- Twitch Interactive, Inc. v. Razdog Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00308 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claim 1 unpatentable as obvious over Darnell and Kim, and over Dasgupta and Darnell; Judge Moore dissented as to the Dasgupta and Kim ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner
“2. “Real Time” – The Parties’ Positions In the preliminary phase of this proceeding, the principal claim term” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of” slip op. at 35
- Expert testimonyOther
“form of storage or minimal time delay, and Patent Owner concedes as much in this proceeding. See, e.g., Ex. 1082, 125:19–22, 126:3–10; Tr. 41:26– 42:14, 53:20–25. Accordingly, the mere fact that Darnell’s system may aggregate content feeds or content items on a server, merge content, store content, and then deliver content to a user interface, does not preclude it from being done in “real time” as that term would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the ’654 patent in its entirety.” slip op. at 48
Patent outcomesUS 10,334,068 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,334,068 - Twitch Interactive, Inc. v. Razdog Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00307 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: the majority finds them obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations, including Darnell and Kim and Dasgupta-based combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“§ 6. This Final Written Decision issues pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (2019). For the reasons discussed herein, we determine that Petitioner, Twitch Interactive, Inc., has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–18 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,729,658 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’658 patent”) are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) (2019).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“2. “Real Time” – The Parties’ Positions In the preliminary phase of this proceeding, the principal claim term” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 9,729,658 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,729,658 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over Wallen and Berggren because the combined teachings render the claimed subject matter obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We agree that Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction is wholly unsupported by, and inconsistent with, the language of independent claims 1, 7, and 13, and the aims of the ’670 Patent Specification. See Ex. 1001, 2:3– 25, 9:32–10:5, 12:51–67, 18:54–19:6, 19:26–42, 20:12–26. Moreover, the cited extrinsic evidence––testimony by Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Lomp–– does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is internally inconsistent and also undermined by Dr. Lomp’s inconsistent deposition testimony. See Ex. 1036, 11:6–17, 12:9–12; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 40, 48. Similarly, the extrinsic evidence cited by Petitioner (e.g., Exs. 1037, 1038, 2009) undermines Patent Owner’s position emphasizing the intended recipient devices of SIB1. In summary, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because it is unsupported by the claim language, the ’670 Patent Specification, and the cited extrinsic evidence. with the ordinary and customary meaning which does not include limiting SIB1 to an ordinary legacy SIB and excluding MTC specific SIBs or SIBs intended for MTC devices. In addition, we need not construe explicitly any other claim term or phrase. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. 868 F.3d at 1017 (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We find that “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill in the art is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the prior art of record. slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“filing date. As explained above, the burden of production shifted to Patent Owner to show that Wallen is not prior art because the ’670 Patent is entitled to the earlier January 20, 2012, filing date of foreign priority application GB1201000. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing a system information block 1, Patent Owner’s arguments do not substantively address how GB1201000 provides written description support for any other limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 43, 57. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in foreign priority application GB1201000, the burden of production did not shift back to Petitioner, and,” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“primary synchronization signal (PSS), a secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and a physical broadcast channel (PBCH) including a master information block (MIB).” See Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–75; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 76, 77, 83–84). Petitioner implicitly acknowledges that Wallen does not expressly disclose a physical broadcast channel (PBCH), but relies on Berggren for confirming that the LTE standard specifies that a PBCH carries the MIB. See Pet. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 74; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 73–75). According to Petitioner, “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to transmit Wallen’s MIB using a PBCH as taught by Berggren.” Pet. 43 (citing Pet. 33–38). In particular, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated for Wallen’s LTE system to utilize the LTE standard implementation details taught by Berggren,” and “it would have been predictable and beneficial for Wallen’s user equipment to receive the MIB in the [PBCH], as was standard in LTE.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58), 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63). According to Petitioner, “the combination is nothing more than ‘the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.’” Pet. 38 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Wallen’s broadcast MIB with Berggren’s teachings of using a PBCH for transmitting broadcast MIBs. See Pet. 33–38; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,206,670 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,206,670 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00219 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11–22 were not shown unpatentable under any § 103 ground because the prior art did not teach or suggest receiving the claimed resource allocation and multi-level TPC command on one physical channel.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, a petitioner should 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’153 patent issued claims priority to an application filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. not “place the burden on [the Board] to sift through information presented by the Petitioners, determine where each element [of the challenged claims] is found in [the cited references], and identify any differences between the claimed subject matter and the teachings of [the cited references.]” Google Inc. v. EveryMD.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 at 25 (PTAB May 22, 2014).” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“The second and third asserted benefits—reduced complexity and reduced latency—rest on the declaration of Dr. Kotzin (Ex. 1003 ¶ 64) rather than on any disclosure of Andersson or Khan. We accord that testimony little weight on this point because it asserts the benefits in conclusory terms without explaining why they would result from inserting a scheduling grant into Andersson’s undefined “other bits,” as distinct from Khan’s separate-slot design.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 14. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’500 Patent. Therefore, we adopt it as the ordinary level of skill of an artisan in the field of the patented technology for our analysis below.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner offers a proposed construction for the recited “single physical channel” found in limitation 11.2 and “an accumulation of TPC commands” found in independent claims 12 and 18. PO Resp. 9–17. Petitioner likewise addresses the scope of an accumulation of TPC commands, but Petitioner does not contest directly Patent Owner’s proposed construction for “single physical channel.” Pet. Reply 2–7. We determine, however, that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 9,706,500 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,706,500 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 22, 2026 · IPR2025-00217 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–5, 10–15, and 20 not unpatentable under four §103 grounds because the petitioner did not establish the claimed enabled-accumulation indication or single-channel combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’153 patent issued claims priority to an application filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 US 6,334,047 B1, iss. Dec. 25, 2001 (Ex. 1009). 3 US 2001/0036238 A1, pub. Nov. 1, 2001 (Ex. 1010) 4 US 2004/0190485 A1, pub. Sept. 30, 2004 (Ex. 1005). 5 US 2004/0077370 A1, pub. Apr. 22, 2004 (Ex. 1008). 6 US 6,600,772 B1, iss. July 29, 2003 (Ex. 1004). 7 US 6,529,741 B1, iss. Mar. 4, 2003 (Ex. 1007). unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, a petitioner should not “place the burden on [the Board] to sift through information presented by the Petitioners, determine where each element [of the challenged claims] is found in [the cited references], and identify any differences between the claimed subject matter and the teachings of [the cited references].” Google Inc. v. EveryMD.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 at 25 (PTAB May 22, 2014).” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’153 patent. Therefore, we adopt it as the ordinary level of skill of an artisan in the field of the patented technology for our analysis below.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“apparent agreement between the parties: “TPC command accumulation” refers to a process that collects and uses TPC commands from a network device to cumulatively affect transmission power. And having studied the intrinsic record of the ’153 patent, we are in accord. But, we decline to further limit the construction of “TPC command accumulation” in the manner proposed by either party––i.e., (1) each TPC command adjustment must be summed to cumulatively affect transmission power (as proposed by Petitioner) or (2) a TPC command value must be added to an integrator. Although both parties are able to point to disclosures in the ’153 Patent where the TPC command accumulation of an exemplary embodiment is described as using an integrator and/or summing each TPC command adjustment to cumulatively affect a UE’s transmission power (PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–43, 7:15–29, 9:27–42; Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 35–42); Pet. Reply 4–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–43, 7:2–6, 7:8–22, 9:28–40)), neither party has demonstrated persuasively that the intrinsic record of the ’153 Patent demonstrates a clear intent to limit “TPC command accumulation” to those particular embodiments.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“A rationale supports obviousness only where the proffered benefit would flow from the specific modification proposed; a benefit that the prior art realizes in a different structural context does not, without more, establish that the same benefit would result from inserting one reference’s element into the other. On this record, the nexus between Khan’s benefits and Petitioner’s “other bits” modification is missing.” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 10,952,153 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,952,153 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 31, 2026 · IPR2024-01450 · APJ Peter D Shapiro · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6–11, and 13–20 were not shown unpatentable because Dziong and Sathyanath do not teach the claimed sharing definition for existing connections with allocated bandwidth.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“First, the claims use present-tense language, “one or more other connections, which have respective bandwidths and which are permitted to share a bandwidth allocation with the new connection.”3 Ex. 1001, claim 1 (emphasis added). The exclusive use of the present tense have indicates “other connections” must have current possession of the bandwidth. For these other connections to share bandwidth with a newly established connection, they must already exist and have bandwidth ready for immediate use, rather than merely holding a dormant “reservation” pending a network failure. See PO Supp. Br. 1. The Federal Circuit addressed a similar situation where the Court found the present-tense limitation “is connected to the computer network” means a device was required to be connected at the” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“combination, do not teach or suggest limitations 1.2 and 1.3 requiring: providing a sharing definition specifying one or more other connections, which have respective bandwidths and which are permitted to share a bandwidth allocation with the new connection, such that a total bandwidth allocated jointly to the new connection and to the other connections in any given segment is equal to a maximum of the requested bandwidth and of the bandwidths of the other connections in the given segment Ex. 1001, limitations 1.2, 1.3 (emphasis added); see PO Resp. 17–22; Sur-reply 4–5, 12–14. As discussed above in Section II.C.2, we interpret “other connections” to mean “existing connections in the network that already have bandwidth allocated to them.” Because the information shared in Dziong and Sathyanath, described below, relates to reserved protection paths, rather than existing connections that have bandwidth that can currently transmit network traffic, the references do not teach or suggest the “other connections” part of the sharing definition in limitations 1.2 and 1.3. Dziong describes advertising, across the network, the amount of bandwidth reserved for recovery on each link that would be activated when a protected link fails. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 60; Pet. 36. Once activated, network traffic from a “primary path” failure is rerouted to these recovery paths. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7–9, 70, 83. Petitioner points to this advertising of the reserved bandwidth information as teaching the claimed “sharing definition.” Pet. 33–36 (arguing that the “protection paths [in Dziong] have bandwidth reservations” and “share an overall protection bandwidth reservation”); Reply 21–23. However, since the advertised information only contains information about the recovery paths “that would be activated” upon a primary path failure, such paths are not existing connections that already have bandwidth allocated to them, and therefore do not teach the claimed “other connections” that are part of the sharing definition. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 60.” slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 7,596,088 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,596,088 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 13, 2026 · IPR2024-00913 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 16, and 17 are unpatentable over Blease, Weyman, and Hu, with some claims also over Deng; claims 8–10 and 18 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“disclosure in Weyman (or Blease) for deactivating and activating ports, or performing certain actions in the time between such actions. Again, the only portion of Weyman cited pertains to a request to join the fabric from a processing unit having a “default” configuration, which does not relate to the timing or sequence of events in initialization. See Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 69, 156, 161–162; Ex. 1103 ¶¶ 93–94. Nor does Dr. Lavian point to any other evidence in the record supporting his conclusion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “ensure[d] that the processing unit is deactivated prior to being updated for use . . . and then activate[d] the processing unit after updating.” See Ex. 1103 ¶ 94. Accordingly, we give little weight to Dr. Lavian’s conclusory opinion” slip op. at 75
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“See Axonics, 73 F.4th at 957; Allied Erecting, 825 F.3d at 1381; Mouttet, 686 F.3d at 1332–33. Petitioner’s position is that, based on the teachings of Weyman, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Blease’s system to distribute the functionality of control unit 44 (including its existing multicast forwarding information 48 used by OIF mapper 50). See Pet. 23–26, 38; Fleming v. Cirrus Design Corp., 28 F.4th 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“That the proposed combination of [two references]—rather than one of the individual references—discloses the disputed claim limitations does not defeat the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. In this case, it is sufficient that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art in a way such that the combination discloses the claim limitations.”).” slip op. at 55
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“10 In the Cisco IPR, we determined that Cisco had proven claims 8 and 18 to be unpatentable based on a different combination of references (identified as Weyman, Jain, and LeMaire), finding that limitation 8[f.ii] was taught by Jain and LeMaire. IPR2024-00506, Paper 38 at 58–77. As explained herein, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments in this proceeding that limitation 8[f.ii] is taught or suggested by Weyman. Also, in the Decision on Institution in this proceeding, the Board found that there were questions as to Petitioner’s showing for limitation 8[f.ii] and declined to reach a conclusion on whether Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its asserted ground based on Blease and Weyman. Dec. on Inst. 43.” slip op. at 71
Patent outcomesUS 8,014,394 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,014,394 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00893 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 8, 11, 12, 15, 20, 23, and 24 are unpatentable as obvious over Gai and IEEE 1999.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that at the time of the application for the ’986 patent (January 2002), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field, plus at least two years of industry experience or graduate-level academic experience with computer networking.” Pet. 20. In the Decision on Institution, the Board agreed with and applied Petitioner’s proposed definition, removing the phrase “at least” to avoid unnecessary ambiguity. Dec. on Inst. 18–19. Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed definition for its Response. PO Resp. 5. Neither party made any further argument regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art in its papers during trial. In the Cisco IPR, we adopted a similar definition, determining that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or in an equivalent field, or approximately two years of experience working in the field of information technology and networking,” where “[l]ack of professional experience can be substituted by additional education, and vice versa.” IPR2024-00505, Paper 29 at 10–11 (alteration in original); see Dec. on Inst. 19 n.7 (noting the proposed definition in the Cisco IPR). Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’986 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’986 patent and cited prior art, we adopt the same definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as the Cisco IPR and apply it for purposes of this Petitioner’s similar proposed definition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Gai discloses entering an Enable_Uplinkfast command at an access switch (e.g., access switch 114) to block a failed port (e.g., the root port) and configure the access switch to send dummy traffic upstream through a new active port. . . . When modified in view of IEEE 1999’s disclosure that self-healing network traffic can advantageously be sent both upstream and downstream, the command would be entered at a backbone switch (e.g., backbone switch 122) to block a failed port (e.g., a designated port connected to access switch 114) and configure the backbone switch to send dummy traffic downstream to an access switch (e.g. access switch 114) through a new active port. While Gai uses its protocol signaling command, Enable_Uplinkfast, to send dummy traffic through a new root port, [a person of ordinary skill in the art] would deem it an obvious implementation detail to modify the parameters of the port on a backbone switch. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 139 (citing Ex. 1005, col. 6, ll. 39–46).” slip op. at 34
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Cisco IPR, we addressed four claim terms in the final written decision: “access switch” and “edge switch,” which appear in independent claims 1 and 13 and various dependent claims, and “downstream” and “upstream,” which appear in claims 11, 12, 23, and 24. IPR2024-00505, Paper 29 at 11–14. We interpreted “access switch” to mean “a switch with ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints, such as user computer systems,” interpreted “edge switch” to mean “a core switch that is directly connected to an access switch,” interpreted “downstream” to mean “away from the root switch,” and interpreted “upstream” to mean “toward the root switch.” Id. As noted above, Patent Owner did not appeal that decision. We incorporate herein our previous analysis in the Cisco IPR, but note that none of the analysis of the disputed issues below depends on such determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to prove unpatentability of the challenged claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1999, supported by the testimony of Mr. McNair, which we credit, is persuasive. See Pet. 25–30, 40–46; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–145, 165–174. Based on the full trial record, we find that Gai and IEEE 1999 teach limitation [1E] and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine their teachings in the manner described by Petitioner. Based on all of the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 3 would have been obvious over Gai and IEEE 1999 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 4. Claims 8, 15, and 20 Claim 8 depends indirectly from independent claim 1. Claims 15 and 20 depend indirectly from independent claim 13, which is similar to claim 1 but recites a network switching device rather than a method. As to independent claim 13, Patent Owner refers to its earlier arguments regarding claim 1, asserting that limitation [13C] is “substantially similar” to limitation [1E]. PO Resp. 14–15. We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments for the reasons explained above. See supra Section II.D.3.b. Patent Owner does not argue dependent claims 8, 15, and 20 separately from their respective parent claims 1 and 13. See PO Resp. 19. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and supporting evidence, including the testimony of Mr. McNair, and are persuaded that Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 8, 15, and 20 would have been obvious based on Gai and IEEE 1999 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for the reasons stated by Petitioner. See Pet. 21–46, 48–52, 55–59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 113–175, 179–185, 194–203.” slip op. at 41
Patent outcomesUS 6,917,986 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,917,986 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00819 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan; claim 20 was not shown unpatentable because the references did not teach its required comparison of desired and interferer signal strengths.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 9. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Here, as in the Director’s example, Petitioner advanced a narrower construction of the dynamic limitations before the district court, which the district court declined to adopt. Pet. 9; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. Instead, the district court adopted a “plain-and-ordinary meaning” construction, which Patent Owner proposed. PO Resp. 38; PO Sur-reply 10 n.2; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed applying the plain and ordinary meaning construction that had already been preliminarily adopted by the district court. Compare Pet. (filed May 1, 2024) with Ex. 2015 (preliminarily adopting plain and ordinary meaning construction on March 25, 2024). Applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR. Thus, we give the dynamic limitation its plain-and-ordinary meaning, which is “adjusting during operation based—at least in part—on information gained during operation.”” slip op. at 13
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In our Institution Decision, we stated that we “will give the term ‘signal path’ its ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ and not limit it only to analog components, as the district court found and the parties agree.” Inst. Dec. 11. Given that the parties continue to agree on this point, we see no need to depart from the construction we adopted in our Institution Decision. Moreover, applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR for the same reasons as discussed above. In this proceeding, the dispute between the parties concerns the application of this and the surrounding claim language (i.e., “in the receiver signal path,” “in the signal path”) to the disclosures in Behbahani. See PO Resp. 43–45. Therefore, we will provide further discussion in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding Behbahani below. However, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language to the extent it requires adjusting an impedance and/or bias current of a circuit while it is in the signal path. See Id. at 50–51.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther
“Patent Owner’s arguments generally fail to address why Behbahani’s Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “plurality of circuits [comprising/including] . . . a filter,” and instead focus on why the low-pass and high-pass filter circuits do not teach the limitation, which is not Petitioner’s position. As stated above, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language – i.e., that it “requires adjusting the bias, in or of a circuit.” See PO Resp. 49. However, Patent Owner’s reading of the claim does not persuasively address why the Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit.” We have reviewed Dr. Larson’s cited testimony and disagree with Patent Owner that he provided “a well-supported opinion . . . as to why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not understand the entire bandpass box to be a single ‘circuit,’ or to reflect variation in ‘an impedance’ or ‘a bias’ in the claims.” Sur-reply 4 (citing Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 46–48, 71, 74–83). Dr. Larson testifies that the ’330 patent (which has the same specification as the ’164 patent) “teach[es] these adjustments [that dynamically change operating parameters] as changes effected in a single circuit block.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 46 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 8A, 9A, 8:20–25, 8:36–39, 9:36–59, 10:1–18 (emphasis added)). Dr. Larson does not provide further explanation as to what he means by a “single circuit block,” but relies on Figures 8A and 9A, which show a “function block,” and other disclosures referring to a “function block.” See id. There is no dispute that the recited “circuit” in the receiver signal path is referring to these “function blocks.” See Tr. 22:20–23:4. The ’164 patent states that Figure 8A, which includes function block 820, is “an embodiment of the present invention” 8:28–30. Similarly, Figure 9A, which includes function block 920, “illustrate[s] one of the possible power saving techniques.” Id. at 3:41–42. The ’164 patent describes that “[f]unctional block 820 . . . may be a filter, mixer, amplifier, or other circuit or circuits in a wireless transceiver or other electronic circuits or system.” Id. at 8:30–33 (emphasis added). Based on these disclosures, we are not convinced that Function Block 820 or 920 cannot include multiple filters in a Variable Bandpass Filter Block, or that Behbahani’s Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit.” Dr. Larson also relies on Figure 6 of the ’164 patent to conclude that” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 11,564,164 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,564,164 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00816 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–13, 16, 23, 25–27, and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 11. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Here, as in the Director’s example, Petitioner advanced a narrower construction of the dynamic limitations before the district court, which the district court declined to adopt. Pet. 10; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. Instead, the district court adopted a “plain-and-ordinary meaning” construction, which Patent Owner proposed. PO Resp. 36–38; PO Sur-reply 10 n.2; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed applying the plain and ordinary meaning construction that had already been preliminarily adopted by the district court. Compare Pet. (filed May 1, 2024) with Ex. 2015 (preliminarily adopting plain and ordinary meaning construction on March 25, 2024). Applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR. Thus, we give the dynamic limitation its plain-and-ordinary meaning, which is “adjusting during operation based—at least in part—on information gained during operation.”” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “component” or “impedance” that is dynamically adjusted, and instead focus on why the low-pass and high-pass filter circuits do not teach the limitation, which is not Petitioner’s position. As stated above, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language – i.e., that it “requires adjusting a variable impedance of a circuit or component thereof, while it is in the signal path.” See PO Resp. 49. However, Patent Owner’s reading of the claim does not persuasively address why the Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit” or “component.” We have reviewed Dr. Larson’s cited testimony and disagree with Patent Owner that he provided “a well-supported opinion . . . as to why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not understand the entire bandpass box to be “a component,” “a circuit,” or “an impedance” in the claims.” Sur-reply 4 (citing Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 46–48, 71, 74–83). Dr. Larson testifies that the ’330 patent “teach[es] these adjustments [that dynamically change operating parameters] as changes effected in a single circuit block.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 46 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 8A, 9A, 8:20–25, 8:36–39, 9:36–59, 10:1–18 (emphasis added)). Dr. Larson does not provide further explanation as to what he means by a “single circuit block,” but relies on Figures 8A and 9A, which show a “function block,” and other disclosures referring to a “function block.” Id. There is no dispute that the recited “circuit” or “component” in the receiver signal path is referring to these “function blocks.” See Tr. 22:20–23:4. The ’330 patent states that Figure 8A, which includes function block 820, is “an embodiment of the present invention” that describes a “possible power saving technique[].” Ex. 1001, 3:30–33, 8:20–25. Similarly, Figure 9A, which includes function block 920, “illustrate[s] one of the possible power saving techniques.” Id. at 3:33–34. The ’330 patent describes that “[f]unctional block 820 . . . may be a filter, mixer, amplifier, or other circuit or circuits in a wireless transceiver or other electronic circuits or system.” Ex. 1001, 8:22–25 (emphasis added). Based on these disclosures, we are not convinced that Function Block 820 or 920 cannot include multiple filters in a Variable Bandpass Filter Block, or that Behbahani’s Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit,” “component,” or “impedance.”” slip op. at 42
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“The absence of meaningful disclosure of the implementation details of the circuit in the ’330 patent suggests that the circuit implementation details Patent Owner argues about now would have been within the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. That is, Patent Owner did not provide in its own specification “the type of detail [it] now argues is necessary in prior art references,” which permits a “finding that one skilled in the art would have known how to implement the features of the references and would have concluded that the reference disclosures would have been enabling.” In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994). When a patent specification does not “specifically describe[]” any “equipment or techniques to be used,” it may be deduced “that all of the equipment and technical knowledge required to perform the claimed method” is known to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Fox, 471 F.2d 1405, 1407 (CCPA 1973); see also Southwire Co. v. Cerro Wire LLC, 870 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (without proof to the contrary, when there is no focus on a disputed claim limitation in the specification, the limitation is merely “an observed result of an old process”). To that end, Petitioner provides persuasive testimony from Dr. Abidi that signal strength measurement circuits were known in the art, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood how to implement a known technique for measuring signal strength, which is not disputed by Patent Owner. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 180– 181; Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 12–16; see Pet. Reply 24–26; Pet. 60–62. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that Behbahani’s disclosure at least suggests circuitry for performing such a determination of signal strength. See Pet. Reply 24 (citing Pet. 60–61; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 92–98, 179–181). Petitioner further argues that Tan “provides an example of circuitry used to detect signals at various points in the low-pass filter signal path as a means of implementing a prefilter automatic gain control.” Pet. 60–61 (citing Ex. 1006, 481); Ex. 1003 ¶ 180. The example in Tan is a peak detector circuit. Pet. 61; Ex. 1003 ¶ 180; Ex. 1006, Fig. 8. Dr. Abidi testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Tan’s signal strength measurement circuitry to measure nodes AI and AO. Ex. 1003 ¶ 180. In response to Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how to use Tan’s peak detector in Behbahani (PO Resp. 70), Dr. Abidi provides testimony explaining how Tan’s peak detector circuit provides a measure of the signal strength, which we find persuasive, and is unrebutted by Patent Owner. Ex. 1042 ¶ 15.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 7,010,330 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,010,330
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.