- PTAB · Aug 14, 2024 · IPR2024-00207 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–25, 38, and 39 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Motorola would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’249 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“The mixing operation described in Botha appears materially different than that described in Löppönen. The Office acknowledged in allowing the ’249 patent that in Löppönen’s mixed stream, “the user still hears only one group at a time.” Ex. 1003 at 32, 76–77. That does not appear to be the case in Botha. In Botha, the combination of a variety of audio streams [occurs] in such a way that each participant will hear all other participants’ voices except their own. This is known as an ‘N minus l’ mix- where ‘N’ represents the sum of all audio streams entering a[t] the core logic of the invention, and the ‘minus l’ portion refers to the subtraction of the current participant’s stream from the stream returned to them. Ex. 1004, 10:35–43. 3. Conclusion Based on the current record before us, we determine that Petitioner is not asserting the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously presented to the Office with respect to Botha (Ground 1). Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).3 E. Prior Art References” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art: would have had at least a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field, plus approximately three years of industry in networking or communication systems, in particular address interoperability between different types of networks and satellite communications. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 68). Patent Owner “does not dispute the proposal provided by Petitioner as to who would qualify as a POSITA.” Prelim. Resp. 6. pre-AIA law applies. See Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, we cite to pre-AIA § 103(a). We regard Petitioner’s definition as consistent with the ’249 patent and the asserted prior art, and the definition is supported by the testimonial evidence. Therefore, for the purpose of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We agree with Petitioner that we can determine whether to institute trial without having to resolve Petitioner’s assertion of indefiniteness. See Samsung, 948 F.3d 1355 (question of indefiniteness “is simply another ground on which the claims might be challenged in an appropriate forum,” and “does not necessarily preclude the Board from addressing the patentability of the claims on section 102 and 103 grounds”). Independent claim 25 is directed to a system for providing a push-to- talk proxy media service, reciting a “means for receiving,” a “means for mixing,” and a “means for transmitting,” among other things. Ex. 1001, 25:51–64. Petitioner identifies the recited functions and provides corresponding structures for these “means for” limitations recited by claim 25 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner “maintains that the proposed constructions for these three claim terms are overly limiting since the specification provides support for a broader range of structures, at the least, and does not concede to the constructions provided by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 6. It is not necessary for us to resolve the claim construction issues identified by the parties in order for us to determine whether to institute inter partes review of the ’249 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision and based upon the preliminary record, we decline to expressly construe any of the claim terms at this point in the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This preliminary Decision, however, does not prevent the parties from proposing, presenting evidence, or arguing a same or different construction of the claims during trial. The parties are encouraged to present their claim construction arguments and evidence as permitted by our rules.2 A final claim construction will be determined after the close of all the evidence and after any oral hearing in this matter. D. Discretionary Denial – 325(d)” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,145,249 - PTAB · Aug 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00511 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of all challenged claims on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Shaffer-Keller obviousness challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’949 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review with respect to all challenged claims and grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Other
“below, we agree with Petitioner on this record that the ’852 patent claims lack priority to the parent application, Shaffer. For example, paragraph 34 of the ’299 application11 resulting in the ’852 patent explains that “IS 102 (FIG. 1) can determine if the endpoint 104 adheres to the rules of transmission.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 34. This paragraph does not state that any other device (such as the endpoint itself) receives a determination from the IS that the endpoint does not adhere to the rules of transmission. Figure 7, reproduced below, is similarly devoid of any such description: 11 U.S. App. No. 14/523,299 (Ex. 1004). The specification describes Figure 7 as “an example methodology that can facilitate dynamic communication between non-compatible communication devices.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 55. The specification further explains that “if the device demonstrates that it cannot comply with the behavioral characteristics of the interoperability system, the device can be attached to a VTG [virtual talk group] via a proxy,” in blocks 710 and 714 of Figure 7. Id. ¶ 56. But the ’299 application does not explain that this lack of compliance is communicated to any device, such as an endpoint.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner also sets forth a rationale to combine Shaffer and Keller. Id. at 33–34. For example, Petitioner argues that Shaffer’s goal was to provide a way for incompatible endpoints to work using “standards-based IP technologies,” and Keller’s SIP protocol is an established “standards-based IP technolog[y]” for signaling in PTT. Id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶ 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 155). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have looked for an example of such a system, such as Keller’s SIP-based system, for a PTT system as in Shaffer. Id. at 33–34. Combining these systems therefore 15 This appears to be a typographical error, as Petitioner appears to be quoting Ex. 1024 ¶ 122. “would have been seen by a POSITA as nothing more than a combination of known elements according to their established functions to achieve an expected result, and would been considered to constitute nothing more than a routine engineering task that was well within the skill level of a POSITA,” Petitioner argues. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 155). On this record, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Shaffer and Keller discloses limitation [1c] and determine that Petitioner articulates a sufficient rationale to combine these references.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “at least a bachelors’ degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field, plus approximately three years of industry in networking or communication systems, in particular address interoperability between different types of networks and satellite communications,” and that “[a]dditional education in the fields of electrical engineering or computer science, such as a masters or doctorate degree, could substitute for professional experience in the field.” Pet. 14–15. Petitioner adds that “[a] person with less or different education but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. Prelim. Resp. 7. Based on the current record, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan as consistent with the ’852 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,319,852 - Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Sta Group LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00479 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–5 and 8–11 were obvious over Choksi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). slip op. at 5
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends, and we agree, that “the Petition ignores that the proxy is ‘dynamically inserted to connect . . . the endpoint to a virtual talk group.” Prelim. Resp. 17. Petitioner’s argument fails because the 5 Elsewhere, Petitioner mentions “virtual talk group” in the context of the recited “rules of transmission” (Pet. 27) and trusted endpoint identity (Pet. 30), but neither of these passages provides an explanation of how Choksi discloses “receive a first determination from the IS . . . that a proxy is to be dynamically inserted to connect the endpoint to a virtual talk group.” Petition provides no explanation as to what constitutes claim 1’s “virtual talk group” in Choksi, let alone that Choksi teaches “that a proxy is to be dynamically inserted to connect the endpoint to a virtual talk group” as claimed. Even if we were to agree with Petitioner that Choksi’s signaling bridge is a dynamically inserted proxy, Petitioner does not explain how the signaling bridge “connect[s] the endpoint to a virtual talk group.”” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner contends, and we agree, that “the Petition ignores that the proxy is ‘dynamically inserted to connect . . . the endpoint to a virtual talk group.” Prelim. Resp. 17. Petitioner’s argument fails because the 5 Elsewhere, Petitioner mentions “virtual talk group” in the context of the recited “rules of transmission” (Pet. 27) and trusted endpoint identity (Pet. 30), but neither of these passages provides an explanation of how Choksi discloses “receive a first determination from the IS . . . that a proxy is to be dynamically inserted to connect the endpoint to a virtual talk group.” Petition provides no explanation as to what constitutes claim 1’s “virtual talk group” in Choksi, let alone that Choksi teaches “that a proxy is to be dynamically inserted to connect the endpoint to a virtual talk group” as claimed. Even if we were to agree with Petitioner that Choksi’s signaling bridge is a dynamically inserted proxy, Petitioner does not explain how the signaling bridge “connect[s] the endpoint to a virtual talk group.”” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,319,852 - PTAB · Aug 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00595 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim, including obviousness over Pierre and Gershman.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“Advanced Bionics Part 2 We also consider whether Petitioner has demonstrated the Office erred “in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. “An example of a material error may include misapprehending or overlooking specific teachings of the relevant prior art where those teachings impact patentability of the challenged claims.” Id. at 8 n.9; see also NPRM at 28700 (“material error may include misapprehending or overlooking clear, specific evidence in the prior record, including teachings of the relevant prior art that impact the patentability of the challenged claim”). We evaluate Becton, Dickinson factors (c), (e), and (f) to determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated material error. Id. at 10. Those factors are: (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson, Paper 8 at 17–18. According to our precedent, “if the record of the Office’s previous consideration of the art is not well developed or silent, then a petitioner may show the Office erred by overlooking something persuasive under [Becton, Dickinson] factors (e) and (f).” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10; see also Keysight Techs., Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc., IPR2022-01421, Paper 14 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2023) (Director Review vacating Board decision denying institution, finding examiner misapprehended or overlooked prior Board determinations regarding same references in related IPR). In evaluating Becton, Dickinson factors (c) and (e), we determine Petitioner has shown the Examiner erred by overlooking Gershman’s teaching of a “moving plate” and digital image capture of an unrestrained chick as a disclosure of the “unrestrained chick” limitation. More particularly, the record evidence at this stage of the proceeding indicates the Examiner did not meaningfully consider Gershman’s disclosure: (i) of Figure 3, showing a chick on a “moving plate,” (ii) of Figures 5 and 6, digital images of a chick “reflexively” opening its wings without restraint for image capture, or (iii) that it would have been “obvious” to “adapt[]” and “add” the “moving plate” system to the “end” of industrial chick processing lines. Pet. 10, 22, 36–37 (compare Ex. 1002, 220–221, 226–228 with Ex. 1003, 1, 2, 5, 6, 10). Regarding Becton, Dickinson factor (f), the Petition presents additional evidence and facts, including material teachings of the new Pierre reference regarding the “unrestrained chick” limitation as detailed in Part 1 above, that warrant inter partes review.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim in the ’124 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–18 of the ’124 patent on all grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“unrestrained chick” limitation in independent claims 1 and 6. Pet. 36–37, 39–40. Petitioner emphasizes Pierre’s teaching of placing a chick in a position where it is falling so that it will open its wings “naturally” for image capture by a digital camera. Id. at 36, 39 (citing Ex. 1004, 4). Petitioner argues it would have been obvious to use Gershman’s moving plate to cause a chick to fall and “reflexively” open it wings for image capture as in Pierre, “because both Pierre and Gershman are in the same field and directed to solving the same problem, namely, automating assessment of chicks by imaging their wings.” Id. at 37, 39–40. Patent Owner does not address the argument. See Prelim. Resp. 12–15. On the present record, we agree with Petitioner’s reliance on Pierre-Gershman and also refer to our analysis of Ground 1 and the teaching of Gershman’s “moving plate” as a disclosure of the “unrestrained chick” limitation. On the present record, Petitioner’s argument and evidence support the position that Pierre and Gershman are analogous art and the proposed combination of Pierre-Gershman teaches the “unrestrained chick” limitation. slip op. at 24
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,806,124 - Databricks, Inc. v. R2 Solutions LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00659 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Pike, Pike with Chowdhuri, or Pike with Chowdhuri and MacLeod rendered claims 1–46 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’610 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–46 of the ’610 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner relies on conclusory reasoning grounded in hindsight to assert a POSITA would have found it obvious to include file names to identify the data in each of Pike’s input files “because it would have allowed for locating that data group in Pike’s system and understanding the data in that file.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 93).13 Petitioner then makes the leap that, by understanding the data in an input file, a MapReduce programmer would have had reason “to identify input files and write ‘application-specific’ map and reduce functions on those files.” Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1002, 10:1–7, 11:28–47, 14:12–27; Ex. 1005 ¶ 93). The difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that neither Pike nor other cited references disclose, teach, suggest, or otherwise provide motivation to write application-specific map and reduce functions that process each input file by identifiable schema or data type, i.e., by “data group” as recited in claim 1. Pike teaches application-specific programming “to process the input data one record at a time” or “to generate its output data in the form of key/value pairs,” nothing more. Ex. 1002, 7:31–36; see Pet. 29 (citing same); Prelim. Resp. 40–41, 50–51, 56 (citing same). Petitioner’s posited file names for Pike’s input files, moreover, could not serve as the claimed “data group” mechanism to identify the data in each input file by schema (or data type) for separate map and reduce processing. Each of Pike’s 13 Linn Declaration paragraph 93 is substantially identical to Petitioner’s argument and does not add any further insight or analysis on this point. data blocks can include data from more than one input file, a portion of one input file, or an entire input file. Ex. 1002, 6:55–7:6; see also Prelim. Resp. 47 (“Pike’s ‘data blocks’ (purported ‘partitions’) can be entire ‘input files,’ parts of ‘input files,’ or parts of multiple ‘input files’”). Therefore, a file name for one input file could not uniquely identify all of the data within a given data block, which could include data from different input files. Id. We agree with Patent Owner’s reasoning and argument on this point as well. In sum, Petitioner fails to show sufficiently that a POSITA would have had reason or motivation to use input file names in Pike as “data group” identifiers, as recited in claim 1 of the ’610 patent. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (obviousness requires “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”).” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentable
“We further agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s asserted motivation for tracking processed data “derived from a particular [input] file” to improve efficiency “by enabling a data set to be selectively reduced after it is mapped” (Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 119)), is speculative hindsight-based reasoning. Petitioner’s posited motivation is grounded in benefits residing in the ’610 patent, not in the prior art or knowledge of a POSITA. Prelim. Resp. 48. Petitioner’s evidence—Dr. Linn’s naked opinion that a POSITA “could” have used the identification of processed output file data as “derived from a particular file” to selectively reduce intermediate data (Ex. 1005 ¶ 119)—is unpersuasive for the reasons given above and legally insufficient. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 35
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to the patentability of any of claims 1–46 of the ’610 patent. Therefore, we deny institution of inter partes review of the challenged claims. We need not address Patent Owner’s argument for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) in view of our decision denying institution on the merits.” slip op. at 50
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,190,610 - Cloudera, Inc. v. R2 Solutions LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00303 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on the merits, finding that Pike and Pike with Chowdhuri, alone or with MacLeod, did not show a reasonable likelihood of rendering claims 1–46 unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’610 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–46 of the ’610 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“someone having “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related [to] performing data analytics and/or related data processing tasks.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 67–69; In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Petitioner further asserts that work experience can substitute for formal education and additional formal education can substitute for work experience. Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 14.” slip op. at 14
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“13–31; Ex. 1008, 10–19); Prelim. Resp. 10 n.1, 17 (citing Pet. 10; Ex. 1007, 24– 25); see also Paper 7, 2 (Updated Mandatory Notices).10 The parties each provided proposed constructions of “data group” and related arguments to the court. Id. The district court construed “data group” as “a group of data and a mechanism for identifying data from that group (e.g., a group identifier).” Ex. 1007, 23–25. Having reviewed the district court’s construction of “data group,” and given the parties’ application of that construction here, we apply the district court’s construction of “data group” for purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (claim terms “need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s argument explicitly and implicitly relies on the teachings of the ’610 patent, not Pike or some other MapReduce reference or teaching, for the proffered motivation that a “POSITA would have understood,” “recognized,” or “found it obvious to implement” Pike’s MapReduce system to include input file names as the “data group” identifiers in claim 1 of the ’610 patent. See Pet. 17–18. Petitioner relies on conclusory reasoning grounded in hindsight to assert a POSITA would have found it obvious to include file names to identify the data in each of Pike’s input files “because it would have allowed for locating that data group in Pike’s system and understanding the data in that file.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 93).14 Petitioner then makes the leap that, by understanding the data in an input file, a MapReduce programmer would have had reason “to identify input files and write ‘application-specific’ map and reduce functions on those files.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, 10:1–7, 11:28–47, 14:12–27; Ex. 1005 ¶ 93). The difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that neither Pike nor other cited references disclose, teach, suggest, or otherwise provide motivation to write application-specific map and reduce functions that process each input file by identifiable schema or data type, i.e., by “data group” as recited in claim 1. Pike teaches application-specific programming “to process the input data one record at a time” or “to generate its output data in the form of key/value pairs,” nothing more. Ex. 1002, 7:31–36; see Pet. 27 (citing same); Prelim. Resp. 39–40, 49–50, 55 (citing same).” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,190,610 - Guest-Tek Interactive Entertainment Ltd. v. Nomadix, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 22, 2018 · IPR2018-00392 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing of its denial of institution on the obviousness ground over Slemmer and Vu, finding no abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“supporting Petitioner’s position that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the cited references. Req. Reh’g. 8–10. In particular, Petitioner reiterates previous arguments presented in the Petition such as “Vu is one of the first prior art references to teach the handshake” but that “other prior art references also teach it.” Req. Reh’g 8. These arguments were previously addressed. Decision 6–7. Although Petitioner may disagree with our resolution of the arguments that Petitioner presented in its Petition, such arguments were considered fully in our Decision.” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,725,899 - Guest-Tek Interactive Entertainment Ltd. v. Nomadix, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 22, 2018 · IPR2018-00376 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and upheld denial of institution on the Slemmer and Vu obviousness ground because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on a petition, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co.,, 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“supporting Petitioner’s position that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the cited references. Req. Reh’g. 8–10. In particular, Petitioner reiterates previous arguments presented in the Petition such as “Vu is one of the first prior art references to teach the handshake” but that “other prior art references also teach it.” Req. Reh’g 9. These arguments were previously addressed. Decision 7–8. Although Petitioner may disagree with our resolution of the arguments that Petitioner presented in its Petition, such arguments were considered fully in our Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“construction for the term ‘TCP connection hand shake completion data,’ which resulted in an incorrect determination.” Req. Reh’g. 5. In particular, Petitioner now proposes a broadest reasonable construction of the term “TCP connection hand shake completion data” to mean “two devices initiating a communication session by the first device sending information to a second device, and the second device then responding to the first device.” Req. Reh’g. 7. Based on this newly proposed construction of the term “TCP connection hand shake completion data,” Petitioner argues that Vu discloses this feature. Req. Reh’g. 6–8. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), Petitioner must “identify all matters [Petitioner] believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” Petitioner did not present this proposed construction in the Petition. See generally Req. Reh’g.; see generally Pet. We could not have “misapprehended or overlooked” what was not presented.” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,266,266 - Apple Inc. v. Andrea Electronics Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00627 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 10–16, 21–23, 25, and 38–46 are unpatentable; claims 6–9, 17–20, 24, and 47 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Although the dictionary defines “periodically” as “from time to time” or “at regular intervals of time,” based on the record before us, we agree with Patent Owner that its proposed construction is how one skilled in the art would have understood that term in the context of the ’345 patent Specification. Turning first to the intrinsic evidence, the Specification explains that “[t]he future and current minimum values are calculated continuously and initiated periodically, for example, every 5 seconds.” Ex. 1001, 8:37–39. Although the Specification later notes that “[i]t will be appreciated that, while specific values are used as in the several equations and calculations employed in the present invention, these values may be different than those shown” (id. at 8:64–67), this passage does not mean that the Specification contemplates arrangements where “periodically” is simply “from time to time.” Rather, we determine that statement from the Specification indicates that the specific amount of time (i.e., every 5 seconds) may vary. Turning now to the extrinsic evidence, the testimony of Dr. Douglas supports our conclusion, explaining that “at regular intervals of time” is the “only . . . definition . . . consistent with the understanding of a person skilled in the art in light of the specification of the ’345 Patent and its use in the particular field of audio signal processing” because [l]ike the “period” of an audio signal itself, which is the amount of time it takes for a signal to repeat itself, “periodically” as recited in claims 6 and 9 and throughout the remainder of the specification of the ’345 Patent refers to actions that occur at regular intervals (e.g., every 5 seconds rather than merely “from time to time”). Ex. 2002 ¶ 48. Moreover, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Hochwald testifies that outside of the context of the ’345 patent Specification, “periodically” means “at regular time intervals” (Ex. 2005, 99:13–15), and when asked about that term’s meaning in the context of the ’345 patent Specification, Dr. Hochwald simply noted that “all I can do is read what it says,” which is that “[i]t’s doing something periodically, for example, every five seconds” (id. at 100:4–6). Accordingly, the testimony from Dr. Douglas, as well as that from Dr. Hochwald, supports Patent Owner’s construction. In summary, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction of “periodically,” requiring “at regular intervals of time,” because (1) this is consistent with how this term is used in the context of the ’345 Patent Specification; and (2) this is supported by the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Patent Owner responds that, because Helf uses average values (i.e., the average of eight consecutive values), it does not disclose using a minimum value. PO Resp. 17–23. Patent Owner acknowledges that the ’345 patent, itself, uses a “smoothing process [that] produces frequency bins with multiple smoothed magnitude values, ultimately finding the minimum of all of the values,” but contends that “Helf’s averaging process produces a single output representing one average of the original samples.” Id. at 20–21 (underlining omitted) (citing Ex. 1001, 8:14–28; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 52, 63–72). We disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of the differences between Helf and the ’345 patent. While Helf may ultimately produce a single minimum value, as discussed above, that value is based on a minimum value of the averages calculated over the given time period. At oral hearing, Patent Owner acknowledged that Helf determines many averages values (i.e., the averages of the eight consecutive frames) and determines a minimum of those values. See, e.g., Tr. 22:2–6. The claim simply requires a “future minimum value,” and does not preclude that value from being a minimum value taken from a set of average values. Indeed, such an interpretation of the claim would be inconsistent with the ’345 patent’s use of smoothed values noted by Patent Owner. Ex. 1001, 8:14–28. The testimony of Dr. Douglas cited by Patent Owner does not convince us otherwise. See Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 52, 63–72 (effectively repeating Patent Owner’s contentions, which are unpersuasive for the reasons set forth above). Accordingly, we are persuaded that Helf’s minimum value (Mk) corresponds to the “future minimum value” recited in claims 4 and 39.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation foundMixed
“With respect to its “running minimum estimator,” Helf explains that the “running minimum estimator” is used “when either the speech signal is never absent for more than a second or the background noise itself is never constant in spectral shape.” Ex. 1010, 8:11–15. Helf acknowledges that its “running minimum estimator” is “much less accura[te]” than its “stationary estimator,” which is typically used for background noise estimates. Id. at 8:15–17. As a result, Helf only uses its “running minimum estimator” if “[i]t has been more than 10 seconds since the last update of the background noise spectral estimate due to the Stationary Estimator,” and “[t]he difference, D, between the past background noise estimate, which may have resulted from the Stationary Estimator or the Running Minimum Estimator, and the current Running Minimum Estimator is great.” Id. at 8:32–42. We see no persuasive reason to set Helf’s current background noise estimate (Nk and Ck, considered the “current minimum” by Petitioner) to the minimum estimate (Mk) from the “running minimum estimator” (considered the “future minimum” by Petitioner). The testimony of Dr. Douglas supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 119, 120. Addressing the portions of Helf noted above, Dr. Douglas testifies that “Helf only relies on Mk in a ‘worst case’ scenario” and “disfavors the use of Mk, even where Bk is unavailable,” and concludes that “one of ordinary skill would not be motivated to force the use of the disfavored Mk every ten seconds even where the much more accurate Bk estimate is available.” Id. ¶ 119. Dr. Douglas further testifies that “one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to abandon[] the comparison of D to a threshold” because “one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Helf is a signal-dependent system, and it would not abandon its ability to adapt to varying signal conditions in favor of a blind periodic update using a disfavored estimate.” Id. ¶ 120. We credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald in this regard. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 157–159; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 115–120. The testimony from Dr. Douglas is consistent with the disclosure of Helf, while that of Dr. Hochwald is based on conclusory statements. For example, the only portions of Dr. Hochwald’s testimony cited in the Petition in connection with the rationale provided in this challenge are conclusory statements that “[a] person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify Helf to update the background noise estimate after every 10 second period based on the teachings of Martin,” and “[t]he skilled person would have recognized it was beneficial to periodically update the minimum noise value to ensure it accurately reflected the current noise level,” which are contrary to the disclosure of Helf noted above. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 158, 159.” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedOther
“We see no persuasive reason to set Helf’s current background noise estimate (Nk and Ck, considered the “current minimum” by Petitioner) to the minimum estimate (Mk) from the “running minimum estimator” (considered the “future minimum” by Petitioner). The testimony of Dr. Douglas supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 119, 120. Addressing the portions of Helf noted above, Dr. Douglas testifies that “Helf only relies on Mk in a ‘worst case’ scenario” and “disfavors the use of Mk, even where Bk is unavailable,” and concludes that “one of ordinary skill would not be motivated to force the use of the disfavored Mk every ten seconds even where the much more accurate Bk estimate is available.” Id. ¶ 119. Dr. Douglas further testifies that “one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to abandon[] the comparison of D to a threshold” because “one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Helf is a signal-dependent system, and it would not abandon its ability to adapt to varying signal conditions in favor of a blind periodic update using a disfavored estimate.” Id. ¶ 120. We credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald in this regard. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 157–159; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 115–120. The testimony from Dr. Douglas is consistent with the disclosure of Helf, while that of Dr. Hochwald is based on conclusory statements. For example, the only portions of Dr. Hochwald’s testimony cited in the Petition in connection with the rationale provided in this challenge are conclusory statements that “[a] person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify Helf to update the background noise estimate after every 10 second period based on the teachings of Martin,” and “[t]he skilled person would have recognized it was beneficial to periodically update the minimum noise value to ensure it accurately reflected the current noise level,” which are contrary to the disclosure of Helf noted above. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 158, 159.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 6,363,345 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,363,345 - Apple Inc. v. Andrea Electronics Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00626 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 12–25, 38, and 47 are unpatentable; claims 4–11 and 39–46 are not shown unpatentable, chiefly because the proposed Hirsch–Martin combination was not supported.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“In its Reply, Petitioner contends that, “[i]n this configuration [where W = 1], any purported distinction between windows and sub-windows in Martin vanishes and [Patent Owner]’s argument is irrelevant,” acknowledging that the proposed modification eliminates Martin’s sub-windows. Pet. Reply 5. Petitioner further contends that Patent Owner “incorrectly argues that the use of sub-windows is central to Martin’s algorithm” and “[n]othing in Martin suggests that the use of sub-windows is required.” Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 6–8). We disagree with Petitioner, and credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald with respect to Martin’s use of sub-windows because, as discussed below, Dr. Hochwald’s testimony is not consistent with the disclosure of Martin, while the testimony of Dr. Douglas is consistent with that disclosure. See, e.g., Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 6–9 (asserting that Martin does not expressly require sub-windows); Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 94–96 (discussing Martin’s use of at least two sub-windows for monotonic determination). As noted above, Martin’s algorithm requires a determination of whether or not “the minimum power of the last W windows with M samples each is monotonically increasing.” Ex. 1006, 1094. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to modify Hirsch’s system based on a scenario from Martin where W = 1 because such a scenario is counter to the entire purpose of Martin. Even Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Hochwald, acknowledges that a single data point (i.e., W = 1) cannot be used to determine whether something is monotonically increasing. See Ex. 2005 69:10–17 (explaining that you need at least two data points to make such a determination, meaning W ≥ 2). Petitioner fails to provide persuasive reasoning as to why one skilled in the art would have modified Hirsch’s teachings in a manner that is contrary to the express disclosure of Martin.” slip op. at 14
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner attempts to cure these deficiencies in its Reply, contending that, “[e]ven where Martin’s algorithm is configured to use multiple sub-windows, it still teaches the claimed ‘future minimum.’” Pet. Reply 8. We do not consider this new argument, as it is a new theory of unpatentability presented for the first time in the Petitioner’s Reply. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed Cir. 2016) (“A patent owner . . . is undoubtedly entitled to notice of and a fair opportunity to meet the grounds of [unpatentability].”) (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). For at least these reasons, Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 4–11, 39–42, and 46 are unpatentable over the combined teachings of Hirsch and Martin.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Hirsch is directed to “techniques . . . to estimate the noise spectra or the noise characteristics for noisy speech signals” that “can be combined with a nonlinear spectral subtraction scheme.” Ex. 1005, 153. Hirsch discusses use of “FFT based spectral analysis” (id. at 154), for example, which Petitioner cites as corresponding to the “generating the frequency spectrum of said audio signal thereby generating frequency bins of said audio signal” recited in claim 1 (Pet. 27). Hirsch discusses use of an “adaptive threshold” for each frequency bin to distinguish between speech and noise (Ex. 1005, 153), which Petitioner cites as corresponding to the “setting a threshold for each frequency bin using a noise estimation process” recited in claim 1 (Pet. 27). Hirsch describes comparing spectral components to their corresponding thresholds to determine if speech is present (Ex. 1005, 153), which Petitioner cites as corresponding to the “detecting for each frequency bin whether the magnitude of the frequency bin is less than the corresponding threshold, thereby detecting the position of noise elements for each frequency bin” recited in claim 1 (Pet. 27–28). Based on the record before us, we are persuaded that Hirsch discloses each and every element of claim 1. We also are persuaded that Hirsch discloses each and every element of claim 38 for the reasons discussed above in connection with claim 1, as well as the “subtracting said noise elements . . . from said audio signal” additionally recited in claim 38. With respect to the recited “subtracting,” Petitioner cites Hirsch’s discussion of spectral subtraction. Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1005, 153–155). As Petitioner notes, “[t]he spectral subtraction technique shown in Hirsch subtracts the noise estimate from each sub-band or ‘bin’ and sets any negative values to zero” (id. (citing Ex. 1005, 153)), which “is the same technique used in the ’345 patent” (id. (citing Ex. 1001, 6:58–61, 7:16–27)). Claims 2, 3, 12, 13, 21, and 23 depend from claim 1, and Petitioner cites to relevant portions of Hirsch as disclosing the additional limitations of those claims. See Pet. 28–31. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s unrebutted arguments and evidence related to how Hirsch properly accounts for each and every element of these dependent claims, which we adopt for purposes of this decision. Specifically, we find that Hirsch discloses the additional limitations recited in those claims based on the citations to Hirsch therein and the supporting expert testimony. See id. Based on our review of the record before us, the preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s contentions that claims 1–3, 12, 13, 21, 23, and 38 are anticipated by Hirsch.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation foundMixed
“Initially, we agree with Petitioner that one skilled in the art would have considered Martin’s teachings, generally, when reviewing the teachings of Hirsch, as Martin is specifically referenced in Hirsch itself. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that one skilled in the art would have modified Hisch’s system based on the teachings of Martin in the particular manner proposed by Petitioner. Consistent with Patent Owner’s contentions noted above, Martin describes determining “[t]he noise power estimate is based on the minimum of signal power within a window of L samples” and “[f]or reasons of computational complexity and delay the data window of length L is decomposed into W windows of length M such that M * W = L,” and provides an example where W=4. Ex. 1006, 1094. Martin distinguishes between “slowly varying noise power” and “rapidly varying noise power” to determine its noise power estimate, with a determination of whether the minimum power in successive sub-windows is monotonically increasing central to its estimation. Id. “If the minimum power of the last W windows with M samples each is monotonically increasing we decide on rapid noise power variation” and “the noise power estimate equals the power minimum of the last M samples Pn(i) = PMmin(i = r * M).” Id. “In case of non monotonic power the noise power estimate is set to the minimum of the length L window.” Id. Regardless of whether the noise power calculation is that for “slowly varying noise power” or “rapidly varying noise power,” Martin requires that first a determination is made as to whether or not “the minimum power of the last W windows with M samples each is monotonically increasing.” Id. (emphasis added). To the extent there can be any dispute on this issue, the testimony from Dr. Douglas supports the understanding that at least two subwindows are required to determine which noise power calculation to use. See Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 95, 96. In its Reply, Petitioner contends that, “[i]n this configuration [where” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 6,363,345 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,363,345
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.