- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00203 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 16 is unpatentable as obvious over Ellsberry; the Board did not reach the Perego-422 or Perego-422 and Amidi grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we accept Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art except that we omit the qualifiers “at least” before years of education and experience because they render the level ambiguous and may encompass levels that are beyond ordinary. Otherwise, we find Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art consistent with the ’912 patent and the applied prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“However, the subsequent emphasized sentences (id. at 8:54–60) could only be understood in favor of Petitioner’s interpretation. If “the command signal is passed through to both associated ranks” and “the command signal is sent to both memory devices,” each rank must have only one memory device. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that this passage means that a rank may have only one memory device. Patent Owner argues that this paragraph of the ’912 patent (id. at 8:44–64) must be read in conjunction with its Figures which show multiple memory devices per rank. PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:31–38, 20:64–65, 22:34–35, Figs. 1A, 1B, 2A, 3A; Ex. 2062 ¶¶ 106–107). However, the disputed paragraph refers to “certain embodiments” which do not necessarily correspond exactly to what the Figures depict, and the Figures are described as “exemplary” and “compatible with” or “in accordance with certain embodiments described herein.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:32–48. We find no statement here or elsewhere in the ’912 patent that a rank must include multiple memory devices, and cannot include a single memory device.” slip op. at 18
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the ’244 provisional does not provide written description support under § 112 ¶ 1 for claim 16 of the ’912 patent. There is no mention of “bank address” signals in the ’244 provisional. In order to find that “bank address” signals are present, according to Patent Owner’s arguments and the evidence presented, one would have to (1) assume at least that the ’244 provisional pertains to DDR memory modules (when there is no mention of DDR and there were other types of DRAM devices on the market) because Figure 1 suggests them by its use of chip select signals and the term “rank,” and because they were the most common at the time; (2) understand that DDR DRAMs use bank address signals according to the JEDEC standards; (3) recognize that bank address signals are not mentioned in the ’244 provisional; (4) infer that bank address signals would be included as part of the control signals (even though the other address signals are explicitly mentioned and set out separately); and (5) infer that the bank address signals are used for rank multiplication (when row/ and column/address could have been used for this purpose). This is a chain of inferences too long and speculative to show that the ’244 provisional demonstrates that the inventors had possession of the subject matter of claim 16.” slip op. at 29
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner on this issue, which is currently on appeal before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Appeal No. 23-2346, Doc. 14, page 15 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2024). In an inter partes review, a petitioner “may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Ellsberry is a printed publication, having been published in December 2006, as Patent Owner acknowledges. See Ex. 1037, code (43) (publication date of Dec. 7, 2006); see also PO Resp. 54 (acknowledging publication in December 2006). Ellsberry is prior art at least under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1), being “an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent.” See Ex. 1037, code (22) (filing date of June 1, 2005). Thus, Petitioner asserts a permissible ground of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) because it argues that claim 16 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) on the basis of prior art (Ellsberry), which is a printed publication. Accordingly, we determine that Ellsberry is prior art to the ’912 patent at least under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1).” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 7,619,912 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,619,912 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 17, 2024 · IPR2022-00615 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 16 is unpatentable as obvious over Ellsberry; the Board did not reach the Perego-422 grounds because Ground 3 was dispositive.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“We entered an Order for Petitioner to complete the additional discovery as authorized by the Director, and for the parties to propose a briefing schedule for the additional discovery. Paper 42. Petitioner filed the authorized additional discovery as exhibits and a Summary of Responses to the Additional Discovery (Paper 46) along with a Motion to Seal (Paper 43), which we granted (Paper 49). We then authorized a schedule for the parties to brief the applicability of the additional discovery to the issue of whether Google was a real party in interest and the Petition thus time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Papers 51–57. After consideration of the evidence, we determined by Order on Remand from the Director (Paper 62 (parties and Board), Paper 64 (public)) that Google was not a real party in interest and that this proceeding thus was not time-barred.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“After briefing on the additional discovery but before our Order on Remand from the Director, Micron Technology, Inc., Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc., and Micron Technology Texas, LLC (“the Micron entities”) filed a petition and requested joinder to this proceeding. IPR2023-00203, Papers 1, 3. We granted the Micron entities’ petition for inter partes review and joined them as parties on the petitioner side of this case. Id. at Paper 8. A copy of that institution decision was entered in this proceeding. Paper 58. We refer to Samsung and the Micron entities together as “Petitioner” in this Decision.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we accept Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art except that we omit the qualifiers “at least” before years of education and experience because they render the level ambiguous and may encompass levels that are beyond ordinary. Otherwise, we find Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art consistent with the ’912 patent and the applied prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“However, the subsequent emphasized sentences (id. at 8:54–60) could only be understood in favor of Petitioner’s interpretation. If “the command signal is passed through to both associated ranks” and “the command signal is sent to both memory devices,” each rank must have only one memory device. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that this passage means that a rank may have only one memory device. Patent Owner argues that this paragraph of the ’912 patent (id. at 8:44–64) must be read in conjunction with its Figures which show multiple memory devices per rank. PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:31–38, 20:64–65, 22:34–35, Figs. 1A, 1B, 2A, 3A; Ex. 2062 ¶¶ 106–107). However, the disputed paragraph refers to “certain embodiments” which do not necessarily correspond exactly to what the Figures depict, and the Figures are described as “exemplary” and “compatible with” or “in accordance with certain embodiments described herein.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:32–48. We find no statement here or elsewhere in the ’912 patent that a rank must include multiple memory devices, and cannot include a single memory device.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 7,619,912 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,619,912 - PTAB · Apr 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01270 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that LG would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“A Memorandum from Director Vidal titled Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District 4 US 20030076783 A1, filed Oct. 19, 2001, published Apr. 24, 2003 (Ex. 1009). 5 US 2004/0223507 A1, filed May 7, 2003, published Nov. 11, 2004 (Ex. 1006). 6 US 6,359,877 B1, filed July 21, 1998, issued Mar. 19, 2002 (Ex. 1008). Court Litigation (USPTO June 21, 2022) (“Interim Procedure”)7 provides that “the PTAB will not deny institution of an IPR or PGR under Fintiv . . . where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Procedure 9. Petitioner has submitted such a stipulation. Ex. 1300; Paper 24 at 1. Thus, we do not exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“framework is met because Kuchibhotla and Liu were cited in an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) and because “the relevant teachings of Lucent are substantively similar to those of Khan (Ex. 1010).” Prelim. Resp. 28–29. We agree with Patent Owner that the citation of Kuchibhotla and Liu satisfies the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 7–8 (“Previously presented art includes art made of record by the Examiner, and art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent.”); see also Ex. 1002, 34 (IDS listing Kuchibhotla), 36 (IDS listing Liu); Paper 24 at 2–3 (Petitioner’s acknowledgement that Kuchibhotla and Liu were cited). In the second part of the Advanced Bionics framework, we consider Becton, Dickinson factors (c), (e), and (f) to determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. The Examiner did not substantively discuss Kuchibhotla and Liu and, therefore, factor (c) (the extent to which the asserted references were evaluated during prosecution, including whether a rejection rested on any reference) weighs against denying institution. Furthermore, as explained below in § II.F.1, we agree, on this record, with Petitioner’s contentions as to disputed limitation 1.e and, therefore, determine that factor (f) (the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the petition warrant reconsideration of the asserted references or arguments) weighs against denying institution.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering, computer science, or the equivalent thereof, and at least two years of experience with wireless communication systems.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 38–41). Petitioner also contends that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 38–41). Patent Owner does not comment on the level of ordinary skill in the Preliminary Response. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’247 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience. The qualifier expands the range indefinitely without an upper bound, and thus precludes a meaningful indication of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,869,247 - PTAB · Apr 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01269 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 2 and 3 over all petition grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, including on obviousness over Tenny and TS36.300.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“A Memorandum from Director Vidal titled Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (USPTO June 21, 2022) (“Interim Procedure”)7 provides that “the PTAB will not deny institution of an IPR or PGR under Fintiv . . . where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Procedure 9. Petitioner has submitted such a stipulation. Ex. 1300; Paper 24 at 1. Thus, we do not exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“In view of Marinier’s disclosures and in view of the Examiner’s allowance of the claims despite the Examiner’s findings and the applicant’s apparent failure to respond to those findings during prosecution, we determine that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims by allowing the claims over Marinier in combination with Yoo and Narasimha, and we do not deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“d) Determination for Claim 2 For the reasons discussed above and based on Petitioner’s contentions and evidence, summarized above, we are persuaded, on this record, that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating that claim 2 is unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of Tenny and TS36.300. Because we are sufficiently persuaded by Petitioner’s obviousness showing, we need not rely on Petitioner’s anticipation ground based on Tenny, which we address above.” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’545 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience. The qualifier expands the range indefinitely without an upper bound, and thus precludes a meaningful indication of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,854,545 - PTAB · Apr 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01273 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 17–24 and 26–28 on all Petition grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 17 was obvious over Sayana and Lee-689.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“grounds 1–3 (which includes all of the challenged independent claims), we consider whether Petitioner has shown that the Office materially erred. Becton, Dickinson factor (c) focuses on the record previously developed by the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. If the record, “is not well developed or silent, then a petitioner may show the Office erred by overlooking something.” Id. However, “if the alleged error is a disagreement with a specific finding of record by the Office, then ordinarily the petitioner’s required showing of material error must overcome persuasively that specific finding of record.” Id. at 10–11.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Id. at 6. “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. In evaluating these factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. (citing CTPG 58 (November 2019)).” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Sayana’s “codebook subset restriction” information using Lee-689’s bitmap, resulting in a system in which a separate bitmap is used for each of Sayana’s codebooks (wideband and subband) to identify precoding matrices to restrict from each respective codebook, would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 114; see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 85; Ex. 1007, 18:5-15. Specifically, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have made that modification in order to provide flexibility in the signaling of precoding matrices to UEs by specifying precoder subsets for each specific precoder codebook. See Ex. 1003 ¶114. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that the combination of Sayana and Lee-689 teaches limitation 17.a.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,136,924 - PTAB · Apr 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01272 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 on all asserted grounds because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 3 Based on the current record, there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 3 is unpatentable as obvious in view of Stewart and 3GPP-Summary 4. Claims 1, 2, and 4–6 Because Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’486 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every challenge raised by Petitioner, especially, as in this case, when Patent Owner does not separately argue” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“comments received from stakeholders in response to a Request for Comments. Interim Fintiv Guidance 2. For example, “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Fintiv Guidance 7. Petitioner filed a Sotera-type stipulation. Ex. 1300. Specifically, Petitioner stipulates that if we institute this proceeding, “Petitioner will not pursue in Pantech Corp. v. LG Elecs. Inc., No. 5:22-cv-00113 (E.D. Tex.), the grounds of invalidity asserted in the IPR, or any other ground that was raised or could have reasonably been raised in the IPR.” Id. In view of the Sotera-type stipulation, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution. Interim Fintiv Guidance 7–8.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“implementation of incremental redundancy for HSDPA” using a “new ‘ringbuffer’ scheme.” Ex. 1007, §§ 1, 2.4. 3GPP-Summary describes Motorola’s proposed improvement as interleaving separately systematic bits and parity bits and that the separately interleaved bits (systematic bits followed by parity bits) are then stored in a buffer. Id. § 2.4 (“The systematic bits and the parity bits from the R=1/3 mother code are interleaved separately. A transmitter buffer is defined, where the interleaved systematic bits are stored, followed by the interleaved parity bits.”). When combined with Stewart, the output of the different interleavers (which in Stewart are for the systematic bits, first parity bit stream, and the second parity bit stream (Ex. 1005, 4:14–19, 4:25–29, Fig. 4)) are buffered in a single buffer prior to transmission. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 175–178.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“3GPP-Summary teaches eight different redundancy versions: “Eight different initial positions are defined in the buffer, giving at maximum eight (non-self-decodable) redundancy versions.” Ex. 1007 § 2.4. The eight different redundancy versions are defined by their different initial positions. Id. 3GPP-Summary further teaches that “at transmission, bits are sequentially transmitted from the buffer, starting at the selected initial position” and that “(wrap around is used at the end of the buffer).” Id. A person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood, based on specific initial positions, that either systematic bits would have been selected the initial starting point (or redundancy version): So, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that if the “starting point” is located in the area of the “transmitter buffer” that stores the “interleaved systematic bits,” systematic bits are read out from the “transmitter buffer” for transmission before the parity bits are read out. If the “starting point,” on the other hand, is located in the area of the “transmitter buffer” that stores the “interleaved parity bits,” the parity bits are read out from the “transmitter buffer,” and then reading wraps around to the systematic bits. Accordingly, 3GPP-Summary teaches reading out for transmission systematic bits followed by interleaved parity bits (i.e., selecting parity bits over systematic bits) and vice versa (reading out for transmission interleaved parity bits and wrapping out to read out interleaved systematic bits, i.e., selecting systematic bits over parity bits). Ex. 1003 ¶ 182 (citing Ex. 1007 § 2.4).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,065,486 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 1, 2024 · IPR2022-01428 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–34 are unpatentable: claims 1–6, 8–14, 16–19, and 29–34 as obvious over Kim and Rajan; claim 7 over Kim, Rajan, and Riho; and claims 15, 20–28 over Kim, Rajan, and Wyman.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“As Patent Owner confirmed during oral argument, the term “array dies” in the claims encompasses non-DRAMs. Tr. 53:4–7. Because the subject matter pertains to configurations involving non-DRAM devices, the “person having ordinary skill in the art,” by definition under the statute, would have had knowledge of non-DRAM devices. To the extent Petitioner’s proposed skill level, on which the parties agree, does not make that clear, we do. Thus, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner with the exception of the qualifier “at least,” which introduces vagueness as to the amount of experience. We also determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been familiar with designs and operations of non-DRAM devices for the reasons discussed above.” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“litigation, a district court construed this term based on the following argument made by the applicant during prosecution of the ’060 patent regarding U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2008/0025137 A1 (Ex. 1011 (“Rajan137”)): “Rajan[137] does not disclose ‘a plurality of stacked array dies.’ Rajan[137] merely stacks DRAM circuits 206A–D, which are different from array dies.” Ex. 2004, 31–32 (quoting Ex. 1002 (’060 patent prosecution history), 465 (January 13, 2014 Amendment at 10)). The district court found that Patent Owner “did not explain the structural difference between array dies and DRAM circuits, or even how they might be stacked differently” but, nonetheless, found that Patent Owner “structurally distinguished ‘stacked DRAM circuits’ from ‘stacked array dies’ to obtain the patent.” Ex. 2004, 32. Based on this prosecution history, the district court adopted the defendants’ proposed construction that “array die” means “array die that is different from a DRAM circuit.” Ex. 2004, 32. Samsung is a defendant in that litigation. Patent Owner argues that it “agreed to be bound by this construction and proceeded with the jury trial on that construction.” PO Resp. 17 (citing Exs. 2010, 2011). Yet, during the trial in this proceeding, Patent Owner qualifies the district court’s construction to suggest that the term “array dies” means dies that are different from a particular kind of DRAM die. See, e.g., PO Resp. 44 (“[T]he Petition contains no analysis on how or why Kim’s memory chips are different from Rajan137’s DRAM circuits.”); see also Inst. Dec. 10–11 (addressing similar pre-institution arguments); Tr. 58:11– 15 (Patent Owner’s counsel asserting that Rajan137 “describes, for instance, monolithic memory circuits may take the form of, and then it lists an example. And it lists DRAM as an example of a monolithic memory circuit. So, we take DRAM circuit to be a monolithic memory circuit that holds state while powered.”). The district court’s construction, which Patent Owner asserts it adopted, does not contain any such qualification. In our analysis below, we apply the district court’s construction, and we find that the combination of Kim and Rajan teaches array dies that are not DRAMs and, therefore, are “different from a DRAM circuit.” Therefore, we need not address any further qualifications of the district court’s construction or construe the term “DRAM circuit” to determine what Patent Owner actually disclaimed, if anything. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[P]rosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.”); see also Genuine Enabling Tech. LLC v. Nintendo Co., 29 F.4th 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“If the challenged statements are ambiguous or amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations, prosecution disclaimer is not established.”). Based on our findings as to non-DRAM dies, we also need not determine whether the term “array die” should be construed to also encompass DRAM circuits.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that Kim and Rajan are analogous art. Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 154–155). Patent Owner does not dispute that Kim and Rajan are analogous art to the ’060 patent. See PO Resp. We agree with Petitioner that Kim and Rajan are analogous art because they are both in the same field of endeavor as the ’060 patent—memory packages and in particular those involving stacked memory. Ex. 1001, 1:18–19 (“The present disclosure relates to memory devices and memory modules.”), claim 1 (“memory package” with “stacked array dies”); Ex. 1014 ¶ 3 (“Various embodiments of the present disclosure generally relate to a semiconductor memory apparatus . . . .”), Fig. 5 (stacked memory chips); Ex. 1015, 1:14–16 (“This invention relates generally to digital memory such as used in computers[], and more specifically to organization and design of memory modules such as DIMMs [(dual in-line memory modules)].”), Figs. 2–6 (stacked memories).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Based on the foregoing, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement a shared data bus for multiple memory chips as taught by Rajan (e.g., 415A and 415B, above) using, e.g., Kim’s TSV interconnects . . ., in part because a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that there were a finite number of known ways to connect additional dies, including having a subset of dies sharing a through-silicon via (TSV). See Pet. 28. Furthermore, we find persuasive Petitioner’s reasoning that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to connect additional memory dies to Kim’s TSV1 and TSV2 because it would not require creating new TSVs (which would add space and circuitry).” Pet. 28– 29 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 164). As discussed above, Kim suggests having more than two dies, Rajan discloses how to share a data bus among multiples dies, and the evidence of record shows that TSVs were used to implement data busses. Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 48, 50; Ex. 1025, 1:39–42, 2:56–64. We find that using the existing TSVs of Kim would be beneficial to avoid having to create new ones, “which would require space and additional circuitry.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 164. Having found persuasive the above contentions, we turn to the issue of whether the proposed combination would have been within the ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (noting that “a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”).” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 8,787,060 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,787,060 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 1, 2024 · IPR2022-01427 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim, Rajan, and Wyman; the Board did not reach the alternative Riho, Rajan, and Riho2 ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s assertions regarding non-DRAM devices. The obviousness inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) requires us to determine if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. As Patent Owner confirmed during oral argument, the term “array dies” in the claims encompasses non-DRAMs. Tr. 53:4–7. Because the subject matter pertains to configurations involving non-DRAM devices, the “person having ordinary skill in the art,” by definition under the statute, would have had knowledge of non-DRAM devices. To the extent Petitioner’s proposed skill level, on which the parties agree, does not make that clear, we do. Thus, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner with the exception of the qualifier “at least,” which introduces vagueness as to the amount of experience. We also determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been familiar with designs and operations of non-DRAM devices for the reasons discussed above.” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“litigation, a district court construed this term based on the following argument made by the applicant during prosecution of the ’060 patent regarding U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2008/0025137 A1 (Ex. 1011 (“Rajan137”)): “Rajan[137] does not disclose ‘a plurality of stacked array dies.’ Rajan[137] merely stacks DRAM circuits 206A–D, which are different from array dies.” Ex. 2004, 31–32 (quoting Ex. 1002 (’060 patent prosecution history), 465 (January 13, 2014 Amendment at 10)). The district court found that Patent Owner “did not explain the structural difference between array dies and DRAM circuits, or even how they might be stacked differently” but, nonetheless, found that Patent Owner “structurally distinguished ‘stacked DRAM circuits’ from ‘stacked array dies’ to obtain the patent.” Ex. 2004, 32. Based on this prosecution history, the district court adopted the defendants’ proposed construction that “array die” means “array die that is different from a DRAM circuit.” Ex. 2004, 32. Samsung is a defendant in that litigation. Patent Owner argues that it “agreed to be bound by this construction and proceeded with the jury trial on that construction.” PO Resp. 17 (citing Exs. 2010, 2011). Yet, during the trial in this proceeding, Patent Owner qualifies the district court’s construction to suggest that the term “array dies” means dies that are different from a particular kind of DRAM circuit. See, e.g., PO Resp. 47 (“[T]he Petition contains no analysis on how or why Kim’s memory chips are different from Rajan137’s DRAM circuits.”); see also Inst. Dec. 10–11 (addressing similar pre-institution arguments); Tr. 58:11–15 (Patent Owner’s counsel’s assertion that Rajan137 “describes, for instance, monolithic memory circuits may take the form of, and then it lists an example. And it lists DRAM as an example of a monolithic memory circuit. So, we take DRAM circuit to be a monolithic memory circuit that holds state while powered.”). The district court’s construction, which Patent Owner asserts it adopted, does not contain any such qualification. In our analysis below, we apply the district court’s construction, and we find that the combination of Kim, Rajan, and Wyman teaches array dies that are not DRAMs and, therefore, are “different from a DRAM circuit.” Therefore, we need not address any further qualifications of the district court’s construction or construe the term “DRAM circuit” to determine what Patent Owner actually disclaimed, if anything. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[P]rosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.”); see also Genuine Enabling Tech. LLC v. Nintendo Co., 29 F.4th 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“If the challenged statements are ambiguous or amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations, prosecution disclaimer is not established.”). Based on our findings as to non-DRAM dies, we also need not determine whether the term “array die” should be construed to also encompass DRAM circuits.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that Kim and Rajan are analogous art. Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–151). Patent Owner does not dispute that Kim and Rajan are analogous art to the ’160 patent. See PO Resp. We agree with Petitioner that Kim and Rajan are analogous art because they are both in the same field of endeavor as the ’160 patent—memory packages and in particular those involving stacked memory. Ex. 1001, 1:20–21 (“The present disclosure relates to memory devices and memory modules.”), claim 1 (“memory package” with “stacked array dies”); Ex. 1014 ¶ 3 (“Various embodiments of the present disclosure generally relate to a semiconductor memory apparatus . . . .”), Fig. 5 (stacked memory chips); Ex. 1015, 1:14–16 (“This invention relates generally to digital memory such as used in computers[], and more specifically to organization and design of memory modules such as DIMMs [(dual in-line memory modules)].”), Figs. 2–6 (stacked memories).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“In view of the foregoing, we find that Rajan does not disclose the particular structure in which the shared data busses in Figure 4 are implemented. In other words, Rajan’s disclosure is agnostic as to the particular interconnect technology by which the memories that share data busses are connected to the buffer chip. Dr. Brogioli also testifies that a “data bus can be shared without sharing interconnects, especially in Rajan,” “because Rajan uses wire bonds for connecting its DRAM circuits to the data busses.” Ex. 2023 ¶ 143 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 50). As discussed above, we do not credit Dr. Brogioli’s opinion that Rajan uses wire bonds because it is based on a different reference. Furthermore, the fact that a data bus can be shared without sharing interconnects is irrelevant because Petitioner’s proposed combination is to share interconnects (Kim’s TSVs). See Pet. 30. Rajan’s Figure 4 discloses a stack of memory circuits, as discussed above (see Ex. 1015, 2:6–7, 4:51–55), and Kim discloses using TSVs in stacks of memory chips, as also discussed above (see Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 48, 50, Fig. 5). Thus, Petitioner’s combination is a straightforward one – “implement a shared data bus for multiple memory chips as taught by Rajan . . . using, e.g., Kim’s TSV interconnects.” Pet. 30 (discussed above). At oral argument, Patent Owner’s counsel argued that the “TSV is the individual data wire going down to the bus that’s shared.” Tr. 65:12–13. According to Patent Owner’s counsel, Rajan talks about [two chips] sharing a data bus. So, I don’t see how, from Rajan, you would get the idea of a shared TSV when Rajan speaks solely about sharing data buses. And the data bus, under JEDEC standard, involves individual data wires coming from each of the chips.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 9,318,160 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,318,160 - PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01382 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–3 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, we determine the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’347 patent on all grounds asserted in the Petition. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that a decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design and/or fabrication, including the processing of semiconductor materials, analysis of device operation, or the development of new device topologies.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53). Petitioner also contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 19. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition or offer its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’347 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’347 patent and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”)” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“type gate material of independent claim 1 requires that the “bottom of the ptype gate material is more than 10% wider than the top of the material.” Pet. 19. We begin our analysis with the language of the claims themselves. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Here, the claims do not recite any numerical degree of horizontal extension, let alone a requirement that the bottom of the p-type gate material must be more than 10% wider than the top of the material. Thus, the plain language of the claims themselves do not support Petitioner’s proposed construction. Of course, the claims do not stand alone, but rather, must be read in view of the specification, of which they are part. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Petitioner relies on a numerical value for horizontal extension disclosed in Lidow, which is incorporated by reference in the ’347 patent. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 41–42, Fig. 8; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–74). But Lidow’s disclosure of a numerical value (10%) is made in the context of discussing a single embodiment. Ex. 1011 ¶ 41. Lidow does not include a numerical value in its disclosure of other embodiments. See, e.g., Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 43–51.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Again, Patent Owner’s arguments raise issues that are best resolved on a full record. While we do have some concern’s regarding Petitioner’s asserted reasons to combine all of the prior art references, Petitioner has provided sufficient argument and evidence for purposes of institution that a POSITA would have had reason to manufacture the modified Figure 1A of Saxler by using Beach’s self-aligned technique with Shenoy’s isotropic etching process, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–62, 93; Ex. 1014 (Xu); Ex. 1021 (Sheppard); Ex. 1015 (Smith); Ex. 1018 (Hu); Ex. 1009 (Shenoy); Widmann (Ex. 1023); Ahn (Ex. 1010); see also Pet. 31–35. For example, Dr. Shealy testifies that a POSITA would have recognized that using Beach’s self-aligned techniques and Shenoy’s isotropic etching process to arrive at Saxler’s non-recessed gate structure would have been a simple and predictable combination in view of Smith’s use of self-alignment techniques to create its stacked gate structure and would have done so to reduce steps and costs while improving reproducibility. Ex. 1003 ¶ 93. We also note that we understand Petitioner’s proposed combination uses a single photomask when etching both the gate metal and the p-type gate material layer, including when etching the gate metal to form a pair of ledges on the p-type gate material below the gate metal. See, e.g., Pet. 48 (stating that it would have been obvious to use one mask to etch the gate metal and cap layer and further stating that using Shenoy’s method of isotropically etching the gate metal would form symmetric undercuts of the photomask). To the extent, the Board’s understanding of Petitioner’s argument is not correct, the parties are urged to address this issue. Finally, Patent Owner asserts that Shenoy is non-analogous art and may not be combined with Saxler or Beach because Shenoy involves electrochemical etching, a highly specialized etching method with little relevance to the process described in the ’347 patent or Saxler. Prelim. Resp. 27.” slip op. at 32
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,748,347 - PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01384 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. CONCLUSION Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim of the ’335 patent is unpatentable over the prior art of record, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims. And because we find some grounds sufficient for institution, we institute on all grounds in the petition. See SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1353 (2018); PGS Geophysical, 891 F.3d at 1360. determination with respect to the patentability of any challenged claim or any underlying factual or legal issue, including claim construction. IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–7 of the ’335 patent is instituted with respect to all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition, commencing on the entry date of this Decision; and FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of trial.” slip op. at 54
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design and/or 1 The relevant sections of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, took effect on March 16, 2013. Because the ’335 patent has an effective filing date prior to the effective date of the applicable AIA amendments, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 US 2006/0108606 A1, published May 25, 2006 (Ex. 1007). 3 JP H11-261053, published Sept. 24, 1999 (Ex. 1005 (original language); Ex. 1006 (certified English translation)). 4 US 2007/0007547 A1, published Jan. 11, 2007 (Ex. 1008). 5 R.V. Shenoy, et. al, Effect of Mask Wall Angle on Shape Evolution during Through-Mask Electrochemical Micromachining, J. ELECTROCHEM. SOC., Vol. 143, No. 2, 544, Feb. 1996 (Ex. 1013). device operation, or the development of new device topologies.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53). Petitioner also contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition or offer its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’335 patent and the prior art of record, at this stage of the proceeding we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’335 patent and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“type gate material of independent claims 1 and 5 requires that the “bottom of the p-type gate material is more than 10% wider than the top of the material.” Pet. 19. We begin our analysis with the language of the claims themselves. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Here, the claims do not recite 7 Patent Owner cites to the Lidow-508 patent itself, instead of the published application included in the record as Ex. 1011, which Petitioner cites to. The parties have not identified any difference between the two references. the bottom of the p-type gate material must be more than 10% wider than the top of the material. Ex. 1001, 5:5–6:30. Thus, the plain language of the claims themselves does not support Petitioner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“As discussed above, however, we are persuaded, at this stage, by Petitioner’s argument that that Saxler teaches or suggests an operable enhancement-mode device. See § II.D.1.a.i, supra. Additionally, Patent Owner’s argument regarding modifications that “could be detrimental” to certain devices is not only speculation, but also comprised entirely of attorney argument. Finally, Patent Owner does not directly address Petitioner’s arguments and accompanying evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Saxler and Yoshida to take advantage of simplified manufacturing steps and reduced costs. Based on the present record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Saxler and Yoshida disclose or suggest all of the limitations in claims 1, 3, and 4, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Saxler and Yoshida with a reasonable expectation of success. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge that claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Saxler and Yoshida. For the same reasons as noted above, we decline to address Petitioner’s challenge of claims 2 and 5–7 based on Saxler and Yoshida alone at this stage. See § II.D.1.c, supra.” slip op. at 44
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,312,335
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.