- Micron Technology, Inc. v. Katana Silicon Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 13, 2024 · IPR2023-00071 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3–5, 8, 11, 20–22, 27–29, 31, and 33 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations of prior art and skilled-artisan knowledge.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“On the fully developed record, we find that Petitioner’s construction, “a layer that adheres,” is more strongly supported by the evidence than Patent Owner’s construction, “a pre-formed layer that is adhered.” Our analysis begins with the claim language. The term “adhesion layer” appears in each of the ’806 patent’s independent claims, which include both method and device claims. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 13:44–63 (claim 1 directed to a “semiconductor device”); id. at 17:58–18:17 (claim 30 directed to a “method of manufacturing a semiconductor device”). Claim 1 recites “a first semiconductor chip having a first adhesion layer adhered to its back surface” and “a second semiconductor chip having a second adhesion layer adhered to its back surface.” Id. at 13:49–51, 13:54–56 (emphasis added). Claim 30 recites the steps of “forming a first insulating adhesion layer on a back surface of a first wafer” and “forming a second insulating adhesion layer on a back surface of a second wafer.” Id. at 17:60–62, 18:3–5 (emphases added). In the absence of contrary evidence, we must assume that the term “adhesion layer” has the same meaning in all claims of the ’806 patent. In re Varma, 816 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the principle that the same phrase in different claims of the same patent should have the same meaning is a strong one, overcome only if ‘it is clear’ that the same phrase has different meanings in different claims,” quoting Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). The language of claim 30 and similarly worded claims of the ’806 patent suggests strongly that an “adhesion layer” may be formed in situ on the back surface of a wafer and need not be pre-formed, as argued by Patent Owner. The testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Elenius, supports this interpretation. See Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 43, 50 (testifying that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would recognize that there are multiple methods of forming an ‘adhesion layer’ on the back surface of the semiconductor chip” and that “[p]astes and other adhesives, adhesive agents, adhesive layers or other material that are dispensed onto a substrate or chip back are formed into a layer over time as they harden through curing” (emphasis added)). Thus, the language of claims 30 and 31 does not support Patent Owner’s construction that the “adhesion layer” must be a pre-formed layer that is adhered. Cf. PO Resp. 22–25 (arguing for that construction).” slip op. at 17
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Citing testimony from Dr. Suhling, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the priority date of the ’806 patent would have had i) a bachelor-level degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, material science, or a related subject and five or more years of experience working in the field of semiconductor packaging; ii) a Master’s-level degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, material science, or a related field, and at least 1-3 years of experience in the design/development of semiconductor packages; or iii) a Ph.D.- level degree in mechanical engineering, material science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and at least some experience in the area of semiconductor packaging. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28–32). Petitioner further states that “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Elenius, states that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical, mechanical or materials engineering and two to three years of experience in the design or development of semiconductor manufacturing, or the equivalent.” Ex. 2014 ¶ 32. Mr. Elenius further states that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. For purposes of this Decision, we find no meaningful differences” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“3. Reasons to Combine Petitioner contends that it would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Ball’s teachings of stacking chips with Mostafazadeh’s process for applying adhesive to create individual chips with adhesive backsides. Pet. 28–29. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Ball and Mostafazadeh for several reasons, including to provide a more efficient manufacturing process for multichip modules and to simplify the stacking process. Pet. 28–31. Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine Mostafazadeh with Ball because there would have been no reasonable expectation of success and the combination would not have resulted in a functioning semiconductor device. PO Resp. 39. Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner’s combination of Ball and Mostafazadeh would fail for multiple reasons and that Mostafazadeh does not describe multi-chip stacked mounting. Id. at 39–52. Having considered the evidence and arguments, we determine that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner. Petitioner demonstrates persuasively that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reasons to combine Ball’s stacked multichip module with Mostafazadeh’s process for applying adhesive at the wafer stage and then dicing to create individual chips with adhesive backsides. Pet. 28–31. In particular, Petitioner shows that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered Mostafazadeh’s teaching of applying the adhesive to a wafer surface and then subsequently dicing the wafer in order to provide a more efficient manufacturing process for multichip modules and to simplify Ball’s process of stacking chips. Id.; see KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (stating that the “mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement” suggests obviousness). The teachings of both Ball and Mostafazadeh support Petitioner’s combination. Ball teaches a stacked multichip module using flip-chip and wire bond interconnections, where a lower chip is flip-chip connected to a substrate using metal bumps, and an upper chip is wire bond connected to the substrate. Ex. 1005, Abstract, 3:42–64, 4:58–59, 5:3–12, 5:18–20, 5:23– 27, Fig. 1. Ball teaches that the upper chip is attached to the lower chip in a back-to-back arrangement with a layer of adhesive applied over a back side of the lower chip. Id. Mostafazadeh teaches a method for applying integrated circuit dies to support surfaces. Ex. 1003, Abstract. In Mostafazadeh’s method, an adhesive coating is formed on a surface of a semiconductor wafer, the adhesive coating is dried, and the semiconductor wafer is diced to form integrated circuit dies, each having an adhesive layer on its mounting surface, i.e., its back surface. Id. at 3:5–11, 5:20–25, 7:9–11, 7:29–8:2, Fig. 2 (steps 104–110). A selected die is then attached to an associated support surface by placing the adhesive layer of the selected die in contact with the associated support surface. Id. at 3:11–13, 8:10–12, Fig. 2 (steps 112–118).” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner meets its burden of proof for claim element [3d]. Our finding is supported by Figure 1 of Ball, which depicts a second chip mounted to a first chip in a back-to-back arrangement. Ex. 1002 ¶ 158; Ex. 1005, Fig. 1. More particularly, Ball’s Figure 1 shows that back side 32 of upper die 12 (the claimed “second semiconductor chip”) is mounted to back side 30 of lower die 14 (the claimed “first semiconductor chip”) by adhesion layer 28. Ex. 1005, 5:18–20. Relying on Dr. Suhling’s testimony, Petitioner shows persuasively that “a circuit is formed on the front surface 34 of upper die 12 . . . , as evidenced by bonding pads 36 and wires 38 connecting the upper die’s circuitry to the wiring layer on substrate 16.” Pet. 41; Ex. 1002 ¶ 159. We credit Dr. Suhling’s unrebutted testimony that, “[b]ecause the circuitry is on the front side of upper die 12, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would know that the back surface adhesive layer is ‘where a circuit is not formed.’” Ex. 1002 ¶ 159. Patent Owner argues that, to meet claim elements [3b] and [3d], “a reference must show that an adhesion layer extends to cover the entire back surface of the second semiconductor chip where a circuit is not formed.” PO Resp. 30. We find no support in the claim language or other intrinsic evidence for Patent Owner’s argument. In our view, the phrase “back surface where a circuit is not formed” identifies the back side of the chip as opposed to the front side, where a circuit is formed. Ex. 1001, 14:26–27 (claim element [3d]). Our interpretation is supported by the claim language as a whole. Claim element [3b], for example, recites “a first semiconductor chip having a circuit forming on its front surface and an adhesion layer adhered to its back surface.” Id. at 14:17–19 (emphasis added). In this” slip op. at 47
Patent outcomesUS RE38,806 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Katana Silicon Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 13, 2024 · IPR2023-00072 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12–19, 23–26, 30, and 32 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Although the proposals for the level of skill in the art by the parties’ declarants have differences in wording, we find no meaningful differences between the parties’ respective definitions that would materially alter the outcome of this Decision. Nevertheless, based on our review of the ’806 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’806 patent, and cited prior art, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionGranted
“On the fully developed record, we find that Petitioner’s construction, “a layer that adheres,” is more strongly supported by the evidence than Patent Owner’s construction, “a pre-formed layer that is adhered.”” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner shows persuasively that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Mostafazadeh with Ball and Fogal. Pet. 32–33. The evidence discussed above concerning reasons to combine supports a reasonable expectation of success. We are also persuaded by Dr. Suhling’s testimony that the “combination of Ball, Fogal, and Mostafazadeh would require no modification of the multichip modules in Ball and Fogal: rather Mostafazadeh merely explains in more detail methods known in the art for creating chips with adhesive surfaces.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 239; see also id. ¶¶ 62– 69 (describing prior art methods for applying adhesive to the backside of a wafer). For the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of successfully combining Ball, Fogal, and Mostafazadeh.” slip op. at 46
- ExcludeOther
“We do not discuss or cite any of these exhibits in this Decision, or rely on any of them in reaching our determination that all of the challenged claims are unpatentable. Because their presence in the record would not affect our analysis in this Decision, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s motion with respect to these exhibits.” slip op. at 72
Patent outcomesUS RE38,806 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Katana Silicon Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 13, 2024 · IPR2023-00073 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 are unpatentable under §103: the Board found the asserted combinations taught the limitations, with motivation to combine and a reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The claim language, “forming” an “adhesion layer on a back surface,” suggests strongly that an “adhesion layer” may be formed in situ on the back surface of a wafer. The testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Elenius, supports this interpretation. See Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 43, 50 (testifying that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would recognize that there are multiple methods of forming an ‘adhesion layer’ on the back surface of the semiconductor chip” and that “[p]astes and other adhesives, adhesive agents, adhesive layers or other material that are dispensed onto a substrate or chip back are formed into a layer over time as they harden through curing” (emphasis added)). Thus, the language of the claims of the ʼ879 patent does not support Patent Owner’s construction that the “adhesion layer” must be a preformed layer that is adhered. Cf. PO Resp. 21–23 (arguing for that construction).” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we find no meaningful differences between the parties’ respective definitions that would materially alter the outcome of this Decision. Nevertheless, based on our review of the ’879 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’879 patent, and cited prior art, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Mostafazadeh, could overflow.” PO Resp. 41, 42 (citing Ex. 2014 ¶ 121). According to Patent Owner, the downward pressure during mounting “could cause adhesive to squeeze out.” Id. at 41. We find that Patent Owner’s argument and the corresponding testimony of Mr. Elenius are speculative and do not outweigh Petitioner’s evidence of obviousness. The overflow issue was recognized and addressed by Mostafazadeh. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, Mostafazadeh provides explicitly that its adhesive layer “covers an entire mounting surface 190 of the selected integrated circuit dies 182 and does not extend beyond a boundary of the mounting surface 190.” Ex. 1003, 10:6–9 (emphasis added). Additionally, Mostafazadeh teaches that when “the adhesive layer is rolled on, it is exactly the same size as the mounting surface and is quite even. Thus, when the die is attached to its supporting surface the adhesive does not extend beyond the mounting surface of the die.” Id. at 9:15–18. Further, Mostafazadeh teaches that its process avoids the adhesive jutting around the edges of the die. Id. at 2:26–28. These teachings support that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of successfully applying Mostafazadeh’s die attachment method to Ball’s multichip device while avoiding adhesive overflow. Next, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s combination would fail” slip op. at 40
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner. Petitioner demonstrates persuasively that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reasons to combine Ball’s stacked multichip module using flip-chip and wire bond connections with Mostafazadeh’s process for applying adhesive to create individual chips with adhesive backsides. Pet. 25–28. In particular, Petitioner shows that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered Mostafazadeh’s teaching of applying the adhesive to a wafer surface and then subsequently dicing the wafer in order to provide a more efficient manufacturing process for multichip modules and to simplify Ball’s process of stacking chips. Id.; see KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (stating that the “mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement” suggests obviousness). The teachings of both Ball and Mostafazadeh support Petitioner’s” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 6,352,879 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 6,352,879 - PTAB · May 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00084 · APJ Donna M Praiss · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been shown obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’484 patent, and we institute inter partes review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Guidance Memo 3 (footnote omitted) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). The Guidance Memo explains that such a Sotera stipulation “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB. . . . and allows the PTAB to review grounds that the parallel district court litigation will not resolve.” Id. at 7–8. Here, in an email to Patent Owner, Petitioner “stipulates that if the PTAB institutes IPR, Structural Wrap will not pursue in [the Florida Litigation] the same grounds asserted in the petition, or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Ex. 1022, 1.” slip op. at 12
- Adverse judgmentDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive because the cited discussion in the prosecution history does not relate to the challenged claims in this proceeding. Pages 25–26 of Exhibit 2008 correspond to the Declaration of Christopher Mouriz (“Mouriz Declaration”). The Mouriz Declaration relates to claim language that “recites attaching the construction material to a specific component of a roof, namely, the vertical, outward facing [fascias] of the eaves of the roof.” Ex. 2008, 25 ¶ 7. The Mouriz Declaration explains that “the roof component to which a waterproofing membrane is attached is not recognized as a particular parameter that can be experimented with, in order to increase or optimize the waterproofing process in a structural waterproofing system.” Id. at 26 ¶ 8. Thus, the claim language discussed in the Mouriz Declaration relates to attaching construction material specifically to “vertical, outward facing facias of the eaves of the roof.” Id. at 25 ¶ 7. There is no discussion of wrapping battens. Pages 40–41 of Exhibit 2008 correspond to a Response to Office Action wherein the applicant distinguishes the ’554 application claims over prior art references cited by the Examiner, namely, Lennox and Wiki. Ex. 2008, 40–41. The applicant argues that “neither Lennox nor Wiki discloses attaching the construction material that was rolled in the end of the strip to the vertical, outward-facing fascia of the eaves of the roof, as claimed by Applicant.” Ex. 2008, 41 (emphasis original). Again, the claim limitation at issue, which Patent Owner directs us to, relates to the location for attaching construction material, namely, vertical outward-facing fascia. We see no similar limitation in the challenged claims. We also note that Petitioner does not rely on Lennox and Wiki in this proceeding. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner should be estopped from arguing that the challenged claims of the ’484 patent are obvious based on arguments presented to the Office concerning claims and references that are not involved in this proceeding.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine we need not explicitly construe any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375. We encourage the parties to further discuss an express construction for “sheet” during trial if they choose.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,168,484 - PTAB · Apr 17, 2024 · IPR2024-00005 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 9 and 19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Gowanlock 2 combined with Swivelpole renders at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“District Court proceeding, and restate those positions here. See Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1057, Ex. 1058); Prelim. Resp. 5. Both parties agree, however, that construction of “mounting pole” is not necessary in this proceeding. Pet. 21; Prelim. Resp. 5. Accordingly, we need not construe this term at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in petroleum engineering, mechanical engineering, civil engineering, construction, architecture, or a similar degree with a year or more experience working on or around rigs, such as a drilling rig, where one or more lighting systems were used to illuminate the wellsite.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 39–40). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional practical experience would substitute for lack of a formal degree.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 41). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’626 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“As to motivation to combine the references, we find that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates a rational basis for a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Gowanlock 2 and Swivelpole. See Pet. 43– 51; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 89–96. Patent Owner’s argument that the combination “goes against the fundamental teachings of both references, neither of which disclose a crown deck” (Prelim. Resp. 50) is not persuasive, because as discussed above, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Gowanlock 2 discloses a crown deck. We do not agree that Swivelpole’s disclosure is limited to a lighting system for illuminating the area immediately beneath the light, and nothing beyond its adjacent walkway. See id. at 50–51. For example, Swivelpole’s description of its S3 system also states it is ideal for lighting roof tops. Ex. 1004, 9. Because Patent Owner’s argument does not reasonably credit the ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art to interpret Swivelpole’s disclosure as a whole, we do not find it persuasive.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“We find that Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in failing to consider the teachings of the prior art of record. Under the second prong of Advanced Bionics, we consider “the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection.” Becton, Dickinson, 17. Here, Petitioner has shown that during prosecution of the ’626 patent, the Examiner immediately allowed claims 21–33 and 35–39 of the application without rejection, in the first office action dated November 25, 2020. Ex. 1002, 34–35. The reasons for allowance set forth in the office action merely recite the limitations of claims 21 and 31, and state “the references of the Prior Art of record fail to teach or suggest the combination of the limitations as set forth in claim [21 and 31].” Id. Upon issuance, claims 21 and 31 became claims 9 and 19 of the ’626 patent, respectively. In view of the Examiner’s statement in the reasons for allowance of claims 9 and 19, we determine the Examiner erred by failing to consider the prior art of record. As discussed above with regard to the patentability challenges to claims 9 and 19 (see Section II.D.4), we find that Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that the combination of Gowanlock 2 and Swivelpole discloses the subject matter found allowable by the Examiner. Accordingly, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in a manner material to patentability by overlooking the teachings of Gowanlock 2 and Swivelpole. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d). IV.” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,900,626 - Sma Solar Technology America, LLC v. Tigo Energy, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 2, 2024 · IPR2023-01175 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied SMA’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1–20 because the request showed no overlooked matter, misapplication of law, or abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Rule 42.71(d) states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, a reply, or a sur-reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence or merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence. Moreover, “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“patent claim requires a finding that the claim at issue ‘reads on’ a prior art reference.”). Our Institution Decision analyzed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, and determined that Petitioner provided no persuasive argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Mieth’s load 20 is a micro-controller—i.e., that the claimed micro-controller reads onto Mieth’s load 20. Inst. Dec. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1014, 1180, Fig. 5; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 102–103). The Request, as did the Petition, misapplies the anticipation analysis by arguing that a micro-controller is a load, rather than persuasively arguing that Mieth’s load is the claimed micro-controller. Id. at 10–12; Req. 8. None of Petitioner’s evidence or arguments explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that load 20 disclosed in Mieth is a micro-controller. As such, Petitioner has not shown any material error in our decision that Petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of anticipation by Mieth.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“reads on the micro-controller recited in the claims of the ’848 patent” (Req. 6), the test for anticipation is not whether the prior art reads on the claims, but rather whether the claims read on the prior art. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Anticipation of a patent claim requires a finding that the claim at issue ‘reads on’ a prior art reference.”). Our Institution Decision analyzed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, and determined that Petitioner provided no persuasive argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Mieth’s load 20 is a micro-controller—i.e., that the claimed micro-controller reads onto Mieth’s load 20. Inst. Dec. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1014, 1180, Fig. 5; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 102–103). The Request, as did the Petition, misapplies the anticipation analysis by arguing that a micro-controller is a load, rather than persuasively arguing that Mieth’s load is the claimed micro-controller. Id. at 10–12; Req. 8. None of Petitioner’s evidence or arguments explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that load 20 disclosed in Mieth is a micro-controller. As such, Petitioner has not shown any material error in our decision that Petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of anticipation by Mieth. slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“D. Petitioner’s Section 103 Argument Petitioner argues throughout the Request that Mieth also discloses the “micro-controller” limitation under 35 U.SC. § 103. See Req. 7, 9–11, 13– 15. As explained above, however, the Request does not identify any matters that the Board misapprehended or overlooked. We addressed Petitioner’s obviousness arguments in our Institution Decision, and determined that those arguments failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on its arguments that Mieth and Balogh, or Mieth, Balogh, and Liu, teach or suggest the claimed “micro-controller” limitation. Inst. Dec. 13–15.” slip op. at 8
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,966,848 - The Noco Company, Inc. v. Pilot, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 6, 2024 · IPR2022-01417 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–27 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 5–12 and 13, 14, 17–19, 22–24, 27 are anticipated; the remaining claims are obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “a Bachelor’s Degree in a relevant engineering discipline such as electrical engineering and at least two years of relevant experience in the design and/or development of automotive electrical systems, or a Masters or more advanced degree in a relevant engineering discipline such as electrical engineering.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 46). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition or offer its own. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’236 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’236 patent and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “[a]ll of the claim terms are given their plain meaning, as understood by the [person of ordinary skill in the art], unless indicated otherwise.” Pet. 9. After considering the arguments and information Petitioner presents, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any terms for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“with Petitioner that the ’236 patent is not entitled to the 2014 priority date of the original application, or any date earlier than April 21, 2021, which is the filing date of the ’236 patent. Whether the Specification complies with the written description requirement calls for a comparison of the scope of the claim with the scope of the description to determine whether the inventor has demonstrated possession of the claimed invention. See Ariad, 598 F.3d 1336 at 1353; Power Oasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The independent claims of the ’236 patent each require (1) a load detection sensor “configured to detect presence of a vehicle battery” and (2) a reverse polarity sensor “configured to detect polarity of a vehicle battery.” Ex. 1001, 5:16–27 (claim 1), 6:7–22 (claim 13), 6:65–7:13 (claim 18), 8:1– 15 (claim 23). The Specification of the ’236 patent does not expressly disclose both a load detection sensor and reverse polarity sensor configured to perform the recited functions. Instead, the Specification identifies a single circuit, the “automatic detection module,” that “can automatically detect[] whether the load is detected” and “whether the electrode is connected with the automobile storage battery reversely.” Ex. 1001, 2:51–54. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that the disclosure of a single circuit capable of performing two functions does not demonstrate the inventors had possession of an invention that requires two separate sensors configured to perform separate functions as recited in the claims. See Ariad, 598 F.3d 1336 at 1352 (“[A] description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the [written description] requirement.”); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that “the disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue,” but that “one skilled in the art, reading the original disclosure, must immediately discern the limitation at issue in the claims”); cf. PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 1235, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding a claim for a method involving sequential application of two chemicals was invalid for lack of adequate written description where the specification indicated that the invention was a method of applying a “composition” containing the two chemicals). For all of the foregoing reasons, we agree with Petitioner that the Specification of the ’236 patent does not provide adequate written description support for distinct “load detection” and “reverse polarity” sensors, and, therefore, the challenged claims are not entitled to a priority date earlier than April 21, 2021, the filing date of the ʼ236 patent.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“demonstrating that Nook-015 discloses the limitations in claim 1. After reviewing the undisputed evidence and arguments Petitioner presents in the Petition regarding claim 1, we agree, for the reasons stated by Petitioner and supported by Dr. Wood’s testimony, that Nook-015 discloses an internal power supply, output port, load detection sensor, reverse polarity sensor, power switch, and microcontroller, all connected and configured as claim 1 requires. Ex. 1004, 3:17–26, 3:67–4:2, 4:20–38, 5:35–37, 5:50–54, 8:4–37; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78–79; Pet. 25–29. b. Claims 2 and 5–12 Claims 2 and 5–12 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1. Petitioner directs us to portions of Nook-015 that disclose the additional limitations in these claims. Pet. 29–33. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s arguments or evidence regarding these dependent claims. For the reasons stated by Petitioner and supported by Dr. Wood’s testimony, we agree that Nook-015 discloses the limitations recited in these claims, as discussed below.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 11,104,236 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,104,236 - Imiracle HK Limited v. VPR Brands, LPInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 25, 2024 · IPR2023-01255 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 13–15 were unpatentable over Tao, Yang and Tao, or Wang411.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we deny the Petition and do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“A. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of Claims 12, 17, and 18 As indicated above, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 12, 17, and 18 of the ’622 patent. See Ex. 2002. In view of Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer, we treat claims 12, 17, and 18 as having never been part of the ’622 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because inter partes review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, we do not consider claims 12, 17, and 18 to be within the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 13–15, the challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or biomedical engineering or related fields, along with at least five years of experience designing electromechanical devices, including those involving circuits, electroacoustics, fluid mechanics and heat transfer.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 45–47). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner neither responds to Petitioner’s proposed definition, nor provides a definition of its own. See generally, Prelim. Resp. Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’622 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), revised 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 effective March 16, 2013. Because the ’622 patent has an effective filing date before March 16, 2013 (Ex. 1001, codes (22), (30)), we refer to the pre-AIA version of Sections 102 and 103. 2 Tao, CN 201051862Y, published April 30, 2008. (Ex. 1006 (English translation); Ex. 1007 (translation certificate); Ex. 1008 (original Chinese)). 3 Yang, CN 201029436Y, published March 5, 2008 (Ex. 1009 (English translation); Ex. 1010 (original Chinese); Ex. 1011 (translation certificate)). 4 Wang, WO 2008/139411 A2, published Nov. 20, 2008 (“Wang411,” Ex. 1012). required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that the claim terms “electric airflow sensor,” “time period and a magnitude of the electric current,” and “diaphragm microphone” should be construed in accordance with constructions stipulated to by Patent Owner in litigation in the District of Arizona (“stipulated constructions”). Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1005; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 49–51). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions, and further contends that the terms “Single Chip Micyoco” and “instructs” should also be construed consistent with the stipulated constructions. Prelim. Resp. 6. Based on the parties’ apparent agreement, and considering the record before us, we adopt the stipulated constructions provided below for purposes of this Decision. See Ex. 1005 (stipulated claim construction in the District of Arizona litigation). an electric sensor to detect air movement generated by a user’s inhaling or puffing act “time period and a magnitude of the the duration of time and the strength electric current” of the current that is provided to the heating element “diaphragm microphone” a device for converting pressure waves into electrical energy using a thin sheet of material that is capable of vibrating “Single Chip Micyoco” a microcontroller including a processor, software instructions to be executed by the processor, memory, and I/O processed by the processor “instructs” provides a signal that tells the power supply to provide or not provide electricity to the inhaler and atomizer Ex. 1005, 1–2.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,205,622 - PTAB · Jan 24, 2024 · IPR2023-01184 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2–4, 6–8, 15–16, and 18–19 are unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateOther
“Although Petitioner has asserted the absence of specific supporting disclosure for claims 1, 15, and 18 from the ’780, ’317, and ’977 applications and the ’155, ’587, ’601, ’977, and ’753 provisional applications, the burden to show an effective filing date (or dates) of the challenged claims prior to April 22, 2010 falls on Patent Owner here because Petitioner has asserted prior art references with earlier effective dates. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (In an inter partes review, “a patentee bears the burden of establishing that its claimed invention is entitled to an earlier priority date than an asserted prior art reference.”). An earlier effective filing date is not presumed because, as shown in the above figure, the ’783 application is a continuation-in-part to each of the ’780, ’317, and ’977 applications that have filing dates earlier than April 22, 2010. See PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When neither the PTO nor the Board has previously considered priority, there is simply no reason to presume that claims in a [continuation-in-part] application are entitled to the effective filing date of an earlier filed application.”). On this record, and in the absence of the development of any contrary argument, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently for institution that each of the asserted references are prior art to the challenged claims. The parties will have an opportunity to present their positions on the issue of the effective filing date of the challenged claims further during trial.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“of Kronberg, discloses or suggests all of the elements of claim 6. Pet. 28–34 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 107–148). More particularly, Petitioner argues that Adest discloses the limitations of claims 6, but to the extent there is a dispute that Adest discloses the “watchdog unit” limitation [6A], a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the watchdog apparatus taught by Kronberg with the solar power system taught by Adest to monitor communications between signal mechanism 420 and power modules 405 of Adest. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 127). Petitioner further argues that the watchdog taught by Kronberg was a well-known technique for detecting malfunctions at the time of the invention, and would have been one of a number of solutions for detecting the absence of a periodic signal. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 128–129; Ex. 1009, 1269). Petitioner further argues that Kronberg “suggests that its watchdog apparatus is to be used to provide ‘automatic shutdown of critical devices in case of failure,’” consistent with Adest’s objective of shutting down a power generating facility when a transmitter fails to send a communication because of, for example, a fire or theft of a photovoltaic module. Id. at 32–33 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:12–15; Ex. 1005, 7:6–12).” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“The limitation “means to poll the central controller to determine if an interruption of the communication is transient” presumptively invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Claims subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 are construed in a “two-step process,” whereby we “first identify the claimed function,” and then “determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Id. at 1351. Accordingly, our rules require that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Further, “the corresponding structure for a § 112 ¶ 6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in the specification” Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Federal Circuit precedent requires disclosure of an algorithm in the specification for any computer-implemented function beyond “basic functions of a microprocessor.” See EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A microprocessor or general purpose computer lends sufficient structure only to basic functions of a microprocessor. All other computer implemented functions require disclosure of an algorithm.”). Petitioner does not identify any portion of the ’218 patent specification that describes corresponding structure for performing the claimed function of “poll[ing] the central controller to determine if an interruption of the communication is transient.” See Pet. 39. Accordingly, Petitioner has not identified sufficient corresponding structure for performing the function of this presumptive means-plus-function limitation.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,823,218 - Sma Solar Technology America, LLC v. Tigo Energy, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 22, 2024 · IPR2023-01175 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Mieth, alone or in the asserted combinations, disclosed or suggested the claimed micro-controller.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we decline to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, claim terms are afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. The “ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or a similar discipline and at least two years of design experience with circuit design.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 31). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s definition because it excludes “individuals with higher education and less experience.” Prelim. Resp. 7. However, Patent Owner does not argue that the level of ordinary skill in the art impacts the analysis. See id.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to show Mieth expressly discloses the claimed micro-controller. Petitioner relies on Mieth’s load 20 (Pet. 23, 50), but Patent Owner correctly observes that (citing Ex. 1002, 1:19–21, 1:23–28, 2:1–15, 4:25–27, 8:8–9, 8:20–23, 8:29– 33). We also agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to show Mieth inherently discloses the claimed micro-controller. Petitioner argues that a “PHOSITA would understand that a load in a circuit can be or include a micro-controller” and “the load 20 is analogous to the claimed micro-controller.” Pet. 23. Petitioner’s argument itself, however, as noted by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 9), admits that load 20 is not “necessarily” a micro-controller, and that load 20 does not “necessarily” include a micro-controller. Continental Can Co., U.S.A. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268–69 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”); see also Pet. 50 (discussing, in the context of claim limitation [10E], “load 20 (micro-controller))” (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 163).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,966,848
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.