• Multi-Color Corporation v. Brook & Whittle LtdInstituted
  PTAB · Sep 19, 2025 · PGR2025-00025 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by the Gatorade Label.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’422 Patent is eligible for post-grant review and has shown it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’422 Patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’422 Patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would possess at least (1) a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or a related field, with (2) five years of experience in material identification and characterization using multiple analytical methods and field sampling, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 24). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for one of ordinary skill in the art nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

    “336. The applicant explained that not all combinations of shrink films and light blocking materials are recyclable. Id. at 335. The applicant explained that films can be compatible with PET recycling in two ways, (1) the film can float in water and be separated from PET that sinks in water or (2) the PET films crystallize and “can be recovered with the PET stream.” Id. at 336 (citing “A Resource Document by the Association of Plastic Recyclers (APR)”) (found at Ex. 1002, 323–332) (emphasis omitted). The applicant explained that “removing the label before or during the recycling process is not evidence of the recyclability of the label” and that “[r]emoving the label during the recycling process is not equivalent to actually recycling the label.” Id. at 335. As such, a POSITA reading the prosecution history would understand that a label is not recyclable with a PET container, as recited by the independent claims, by removing the label from the PET recycle stream before or during the recycling process.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “To determine how a person skill in the art would determine if a shrink label is “recyclable” as recited in the independent claims, we look to how the Specification of the ’422 Patent describes or defines recyclable shrink labels. For example, the ’422 Patent states that PET shrink films are generally considered recyclable if no inks are retained on the film after a caustic wash cycle typically used in PET reclaiming processes. Ex. 1001, 6:61–65. The ’422 Patent further states that labels are fully recyclable if the polymers used are clear, preferably clear PET, and the labels include inks that can be washed off in a “typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash).” Id. at 11:44– 49; see also id. at 11:49–54 (describing embodiments in which the labels are free or substantially free of inks that cannot be washed off in a caustic wash or where the labels are free or substantially free of color plastics that cannot be recycled). The ’422 Patent further discusses “industry standards” for determining whether various embodiments of shrink labels are recyclable. See, e.g., id. at 11:29–53. For example, the Specification states that the “Association for Plastic Recyclers (APR) Critical Guidance Protocol for Clear PET Articles with Labels and Closures (PET-CG-02)” (Ex. 1005) can certify that a film is fully recyclable with a container or bottle. Id. at 11:34– 38. Additionally, the Specification states that labels “are recyclable according to the Evaluation of the Near Infrared (NIR) Sorting Potential of a Whole Plastic Article (SORT-B-01)” (Ex. 1010) and/or the “Evaluation of Sorting Potential for Plastic Articles Utilizing Metal, Metalized, or Metallic Printed Components (SORT-B-03)” (Ex. 1011). Ex. 1001, 11:39–44. The ’422 Patent further states that embodiments of the labels “are fully recyclable. For example, the labels may include inks that can be washed off in a typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash) and the polymers” are preferably clear PET. Id. at 11:44–48. The ’422 Patent thus provides various descriptions or standards to determine the recyclability of shrink labels. For the purposes of addressing the anticipation and obviousness grounds, we determine that any of these standards can be used to determine if a shrink label is “recyclable.” We note that our construction is preliminary and is based on the present record. We invite the parties to further the address the construction of “wherein the recyclable shrink label is recyclable with a PET container” during trial.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,961,422
• Champion Laboratories, Inc. / First Brands Group, LLC v. Hengst SENo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00603 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 5, 8–11, 15–17, 19, 23–25, and 28–30 were not shown unpatentable over Yokoyama, Yokoyama and Cline, or Honermann and Cline.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Because the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in dispute, and because the parties’ definition is consistent with the disclosures in the ʼ203 patent, the prior art, and the declaration testimony of Mr. Nranian and Dr. Basirat, we view the prior art and arguments through this lens when determining whether the claims are unpatentable as obvious over the prior art.5 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (identifying “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art” as an underlying factual inquiry to be resolved in deciding obviousness, which is a question of law).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Although the parties spend significant portions of their briefing discussing the term “eccentric” and how it applies to certain figures from the ʼ203 patent and the relied-upon prior art, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe the term “eccentric” beyond the parties’ agreed-upon definition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “(opining that “Patent Owner’s construction of ‘having an axis no located in a geometric center’ is too narrow”). Mr. Nranian’s Declaration testimony in this respect is not persuasive for several reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent. Compare Ex. 1016 ¶ 3 (criticizing the “axis” language in Patent Owner’s definition), with id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (relying on that very language to support an argument). Also, Mr. Nranian’s proposed definition of “eccentric” to merely mean “not located at the center” begs the question of what, precisely, is “the center”? Mr. Nranian does not persuasively explain how far a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand she could travel from the exact center point of an object and still be in “the center” of that object. See Tr. 10:13–19 (Judge McGee asking whether the center is “a miniscule point in the middle of [the] disc”); see also id. at 10:25–12:26 (Judge Weatherly highlighting the significant ambiguity in referring to something as in “the center”). Also, Mr. Nranian’s opinion is inconsistent with how the ʼ203 patent compares something that is “central,” i.e., “at the center,” and something that is “eccentrically” located. Ex. 1001, 7:13–14 (describing pipe nozzle 15 as “central”); id. at 8:53–56 (describing a “through hole” as “located in the center of the front panel 22” depicted in Figures 7 and 8); id. at 10:23–31 (describing return 12 as “in the center” and outlet 13 as “eccentrically thereto” in Figure 17). Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated Figure 7 is reproduced below: Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated version of Figure 7 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates “central pipe nozzle 15” in yellow passing through the “through hole” located in “the center” of front panel 22. PO Resp. 20. Significantly, pipe nozzle 15 and the through hole in panel 22 are both described as “central” and in “the center” but must have different diameters; otherwise, “central pipe nozzle 15” would not be capable of traveling through “through hole 22.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 7. Thus, the ʼ203 patent intrinsically bases whether an element is “central” or “in the center” on whether its axis is located at the geometric center. This is also illustrated in Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent, reproduced below: Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates filter housing 10 with return 12 “in the center . . . and, eccentrically thereto, the outlet 13 with the seat 14 for the blocking element 24.” Ex. 1001, 10:23–30. Finally, Mr. Nranian’s narrow interpretation of “eccentric”––which excludes the “having the axis or support so located” in the geometric center language––is at odds with the arguments it was proffered to support. Cf. Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 9,023,203 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,023,203
• Jiangsu Favored Nanotechnology Co., Ltd. v. P2i Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00380 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, and 9–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Cohen and Legein or Francesch and Legein; Petitioner’s motion to strike is denied as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’087 patent in June 20154 “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a field such as chemistry, physics, or chemical engineering, as well as at least two years of experience with plasma-polymerization techniques.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 22–29); PO Resp. 13 (Patent Owner stating that it “does not dispute this characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art.”); see also PO Sur-reply 1–2 (noting both parties’ agreement on the education and experience level of the ordinarily skilled artisan).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “On the fully developed trial record, we determine that no claims need an express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Because of Patent Owner’s shifting definitions of the education and experience level of the ordinarily skilled artisan, it is unclear on the complete record what precise definition Patent Owner and Dr. Senkevitch are applying when arguing the skilled artisan’s capabilities. PO Resp. 13, 22–27, 31–32, 34–40; PO Sur-reply 1–6, 11–13; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 40, 52–55, 60, 68, 74, 76, 77, 80–86, 89, 91, 94, 95, 100, 102–105, 108, 110, 111, 113–116, 118–120, 122, 124, 127–134. We, therefore, give Dr. Senkevitch’s testimony regarding the capabilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art minimal weight, which leaves us with Patent Owner’s insufficiently supported arguments regarding the skilled artisan’s capabilities. PO Resp. 13, 22–27, 31–32, 34–40; PO Sur-reply 1–6, 11–13. Moreover, as Petitioner correctly points out, the ʼ087 patent expressly teaches that the precise conditions for forming a protective polymeric coating “will vary depending upon factors such as, without limitation, the nature of the monomer compound, the crosslinking agent, the substrate, as well as the desired properties of the coating” and that such “conditions can be determined using routine methods.” Ex. 1001 15:1–15:5 (emphasis added); Pet. Reply 17. Where the patent itself leaves to the judgment of an ordinarily skilled artisan the assessment of these factors to ascertain suitable conditions for forming the protective coating, we find persuasive Petitioner’s view that it would have been well within the level of ordinary skill to ascertain such suitable conditions.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner. Although the claims of the ʼ087 patent recite obtaining the protective cross-linked polymeric coating “by exposing the device or component to a plasma,” the field of endeavor analysis in an analogous art inquiry does not exclusively turn on the claims at issue, but rather takes account of the entirety of a patent’s disclosure. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the PTO must show adequate support for its findings on the scope of the field of endeavor in the application’s written description and claims” (emphasis added)); In re Mettke, 570 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting an argument that the field of endeavor was limited to a claimed “Internet terminal” when “the specification describes various communication media, including facsimile machines and email, as related to the invention.”). This is significant here because the ʼ087 patent discloses that “[t]he … invention relates to protective coatings” and specifically “relates to protective coatings for electronic or electrical devices and components thereof, and methods of forming such coatings.” Ex. 1001, 1:14–17. Based on this disclosure, we find that the ʼ087 patent’s field of endeavor relates to “protective coatings for electronic or electrical devices and components thereof” broadly, not just those formed on such devices or components via a plasma polymerization process as asserted by Patent Owner. Id. Although Cohen does not explicitly disclose that its crosslinked polymers constitute a “protective coating,” Cohen does disclose that its “copolymerizable mixture can be cast into films” (Ex. 1004, 2:61–62), that the polymerization can “effected in situ,” and that the polymers may be used in “numerous” electrical applications (id. at 5:17–25). Tr. 8:9–10:2, 27:2– 21; see Pet. Reply 5 (explaining how “Cohen described insulating polymers that could be applied as films and be used to protect substrates including cables and electrical coils.” (citing Ex. 1004, 2:60–63, 5:13–25)). These disclosures suggest strongly that Cohen’s crosslinked polymers––if cast into a film or formed in situ on an electrical device or component––would serve as a protective coating on that electrical device or component, even though Cohen does not expressly refer to its crosslinked polymers ipsis verbis as a “protective coating.” Thus, we find that Cohen is within the field of endeavor of the ʼ087 patent.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,041,087 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,041,087
• Billerud Aktiebolag (Publ) v. Westrock MWV, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 12, 2025 · IPR2023-01206 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–22 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 23 was not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 25–26 are allowed, while 24 and 27 are denied for lack of written-description support.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “Exhibits 1013 and 1014 are also not admissible as expert testimony because Mr. Wirén is not “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. “To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case—like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art. Without that skill, the witness’ opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.” Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Mr. Wirén does not meet our definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Section II.B, supra. That definition is based on the undisputed testimony of Messrs. Zotterman and Klass. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 2003 ¶ 26. Although Mr. Wirén has a Master’s of Science in chemical engineering, he lacks any experience or specialization in paperboard manufacturing. Ex. 2011, 12:1–10, 19:6–25, 20:2–7. We therefore agree with Patent Owner that Exhibits 1013 and 1014 are the testimony of Mr. Wirén and should be excluded from evidence because Mr. Wirén is not a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art. PO MTE 5–6, 9; Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Unless a patent lawyer is also a qualified technical” slip op. at 61

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Based on the testimony of the parties’ witnesses, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in paper science and engineering, chemical engineering, process engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related degree, with three to five years of experience in paperboard manufacturing, or a master’s degree in paper science and engineering, chemical engineering, process engineering, or mechanical engineering, or a similar field with a specialization in paperboard manufacturing. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 2003 ¶ 26. We find that the level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, is consistent with the level of technical understanding and competence reflected in the ’142 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “A claim construction that excludes a particular element is viewed as a “negative limitation.” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 Fed. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2021). “[S]uch exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Id. (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are exacting.” GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term,’ and ‘clearly express an intent to define the term.’” Id. (citing Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365). Similarly, disclaimer or disavowal requires that the specification or prosecution history demonstrate that the invention does not include a particular feature. Id. Here, we find no claim language, lexicography, or disclaimer in the ’142 Patent or its file history that would support defining a “hot-hard calender” as requiring that only one of the two rollers be heated to an elevated temperature.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “a contact surface of said thermo-roller is heated to an elevated temperature of at least 250°F.” Petitioner shows persuasively that the temperature limitation is taught by the combination of Fugitt and Papermaking. Pet. 32–34. Fugitt discloses that “[t]he rolls of the calender may be steam heated.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 26. In a section titled “Heated Rolls,” Papermaking discloses that “Steam can be used up to 170°C [338°F] surface temperature.” Ex. 1010, 95, 98. Petitioner is thus correct that, “[w]hile Fugitt teaches that a hot calender may be steam heated, Papermaking clarifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that steam heated thermo-rollers may reach up to 338°F.” Pet. 36. Based on these disclosures, we are persuaded by Mr. Zotterman’s testimony that it would have been “obvious to heat the thermo-roller of Fugitt to at least 250°F.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 159. combine Fugitt and Papermaking because of Papermaking’s status as a “trusted handbook[],” because both references disclose a method of manufacturing a paperboard structure with hot calendering,” and “because of the known advantages of heated rollers.” Pet. 36–37; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157, 159, 162. Petitioner’s contention is supported by Papermaking’s disclosures that, for cartonboard, “[p]recalendering is used before the coater to reduce roughness and porosity” and “[h]igh thermo roll temperatures (in some cases over 200°C) result in bulk savings because of the temperature gradient.” Ex. 1005, 80–82; see also Pet. 38; Ex. 1003 ¶ 164 (citing these disclosures). Papermaking’s disclosed range of “up to 170°C [338°F]” for steam- heated rolls (Ex. 1010, 98), overlaps the claimed range of “at least 250°F.” Patent Owner agrees. Tr. 27:11–13. “If the relevant comparison between a disputed claim limitation and the prior art pertains to a range of overlapping values, ‘. . . even a slight overlap in range establishes a prima facie case of obviousness.’” Genentech, Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 946 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “[S]uch an overlap creates a presumption of obviousness, and . . . the burden of production falls upon the patentee to come forward with pertinent evidence that the overlapping range would not have been obvious in light of the prior art.” Id. (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 11,293,142 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,293,142
• Tennant Company v. Oxygenator Water Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · IPR2021-00625 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand

  Claims 13, 14, and 17–27 were not shown unpatentable because Tennant did not establish that Wikey or Davies inherently disclosed the claimed microbubbles and nanobubbles.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11. On September 19, 2024, we authorized the parties to file supplemental briefing, stating also that the “parties are not authorized to present new factual assertions, provide additional exhibits, or raise new arguments beyond those directed to the issues raised in the remand.” Ex. 3001. Pursuant to this authorization, Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 61; “Pet. Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Patent Owner filed a Lead Brief on Remand (Paper 62; “PO Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Petitioner filed a Reply Brief on Remand (Paper 66; “Pet. Reply Br. Rem.”). Patent Owner filed a Responsive Brief on Remand (Paper 65; “PO Resp. Br. Rem.”).” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Accordingly, and in line with our previous determination that “Wikey appears to disclose each limitation of claim 13 except ‘microbubbles and nanobubbles having a bubble diameter of less than 50 microns’” (Final Dec. 20), we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey inherently discloses microbubbles or nanobubbles. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey discloses every limitation of claim 13.” slip op. at 56

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11.” slip op. at 3

  Patent outcomesUS RE45,415 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
• ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01058 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Roku did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted § 103 combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “arguments presented by both parties, we find Petitioner’s evidence to be insufficient to carry its burden of showing Wang777 discloses or suggests claim elements 1.3, 6.3, and 10.3. More specifically, we find that Petitioner does not present persuasive evidence that Wang777 discloses or suggests the use of “a sequential order of at least two different obtained content identifiers in the play stream to identify a channel corresponding to the data samples.” Furthermore, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Russ, adds little, if any, persuasive value because his testimony is almost indistinguishable from Petitioner’s argument in the Petition and, as such, incorporates the same flaws. Compare Pet. 52–56 with Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–144. The reason Petitioner’s reliance on paragraph 72 of Wang777 is unavailing is because we are not persuaded that it discloses or suggests using two different content identifiers to identify a channel. When viewing the cited portions of that paragraph in the proper context of what Wang777 teaches as a whole (as we are required to do), we are not persuaded a skilled artisan would understand that the disclosed additional and different content identifiers in the alleged play stream are being used to identify a channel.” slip op. at 21

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “claims issued in the ’849 patent. Pet. 40–103. Patent Owner contends that 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) applies to this case and that we should discretionarily deny institution. Prelim. Resp. 7–19. Patent Owner also asserts that Petitioner’s challenges are deficient under § 314(a); in particular, Patent Owner disputes the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence to show the prior art discloses or suggests claim elements 1.3, 6.3, and 10.3 of the independent claims. Id. at 20–62. Although Patent Owner’s arguments applying § 325(d) and Advanced Bionics, 4 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2004/0260682 A1, published December 23, 2004 (“Herley”) (Ex. 1011). 5 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2005/0193016 A1, published September 1, 2005, filed February 17, 2005 (“Seet”) (Ex. 1012). 6 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2002/0116195 A1, published August 22, 2002 (“Pitman”) (Ex. 1013). 7 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2003/0018709 A1, published January 23, 2003 (“Schrempp”) (Ex. 1014). 8 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2003/0086341 A1, published May 8, 2003 (“Wells”) (Ex. 1015). Paper 6, (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) are sound, we decline to exercise our discretion. Nevertheless, as discussed below, our merits analysis also leads to denial of the Petition because the cited evidence fails to persuade us that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail on any claim challenged.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “We agree with Patent Owner that a person can qualify as a skilled artisan based on relevant industry experience in lieu of a formal degree. We also agree that ACR systems are relevant to the subject matter of the ’849 patent. We disagree, however, that industry experience with ACR systems is required to qualify as a skilled artisan. The ’849 patent describes a media usage monitoring and measurement method that relies on “known content recognition methods,” including known ACR. Ex. 1001, code (54), 5:48–54. The claimed invention relates to analyzing sample sequence data to enhance content identification and to establish channel identification. Id. at code (57), 15:14–32 (claim 1). The ’849 patent relies upon known ACR systems, but does not claim a new method of content recognition such that industry experience designing or implementing ACR systems is required. We accept that such experience may assist in providing relevant industry experience. For these reasons, we determine that a skilled artisan would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or an equivalent degree, with two years of relevant industry experience in digital media content delivery or designing or implementing ACR systems. A person may qualify as a skilled artisan based on more than two years of relevant industry experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “arguments presented by both parties, we find Petitioner’s evidence to be insufficient to carry its burden of showing Wang777 discloses or suggests claim elements 1.3, 6.3, and 10.3. More specifically, we find that Petitioner does not present persuasive evidence that Wang777 discloses or suggests the use of “a sequential order of at least two different obtained content identifiers in the play stream to identify a channel corresponding to the data samples.” Furthermore, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Russ, adds little, if any, persuasive value because his testimony is almost indistinguishable from Petitioner’s argument in the Petition and, as such, incorporates the same flaws. Compare Pet. 52–56 with Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–144.” slip op. at 21

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,719,849
• ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01055 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons that follow, we do not institute an inter partes review because the information presented in the Petition, in view of the Preliminary Response, does not show that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “We agree with Patent Owner that a person can qualify as a skilled artisan based on relevant industry experience in lieu of a formal degree. We also agree that ACR systems are relevant to the subject matter of the ‘622 patent. We disagree, however, that industry experience with ACR systems is required to qualify as a skilled artisan. The ‘622 patent describes a media usage monitoring and measurement method that relies on “known content recognition methods,” including known ACR. Ex. 1001, code (54), 5:38–44, 5:59–6:13. The claimed invention relates to analyzing sample sequence data to enhance content identification and to establish channel identification. Id. at code (57), 14:37–51 (claim 1). The ‘622 patent relies upon known ACR systems, but does not claim a new method of content recognition such that industry experience designing or implementing ACR systems is required. We accept that such experience may assist in providing relevant industry experience. For these reasons, we determine that a skilled artisan would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or an equivalent degree, with two years of relevant industry experience in digital media content delivery or designing or implementing ACR systems. A person may qualify as a skilled artisan based on more than two years of relevant industry experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “arguments presented by both parties, we find Petitioner’s evidence to be insufficient to carry its burden of showing Wang777 discloses or suggests claim elements 1.3, 6.3, and 10.3. More specifically, we find that Petitioner does not present persuasive evidence that Wang777 discloses or suggests the use of “a sequential order of at least two different obtained content identifiers in the play stream to identify a channel corresponding to the data samples.” Furthermore, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Russ, adds little, if any, persuasive value because his testimony is almost indistinguishable from Petitioner’s argument in the Petition and, as such, incorporates the same flaws. Compare Pet. 52–56 with Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 135–142. The reason Petitioner’s reliance on paragraph 72 of Wang777 is unavailing is because we are not persuaded that it discloses or suggests using two different content identifiers to identify a channel. When viewing the cited portions of that paragraph in the proper context of what Wang777 teaches as a whole (as we are required to do), we are not persuaded a skilled artisan would understand that the disclosed additional and different content identifiers in the alleged play stream are being used to identify a channel.” slip op. at 21

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “none of the claim terms require explicit constructions” and “all claim terms have been given their plain and ordinary meaning, in the context of the ’622 patent specification, under the Phillips standard.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner does not dispute this contention (see generally Prelim. Resp.) and its declarant, Mr. Hoarty, states that he “applied the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms at issue” (Ex. 2001 ¶ 52). are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Here, both parties rely on the plain and ordinary meaning for all of the terms used in the claims challenged in the Petition and neither party suggests a particular meaning beyond what is clearly conveyed by the claim terms in the context of the ’622 patent. Therefore, we need not construe expressly any of the claim terms.” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,756,622
• ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01054 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution

  Institution denied for claims 1–15 because Petitioner did not show Seet was prior art, defeating the reasonable-likelihood showing for every asserted obviousness ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any one of claims 1–15 of the ’768 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’768 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner fails to show that the full scope of claim 9 of Seet is described in the Seet provisional. Seet expressly defines the claim term “media,” stating that, as it is “used herein,” “media” includes audio, video, software, and pictures. Ex. 1006 ¶ 50 (“Media content may include one . . . of audio . . ., video . . ., software . . ., and pictures”). Such a statement provides a clear definition of the term “media” that includes video, software, and pictures, in addition to audio. In addition to the express definition, Seet elsewhere indicates that its media includes video and other non-audio signals and databases. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26 (“if the media stream 102 is a video broadcast, each media item may comprise a television show or segment, an advertisement, or any other type of video”), 42–46 (creating databases of “videos,” “faces,” and “files”), 49 (“any signal that contains repeating content over any broadcast medium can benefit from the procedure described herein.”). Accordingly, the use of media in claim 9 for its claimed “media content database” and “media stream[s]” also includes both audio and non-audio media.” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not met its burden to show that Seet is prior art. Seet is not entitled to the benefit of its provisional filing date unless a claim in Seet has written description support in the Seet provisional. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1381–82. As the “‘hallmark’ of written description, . . . the disclosure must be considered as a whole, as the person of ordinary skill in the art would read it to determine if it reasonably conveys possession” of the claimed invention. Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Laboratories Private Ltd., 111 F.4th 1358, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citation and emphasis omitted).” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art [“POSITA”] at the critical time would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree with at least two years of relevant industry experience, including in digital media content delivery.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner argues that the level of ordinary skill should include persons lacking a formal degree but possessing considerable industry experience designing and implementing automated content recognition systems, and that such systems are the relevant industry experience. Prelim. Resp. 6–7. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, modified by the more inclusive standards of Patent Owner, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’768 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,510,768
• ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01057 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Roku did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–15 unpatentable; Seet was not shown to be prior art.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Without the benefit of its provisional filing date, Seet, filed on February 17, 2005, is not prior art to the ’848 patent, having an uncontested benefit to the May 27, 2004 filing date of its provisional. Because each of Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of its unpatentability assertions. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of claims 1–15. We determine that the record does not support institution. Accordingly, no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner fails to show that the full scope of claim 9 of Seet is described in the Seet provisional. Seet expressly defines the claim term “media,” stating that, as it is “used herein,” “media” includes audio, video, software, and pictures. Ex. 1006 ¶ 50 (“Media content may include one . . . of audio . . ., video . . ., software . . ., and pictures”). Such a statement provides a clear definition of the term “media” that includes video, software, and pictures, in addition to audio. In addition to the express definition, Seet elsewhere indicates that its media includes video and other non-audio signals and databases. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26 (“if the media stream 102 is a video broadcast, each media item may comprise a television show or segment, an advertisement, or any other type of video”), 42–46 (creating databases of “videos,” “faces,” and “files”), 49 (“any signal that contains repeating content over any broadcast medium can benefit from the procedure described herein.”). Accordingly, the use of media in claim 9 for its claimed “media content database” and “media stream[s]” also includes both audio and non-audio media. The disclosure of the Seet provisional, however, is more limited and defines the term media exclusively as audio. Ex. 1019, 4 (“Media will be defined as any streaming audio source in any form, be it radio, television, cable, satellite, internet stream, or the like.”). This definition does not include the full scope of “media” as that term is used in claim 9 of Seet because it does not include video, software, and pictures.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree with at least two years of relevant industry experience, including in digital media content delivery.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner argues that the level of ordinary skill should include persons lacking a formal degree but possessing considerable industry experience designing and implementing automated content recognition systems, and that such systems are the relevant industry experience. Prelim. Resp. 6–8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, modified by the more inclusive standards of Patent Owner, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’848 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Here, neither party sets forth any explicit claim construction. Pet. 14; Prelim. Resp. Although Patent Owner analyzes the term “media monitoring device” in its arguments (Preliminary Response 37–43), our ultimate determination on institution does not turn on that construction. We determine that no need exists to determine a particular construction for purposes of this institution decision, and instead construe the claims pursuant to § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,719,848
• ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01056 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–11 were unpatentable over the asserted prior-art combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner does not meet the reasonable likelihood standard, and we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that a person can qualify as a POSA based on relevant industry experience in lieu of a formal degree. We also agree that ACR systems are relevant to the subject matter of the ’896 Patent. We disagree, however, that industry experience with ACR systems is required to qualify as a POSA. The ’896 Patent describes a media usage monitoring and measurement method that relies on “known content recognition methods.” Ex. 1001, code (54), 5:48–52. The claimed invention using certain data, including content identification results. Id. at code (57), 15:12–35. The ’896 Patent does not claim a new method of content recognition. For these reasons, we determine that a POSA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or an equivalent degree, with two years of relevant industry experience in digital media content delivery or designing or implementing ACR systems. A person may qualify as a POSA based on more than two years of relevant industry experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “The claims and Specification are consistent with defining “offset” as relative, rather than absolute. Claim elements 1.4 and 9.5 each recite: “a content offset indicating a time position of a content identification result within identified content.” Ex. 1001, 15:24–26, 16:25–27 (emphasis added). In our view, “a time position . . . within identified content” means the time position is relative to a reference point within the identified content. Our understanding of the claim language is reinforced by the Specification. According to the ’896 Patent, content offset data are shown in Figure 5, but not Figure 4. Ex. 1001, 9:22–26. Figures 4 and 5 both show a series of log times and corresponding content IDs, where the log time indicates when a sample began to be captured. Id. at 9:29–32, 9:40–45, 11:32–35, Figs. 4, 5. Figure 5 additionally includes a “content offset” column, as illustrated below. Id. at Fig. 5 (excerpt). According to the ’896 Patent, Each content offset value represents a time offset from the beginning of a particular piece of content. For example, row 8 of Play Stream 510 corresponds to a sample whose beginning is located 9 time units from the beginning of TV program 27, thus the content offset is referenced as (0)+9. Id. at 11:41–46. Although both the log time and content offset are expressed in relative terms in the Figure 5 example, only the content offset is relative to a reference point within the identified content, in this case the beginning of the content. Id. at 9:40–45, 11:41–46.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “We have considered Dr. Russ’s testimony pertaining to claim elements 1.1 and 9.1 and Feininger. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 136–142, 179. Dr. Russ testifies that Feininger’s “[p]resentation time retriever 56 . . . retrieves a ‘program identifier [(content identification results)] from the packet header of the section of the recorded program currently being played back and store[s] that identifier in one or more program identification fields 68.’” Ex. 1003 ¶ 137 (citing Ex. 1005, 5:28–42). Like Petitioner, Dr. Russ does not take into account the description of “content identification” provided earlier in his testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:48–66). Dr. Russ does not assert that Feininger discloses content identification. Without content identification, there can be no content identification results. Dr. Russ further testifies that Feininger’s apparatus 50 “generates the ‘play stream of content identification results’ based on the data samples submitted to data logging device 26.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 139 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:4–13). Missing from this testimony is any opinion about whether Feininger’s apparatus 50 or data logging device 26 performs content identification. Dr. Russ does not point to any teaching or suggestion in Feininger that extracted program identifiers 68 result from content identification.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,572,896

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.