- Silencerco Weapons Research, LLC v. Huxwrx Safety Co. LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 17, 2025 · IPR2024-01214 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 3, 6, 9, 12–14, 18, and 20 were not shown unpatentable; the motion to amend was granted for substitute claims 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 37–40, and 42, and denied for …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including: “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Best Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Elekta Inc., 46 F.4th 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). “The patent’s purpose can also be informative.” Id.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“The ’750 patent states that “the fluid pathway can be a radially serpentine fluid pathway which causes the fluids received in the off axis chamber to flow back and forth around a radius of the off axis chamber,” also using “radially serpentine fluid pathway” to refer to this rotation around the chamber radius “while also traversing a length of the off axis chamber.” Ex. 1001, 4:34–41 (emphasis added). This is the only description of “radially” serpentine flow in the ’750 patent. Notably, the ’750 patent does not use “radially” or “serpentine” to describe a fluid pathway “which causes the fluids to spiral around the central chamber within the off axis chamber along a length of the off axis chamber,” instead referring to such a fluid pathway as a “helical fluid pathway.” Id. at 4:41–44. See CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of . . . different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings.”). Inst. Dec. 11–12. We explained that the flow path depicted above, which is equivalent to that of Figure 14 of the ’750 patent, “flows circumferentially about the central chamber.” Id. at 14. We maintain this interpretation. Stated differently, the depicted flow is around a longitudinal axis of the chamber. See MTA PG 6 (describing the flow path depicted above as “a back and forth flow path around a longitudinal axis of the off axis chamber; that is, a circumferentially serpentine pathway”); see also Ex. 2003 ¶ 40 (Dr. Neitzel describing the flow path depicted above as “a back and forth flow path around a longitudinal axis of the off axis chamber”). The flow is not around a radius of the chamber, which Patent Owner recognizes is required for a flow path to be radially serpentine. See PO Resp. 10 (“Patent Owner agrees with the Board’s conclusion in the [Institution Decision] that ‘radially serpentine’ as recited in the claims of the ’750 patent means a back and forth flow around a radius of the off axis chamber.” (citation modified)); PO Sur-reply 2 (agreeing that “radially serpentine” requires “a back and forth flow around a radius of the off axis chamber”).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that neither Petitioner nor its witness, Mr. Nixon, has explained adequately how Thurler’s disclosure of its tube e being perforated for two thirds of its length “contemplates other lengths of perforations.” See Pet. 48; Ex. 1013 ¶ 212. Such conclusory assertions fail to apprise us of why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to modify Thurler’s device in contradiction to Thurler’s explicit disclosure. We are also not persuaded by Petitioner’s proffered reasoning for modifying Thurler’s device. First, the modification is not a matter of design choice because the perforations allow the gases generated by firing the projectile to pass into the space between tubes e and g where they partially expand. See Ex. 1015, 1:84–91. Thus, modifying the number of perforations necessarily affects the flow of gases through the device. Next, neither Petitioner nor Mr. Nixon explains adequately how reducing the amount of perforation in tube e results in an increased fluid length. See Pet. 49; Ex. 1013 ¶ 213. Rather, although less fluid may enter into tube e with Petitioner’s modification, it appears that that fluid would travel the same distance along tubes e and h as in Thurler’s unmodified device. Finally, neither Petitioner nor Mr. Nixon explains adequately how limiting the amount of gases generated by firing the projectile from entering the expansion zones of tubes g and h provides any benefit. To the contrary, limiting the amount of gases in the manner suggested by Petitioner would reduce the suppression of such gases, resulting in a less effective device. Moreover, Thurler discloses that “there is still a space of a few millimeters between [tubes] e and g which is necessary” to prevent the application of “pressure on the projectile causing the same to deviate.” Ex. 1015, 1:106–2:3. Thus, Petitioner’s modification would not result in the passage of gases occurring only at the first three of Thurler’s tubular sleeves as asserted by Petitioner. Additionally, in the Institution Decision, we explained that Petitioner did not provide adequate reasoning to support the proposed modification of Thurler’s device regarding parent claim 1 to have concentric tubes around the central tube e. See Inst. Dec. 29–31. This shortcoming, which we maintain, carries through to dependent claim 6. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not shown, by a” slip op. at 26
- ScopeMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“We agree with Petitioner that the amendment is broadening. Petitioner’s witness testified that he “wouldn’t call a BB gun a high energy device or a high energy weapon.” Paper 33, 18:4–6. Thus, per Petitioner’s witness, use of a BB gun would not be covered by claim 22, no matter what is discharged from the BB gun. However, if high energy material is discharged from that same BB gun, that use would be covered by proposed substitute claim 43 (assuming the other claim recitations were met). See id. at 21:10–12 (Dr. Neitzel agreeing that “if something produces a high energy material, it automatically is a high energy weapon”). Thus, by deleting “high energy device” and replacing that language with “weapon,” proposed substitute claim 43 impermissibly broadens the scope of claim 22. See Sisvel Int'l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“But if a substitute claim ‘is broader in any respect it is considered to be broader than the original claim even though it may be narrower in other respects.’” (citation modified) (quoting Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Converse Inc., 183 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999))); see also Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 6 (“A patent owner may not seek to broaden a challenged claim in any respect that enlarges the scope of the claims of the patent . . . . Likewise, a proposed substitute claim may not remove a feature of the claim in a manner that broadens the scope of the claims of the challenged patent.”).” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 8,286,750 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,286,750 - PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00141 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Nishida-based challenges.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,749 B2 (“the ’749 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The Petition challenges the patentability of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent. Nike, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)2 filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 13). We discretionarily denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Paper 20. Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision denying institution. Paper 21. Director Review was granted, the Decision denying institution of inter partes review was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Board. Id. at 4. Specifically, the case was “remanded to the Board with instructions to consider Petitioner’s Nishida grounds and to determine whether the Petition should be instituted.” Id. at 3–4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’749” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In support of Petitioner’s position, Dr. Adanur testifies that “Nishida discloses that the unfinished surface area 1.1 is part of the web 1 itself,” that Nishida discloses that the computer-controlled process can (using Nishida’s phrase) “put in” up to seven different textile fibers or yarns into the web of material in one operation, and that, “[t]hus, Nishida discloses simultaneously knitting its layouts 2 and tongue 40 (each a ‘textile element’) with the unfinished surface area 1.1 (a ‘surrounding textile structure’).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 216 (citing Ex. 1022, 2:12–20, 4:47–55, 5:45–49). For purposes of institution, we credit that testimony over the testimony of Dr. Pastore, because, on the current record, we regard Dr. Adanur’s testimony as more consistent with the evidence. This and the other related issues may be explored more fully during the trial.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’749 patent in March 2004 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - Fedex Corporate Services, Inc. v. Roambee CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 3, 2023 · IPR2022-00934 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable over Sharma and Cova; proposed substitute claims 21–40 are unpatentable as obvious, and the revised motion to amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“one transport carrier to another, or the shipment was not handled properly.” (cited at Pet. 12–13)); Ex. 1005 ¶ 30 (“In some embodiments, the communication module 210 is configured to determine a current location of the wireless tracker device at one or more intervals wherein the one or more intervals are based on a delivery route of the shipment.” (cited at Pet. Reply 22)). Additionally, Petitioner’s proposed combination also relies on the teachings of Cova, which include the teaching of using a relay to receive and forward asset data as that asset is in transit.9 See Pet. 19–20; Pet. Reply 20–22; PO Resp. 35 (“[Patent Owner] clarifies this point by acknowledging that a relay device co-located with an asset on a ship may be able to relay tracking information for the duration of the ship’s journey.”); see also, e.g., Ex. 1007, 9:40–59. Accordingly, Sharma alone or in combination with Cova teaches or suggests “receiving . . . [the tracker and sensor data] as the asset and wireless tracker are moved from one location to another location.”” slip op. at 30
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“intermediate area to destination area 718. Ex. 1001, Fig. 7, 14:35–49. Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, the Specification of the ’922 patent does disclose an asset passing a plurality of mobile devices. Petitioner does not persuasively show that the scope of the claimed invention having the subject language cannot be discerned with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute independent claims 21 and 35 are indefinite.” slip op. at 85
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“claims 1–20 of the ’922 patent are unpatentable over Sharma and Cova. In addition, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 21–40 would have been obvious over: 1) Sharma, Cova, and Kubo; 2) Sharma, FedEx ’231, and Kubo; and 3) Sharma, Tile ’254, and Kubo. We determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 21–40 are unpatentable as being indefinite. Because Petitioner has met its burden as to every proposed substitute claim, we deny Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend. We also grant Petitioner’s motion to exclude exhibits 2013, 2014, and 2015.” slip op. at 88
Patent outcomesUS 10,990,922 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,990,922 - Zillow Group, Inc. / Zillow, Inc. et al. v. International Business Machines Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 3, 2022 · IPR2020-01655 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as anticipated by Linden; Petitioner did not show claims 4–7, 9–17, 19, and 20 unpatentable on the asserted anticipation grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“1 Chewy, Inc. filed a Petition seeking review of the same claims challenged in Zillow’s Petition and also a Motion for Joinder with this proceeding. Paper 25, 2. We granted Chewy Inc.’s Petition and Motion for Joinder. Id. at 25.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10 We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’443 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner adopts our “application of the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms.” PO Resp. 10. Because there is no dispute that the claims should be analyzed using the plain and ordinary meaning thereof, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“disclose this limitation, i.e., Linden does not perform word matching, is likewise unavailing because it is premised on an ipsissimis verbis test. We turn to Linden’s disclosure relied on by Petitioner. Linden discloses that “[t]he similar items table 60 could also reflect non-collaborative type item similarities including content-based similarities derived by comparing item contents or descriptions.” Ex. 1003, 9:12–15 (emphasis added). Linden also discloses “if the user is currently searching for books on a particular topic and has added several such books to the shopping cart, this method will more likely produce other books that involve the same or similar topics.” Id. at 3:52–55 (emphasis added). Linden also discloses “the current and/or past contents of a shopping cart can be used to generate recommendations in a system in which mappings of items to lists of similar items are generated from a computer-based comparison of item contents.” Id. at 16:52–56. Linden, thus, explicitly discloses generating recommendations by comparing item contents or descriptions and provides a specific example of matching books involving the same or similar topics. We find this disclosure corresponds to the requirement of step 1[c] of “identifying . . . at least one advertisement . . . having at least one word that matches said . . . search result item.” After considering the evidence cited by Petitioner in light of Patent Owner’s contentions, we find Petitioner establishes that Linden discloses this limitation.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,076,443 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,076,443 - Republic Tobacco, L.P. v. Fan BaoAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 27, 2016 · IPR2015-00072 · APJ Jennifer Meyer Chagnon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–24 are unpatentable under § 103 over Chen alone or Chen and Kastner; adverse judgment is entered and claims 1 and 25 are canceled.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“1 Patent Owner expressly requested cancelation of claims 1 and 25 of the ’752 patent. PO Resp. 9; see also Tr. 19:7–19 (Patent Owner’s counsel conceding the unpatentability of claims 1 and 25). Although Patent Owner did not file a Motion to Amend or statutory disclaimer, we construe Patent Owner’s statements regarding claims 1 and 25 as an abandonment of the contest as to these claims and, thus, as a request for entry of adverse judgment with respect to claims 1 and 25. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Accordingly, claims 1 and 25 will be canceled. 2 CN 201138314Y, published Oct. 22, 2008 (Ex. 1006). Ex. 1006 includes both a certified English translation, and the original publication in Chinese. All citations to Ex. 1006 are to the English translation portion of the document, and refer to the page numbers added by Petitioner at the bottom right-hand corner of each page.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“the art would have a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent engineering design experience, as well as “familiarity with machines to achieve consolidation through compression of loose materials like tobacco to fill hollow tubes and other receptacles and experience in designing machines to achieve consolidation through compression.” Pet. 27–28 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 10). While we agree with Patent Owner that one of skill in the art will have some familiarity or experience in the design of consumer products, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s assertion that the relevant art should be defined so narrowly as to specifically require experience in designing cigarette making devices. Patent Owner presents no evidence beyond the uncorroborated testimony of its declarant (who also happens to be the inventor of the ’752 patent) that the design of cigarette making devices is particularly specialized and beyond the skill of a mechanical engineer. Thus, we disagree with Patent Owner and decline to insert any specific experience or specialized knowledge of cigarette making devices into the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art of the ’752 patent.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“weight.8 PO Resp. 1–2, 11–18. Patent Owner’s argument is based, in part, on its definition of a person of ordinary skill—namely, a person with “at least 4 years’ experience in the design of consumer products, including at least 2 years in the design and operation of cigarette making devices.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 16). Patent Owner asserts that “merely being a skilled engineer is not enough to qualify as one of ordinary skill in the art of the ’752 patent, unless that person has sufficient experience in cigarette making devices specifically.” Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 17).” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“argues that the 1896 date printed on Brown is hearsay and cannot be used to establish dissemination or public availability. Id. at 24. As noted by Petitioner, however, “Brown, including the printed date of 1896, falls within the exception to the rule against hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16).”9 Reply 7. Further, Petitioner provides evidence regarding the” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,261,752 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,261,752
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.