from 1 cm to 3.5 cm in from the introitus” to require heating a portion of the vagina beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner’s arguments is persuasive. The cited portion of Mosher does not explicitly state the location of the treatment area. Ex. 1006 ¶ 74. In it Reply, Petitioner additionally points to paragraph 54 of Mosher, which states: “Preferably, the location of the treatment volume of endopelvic fascia will be disposed along a length of the urethra between the bladder neck and the external meatus so as to avoid injuring nerves.” Pet. Reply 14 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 54). Petitioner argues that “[t]reating the vaginal wall adjacent to the mid-urethral region is within the claimed region of ‘from 1 cm to 3.5 cm in from the introitus.’” Pet. Reply 14–16. This, however, does not teach the claimed area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. The Petition fails to show that either Edwards or Mosher discloses heating a portion of the vagina beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. In its Reply, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to treat the area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–4, 16–17 (citing Pet. 35). The Petition’s argument is unpersuasive because it is conclusory and does not adequately address Edwards’s use of a speculum. Pet. 35. The Petition includes no” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “In its Reply, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to treat the area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–4, 16–17 (citing Pet. 35). The Petition’s argument is unpersuasive because it is conclusory and does not adequately address Edwards’s use of a speculum. Pet. 35. The Petition includes no persuasive explanation as to why it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to use the treatment blade without the speculum. See Pet. 22–24, 35–36. We determine that Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable over Edwards, Ingle, and Mosher.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 8,961,511 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,961,511
• Under Armour, Inc. v. Athalonz, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00636 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim; the Board did not reach the four other instituted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full record, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’786 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Based on the full record, we maintain that it is unnecessary to explicitly construe “athletic positioning” because its meaning is already captured in the claim through the recitation of the relationship between the various slopes of the sole that provide “athletic positioning” of the foot. See Ex. 1001, 44:2–14. The recitations of a “first slope,” “second slope,” “third slope,” and “reference slope” translate into the relative heights proposed in adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it incorporates the specification’s consistent descriptions of “athletic positioning” in terms of relative heights and slopes. For example, one embodiment of an “athletic positioning shape” is where “the heel platform may be 10 to 30 mm higher” than “the toe cup and/or the ball of foot cup.” [Ex. 1001], 13:38–45. Another embodiment discloses “an athletic positioning sole that includes an overall geometric shape” including “the heel of the sole [at] a particular height (e.g., h1, which may be 1’s to 10’s of mm) that slopes at an angle (e.g., Ø1) to the toe on the inside edge of the sole” which “may have a height of zero to a few millimeters.” Id., 17:54–62. PO Resp. 29. However, we find Patent Owner’s contention regarding particular heights and specific angles attempts to import limitations from the Specification into claims. Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). Based on the full record, we determine that express claim construction of “athletic positioning” is not necessary to resolve the present dispute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “8. Conclusion for Ground 1 We have considered all of the arguments and evidence adduced at trial. For the reasons explained, we find Petitioner has persuasively demonstrated that Kim teaches or suggests all limitations of claims 1–8. We also find that the value of Patent Owner’s objective evidence of non-obviousness is weak in comparison to the evidence regarding the prior art under the first three Graham factors. Accordingly, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–8 of the ’786 patent would have been obvious over Kim.” slip op. at 39

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full record, we determine that Patent Owner fails to show nexus between the claimed invention and the asserted objective indicia of nonobviousness. PO Resp. 70–78; PO Sur-reply 25–28. Other than asserting that “the requisite nexus exists here” (PO Resp. 71), and citing to the Declaration testimony of Mr. Markison (id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 322)), the Patent Owner response does not provide an analysis of Patent Owner’s product with respect to the claims of the ’768 patent, and thus does not demonstrate nexus. To the extent Patent Owner references Mr. Markison’s testimony, Mr. Markison’s testimony consists solely of the statement that Patent Owner “sells and markets golf and baseball shoes that embody the claims of the ’786 patent” with reference to an exhibit from district court litigation. See Ex. 2008 ¶ 322 (citing Ex. 2014). We find Patent Owner’s reliance on Mr. Markison’s testimony to be insufficient to establish a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Thus, Patent Owner is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of nexus, because Patent Owner has not shown that the asserted evidence is tied to a specific product that is the disclosed and claimed invention. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Patent Owner also does not provide any evidence that the asserted” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,674,786 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,674,786
• Under Armour, Inc. v. Athalonz, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00638 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 6–8, and 11 as obvious over Kim, and claims 4, 5, 9, and 10 as obvious over Kim and De Obaldia.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 31). Petitioner adds, however, that “the claims are obvious in view of any reasonable definition of a POSITA [(Person of Skill in the Art)].” Id. Patent Owner responds that “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 23 (citing Pet. 15). Patent Owner adds that Mr. Markison’s “knowledge and experience, which includes 13 years of designing and developing athletic shoes that embody the patent at issue here, far exceeds the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 43–44). Based on the full record, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’760 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “In the Institution Decision, we declined to explicitly construe “athletic positioning” because we determined it was unnecessary in view of the claim language. Inst. Dec. 8. More particularly, we stated “independent claim 1 already appears to itself define the term ‘athletic positioning.’ In particular, the claim recites that the big toe area is at a lower position than the heel area and the small toe area.” Id. Based on the full record, we maintain that it is unnecessary to explicitly construe “athletic positioning” because its meaning is already captured in the claim through the recitation of the relationship between the various slopes of the sole that provide “athletic positioning” of the foot. See Ex. 1001, 43:17–27, 43:30–40. The recitations setting forth a relationship between a “big toe area,” a “heel area,” and a “small toe area” translate into the relative heights proposed in Patent Owner’s construction. Patent Owner contends that the Board should adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it:” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We have considered Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, and Patent Owner’s counterarguments and find, on the complete trial record, that Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Kim teaches or suggests “a foot platform that provides an athletic positioning of a big toe area at a lower position than a heel area,” as called for by claim 1. In this regard, we credit Mr. Delgatty’s Declaration testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that, when worn, the toe area would be on the ground, and thus lower than the heel, and based on the sloped forefoot, the big toe would be lower than the small toe.” Pet. Reply 10 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 16). We also credit Mr. Delgatty’s opinion that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “that the shape and orientation of the sole (i.e., the platform on which an athlete stands) in relation to the ground is what determines if the foot is placed in an athletic position when in use.” Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 23). We find Mr. Delgatty’s opinion to be reasonable and supported by Kim’s disclosure. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 37, 43, 44. Here, as Petitioner points out, “the ’760 patent distinguishes between the ‘sole’ and ‘cleats’ as separate components of the shoe” (Pet. Reply 12 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:62–64)), and claim 1 only “requires that the forefoot platform of the sole provide the big toe area at a lower position than the heel area and the small toe area” (id. (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 20)). When asked during deposition, Mr. Markison confirmed that “cleats” or “sport-specific bottom 190” may be “different item[s] in the shoe than the athletic-positioning sole.” Ex. 1023, 85:18–22. specific bottom,” it is not limited to a spike or cleat pattern, but also recites that it may be a “sport specific tread pattern.” Ex. 1001, 44:13–19. Based on the full record, we agree with Petitioner that “[w]hether or not a shoe has cleats, an athlete’s foot will be positioned the same with respect to the surface of the ground when in use, and thus obtain the same positioning benefits the ’760 patent purports to provide.” Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 22). Accordingly, upon review of the information in the Petition and” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full record, we determine that Patent Owner fails to show nexus between the claimed invention and the asserted objective indicia of nonobviousness. PO Resp. 69–77; PO Sur-reply 26–29. Other than asserting that “the requisite nexus exists here” (PO Resp. 70), and citing to the Declaration testimony of Mr. Markison (id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 285)), Patent Owner’s response does not provide an analysis of Patent Owner’s product with respect to the claims of the ’760 patent, and thus does not demonstrate nexus. To the extent Patent Owner references Mr. Markison’s testimony, Mr. Markison’s testimony consists solely of the statement that Patent Owner “sells and markets golf and baseball shoes that embody the claims of the ’760 patent” with reference to an exhibit from district court litigation. See Ex. 2008 ¶ 285 (citing Ex. 2014). We find Patent Owner’s reliance on Mr. Markison’s testimony to be insufficient to establish a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Thus, Patent Owner is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of nexus, because Patent Owner has not shown that claimed invention. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Patent Owner also does not provide any evidence that the asserted objective indicia of nonobviousness is the direct result of unique characteristics of the claimed invention. Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373–75; PO Resp. 69–77; PO Sur-reply 26–29. At best, Patent Owner merely implies that they are the result of unique characteristics of the claimed shoe. For our analysis below, even if nexus were shown, we identify additional reasons why we would give little weight to the asserted objective indicia of nonobviousness.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,064,760 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,064,760
• Under Armour, Inc. v. Athalonz, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00640 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, 9–15, and 17 are unpatentable: claims 10, 11, 15, and 17 over Won, and claims 1–5, 7, 9, and 12–14 over Won and Talarico ’911.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes.” Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 31). According to Petitioner, “the claims are obvious in view of any reasonable definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Id. at 21. For institution, we preliminarily adopted Petitioner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 4. “For purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 13 (citing Pet. 17–18). Patent Owner contends that its declarant Mr. Markison “far exceeds the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art” and, because he is registered as a patent attorney and licensed as an attorney, “can offer good faith and objective opinions on the issues in this proceeding.” Id. at 13–14 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 11–13, 17–30, 42–44). Based on the full record, we maintain and affirm that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes.” Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 30); Inst. Dec. 9; Ex. 1002 ¶ 30; Ex. 2008 ¶ 44.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner notes that, although claim 1 recites a heel platform made of a “first material” and a forefoot platform made of a “second material,” the first and second materials can be the same based on Patent Owner’s apparent interpretation in related litigation. Pet. 27 n.1 (citing Ex. 1012, 30–44). Petitioner applies Patent Owner’s apparent interpretation to the challenges of this proceeding “[w]ithout conceding alternative arguments.” Id. At institution, we were persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments and adopted a construction that the “first” and “second” materials are “different in some manner.” Inst. Dec. 7–8. Patent Owner responds that we should maintain the same construction and disputes Petitioner’s evidence that the “first” and “second” materials can be the same material. PO Resp. 15–19 (citing Pet. 27 n.1; Inst. Dec. 8, 12–13; Ex. 1012, Ex. E, 38, 52; Ex. 2014, 15). Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner should not be allowed to present new arguments or evidence in reply. Id. at 19–21. Petitioner replies that interpreting “first” and “second” materials to be different materials contradicts the plain language of the claims, the Specification, and Patent Owner’s infringement contentions. Pet. Reply 1–5 (citing Pet. 27 n.1; Prelim. Resp. 16–17; PO Resp. 16–18; Ex. 1001, 10:9– 19, 17:52–54, 21:64–22:4, 27:47–51, Figs. 43, 49, claims 1, 6; Ex. 1023, 47:1–48:1, 215:6–217:12, 224:13–225:19; Ex. 1025, 319; Ex. 1026). Patent Owner replies that Petitioner presents new arguments and evidence in reply. PO Sur-reply 5–9 (citing Pet. 27 n.1; Inst. Dec. 13; PO Resp. 16–21; Pet. Reply 1–3, 14 n.1; Paper 19). Patent Owner also argues that, even if Petitioner’s asserted new arguments and evidence are considered, they fail to support an interpretation of “first” and “second” Resp. 16–17; Pet. Reply 1–3; Ex. 1001, 17:50–54, 27:50–54, Figs. 43, 93; Ex. 1023, 215:6–217:12; Ex. 2014, 19–22)” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “4. Other Terms Based on the full record, express interpretation of other terms is not necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 13

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “Patent Owner does not satisfy its “burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested relief.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Evidence of how the inventor viewed claim terms can be useful in considering claim interpretation, and, thus, we agree with Petitioner that the exhibit is relevant. For the reasons stated below, however, we do not need to rely on the exhibit. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibit 1024 is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 11,510,456 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,510,456
• Under Armour, Inc. v. Athalonz, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00637 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim; the Board did not reach the Dufour–Kim and Rubin–Kim grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Under Armour proposes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had— (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 31). Athalonz responds that “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 23 (citing Pet. 11). There being no dispute, we see no reason to depart from Under Armour’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, as it appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’291 patent..” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “outside edge” of the shoe. Ex. 1001, 43:23–28. Athalonz construes those terms to mean “the edges of the portion of the shoe where the foot sits” and that such construction is consistent with how one skilled in the art “would understand those terms in light of the specification.” PO Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 85, 90–91). Athalonz explains that “[i]n light of the specification, the ‘inside’ and ‘outside edges’ in the claims do not refer to the edges of the exterior of the shoe.” Id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 90–91). Under Armour does not dispute Athalonz’s proposed construction of “inside edge” and “outside edge” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 10; Pet. Reply 1. And, from our review of the record, Athalonz’s proposed construction appears consistent with the plain language of the claims and the specification. Thus, we adopt it for purposes of this decision. slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “unnecessary to explicitly construe “athletic positioning shape” because its meaning is already captured in the claim through the recitation of the relationship between the various heights and slopes of the sole that define the “athletic positioning shape.” See Ex. 1001, 43:21–35. Those recitations translate into the relative heights proposed in Athalonz’s construction. Nonetheless, Athalonz contends that we should adopt its proposed construction because it incorporates the specification’s consistent descriptions of “athletic positioning” in terms of relative heights and slopes. For example, one embodiment of an “athletic positioning shape” is where “the heel platform may be 10 to 30 mm higher” than “the toe cup and/or the ball of foot cup.” [Ex. 1001], 13:3–8. Another embodiment discloses “an athletic positioning sole that includes an overall geometric shape” including “the heel of the sole [at] a particular height (e.g., h1, which may be 1’s to 10’s of mm) that slopes at an angle (e.g., Ø1) to the toe on the inside edge of the sole” which “may have a height of zero to a few millimeters.” Id., 10:11–16. PO Resp. 27–28. We find, however, that Athalonz’s proposed construction regarding particular heights and angles is nothing more than an attempt to improperly import limitations from the specification into claims. Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). In sum, we determine that express claim construction of “athletic positioning shape” is not necessary to resolve the present dispute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. Reply 6–10. In support, we credit the declaration testimony of Under Armour’s expert that one of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that the shape and orientation of the sole (i.e., the platform on which an athlete stands) in relation to the ground is what determines if the foot is placed in an athletic position when in use” and that “[c]leats serve to provide traction, not athletic positioning.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 15). We also agree with Under Armour’s expert that one of ordinary skill in the art “would [] understand that because the cleats’ height does not contribute to the athletic positioning shape when in use on soft ground (the surface on which golf is played), it would not be included in the measurement of the claimed first, second, and third heights.” Id. at 8–9 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 16). We find the testimony of Under Armour’s expert to be credible and supported by the trial record. For instance, the ’291 patent specification itself distinguishes between the “sole” and “cleats” of the shoe as separate components. Ex. 1001, 1:59–61. Similarly, Kim describes the sole and cleats as distinct components of a shoe, illustrating the industry’s understanding of these terms. Ex. 1022 ¶ 14; see also Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 9, 14, 15, 30, claim 1 (describing that the spikes, in Kim, “protrude” or “extend” from the “outsole” and are located below the outsole’s “lower surface.”). We also note that Athalonz’s inclusion of the height of Kim’s cleats in measuring the claimed “heights” appears to be inconsistent with its own litigation position in the parallel district court action. See Pet. Reply 9–10. In particular, as Under Armour notes, “Athalonz did not include the height of the cleats in the measurement of the claimed heights” in accusing Under Armour’s shoes that have cleats of infringement. Id. (citing Ex. 1025, 51, 55–56, 61–62 (Athalonz’s infringement contentions regarding claim limitations [1.6] and [1.9])). To the extent Athalonz asserts that its “infringement contentions are extrinsic evidence that should be afforded little weight” (PO Sur-Reply 12), we disagree. While Athalonz’s infringement contentions may indeed be extrinsic evidence, we nevertheless find they provide an indication of Athalonz’s understanding and application of the claims. As such, we find that Athalonz’s infringement contentions, together with the plain language of the claims, the specification, and the credible testimony of Under Armour’s expert, fully supports Under Armour’s assertion that one of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant time frame “would understand that the claimed first, second, and third heights would be measured with respect to the bottom of the sole, not with respect to the bottom of the cleats.” Pet. Reply 14; see also Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 10–24 (Under Armour’s expert confirming same).” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 11,013,291 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,013,291
• Under Armour, Inc. v. Athalonz, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00639 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 8 are unpatentable under § 103 over Umezawa and Gallas, Won and Talarico ’911, and Won, Talarico ’911, and Gallas; remaining grounds were not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full record, we maintain and affirm that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes.” Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 30); Inst. Dec. 9; Ex. 1002 ¶ 30; Ex. 2008 ¶ 44. We find that Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’768 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “After considering the full record, we see no reason to disturb the adopted construction that the “first” and “second” materials, as claimed, are different in some manner. The outcome of our analysis below would not, however, change under an interpretation of “first” and “second” materials being the same material.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “obviousness] involves weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended- Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Above, based on full record before us, we provide our factual findings regarding (1) the level of ordinary skill in the art, (2) the scope and content of the prior art, (3) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. In particular, we find that (1) Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the prior art of record, (2) Umezawa and Gallas teach or suggest all the limitations of claims 1–5 and 8, (3) one of manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success, (4) nexus has not been shown for the alleged objective indicia of nonobviousness, and, even if nexus were shown, Patent Owner’s evidence of long-felt need and copying is entitled to little weight. Weighing these underlying factual determinations, a preponderance of the evidence persuades us that claims 1– 5 and 8 of the ’768 patent are unpatentable over Umezawa and Gallas.” slip op. at 44

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full record, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner fails to show a recognized persistent need, fails to explain why the cited prior art did not meet the need, and fails to show that the claimed invention met the need. Pet. Reply 26. We also determine that prior art shoes would have met Patent Owner’s alleged long-felt “need for putting athletes into a better athletic position.” See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 2:38–41 (“An object of the present invention is to provide golf shoes helpful in smoothly swing without a golfer having to think about weight transfer by smoothly placing the center of body weight on the heel portion.”); Ex. 1006 ¶ 10 (“The object of the easily applied to the inside of a foot.”); Ex. 1008, 13:20–23 (“According to the present invention new footwear is provided accommodating the foot’s natural angulation by providing a sole of dual-density materials which compensates the human foot to its environment.”). Thus, even if nexus were shown, we would give no weight to Patent Owner’s evidence of long-felt need.” slip op. at 42

  Patent outcomesUS 11,375,768 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,375,768
• Ford Motor Company / General Motors LLC et al. v. Neo Wireless LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 3, 2025 · IPR2023-00763 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7 and 11 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over Park and IEEE 802.16-2004 because the combination did not teach a claimed mobile device.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “In summary, the extrinsic record shows that, in the context of wireless network communications using the IEEE 802.16 standard, a “mobile device” is distinct from and excludes a device that is “fixed” or “portable,” where a “mobile” device is described as a device that is mobile during wireless network communications, and a “fixed” or “portable” device is described as a device that is fixed or slowly moving during wireless network communications. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 11; Ex. 1025, 24, 34, 38, 45; Ex. 2025, 71. This understanding of a “mobile device” from the extrinsic record is consistent with the language of claim 7 which recites a mobile device configured for wireless network communications (e.g., receiving an identifier and a signal from a base station), and consistent with the ’450 Patent disclosure that repeatedly and consistently utilizes the term “mobile device.” Accordingly, based on the record, we construe “mobile device” as a device that is mobile during wireless network communications, and is not fixed or slowly moving during wireless network communications.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “We do not agree with Petitioner’s arguments because, as explained above in Section III.B., we construe “mobile device” as a device that is mobile during wireless network communications, and is not fixed or slowly moving during wireless network communications. Thus, after having considered both parties’ arguments and the cited supporting evidence, we are not persuaded that the combination of Park and IEEE 802.16-2004, including the application of Park to WiBro’s teaching of stationary or slowly moving devices communicating using band AMC, teaches or suggests a “mobile device,” as properly construed, that is configured to perform the limitations recited in the body of claim 7.” slip op. at 36

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

    “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(a), a party may file a motion to submit supplemental information if the following requirements are met: (1) a request for authorization to file such motion must be made within one month of the date the trial was instituted; and (2) the supplemental information must be relevant to a claim for which trial has been instituted. In addition to these requirements, the Board considers the motion in light of its mandate under 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b), i.e., “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.”” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 10,447,450 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,447,450

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.