• Solus Advanced Materials Co., Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00005 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all grounds, finding no reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4 were obvious because Petitioner did not show a reasonable expectation of success in combining the cited references.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “Analysis The burden of proving the unpatentability of the challenged claims rests with (and is borne at all times by) Petitioner. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 316(e); see also In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016). To satisfy this burden, Petitioner must “articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”; “mere conclusory statements” will not suffice. Magnum Tools, 829 F.3d at 1380. Indeed, “[i]t is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). Furthermore, “[a]n obviousness determination requires finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine or modify the teachings in the prior art and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We have consistently denied institution of inter partes review in cases in which the petitioner fails to meet its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of success at trial with respect to the latter requirement. See NJOY, LLC v. JUUL Labs., Inc., IPR2024-00536, Paper 17 (PTAB Aug. 12, 2024) (denying institution where petitioner did not show a reasonable expectation of success in combining the asserted references); see also Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. DSM IP Assets, B.V., IPR2024-00493, Paper 7 (PTAB Aug. 21, 2024). We conclude that, in this instance, Petitioner fails to meet its burden of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the references.” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “As an initial matter, we note that, of the 44 specimens tested by Ye, as revealed in Ye’s Table II, only a single specimen, specimen 15, meets the required TC ratios recited in challenged claim 1 of the ’541 patent. Furthermore, none of the references cited by Petitioner teach, or even remotely suggest, the four requisite TC ratios recited by challenged claim 1. We find Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to exclusively select Ye’s sample 15, out of the remaining 43, to which to apply the teachings of Hara and Otsuka concerning the requisite tensile strength and weight deviation ranges in the hope of arriving at the claimed invention, is implausible. Indeed, only the ’541 patent, among all of the evidence of record, that actually mentions the required texture coefficient ratios recited in challenged claim 1. Petitioner provides no convincing argument as to why a skilled artisan would have selected sample 15 for combination with Hara and Otsuka. Rather, Petitioner’s argument appears to be based upon impermissible hindsight reconstruction. However: Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Accordingly, Petitioner’s failure to suggest a reason as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to select that single specimen, without knowledge of the specific TC ratios disclosed by the ’541 patent argues against Petitioner’s contention that the claims are obvious.” slip op. at 47

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached

    “Discretionary Denial of Institution under 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a) and 325(d) Because we deny institution of inter partes review on the merits, we do not reach the parties’ arguments in this respect.” slip op. at 58

  § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,457,541
• Solus Advanced Materials Co, Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01460 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–11 because the Fintiv factors, including the early trial date and close merits case, favored discretionary denial.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “whether to institute an inter partes review. Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not institute an inter partes review unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Institution of inter partes review, however, is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons stated below, we exercise our discretion not to institute an inter partes review. A. Real Parties-in-Interest” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied

    “Board’s projected statutory deadline to issue a final written decision. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 9. “If the court’s trial date is at or around the same time as the projected statutory deadline . . . the decision whether to institute will likely implicate other factors.” Id. Conversely, “[i]f the court’s trial date is earlier than the projected statutory deadline,” this has generally weighed “in favor of exercising authority to deny institution.” Id.” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

    “Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same art and arguments were before the Examiner during prosecution and Petitioner’s has not demonstrated that the Examiner erred in a material manner when allowing the claims. Pet. 17–18. Given our discretionary denial of the Petition in view of the Fintiv factors, we do not address Petitioner’s further arguments with respect to § 325(d).” slip op. at 32

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s recited level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 4. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the prior art of record, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan for purposes of this decision as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 9

  § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,480,090
• Penumbra, Inc. v. Rapidpulse, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Feb 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01261 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · IPR · Institution

  Instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims would have been obvious over the cited combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Board “may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’402 patent, based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Mr. Brown, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) as of the relevant date would be either: (1) a person with a B.S. in engineering or an equivalent field, with two-four years of academic or industry experience in aspiration embolectomy and thrombectomy or comparable industry experience who would, where appropriate, work or consult with others, including a physician, to develop embolectomy or thrombectomy devices; or (2) an interventional neurosurgeon with at least three years of experience developing and/or using medical devices in embolectomy or thrombectomy procedures, and who would, where appropriate, work or consult with others, including an engineer, to develop such a medical device. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 48). Petitioner also contends that, “[a] person with less education but more relevant practical experience, or more relevant education but less practical experience, may also meet this standard.” Id. Patent Owner states that for purposes of its Preliminary Response, it accepts Petitioner’s proposed definition of POSA, but “reserves the right to propose its own description of a POSA if the Board institutes review.” Prelim. Resp. 8 n.3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’402 patent and the cited prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner provides a proposed construction for the term “[limited/limiting] to a positive amount of exit flow” recited in claims 3, 4, 13, and 15, as “the maximum permitted amount of positive exit flow in the distal direction, including no exit flow.” Pet. 15–16. Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner’s proposed construction of ‘a positive amount of exit flow’ as ‘including no exit flow’ is plainly wrong.” Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Pet. 15–16). Patent Owner also asserts that to the extent Petitioner “view[s] the claim term ‘flow in and out’ as encompassing only flow in or no flow at all, that would be plainly wrong too.” Id. Having evaluated the arguments and evidence before us on this record, we determine that construction of “[limited/limiting] to a positive amount of exit flow” is not necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). Turning to a different claim term, we note that neither party provided an explicit construction for the limitation in claim 1 of “control[ling] fluid address the proper claim construction for this term and to specifically discuss what is encompassed by “flow . . . out from the distal end.” We note that in the related cases (IPR2021-01466 and IPR2022-00608), we construed the term, “forward flow” to mean “an amount of liquid in the lumen that exits the distal end in the distal direction that is greater than 6 microliters of fluid.” Ex. 2007, 15; Ex. 2011, 13–14. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine that no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp, 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

    “c) Analysis On the current record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over the combined disclosures of Yang and Mullins. First, Patent Owner asserts that Yang does not disclose the limitation of “a controller . . . to control fluid flow in and out from the distal end.” Prelim. Resp. 21– 32. On the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that introducing a positive pressure pulse such as through the water hammer effect does not necessarily mean that there will be an overall distal end. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 53–54; Ex. 2005 ¶ 60; Ex. 2007, 51 n.12. This is especially true if an overall vacuum state is maintained in the catheter. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 56; Ex. 2007, 43; Ex. 2010, 125:11–18. Further, on the current record, we credit the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Culbert, that to have flow out of the catheter’s distal end when it is in a patient, the pressure in the catheter needs to exceed mean arterial pressure. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 59; Ex. 2010, 126:15–21. Therefore, on the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that Yang may not explicitly disclose flow out from the distal end of the catheter. Whether Yang alone renders this limitation obvious may be explored further on a full trial record; however, because this limitation appears to be taught by Mullins and Petitioner has shown on this record that a POSA would have been motivated to combine the disclosures of Yang and Mullins, we are sufficiently persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood that this limitation is rendered obvious by the combined disclosures of Yang and Mullins.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,406,402
• Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc. v. Spruce Biosciences, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · PGR2021-00088 · APJ John G New · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–25 are unpatentable because the ’908 patent lacks written description support under § 112(a); the Board did not reach Grounds 1–3 or 5.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “To the extent that Dr. Dobs has admitted that she is “not comfortable with chemical terminology”; “could not answer questions regarding the chemical structures in the prior art articles”; “did not know whether CRF1 receptor antagonists contained the structural features she deemed ‘essential’ in her Declaration”; and “agreed that tildacerfont has structurally unique features” (see Ex. 1038, 52–53, 125–126, 126–128, 128–130), we will weigh her testimony regarding those matters accordingly. However, for the reasons explained above, Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Dr. Dobs’ written description opinions in paragraphs 19 and 80–91 of Exhibit 2014 is denied.” slip op. at 10

  • Strike new argumentOther

    “Analysis Patent Owner’s Exhibits 2020–2026 play no part in our reasoning and were not relied upon by the Board in reaching our Decision. Petitioner’s Motion to strike Exhibits 2020–2026 is therefore dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “typically possess a medical degree or a Ph.D. in a field related to endocrinology, and would have knowledge of hormone regulation and disorders, as well as knowledge of the treatment regimens employed to treat such disorders. Pet. 60 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 34). Petitioner argues that such a person of ordinary skill would also have at least three years of experience conducting research concerning endocrine disorders, including CAH or other adrenal disorders. Id. Patent Owner does not expressly contest this definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in its Response. Because we find Petitioner’s definition to be consistent with the demonstrable level of skill in the art (see, e.g., Exs. 1009, 1025, 2003, 2004, 2005), and in the absence of a different proposed definition of the level of skill in the art by Patent Owner, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 26

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “For these reasons, we do not find persuasive the testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Dobs, that: By describing adjustments of dosing protocols to achieve at least a 10% reduction from baseline, and describing this use of tildacerfont as just one embodiment of the claimed use of the entire well-known, well-characterized, and discrete class, the specification reasonably conveyed to a POSA that the invention extended to the particularly claimed use of the entire recited class. Ex. 2014 ¶ 87. On the contrary, far from being a “well-known, well-characterized, and discrete class” the prior art teaches a heterogeneous assembly of different classes of small molecule CRF1 receptor antagonists (Type I, Type II, and “atypical”) displaying a very considerable variety of structures, both in terms of the core pharmacophore (e.g., monocyclic, bicyclic, tricyclic, phenolic, cyclohexyl amide, etc.) as well as in the various side groups. Moreover, the challenged claims recite only “a CRF1 receptor antagonist or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof,” the scope of which also encompasses the much larger (and, according to Williams) much more effective large-molecule (peptide) CRF1 receptor antagonists, about which the Specification is entirely silent. See Ex. 1029, Abstr., 1065.” slip op. at 56

  Patent outcomesUS 10,849,908 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,849,908
• Symrise AG / Symrise Inc. v. Inolex Investment CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 1, 2024 · IPR2023-01035 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board granted cancellation of claims 1–6, 8–10, and 22–28, and denied substitute claims 29–44 because Wright ’451 rendered them obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSA” or “POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree and two or more years of experience or a master’s degree in organic synthesis or chemical engineering, with education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 16). Patent Owner took no position on the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 8. In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition. Dec. Inst. 6–7. In its Motion to Amend, Patent Owner states that it accepts the Board’s definition for purposes of this proceeding. MTA 24. We, therefore, see no reason to disturb our definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears to be consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Although neither party expressly proposes a construction for the term “conversion,” the parties appear to differ in their interpretations of that term. Petitioner interprets “conversion” to mean the percent conversion of the 1- alcohol. See Pet. Opp. RMTA 6–7 (interpreting “conversion” as percentage of remaining 1-alcohol); Ex. 1040, 109:2–11. Patent Owner, on the other hand, interprets “conversion” to mean the total percentage of alkenes that have been produced. Ex. 2010 ¶ 123 (interpreting “conversion” as percentage of total alkenes). During oral argument, counsel for Patent Owner conceded that “conversion can mean either.” Tr. 27:18–28:13. Without the benefit of briefing by the parties, we decline to expressly construe the term “conversion,” as our Decision would be the same under either interpretation, as discussed further below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). Moreover, we do not find it necessary to expressly construe any other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. Id.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. Analysis A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said claimed invention pertains. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Objective evidence of nonobviousness may include” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded. “[A]ny superior property must be unexpected to be considered as evidence of non-obviousness.” Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We must, therefore, first consider what results were expected to determine what a POSA would have considered to be unexpected. Id. As seen by the table below, Wright ’451’s disclosure fully encompasses the temperature ranges and purported unexpected results recited by substitute claim 29 and shown in Table 2 of the ’048 Patent: Reference Reaction Calcination Conversion Regioselectivity Rate13 Temperature Temperature Wright ’451 about 220 °C about 200 °C greater than about 90% to to about to 600 °C about 95% about 99% 440 °C Substitute 240 °C to about 420 °C at least 95% to about Claim 29” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 10,995,048 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,995,048
• Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories S.A. / Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Eye Therapies, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Sep 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00563 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 12, and 28 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Gil, Norden, Dean, Alphagan, and Federal Register.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner

    “partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Our § 325(d) analysis employs a two-prong framework: (1) whether the arguments presented in the petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office; and (2) if so, whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in its prior consideration of those arguments. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Electromedizinishe Gerӓte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 (“Advanced Bionics”), 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). “If a condition in the first part of the framework is satisfied and the petitioner fails to make a showing of material error, the Director generally will exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review.” Id. at 8–9. “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 17

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

    “the District of New Jersey is more than three years, argues that “a trial may not be held until 2026—well after a FWD would be expected in this proceeding.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1027, 2); Reply 8. Based on this evidence of the median time to trial in the district, we find factor 2 weighs in favor of institution. See Fintiv Memo 3 (“[W]hen considering the proximity of the district court’s trial date to the date when the PTAB final written decision will be due, the PTAB will consider the median time from filing to disposition of the civil trial for the district in which the parallel litigation resides.”)” slip op. at 22

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingOther

    “guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms.” Phillips, 415 F.3d 1314. Claim 1 is directed to “[a] method for reducing eye redness in a human subject having ocular hyperemia.” The preamble is limiting because (1) it provides the antecedent bases for “said human” and “said reduction of eye redness” recited in the body of the claim; and (2) “it is a statement of the intentional purpose for which the method must be performed.” See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH, 8 F.4th 1331, 1341–43 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The preamble, however, does not require that eye redness is actually reduced. Id. Nor does the body of the claim recite any efficacy requirement.” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for petitioner

    “In claim construction, “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms.” Phillips, 415 F.3d 1314. Claim 1 is directed to “[a] method for reducing eye redness in a human subject having ocular hyperemia.” The preamble is limiting because (1) it provides the antecedent bases for “said human” and “said reduction of eye redness” recited in the body of the claim; and (2) “it is a statement of the intentional purpose for which the method must be performed.” See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH, 8 F.4th 1331, 1341–43 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The preamble, however, does not require that eye redness is actually reduced. Id. Nor does the body of the claim recite any efficacy requirement.” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,596,600
• Samsung Bioepis Co. Ltd. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 14, 2024 · IPR2023-00442 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–11, 13, 14, 16–24, and 26 are unpatentable as obvious over Dixon because Dixon anticipates them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt the same reasoning here, and conclude that the evidence of record and the Specification of the ’681 patent support construing the preamble’s recitation of a “method for treating a patient with an angiogenic eye disorder” as meaning administering a compound, i.e., the recited VEGF antagonist, to a patient for the purpose of improving or providing a beneficial effect in their angiogenic eye disorder. We find that, as in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH, although the claims “encompass a clinical result, they do not require such a result.” (emphasis added). 8 F.4th 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2021). We consequently reject Patent Owner’s proposed construction that the language of the preamble reciting a “method for treating an angiogenic eye disorder” requires not only an intent to treat, but, additionally, a high degree of efficacy on par with monthly Lucentis. See PO Resp. 9–10.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of the claim terms “initial dose,” “secondary dose,” and “tertiary dose.” Petitioner proposes adoption of the definitions expressly set forth in the Specification of the ’681 patent, viz., that the initial dose is the dose “administered at the beginning of the treatment regimen,” and is followed by the secondary doses that are “administered after the initial dose,” and the tertiary doses are “administered after the secondary doses” and may be distinguished from the secondary doses “in terms of frequency of administration.” Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 36–44. Patent Owner does not expressly dispute Petitioner’s construction, other than to argue that, by 2011, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “initial” and “secondary” doses to correspond to loading doses and “tertiary” doses to correspond to maintenance doses. PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2056 ¶ 66; Ex. 2349, 6–11. Patent Owner contends that the purpose (and expected effect) of loading doses was to achieve visual acuity gains and retina drying, and the goal of less frequent maintenance doses was to maintain the efficacy achieved with loading doses. Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 2056 ¶ 66). As we have explained above, we do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s argument that the definition of these terms requires a high, or otherwise defined, degree of efficacy. As we stated in the -00881 and -01225 Decisions: Based on those express definitions in the Specification, we do not find cause to construe the terms differently. In particular, we do not find that the Specification requires the “tertiary doses” to maintain any efficacy gain achieved after the initial and secondary doses, or that the term suggests any specific level of efficacy. The Specification unequivocally states that “[t]he terms ‘initial dose,’ ‘secondary doses,’ and ‘tertiary doses,’ refer to the temporal sequence of administration of the VEGF antagonist.”” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “If a claim limitation is directed to printed matter, the second step of the Praxair analysis is to determine whether the printed matter is functionally related to its “substrate.” Praxair, 890 F.3d at 1032. Printed matter that is functionally related to its substrate is given patentable weight. Id. (citing DiStefano, 808 F.3d at 850). However, “[w]here the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability.” Id. (quoting In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). More specifically, printed matter is functionally related to its substrate when the language changes not mere thoughts or outcomes, but provides action steps that the method requires. See C R Bard Inc. v. AngioDynamics, Inc., 979 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that the test for printed matter is whether it “merely informs people of the claimed information, or whether it instead interacts with the other elements of the claim to … cause a specific action in a claimed process.”); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that language “is only a statement of purpose and intended result” where its “expression does not result in a manipulative difference in the steps of the claim”) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner notes that the Petitioner in the ’00881 IPR proposed that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have: (1) knowledge regarding the diagnosis and treatment of angiogenic eye disorders, including the administration of therapies to treat said disorders; and (2) the ability to understand results and findings presented or published by others in the field. Pet. 17–18 (quoting -00881 IPR, Paper 94 at 9–10). Furthermore, it was asserted that such a person would typically have an advanced degree, such as an M.D. or Ph.D. (or equivalent, or less education but considerable professional experience in the medical, biotechnological, or pharmaceutical field), with practical academic or medical experience in (i) developing treatments for angiogenic eye disorders, including through the use of VEGF antagonists, or (ii) treating of same, including through the use of VEGF antagonists. Id. at 18 (citing -00881 IPR Paper 94 at 10). Patent Owner does not expressly contest this definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in its Response. In the -01225 IPR, we adopted the same definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art for the challenged claims of the ’681 patent, concluding that that definition was consistent with the level of skill in the art. See -01225 IPR, Paper 96 at 52–53. Having previously adopted this definition of the level of skill in the art for the claims of the ’681 patent, we do so again in the present proceeding.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,130,681 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,130,681
• Dexcom, Inc. v. Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2023-01397 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all grounds because Dexcom did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4, 8, 9, and 11–27 were unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We do not find Petitioner’s argument persuasive. Figure 29 is a “cross-sectional view,… of the insertion device” disclosed by Raymond. Ex. 1110 ¶ 55. Another view of base 122 is depicted in Raymond’s Figure 18, a detail of which is reproduced below: Detail of Figure 18 of Raymond showing base 122 As depicted in Figure 18, base 122 of Raymond’s device comprises a circular disk, with an annular ring on the proximal side. This view is consistent with the cross-sectional view of base 122 in Raymond’s Figure 29, reproduced below: Detail of Raymond’s Figure 29 depicting a cross-sectional view of base 122 The annular ring of base 122, as depicted in Raymond’s Figures 18 and 29 thus comprises, at most, a single recess encircling base 122 beneath the annular ring at the periphery of the base. As such, it neither teaches nor suggests “a plurality of recesses disposed on a periphery of the on-body electronics unit housing, wherein the plurality of recesses comprises a first recess in a spaced relation to a second recess,” as required by challenged claim 1 of the ’335 patent. Petitioner’s argument that Figures 20 and 30 of Raymond depict” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Detail of Raymond’s Figure 29 depicting a cross-sectional view of base 122 The annular ring of base 122, as depicted in Raymond’s Figures 18 and 29 thus comprises, at most, a single recess encircling base 122 beneath the annular ring at the periphery of the base. As such, it neither teaches nor suggests “a plurality of recesses disposed on a periphery of the on-body electronics unit housing, wherein the plurality of recesses comprises a first recess in a spaced relation to a second recess,” as required by challenged claim 1 of the ’335 patent. Petitioner’s argument that Figures 20 and 30 of Raymond depict plural recesses in Raymond’s base 122 is based upon a false premise. See Pet. 37–38. The depiction of base 122 in these Figures is entirely consistent with the depiction of base 122 in Raymond’s Figure 18 as having an annular ring with a single recess situated beneath its rim. With respect to Petitioner’s argument that it would have been an obvious design choice to implement two spaced-apart plural recesses on the housing (see Pet. 38), neither Petitioner nor its Declarant, Dr. Fletcher, adduces any evidence beyond that conclusory statement. Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1103 ¶ 70; Ex. 1110, Figs. 18, 25–27); Ex. 1003, 77. Petitioner makes no persuasive argument as to why a skilled artisan would substitute multiple recesses for a single annular ring, which seemingly serves the purpose of allowing base 122 to be held in position by base-retaining arms 1226. To the contrary, substituting multiple recesses in base 122 to engage retaining arms 1226, and ensuring that each retaining arm 1226 suitably engages each recess, would seem only to add needless complexity to the design, without producing a substantial benefit or improvement.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Turner’s rotation-resisting recesses 77 are not located on the periphery of its body 20. Instead, they are disclosed as being located upon the upper surface of body 20, between its central axis and its edge, and are configured to receive rotation-resisting protrusions 71 of insertion device 70. This placement of rotation-resisting recesses 77 is depicted in Figure 9 of Turner, which is reproduced again below: Figure 9 of Turner is a perspective, exploded view of its fluid delivery system including body 20 and rotation-restricting recesses 77 We therefore find that Turner does not teach or suggest the limitation of challenged claim 1 (and all claims by their dependency) reciting “an on body electronics unit housing comprising a plurality of recesses disposed on a periphery of the on body electronics unit housing.” We further conclude that Petitioner provides no persuasive reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to alter the location of Turner’s rotation-resisting recesses 77 from the upper surface to the circumferential periphery of body 20, because Turner and the ’335 patent teach that their respective recesses serve different functions. Turner teaches that:” slip op. at 47

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

    “Because we deny institution of inter partes review on the merits, we need not reach the parties’ arguments with respect to whether we should exercise our discretion and deny institution of inter partes review under Section 325(d). As we conclude in Sections IV.B.2.d and IV.C.2.c above, Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of showing a reasonable likelihood of demonstrating at trial that the challenged claims are unpatentable over the combination of Thomas and Raymond, or of Thomas, Raymond, and Turner. That remains true even if, arguendo, the Examiner materially erred in concluding that Thomas is not prior art to the ’335 patent, an issue upon 13 Thomas et al. (US 2010/0198034 A1, August 5, 2010) (“Thomas ’034”), Ex. 2101. 14 The publication date of the Thomas reference that is a basis of Grounds 1 and 2 in this inter partes review is August 12, 2010, one week after the publication of Thomas ’034. which we express no view. We consequently deny as moot Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion under Section 325(d).” slip op. at 51

  § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,266,335
• Guardant Health, Inc. v. University Of WashingtonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01158 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–28 are unpatentable because Eltoukhy anticipates them; the Board found they were not entitled to a priority date before Eltoukhy’s publication.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Here, Petitioner asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would typically have an advanced degree, such as a Ph.D., with research experience in genomics, molecular biology, bioinformatics, or a related field, or could have less education but significant professional experience in one or more of these fields.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 38). Patent Owner states that for the purposes of this proceeding, it does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the skill level. PO Resp. 2 (citing Ex. 2023 ¶¶ 21, 22). After reviewing the record, we adopt Petitioner’s definition as it is consistent with the prior art’s demonstration of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “1. “Sequence Reads” Petitioner argues that, for purposes of this Decision, no claim term needs specific construction beyond its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10–11. Petitioner, however, seeks to provide context for understanding the scope of the term “sequence reads.” Specifically, Petitioner contends that “sequence reads” are produced by sequencing at least some of the tagged strands, whereas “consensus sequences” are generated by collapsing sequence reads. Id. at 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:45–47, 20:50–22:25, 23:29–57, 24:46–48, claim 1, claim 6). In the Decision to Institute, we agreed with Petitioner that “[t]he claims of the ’951 patent as well as the specification make clear that a ‘sequence read’ is different and distinct from a ‘consensus sequence.’” DI 7 (quoting Pet. 11). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertion. PO Resp. 12. Based on the complete record, we see no reason to change our determination of the scope of the term “sequence reads.”” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the terms “paired sequence reads” and “unpaired sequence reads.” Even though the ’951 patent Specification discloses grouping sequence reads “sharing a unique set of SMI tags” into paired families,4 “[t]he written description part of the specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the function and purpose of claims.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (“[T]he claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.”). Here, claim 1 explicitly defines the terms “paired sequence reads” and “unpaired sequence reads.” Indeed, in the context of paired versus unpaired sequence reads, claim 1 specifies that the complementarity is related to the “original parent polynucleotide molecule,” and not the duplex tags. For example, claim 1 recites that “each unpaired read represents a first tagged strand having no second differently tagged complementary strand derived from an original parent polynucleotide molecule represented among said sequence reads in said set of sequence reads.” Ex. 1001, 37:50–55 (emphasis added). Thus, the plain claim language contradicts Patent Owner’s argument” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1 defines the terms “paired sequence reads” and “unpaired sequence reads” based on the complementarity of the target sequence strands derived from the “original parent polynucleotide molecule.” Ex. 1001, 37:46–55. As explained above, we reject Patent Owner’s contention that a sequence read is considered unpaired solely based on the complementarity of the SMI tags. See supra Section II.C.2. Due to the “errors introduced during sample preparation and sequencing” (Ex. 1029 ¶ 5), there are four outcomes when determining the complementarity of the sequence reads of two strands of SMI-linked target sequence: (1) the first SMI tag and the first strand target sequence are complementary to the second SMI tag and the second strand target sequence, respectively; (2) the first SMI tag is complementary to the second SMI tag but the first strand target sequence is not complementary to the second strand target sequence; (3) the first SMI tag is not complementary to the second SMI tag but the first strand target sequence is complementary to the second strand target sequence; and (4) the first SMI tag is not complementary to the second SMI tag, and the first strand target sequence is not complementary to the second strand target sequence. It is undisputed that Schmitt groups sequence reads into paired families based on the SMI tags, and Schmitt only considers sequences in which “information from both DNA strands was in perfect agreement.” Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 14, 96; PO Resp. 18. Thus, among the four outcomes, only scenario (1), in which both the SMI tags and the target sequences are complementary, represents a “paired sequence read,” which claim 1 defines as corresponding to “sequence reads generated from a first tagged strand and a second differently tagged complementary strand derived from an original parent polynucleotide molecule.” Ex. 1001, 37:46–50. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument (see PO Resp. 26), in Schmitt,” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 10,752,951 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,752,951
• Edwards Lifesciences Corporation / Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Aortic Innovations LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01151 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all asserted grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged, undisclaimed claim was unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For reasons discussed below, we do not institute review of claims 2, 9, 17, and 18 of the ’834 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proposes that the person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) in November 2012 “would have been an interventional cardiologist with a working knowledge of heart valve designs and endovascular prostheses. This [POSA] would, where necessary, work with a medical device engineer to experiment with or manufacture a prosthetic heart valve.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Patent Owner does not expressly contest Petitioner’s proposed definition. For this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed POSA level, which appears to be consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This POSA level is also consistent with the level the Board applied in earlier decisions involving the same parties and related patents. See, e.g., Ex. 2124, 11; Ex. 1120, 11–12.” slip op. at 16

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “during prosecution. Pet. 18, 99. According to Petitioner, Spenser II never describes its compressible material as including “tightly knitted fibers” and a POSA would, instead, have understood Spenser II’s compressible material as comprising “loose, porous materials.” Pet. 18, 99. We agree with Petitioner that the phrases “tightly knitted” and “tightly knitted fibers” do not appear in Spenser II. At the same time, neither does Spenser II describe its compressible material as being “loose” and “porous.” Notably, in prior proceedings before the Board, Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Buller testified that Spenser II’s compressible material “includes a plurality of PET fibers on the inward-facing surface of the compressible material” (i.e., the “base layer” and alleged “second plurality” of fibers here; Paper 9, 5), that is “sufficiently dense to prevent blood from leaking through the cloth/fabric.” Ex. 2128 ¶ 222; see also Ex. 2122, 20:2–22:18 (testifying that “nonporous” as used in the Specification means “that fluid would not pass through it” and such fluid includes “all components of blood”). We find that Dr. Buller’s description of Spenser II as having a dense, blood impermeable base layer is, on balance, more consistent with applicant’s characterization of Spenser II as having an arrangement of “tightly-knitted fibers”—even if some imagined or microscopic spaces between fibers might still exist in a base layer. Ex. 2128 ¶ 222; see also Ex. 2002 (Brecker testimony) ¶¶ 42–45 (testifying, inter alia, that the description of a “tight fitted outer seal is . . . consistent with Spenser II’s Figure 22” and “knitted” is consistent with Buller’s testimony describing Spenser II’s compressible material as “velour-like woven or knitted” PET (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 162; Ex. 2134 ¶ 56). We are, thus, unpersuaded on this record that applicant mischaracterized Spenser II.” slip op. at 38

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Altogether, the parties’ alleged “plain meaning” yet otherwise undefined interpretation of the “spacing” limitations leaves the Board with insufficient clarity about what the claimed “spacing” means in the affirmative. Paper 9, 3 (arguing “plain meaning”); Paper 11, 3 (arguing applicant’s arguments are in “full harmony with the plain meaning”). The intrinsic evidence is minimally helpful: the Specification does not use the term “spacing” in relation to the positioning of adjacent fibers; the drawings might be helpful but neither party proposes a specific construction that is reliant on them.15 The prosecution history provides clues, but portions of the prosecution record are arguably confounding. The applicant distinguished 15 For example, Dr. Brecker, in support of Patent Owner’s argument, identifies several of the patent drawings and testifies that, “as is particularly clear in Figure 13 (but also present elsewhere), there are gaps and spaces between the fibers that extend to the frame” and then proceeds to testify that prior art, like Spenser II’s compressible material, “bears no resemblance” to the “exemplary” spacings identified in prosecution. See, e.g., Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 42–43. Dr. Brecker’s articulation of a “spacing” does not seem to add anything meaningful beyond the language of the claim as written. And, simply comparing the patent drawings to the prior art drawings presumes a sort of “know-it when you see it” interpretation—it is not an affirmative construction for a “spacing” as claimed. the claimed “spacings” from “tightly knitted fibers.” Ex. 1002, 1001. At what point, however, does a cloth of “tightly knitted fibers” qualify as more “loosely defined” and come within the scope of the claimed “spacing?”16 Id. The applicant also described the “spacing” in semi-functional terms based on “advantages” provided by the claim feature. See, e.g., id. (asserting, e.g., that the spacing permits “expansion and contraction” with “lesser rigidity”); see also id. at 1133, 1140 (asserting, e.g., “reduce[d] restrictions” and avoidance of “restrained valve foreshortening” with the then-claimed “openings”). It is not, however, evident where the Specification supports such “advantages”—no citations were given in prosecution. And, in prosecution of related applications, applicant argued, for example, that “[w]hile all fibers have some degree of being spaced-apart, the construction from Applicant’s claimed invention clearly requires some level more spacing.” Ex. 1149, 13–14 (assertion differences over “Dehdashtian” (alias to Spenser II)) (emphasis added). On this record, what would suffice as “some level more spacing” is unclear. Id.” slip op. at 39

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,337,834

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.