- CQV Co., Ltd. v. Merck Patent GmbHNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · PGR2021-00054 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · PGR · Remand
Claims 1–22 were not shown unpatentable because Sample C was not proven publicly available as prior art, and the original decision found the remaining grounds insufficient.
RulingsRemand decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s evidence in Kuntz (Ex. 1026), the Annual Report (Ex. 1028), Masuko (Ex. 1029), and Pfaff (Ex. 1034) is insufficient to show that Xirallic® Sample C was available to the public before the effective filing date of the ’861 patent. Petitioner has not asserted, nor do we find, that any of these documents refer to or describe the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken. See Final Dec. 26. Kuntz, the Annual Report, Masuko, and Pfaff may support a finding that the Xirallic® line of products was available to the public, but these documents do not support a finding that the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken was available to the public. We also agree with Patent Owner that the Technical Data Sheets (Exs. 1005–1010), Certificates of Analysis (Exs. 1011–1017), and Material Safety Data Sheet (Ex. 1025) are insufficient to show that Xirallic® Sample C was available to the public. Petitioner has not asserted, nor do we find, that any of these documents refer to or describe the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken. See Final Dec. 26–27. Regardless of how the Technical Data Sheets were used in the Opposition against the European counterpart of the ’861 patent (Exs. 1040, 1041) and during the prosecution of the application from which the ’861 patent issued (Ex. 1003, 102–104), the Technical Data Sheets do not refer to or describe the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken. Moreover, as noted by Patent Owner, the Technical Data Sheets (Exs. 1005–1010) indicate that they are “preliminary” and Petitioner has not provided any evidence that the Technical Data Sheets were ever issued to the public, as opposed to just issued internally. See PO Resp. 18–19. We also find persuasive Patent Owner’s argument that the Technical Data Sheets are preliminary because other, later-dated technical data sheets (Exs. 2012, 2013) lack the “preliminary” label and list characteristics that are different from those in Exhibits 1005–1010. See PO Resp. 19 (comparing, e.g., Ex. 1009 and Ex. 2013; Ex. 1005 and Ex. 2012). The Technical Data Sheets may support a finding that the Xirallic® products they describe existed as of the dates on the documents, but they do not support a finding that the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken was available to the public.” slip op. at 20
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedOther
“witnesses. See Elbit Systems of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Illumina, Inc., 620 F. App’x 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856 (1982)). We have reviewed the witness testimony in the record and, more particularly, Mr. Choi’s deposition answers regarding Petitioner’s purchase of the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C came. We find that Mr. Choi’s responses cast doubt on the credibility of his declaration testimony, namely with regard to the public availability of Sample C. Mr. Choi represented that he was involved in the purchase of the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken. Ex. 2011, 48:1–23. Mr. Choi stated that he instructed Petitioner’s marketing team manager to buy the sample from a distributor of Patent Owner’s products located in Europe. Id. at 48:24–49:4. Mr. Choi stated that he has evidence of the transaction, but refused to reveal the name of the company from which Petitioner purportedly purchased the lot of Xirallic® (id. at 49:5–50:3) and refused to produce an email in his possession that would corroborate his testimony regarding Petitioner’s acquisition of the product (id. at 50:8–16, 51:10–23). Mr. Choi represented that he does not remember how much Petitioner paid for Sample B. Id. at 56:4–5. Mr. Choi admitted that the entity from which Petitioner acquired the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken is “not currently a Merck distributor” (Ex. 2011, 50:4–7) and was not “a Merck distributor at the time” that “samples B and C were purchased” (id. at 51:25–52:2). According to Mr. Choi, the company is a “former distributor” of Patent Owner’s products. Id. at 52:3–6. Mr. Choi did not know, according to his testimony, when that unnamed entity first obtained the lot of Xirallic® (id. at 52:7–10) and he stated that he did not have personal knowledge of how the entity obtained the lot of Xirallic® (id. at 52:12–19). Instead, Mr. Choi assumed the entity was “able to obtain the sample through the routine course or process” the entity uses “to take samples or get samples.” Id. at 52:12–19. Mr. Choi believed the sample of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken was sealed when Petitioner received it because samples from dealers are sealed, and he remembered observing that the package was from a dealer. Id. at 52:24– 54:25. However, Mr. Choi admitted that he did not obtain a technical data sheet or certificate of analysis for the lot of Xirallic® from which Samples B and C were taken. Id. at 59:6–11. Mr. Choi also answered questions regarding Petitioner’s purchase of Samples D and H. Ex. 2011, 62:20–66:8, 67:7–9, 73:12–13, 73:17–22. Similar to his testimony regarding Samples B and C, Mr. Choi admitted withholding an email regarding the purchase of the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample D was taken. Id. at 62:20–63:9. Mr. Choi also admitted that he did not know how Akzo USA or Axalta obtained the Xirallic® the companies sold to him, and admitted that Akzo USA was not a distributor of Patent Owner’s products at the time Petitioner purchased the product. Id. at 63:10–66:8, 73:17–22. Mr. Choi also admitted that Petitioner did not pay Akzo USA for the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample D was taken, and did not pay Axalta for the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample H was taken. Id. at 67:7–9, 73:12–13. Although Petitioner presents declaration testimony from Mr. Choi representing that he purchased the lot of Xirallic® from which Samples B and C were taken in October 2011 (Ex. 1004 ¶ 16), Mr. Choi’s declaration testimony lacks corroborating evidence, and his deposition testimony does not support that the product was available to the public, as we found in our Final Written Decision. See Final Dec. 27–28. Notably, Petitioner produced corroborating evidence for Mr. Choi’s acquisition of Samples A, H, and I. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 13 (citing Ex. 1047), 18 (citing Exs. 1024, 1025). However, Mr. Choi withheld similar evidence for the Xirallic® lots from which Samples B, C, and D were taken. See Ex. 2011, 50:8–16, 51:10–23, 62:20– 63:9; Final Dec. 28. As Patent Owner argues, there is “no information to determine when a contract was established, that there was consideration for the exchange, that the product was available to be delivered when the alleged transaction took place, or even when the product was delivered. Choi has no memory of what was paid for the product.” Sur-Reply 24–25; see also PO Resp. 13–14; PO Br. Rem. 2–4.” slip op. at 34
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Based on the evidence discussed above, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Sample C was available to the public. Regardless of whether a company avoids wasting shelf life of its products (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 15–16), there is no persuasive evidence in the record showing that the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken was released from quality control and then made available to the public by Patent Owner. Mr. Choi’s testimony shows that Petitioner obtained the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken in an atypical manner (i.e., not from Patent Owner or one of Patent Owner’s current distributors) (Ex. 2011, 49:5–50:7, 50:8–16, 51:10–23, 51:25–52:6, 52:12– 19), and there is no evidence in the record to show that the lot of Xirallic® was intended for sale, rather than for experimental use only or for some other restricted use. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Sample C qualifies as prior art against the ’861 patent, and we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the ’861 patent is unpatentable over the grounds relying on Sample C.” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 10,647,861 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,647,861 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01463 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“predict how the district court in the related district court litigation will proceed because the court may determine whether or not to stay any individual case . . . based on a variety of circumstances and facts beyond our control and to which the Board is not privy.” Sand Revolution II LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp., IPR2019-01393, Paper 24, 7 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative). We decline to speculate on how the court may rule on the pending motion to stay. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. We decline to deny the Petition on a discretionary basis as requested by Patent Owner. Thus, for reasons explained below, we institute inter partes review of claims 1–10 of the ’706 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“TC(220), and ΔRz/Ra are result effective variables and that copper foils having ΔPD, TC(220), and ΔRz/Ra values that meet the values recited in claim 1 have advantageous properties. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 45 (Kim ’761, disclosing that preferably the “difference in peak count roughness Rpc between the shiny surface . . . and the matte surface . . . of the electrolytic copper foil . . . is preferably 60 or less” because “when the difference in the peak count roughness Rpc exceeds 60 capacity maintenance of the secondary battery is deteriorated.”);15 Ex. 1007, 3:16–23, 4:14–23 (Cheng, disclosing that the foils of Cheng’s invention have (220) and (311) surfaces that provide increased elongation and that solve a high roughness problem that rendered traditional products unsuitable for use in a lithium ion secondary battery), 10:27–34 (Cheng, disclosing that in the foils of Cheng’s invention “the roughness difference between both sides was extremely small” and thus “it was . . . not easy for the electrolytic copper foil to break or fracture during the charging-discharging cycles and the life of a battery is thus increased”), Tables 3 & 4 (Cheng, disclosing embodiments and comparative examples with TC(220) values meeting the requirements of claim 1); Ex. 1008, 6:36–44 (Wolski, disclosing that “the surface roughness Rz at the matte side of the untreated copper foil of the present invention is the same or smaller than the surface roughness Rz at the shiny side . . . so that the surface treated copper foil . . . becomes more low-profiled . . . whereby it becomes a foil having a large etching factor”), 9:1–29 & Table 2 (Wolski, disclosing 15 Dr. Randall testifies that “Kim ’761’s peak count roughness Rpc corresponds to the peak density PD of the ’706 patent.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 52. At this stage in the proceeding, this testimony is unrebutted. 38 embodiments meeting the ΔRz/Ra of claim 1, describing them as having “matte side roughnesses” that are “sufficiently small,” and as having “excellent” “high temperature elongation characteristics”), 11:37–41 (Wolski, describing comparative examples as having “large” matte side roughnesses “whereby etching factors are not good”), 12:12–27 (Wolski, teaching that “as compared with a conventional untreated copper foil, both surfaces of the untreated copper foil obtained by [Wolski’s] invention are flat” resulting in a low profile foil that has “excellent elongations at room temperature and high temperature and also high tensile strength”). The teachings in the prior art support the presently unrebutted testimony of Dr. Randall explaining why the POSA would have been motivated to modify Kim ’761’s copper foil to have the claimed TC(220) and ΔRz/Ra. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–68, 71–74; Pfizer Inc., v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 94 F.4th 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Where [a gap in prior art] includes a parameter not necessarily disclosed in the prior art, it is not improper to consider whether or not it would have been recognized as result-effective. If so, then the optimization of that parameter is ‘normally obvious.’”). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner failed to articulate a sufficient motivation to combine the references. To the contrary, the preliminary record presents a strong showing that the POSA would have been motivated to combine the references in the manner described in the Petition.” slip op. at 38
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 4 (“For purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art”). Petitioner’s definition appears to be consistent with the field of the invention reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’706 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,591,706 - Solus Advanced Materials Co., Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01462 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“experience working on the development of materials or components for electronic devices such as batteries.” Pet. 2. Petitioner further contends that “[a]dditional education, such as a graduate degree, could compensate for less work experience, and additional work experience could compensate for less formal education.” Id. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’014 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). in this proceeding.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner contends that “[t]he Board need not construe any term in order to determine that institution should be denied.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Hanafusa in light of Dobashi with a reasonable expectation of success as Petitioner contends. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertion that the subject matter of claim 1, and claims 4 and 8 that depend therefrom, would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Hanafusa and Dobashi.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner also focuses on Hanafusa’s teaching that all known methods can be used to make a rough surface low-profile, and Dobashi’s teaching that RSm can be used as an indicator for judgment of the surface, to support its contention that a POSITA would have been motivated to apply Dobashi’s RSm to further achieve Hanafusa’s purpose, without explaining how and why that would be the case. In particular, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Josefowicz adequately explain why a POSITA looking for ways to make Hanafusa’s surface roughness low-profile would look to methods to achieve as the period of waviness, RSm can also be used as an indicator for judgment of the surface.” Ex. 1005, 2:66–3:1, 6:23–26. Dobashi explains that waviness is “an indicator for determining whether the fine pattern forming performance is good or bad,” and “[t]he surface has small waviness and is smooth when RSm is large, and the surface has large waviness and is rough when RSm is small.” Id. at 3:1–3, 6:27–29. Dobashi also teaches that surface roughness Rzjis is used as a low-profile indicator. Ex. 1005, 2:66– 3:1. Dobashi, therefore, teaches that RSm is an indicator of surface waviness, which Dobashi explains is different than surface roughness. Id. at 2:66–3:3, 6:23–29. Given these teachings in Dobashi, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Josefowicz sufficiently explains how or why a POSITA would have been motivated to implement Dobashi’s RSm values to make Hanafusa’s surface roughness low-profile. See Pet. 10–12; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–52.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,346,014 - Solus Advanced Materials Co, Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01460 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–11 because the Fintiv factors, including the early trial date and close merits case, favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“whether to institute an inter partes review. Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not institute an inter partes review unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Institution of inter partes review, however, is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons stated below, we exercise our discretion not to institute an inter partes review. A. Real Parties-in-Interest” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“Board’s projected statutory deadline to issue a final written decision. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 9. “If the court’s trial date is at or around the same time as the projected statutory deadline . . . the decision whether to institute will likely implicate other factors.” Id. Conversely, “[i]f the court’s trial date is earlier than the projected statutory deadline,” this has generally weighed “in favor of exercising authority to deny institution.” Id.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same art and arguments were before the Examiner during prosecution and Petitioner’s has not demonstrated that the Examiner erred in a material manner when allowing the claims. Pet. 17–18. Given our discretionary denial of the Petition in view of the Fintiv factors, we do not address Petitioner’s further arguments with respect to § 325(d).” slip op. at 32
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s recited level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 4. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the prior art of record, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan for purposes of this decision as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,480,090 - Sterlite Technologies Inc. v. Afl Telecommunications, LLC.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00127 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4, 8, or 13 were unpatentable over either proposed obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over the proposed prior art. We analyze the asserted grounds with the above-noted principles in mind.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art As noted above, resolving the question of obviousness requires determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Here, however, as Patent Owner observes (Prelim. Resp. 10), 8 Patent Owner does not present arguments or evidence of secondary considerations in its Preliminary Response. Therefore, secondary considerations do not constitute part of our analysis herein. Petitioner has provided no assessment as to the level of ordinary skill to be considered in evaluating the grounds of obviousness that are advanced by Petitioner. The absence of such assessment calls into question the fundamental adequacy of Petitioner in carrying its burden to show a reasonable likelihood of success of unpatentability of the challenged claims that necessarily must take into account the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In any event, we do not discern that there is any apparent dispute between the parties as to the meaning of any claim term. In considering the record at hand, we determine that it is unnecessary to make explicit, or further address, any claim term in deciding whether or not to institute trial. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the 9 Throughout their briefings, the parties refer to the limitations designated [1.1] through [1.7] using the term “element,” e.g., “element [1.7]” (see, e.g., Pet. 23; Prelim. Resp. 23). For consistency with the parties’ chosen nomenclature, we do the same in this Decision. controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“A POSITA would have been motivated to modify Summers’ fiber optic cable 50 to include Kaji’s intermittently-fixed optical fiber tape 2A to obtain the predictable result of enabling a higher density of optical fibers to be packed in Summers’ fiber optic cable 50, as contemplated by Kaji. *** a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success because such modification would amount to nothing more than a simple substitution of Summers’ four-fiber ribbons 52 with Kaji’s intermittently-fixed optical fiber tape 2A by known methods of cable manufacturing. ***” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,287,591 - Innoscience (Zhuhai) Technology Company, Ltd. / Innoscience America, Inc. v. Efficient Power Conversion CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 25, 2025 · IPR2023-01382 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 were not shown unpatentable under any of five § 103 grounds because Petitioner failed to establish sufficient motivation to modify or combine the prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“A petition must identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) Here, Petitioner merely provides general assertions about multiple references, without clearly identifying how, or why a POSITA would have been motivated, to modify the processes disclosed in those references to arrive at the claimed invention. Thus, the Petition does not state with particularity that Saxler’s particular technique for etching is to be used instead of Beach’s etching step when substituting Beach’s self-aligned process for Saxler’s two mask process. Nor does the Petitioner provide a sufficient reason, absent hindsight, why a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the references to result in a process that forms Saxler’s Modified Figure 1A. Thus, for these additional reasons, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Saxler, Beach, and Shenoy.” slip op. at 34
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Both parties agree that the differences between the definitions do not impact the analysis. Resp. 11; Reply 2. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’347 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’347 patent and the prior art. We also note that our Decision would be the same under either parties’ definition.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyOther
“Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Shealy states that he understands paragraph 52 to mean that it is “fair game to pull the recess out of any of those figures [Figures 1A through 6].” Ex. 2004, 39:12–21. Dr. Shealy, however, also clarifies that “[a]s I said before, I think you could take all the embodiments and bring in which ones you want, depending on what you’re trying to accomplish.” Ex. 2004, 40:24–41:1. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that Dr. Shealy’s “statement to modify the reference depending on what you're trying to accomplish” means that “a POSITA may modify with reason to do so. A POSITA would have removed Saxler’s recess to obtain the benefits of enhancement-mode.” Tr. 19:19–25. Again, the Petition does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have removed Saxler’s gate recess.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“remove the recess in Saxler Figure 1A to arrive at the allegedly enhancement mode transistor of Modified Figure 1A. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions in its Reply and at the hearing, the Petition makes no argument that a POSITA would have removed the recess from Saxler Figure 1A to realize the benefits of an enhancement mode transistor. See Reply 4–5; Pet. 24–68. Rather, the Petition merely asserts that a POSITA would have understood that the gate recess of Figure 1A is optional without providing any persuasive reason why a POSITA would have removed the gate recess but retained the sloped sidewalls of Figure 1A. Pet. 25, 40, 45. For example, Petitioner asserts that Saxler’s gate contact may be “recessed or non-recessed” and that when the gate recess shown in Figure 1A is not utilized, Saxler would have the structure of Saxler Modified Figure 1A. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 81; Ex. 1007 ¶ 52, 66); see also Pet. 40, 45 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 52). Neither of these paragraphs provide sufficient motivation to a POSITA to remove the gate recess from Saxler Figure 1A. Saxler paragraph 52 states: Exemplary devices according to some embodiments of the present invention are schematically illustrated in FIGS. 1A through 6. Thus, while embodiments of the present invention are described herein with reference to a recessed gate structure or a non-recessed gate structure, other embodiments of the present invention may include or not include a gate recess. Accordingly, embodiments of the present invention should not be construed as limited to the particular exemplary embodiments described herein but may include any suitable structure having a cap layer and/or passivation layer as described herein. Ex. 1007 ¶ 52. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Shealy states that he understands paragraph 52 to mean that it is “fair game to pull the recess out of any of those figures [Figures 1A through 6].” Ex. 2004, 39:12–21. Dr. Shealy, however, also clarifies that “[a]s I said before, I think you could take all the embodiments and bring in which ones you want, depending on what you’re trying to accomplish.” Ex. 2004, 40:24–41:1. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that Dr. Shealy’s “statement to modify the reference depending on what you're trying to accomplish” means that “a POSITA may modify with reason to do so. A POSITA would have removed Saxler’s recess to obtain the benefits of enhancement-mode.” Tr. 19:19–25. Again, the Petition does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have removed Saxler’s gate recess.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 9,748,347 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,748,347 - Innoscience (Zhuhai) Technology Company, Ltd. / Innoscience America, Inc. v. Efficient Power Conversion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 25, 2025 · IPR2023-01384 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over Yoshida and Saxler; the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“In light of the record before us, we determine that we do not need to reach a specific finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“In the Institution Decision, we declined to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of the “side surfaces” limitation and determined that it was not necessary to further construe this term because “[t]he parties do not dispute that the language ‘side surfaces extending horizontally’ encompasses a gate material with sloped side surfaces as depicted in Figure 5 of the ’335 patent.” Inst. Dec. 11–16 (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). We invited the parties to address this limitation further during the course of this trial, but neither party provided additional evidence or argument regarding the “side surfaces” limitation. Inst. Dec. 16; see generally PO Resp.; Reply; Sur-reply. Accordingly, we maintain our determination from the Institution Decision that we do not need to construe the “side surfaces” limitation. Inst. Dec. 15– 16.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“This evidence, particularly the language in the ’335 patent itself, undermines Patent Owner’s argument that “[t]he process for forming gate ledges using separate masks instead of the self-aligned process disclosed in the ’335 patent cannot produce ledges that are ‘substantially symmetric.’” PO Resp. 39 (emphasis added); see also PO Resp. 42–43 (arguing that a gate structure with ledges having substantially equal widths is “not achievable” without using a single photo-mask process). We have considered the evidence presented by Patent Owner and Dr. Schubert in support of Patent Owner’s arguments. PO Resp. 38–43; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 49–51. We, however, are unable to discern sufficient evidence supporting a conclusion that using separate masks cannot produce ledges that are substantially symmetric, particularly when the ’335 patent suggests otherwise. See Ex. 1001, 4:60– 63 (referring only to the “possibility of misalignment”). Even if, as Patent Owner and Dr. Schubert contend, misalignment “naturally” occurs when using a two-mask process, that does not foreclose the possibility that the” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“It is well settled that “[a] reference does not teach away . . . if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Furthermore, “teaching that a composition may be optimal or standard does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 10,312,335 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,312,335 - PTAB · Mar 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01458 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 7, 8, and 11 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the record at this stage, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we grant institution of an inter partes review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner’s construction of the claims as informed by its allegations of infringement in co-pending litigation, as best Petitioner is able to understand such allegations.” Pet. 18 (citing Exs. 1016–1017). Petitioner does not propose construction of any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. Upon review of the record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would possess at least a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, industrial design or product design or product design engineering, chemistry, or physics, or a related field, and at least three to four years of industry experience, or a Master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, industrial design or product design or product design engineering, chemistry, or physics, or a related field, and at least one to two years of industry experience. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). Petitioner further argues a “POSA would have been familiar with electrically powered cigarettes and their components and underlying technologies or similar components and technologies.” Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’788 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“second chamber. Pet 55 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 20, Fig. 1a). Petitioner concedes Lee does not disclose a bulb containing a heating wire, but contends this would have been obvious at least in view of Gilbert. Id. at 56 (referring to Pet. 41–42, citing Ex. 1004, 2:45–46, 2:50, 2:71–3:2, Fig. 2). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to explore other types of heating elements than the nichrome wire described in Lee due to issues with e-cigarettes at the time, such as metallic taste or inhalation risks associated with the use of a metal wire heating element. Id. at 57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 117). Petitioner contends it was known to use bulb heaters for vaporizing fluids for almost 100 years (id. ¶¶ 117–118), and therefore a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to implement a heating element within a glass bulb in Lee’s device to address the metal taste and inhalation risk issues. Pet. 57. Petitioner further contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement a heating element within a glass bulb to increase the life of the heating element and prevent failure of the device, because Levin teaches that directly contacting the heating element was known to reduce the life of the heating element, and discloses a heater bulb for vaporizing an active ingredient for inhalation by the user. Id. at 58–59 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 4, 49, 56). In view of the foregoing, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently for purposes of institution that the combination of Lee, Gilbert, and Levin teaches or suggests limitation [1d], and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to use Gilbert’s or Levin’s bulb heater in Lee’s electronic cigarette, with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,538,788 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2025 · IPR2024-01199 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim based on the preliminary record.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, Reply, Sur-reply, and evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“Director review) (precedential). Here, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 is neutral, factors 2 through 4 all weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution, and factor 5 weighs in favor of discretionary denial. Accordingly, when considered in combination, Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, and we do not consider the question of compelling merits. 7. summary We consider the above factors and take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6; Guidance Memorandum. On this record, after weighing all of the factors and taking a holistic view, we determine that the facts presented weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’053 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’053 patent and the prior art. We will make any final determination pertaining to the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, on the full trial record.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,878,053 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2025 · IPR2024-01198 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 10–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability and no basis for discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’315 patent. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 10–20 of the ’315 patent. A. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Gilstrap may rule on Petitioner’s motion for a stay. Accordingly, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 is neutral.” slip op. at 30
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “an advanced degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, materials science, or a related discipline” and “at least one year of experience in designing, developing, or researching the design and/or manufacture of solar cells or related technologies.” Pet. 23. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have had “a bachelor’s degree in one of the aforementioned disciplines” and “at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching the design and/or manufacture of solar cells or related technologies.” Id. Petitioner also states that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated for by a higher level of education, and vice versa.” Id. at 23– 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–41). Patent Owner responds that, for purposes of the Preliminary Response, it “applies [Petitioner’s] level of ordinary skill.” Prelim. Resp. 13. On this record, we preliminarily adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’315 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe each claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. C. Asserted Obviousness over Choi, Granek or Marvin, and Istratov” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,251,315
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.