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  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00623 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–7 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the information presented by the parties, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of claims 1–7 of the ’974 patent is unpatentable, and we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. Id.” slip op. at 2

    • BurdenInstituted

      “reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Whether a reference anticipates a claim is assessed from the skilled artisan’s perspective. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference.” (quoting In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).” slip op. at 10

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “2. The Parties’ Contentions The parties agree that the MSI-H Study Record was publicly available by June 12, 2013. (See Pet. 7; see Prelim. Resp. 19 (“JHU submitted the MSI-H Study Record on June 10, 2013, and it was posted on clinicaltrials.gov on approximately June 12, 2013”). In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s argument (see Pet. 8) that the MSI-H Study Record is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and is not covered by an exception under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). See Prelim. Resp.” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInstituted

      “22. Our research group eventually approached Merck. Merck agreed in early 2013 to supply its then-unapproved anti-PD-1 antibody, MK-3475 (pembrolizumab) for use in the study. It was, however, the research team at Hopkins who secured IRB approval, conducted, and paid for the study. On June 12, 2013, the solicitation for patients was first posted on clinicaltrials.gov (Exhibit D). In my mind, the four arms allowed us to try to get at an answer to a question to which we did not know the answer-specifically whether or not patients with MSI-high or MMR deficient tumors would exhibit an improved response when treated with MK-3475, compared with the more common MSS [microsatellite stable] or MMR proficient colon cancers. Thus, the trial covered all patients with colon cancer, MSI and MSS, but separated into two groups. 23. The preliminary results of this study demonstrated clinical responses at an unexpectedly high rate (>50% objective response rate) in the MSI-high (MMR deficient) arm but not in the MSS (MMR proficient) arm. (Ex. 1002, 270–271.) This affidavit, submitted during prosecution of the ’974 patent, supports the argument that an improved outcome of treating a patient with a tumor exhibiting an MSI-high or a MMR deficiency status with pembrolizumab compared to similarly treating a patient without an MSI-high or a MMR deficiency status, a recited in claim 1, is an inherent result. Patent Owner does not dispute this result in the Preliminary Response. See Prelim. Resp. 7 (“The ’974 Patent reports that mismatch repair-deficient colorectal cancers (i.e., MSI-H CRC) had an immune-related objective response rate and immune-related progression-free survival rate of 40% and 78%, respectively—a huge improvement compared to the 0% and 11% rates found in mismatch repair-proficient colorectal cancers (i.e., MSI negative CRC).”).” slip op. at 17

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,325,974
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00625 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable and declining discretionary denial under §§ 314(a) and 325(d).

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency foundDecided for petitioner

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Petitioner argues that Pernot teaches treating colorectal cancer and that, therefore, because the MSI-H Study Record is directed to a clinical study treating colorectal cancer in a patient whose cancers are MSI-H with pembrolizumab, which is an anti-PD-1 antibody, one of ordinary skill in the art knowing the teachings of the MSI-H Study Record would have considered the teachings of Pernot. (See Pet. 36.) Petitioner argues that Pernot teaches that colorectal cancer patients that are MSI-H are “good candidates for immunotherapy,” such as PD-1 inhibitors. (See Pet. 36 (quoting Ex. 1006, 3741 (“[Colorectal cancer] associated with MSI could lead to a more intense immune response, but also to specific immunoregulatory phenomena, making [patients with colorectal cancer] good candidates for immunotherapy.”)).) Petitioner cites further to Dr. Neugut’s testimony to argue that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the disclosure of Pernot with the methods taught in the MSI-H Study Record in order to obtain the results of the MSI-H Study Record’s study. (See Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 93).)” slip op. at 17

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,339,219
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00624 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6–10, and 12–15 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenge and declining Fintiv denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the information presented by the parties, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of claims 1–4, 6–10, and 12–15 of the ’975 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Obviousness is determined by looking to the scope and content of the prior art, differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). “[T]he analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “pending Maryland litigation has been stayed in its entirety pending resolution of IPR2024-00240, which involves a related patent that is also involved in the litigation. Reply, 1 (citing Order in Maryland litigation, dated June 29, 2024, Ex. 1100, 1); see Sur-Reply, 1 (acknowledging “the recent stay of the parties’ co-pending litigation involving the ’975 Patent.”). In its Memorandum Opinion, the court acknowledged that inter partes reviews of additional patents involved in the litigation could be instituted. See Ex. 1101, 3. Accordingly, the first Fintiv factor weighs heavily in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. Because of the stay, the second and third Fintiv factors also weigh heavily in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. The stay indicates that the court’s trial date will not be close to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision and that neither the court nor the parties will invest further in the parallel proceeding. See Fintiv, at 6 (“A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts. This fact has strongly weighed against exercising the authority to deny institution under NHK.”); see also Memorandum Opinion in Maryland litigation issued June 29, 2024, Ex. 1101, 2 (noting that the” slip op. at 32

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,325,975
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00622 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 6–11, 13–20, 22–24, and 26–28 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining discretionary denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “the . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “the . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that the MSI-H Study Record is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and is not covered by an exception under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 8. The parties agree that the MSI-H Study Record was publicly available by June 12, 2013. Id. at 7; Prelim. Resp. 19 (“JHU submitted the MSI-H Study Record on June 10, 2013, and it was posted on clinicaltrials.gov on approximately June 12, 2013”).” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “summarized above, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes that Petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of the MSI-H Study Record. We are persuaded that the MSI-H Study Record discloses the limitations of claim 1. Pet. 16–24. We are further persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify the MSI-H Study Record with Pernot and Benson to benefit from the improved outcomes in treating MSI-H colorectal patients with the drug therapeutic. Id. at 41–44. We are also persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to test patients to determine their MSI-H status as such testing was routine in the art. Id. at 44–45. We are also persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the MSI-H Study Record and Benson to treat patients with metastatic and advanced disease. Id. at 46–47.” slip op. at 27

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,934,356
  • PTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00876 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 6 as obvious over Linnarsson and McCloskey, and claim 5 as obvious over those references and ordinary skill.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

      “Clearly, the second Hall-Ellis declaration is offered to prove that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. See, e.g., Ex. 1065 ¶50 (“In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that [McCloskey] was publicly available no later than [January 3, 2008].”). Thus, the second Hall-Ellis declaration should have been served within ten business days of Patent Owner’s October, 27, 2023, objection to the admissibility of McCloskey. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) (“The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.”). Because it was not filed until March 29, 2024, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration. In its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner argues that, under Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), it was allowed to wait until its Reply to file the second Hall-Ellis declaration. Paper 37, 1–2. The Board in Hulu does state that, “if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, at 15 (37 C.F.R. § 42.23). However, the Board’s statement was referring to the scope of permissible reply arguments under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). See Hulu at 14 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)’s requirement that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response”). The Board in Hulu does not purport to interpret 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 or even discuss supplemental evidence. Petitioner clearly missed the deadline imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2), which was triggered by Patent Owner’s October 27, 2023, objection to McCloskey. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration (i.e., Ex. 1065).” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “We find that both references are analogous art to the ’981 patent, as there is ample supporting evidence in the record, including that to which the Reply cites (citations identified in the immediately preceding paragraph). Indeed, Patent Owner does not dispute the merits of either argument. PO Sur-Reply 27–28. Rather, Patent Owner, argues that we “should not now permit Petitioner to rewrite its clearly-deficient Petition.” Id. at 28. Petitioner’s Reply does not re-write its Petition. What Petitioner’s Reply does, in response to Patent Owner’s arguments, is precisely what Sanofi-Aventis contemplates as being proper in a reply brief. Indeed, in ruling against the petitioner in Sanofi-Aventis, the Federal Circuit specifically noted that the petitioner could have used its reply brief “to explain how [the prior art reference] is analogous to the [challenged] patent” but did not do so. 66 F.4th at 1379–1380. Here, in contrast, Petitioner used its Reply brief to explain how Linnarsson and McCloskey are analogous to the ’981 patent. Petitioner’s explanation in its Reply brief was both proper and persuasive.” slip op. at 14

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “That McCloskey is what it purports to be (a journal article) and that it was published in 2007 are corroborated by multiple pieces of evidence. McCloskey names four authors, all four of whom are named inventors of US 2007/0020640 A1, published Jan. 25, 2007 (“McCloskey ’640”). Ex. 1004, 1, Ex. 2001, code (76). Patent Owner concedes that McCloskey and McCloskey ’640 involve the same subject matter, having argued that the consideration of McCloskey ’640 supported discretionary denial of the Petition based on McCloskey. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 22 (“Petitioner’s secondary reference, an article by McCloskey, is at best cumulative of the far more detailed McCloskey ’640, which was raised by the Office and substantively discussed as the basis for a potential rejection using its asserted disclosure of a polynucleotide-specific tag—the same purported teaching for which Petitioner relies on McCloskey here.”). Notably, McCloskey ’640 was published on January 25, 2007. Ex. 2001, code (43). That is just days before McCloskey was received by BIOCHEMICAL GENETICS on January 31, 2007. See EX. 1004, 1 (“Received: 31 January 2007 / Accepted: 29 May 2007 / Published online: 23 October 2007”). In other words, it appears that the authors sought to have their research published in a scientific journal promptly after the subject matter of their research had been published by the Office. Further, the existence of McCloskey and its publication year of 2007 is confirmed by other sources in the record. See Ex. 1029, code (56) (United States Patent identifying as a cited reference: “McCloskey, et al. Encoding Pcr products with batch-stamps and barcodes. Biochem Genet. Dec. 2007;45(11-12):761-7. Epub Oct. 23, 2007.”); Ex. 1053, code (56) (same); Ex. 1060 (article’s bibliography citing “McCloskey ML, Stöger R, Hansen RS, Laird CD. Encoding PCR products with batch-stamps and barcodes. Biochem. Genet 2007;45:761–767. [PubMed: 17955361]”). Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied with respect to” slip op. at 19

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “The Petition states that “Petitioner does not believe that any terms require explicit construction in view of the prior art being presented.” Pet. 36. Despite this stated position, Petitioner proposed constructions for “multiplex-identifier (MID)” and “providing a sample.” Id. Patent Owner, in its Preliminary Response, stated that it “agrees that at this time, solely for purposes of an institution decision on the Petition, no terms require explicit construction.” Prelim. Resp. 45. In instituting the IPR, we found no need to provide an express construction of any claim term. Inst. Dec. 6. In the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner repeats that it “does not believe any term needs construction,” but nonetheless “applies the Petition’s definitions for ‘MID’ and ‘sample.’” PO Resp. 19. The Petition defines MID as “‘a tag or combination of tags associated with a polynucleotide whose identity (e.g., the tag DNA sequence) can be used to differentiate polynucleotides in a sample.’” Pet. 36 (quoting Ex. 1001, 6:33–38). The Petition defines sample as “‘a quantity of material from a biological, environmental medical, or patient source in which detection, measurement, or labeling of target nucleic acids is sought.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 12:7– 10). We apply these same definitions in our analysis.” slip op. at 6

    Patent outcomesUS 10,155,981 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,155,981
  • PTAB · Sep 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00695 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–13 on all grounds, finding compelling evidence of obviousness over Perlman for claims 1 and 12 and a reasonable likelihood of success on the remaining claims.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “The second Fintiv factor strongly favors denial, the third Fintiv factor somewhat favors denial, the first and fifth factors are neutral, and the fourth factor somewhat weighs against denial. Accordingly, we determine that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, and thus, we assess compelling merits. CommScope, Paper 23 at 5 (“In circumstances where, however, the Board’s analysis of Fintiv factors 1–5 favors denial of institution, the Board shall then assess compelling merits.”). We note that the compelling merits standard is met if “the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Guidance Memo 4 (emphasis added). Thus, the standard need only be met as to one claim. In this case, we determine, for the reasons explained below in our analysis of Petitioner’s unpatentability challenges, that the Petition presents a compelling challenge based on a single close reference at least for independent claims 1 and 12. Perlman’s disclosure provides clear and robust teachings for the limitations of those claims. Patent Owner’s only arguments on the merits, directed to two limitations common to both independent claims, are premised on an interpretation of “transmitting . . . data streams independently over a network” that has no basis in the record. “A challenge can only ‘plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable’ [Guidance Memo 5] if it is highly likely that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim.” OpenSky Indus., LLC v. VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR202101064, Paper 102, 49–50 (PTAB Oct. 4, 2022) (precedential). We have so determined in regard to at least independent claims 1 and 12, and therefore decline to deny institution based on the Fintiv factors.” slip op. at 15

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Guidance Memo 4 (emphasis added). Thus, the standard need only be met as to one claim. In this case, we determine, for the reasons explained below in our analysis of Petitioner’s unpatentability challenges, that the Petition presents a compelling challenge based on a single close reference at least for independent claims 1 and 12. Perlman’s disclosure provides clear and robust teachings for the limitations of those claims. Patent Owner’s only arguments on the merits, directed to two limitations common to both independent claims, are premised on an interpretation of “transmitting . . . data streams independently over a network” that has no basis in the record.” slip op. at 15

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 16 (citing Freedman Decl. ¶¶ 20–22). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for purposes of its preliminary response. Prelim. Resp. 15. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s articulation.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

      “Based on this record, we determine that the claim requirement at issue requires the parallel encoded data streams to be transmitted such that the encoded tiles arrive at the destination for separate decoding and recombination to reproduce the image. The embodiments described in the ’426 specification describe nothing more. The portions of Perlman on which Petitioner relies amply demonstrate the same behavior. It is not necessary to determine the precise method by which the separately encoded data tiles are transmitted, as long as they are separately received, decoded, and recombined at their destination. Patent Owner’s example illustrates this: whether four people travel from Dallas to Washington, D.C. in one, two, three or four cars does not change the fact that each person retains their individual identity during the journey, just like the encoded tiles of Perlman during transmission. Whatever additional, unexplained requirements Patent Owner would attach to the term “independently” in this context has no reasonable basis.” slip op. at 24

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,649,426
  • PTAB · Sep 5, 2024 · IPR2023-01300 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). A decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition.” PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have possessed a strong understanding in the use and development of genetics and genomics approaches for detecting or monitoring human diseases, such as spatial detection of a target analyte (e.g., mRNA or DNA) in a tissue, and would typically have a Ph.D. in a relevant field (e.g., molecular biology, genetics, and bioinformatics) with two years of experience. Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 24–36). For the purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not provide its own proposed level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s unchallenged definition as it is consistent with the cited prior art and disclosure of the ’142 patent.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Thus, according to claim 1, to synthesize a first/second plurality of DNA products by performing a synthesis reaction, the “DNA products” must 1) use the oligonucleotides collected in steps (a) and (b) as templates from which the DNA is synthesized, and 2) incorporate a source location-identifying nucleic acid sequence.” slip op. at 20

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “(2) Analysis Neither party has offered a construction for “collecting oligonucleotides under conditions that release them” in claim 1. We note that, in the related litigation, the district court determined that “under conditions that release” should have its plain and ordinary meaning. Ex. 1052, 38. For purposes of institution, we also apply the plain and ordinary meaning of this claim phrase and do not need to expressly construe the claim phrase for purposes of institution. On this record, for the reasons explained by Petitioner and as supported by its declarant testimony, we conclude Petitioner has sufficiently shown that So-456 discloses the “collecting oligonucleotides under conditions that release them” limitation recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 42

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,473,142
  • PTAB · Aug 30, 2024 · IPR2022-01531 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–17, 20–21, 24–26, and 29–34 on all grounds stated in the Petition.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Director reviewOther

      “Petition did not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and did not institute inter partes review. Paper 17 (“Inst. Dec.”). Petitioner requested Director review of our decision denying institution (Paper 18 (“Request”)). The Director delegated review of the decision to a Delegated Rehearing Panel. Paper 19. Patent Owner was granted the option to file a response to Petitioner’s Request (Paper 22 (“Request Resp.”)). The Director Review Panel (“DRP”) vacated our decision and remanded the case to this panel with a revised construction for claim 1. Paper 23 (“DRP Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect (2018). Upon reconsideration of the briefing and the evidence of record in light of the DRP’s claim construction, we conclude that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we grant institution of inter partes review of claims 1–17, 20–21, 24–26, and 29–34 of the ’682 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “We find that Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in the prior consideration of Morales-Sanfrutos, Straus, Singh, and Lees. For instance, under the second prong of Advanced Bionics, we consider “(c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during “(e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art.” Becton, Dickinson, 17–18. We agree with Petitioner that the Office overlooked Morales- Sanfrutos’ and Singh’s teachings during examination and reexamination. Pet. 79. Although Morales-Sanfrutos, Straus, and Singh were listed on an IDS, they were not the subject of a rejection during examination or reexamination. Moreover, for the reasons discussed below at this stage with regard to Petitioner’s grounds over Morales-Sanfrutos, as evidenced by Straus, and over Singh, Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates that the Office materially erred in overlooking Morales-Sanfrutos’s and Singh’s teachings regarding their linker structures. Id. Further, to the extent the Lees’ teachings were considered during examination and reexamination, Lees’ disclosure of a homobifunctional sulfone linker was overlooked. Lees’ homobifunctional linker, which Patent Owner argues is substantially similar to Harris’ homobifunctional linker, which Petitioner chiefly relies upon in Grounds 2–5, was not the subject of a rejection during examination. Pet. Resp. Brief 1; Prelim. Resp. 25–26. We agree with Petitioner that only Lees’ heterobifunctional linker was applied in a rejection during examination. Pet. Resp. Brief 1; Ex. 1018, 42–43, 62. 4. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 27

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the information presented, we find that the asserted prior art itself is sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the (prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). To the extent a more precise definition is required, we apply Petitioner’s unopposed definition for purposes of determining whether to institute review because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,131,682
  • PTAB · Aug 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00901 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9, 11–19, and 21–24 on all petition grounds and granted fuboTV’s motion to join the Aylo IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Because the issues in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Aylo IPR, and for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the Aylo IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition. See Aylo IPR, Paper 8.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition is substantively identical to the petition in the Aylo IPR, contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and relies on the same declaration of Dr. Henry Houh. Mot., passim; Ex. 1003. Petitioner also represents that it “agrees to take an understudy role” so that “the parties can comply with the trial schedule assigned to the Instituted Aylo IPR without any duplicative efforts by the Board or the Patent Owner.” Mot. 7–8.” slip op. at 10

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,677,798
  • PTAB · Aug 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00904 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4–12, 14–19, 21–25, and 27–29 on all petitioned grounds, and granted fuboTV’s motion to join the Aylo IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least 1 claim of the ’680 patent. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4–12, 14–19, 21–25, and 27–29 of the ’680 patent. We also grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition is substantively identical to the petition in the Aylo IPR, contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and relies on the same declaration of Dr. Henry Houh. Mot., passim; Ex. 1003. Petitioner also represents that it “agrees to take an understudy role” so that “the parties can comply with the trial schedule assigned to the Instituted Aylo IPR without any duplicative efforts by the Board or the Patent Owner.” Mot. 7–8.” slip op. at 10

    None
    Patents in suitUS 10,951,680

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.