- PTAB · Jan 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01091 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 27, 30, 32, 34, 59, 62, and 64 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“d. Conclusion Regarding Asserted Obviousness over Kim In sum, for the reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s showing regarding claim 1 is sufficient for institution. Accordingly, having reviewed the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence cited therein, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that Kim renders obvious claim 1. As such, Petitioner’s showing is sufficient to institute an inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). Notwithstanding, we address other claims and other grounds below, particularly in response to Patent Owner’s preliminary arguments.” slip op. at 29
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a related field, and would have had at least two years of relevant work experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof.” Pet. 10 n.4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26); Ex. 1003 ¶ 26. Dr. Cockburn also indicates that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner indicates it “does not necessarily agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, but does not believe that resolving that level is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this preliminary response.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Dr. Surati indicates that his opinions provided in his declaration in support of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response are “provided from the perspective of the POSITA” proposed by Dr.Cockburn. Ex. 2001 ¶ 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). consistent with the prior art of record. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“standards for finding lexicography in a specification are exacting. Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning and must clearly express an intent to redefine the term.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). As Patent Owner correctly notes, the specification states: In various embodiments, the contact pressure level may be represented by a touch state. In the context of the present description, a touch state refers to a predefined subset of the range of measurable contact pressures. For example, in one embodiment, contact pressure levels may be represented as one of four predefined touch states: no touch, light touch, medium touch, and heavy touch. Ex. 1001, 19:35–41; Prelim. Resp. 27 (quoting Ex. 1001, 19:35–41). Patent Owner, however, has not identified any words of manifest exclusion or restriction in that passage that indicate an intent to redefine the claim term. Rather than indicating the claims are to be restricted, the specification indicates how that the term “touch state” is to be understood in the descriptions presented in the specification. Ex. 1001, 19:36–37.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“would have been obvious over Kim and Bowens to be sufficient for institution. Petitioner generally relies on Kim’s description as discussed above. Pet. 62–68. Specifically, in its combination, Petitioner relies on Kim’s hold event and scaling operation for Limitations [1.g and 1.h]. Pet. 64–67. Petitioner additionally relies on Bowen as providing details on recognizing and acting on specific gestures on a user interface. See, e.g., Pet. 55. Petitioner provides reasons one of ordinary skill would have combined the references in the manner proposed by Petitioner. See, e.g., Pet. 53–62. Petitioner also provides reasons one of ordinary skill would have reasonable expectation of success in combining the references in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Pet. 60–61.” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,936,114 - Tvision Insights, Inc. v. The Nielsen Company (US), LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01014 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 4–6, 8, 11–14, and 18–20 are unpatentable as obvious over either Lu-577 and Tian or Nielsen-372, Steinberg, and Tian.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“B. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of Claims 1, 9, and 16 As indicated above, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 1, 9, and 16 of the ’243 patent. See Ex. 2002. In view of Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer, we treat claims 1, 9, and 16 as having never been part of the ’243 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C. §] 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”) (citing Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). And, because no inter partes review can be instituted based on disclaimed claims, we do not consider claims 1, 9, and 16 to be within the scope of this proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims”); see also General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution of inter partes review in view of a statutory disclaimer of all” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that” slip op. at 11
- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“III. CONCLUSION34 Based on the entire trial record, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 4–6, 8, 11–14, and 18–20 of the ’243 patent are unpatentable. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that (1) the combination of Lu-577 and Tian and (2) the combination of Nielsen- 372, Steinberg, and Tian both render obvious the subject matter of claims 4– 6, 8, 11–14, and 18–20 of the ’243 patent. A summary of our conclusions is set forth in the table below.” slip op. at 92
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentable
“Pet. Reply 27 (second to fourth alterations in original). We agree with Petitioner and, accordingly, we reject this misdirected argument.31 Stated simply, Nielsen-372’s teaching of a system including a camera supports combining Nielsen-372’s teachings with a Steinberg’s method which uses a camera.” slip op. at 66
Patent outcomesUS 11,470,243 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,470,243 - Mianyang Boe Optoelectronics Technology Co., Ltd. / Wuhan China Star Optoelectronics Semiconductor Display Technology Co., Ltd. et al. v. Samsung Display Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01075 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner failed to show claims 1–6, 10, 12, 17–19, 21–23, 40–47, 51, and 52 unpatentable because the cited art did not teach or suggest a pixel defining layer.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we again adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Pattison, and appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). We find Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill to be imprecise, because Patent Owner does not specify the amount of experience possessed by an ordinarily skilled artisan. The unbounded reference to “experience” is vague and overly broad, as it could mean 1 year of experience or over 30 years of experience, for example. In addition, the ’578 patent is directed to “a pixel arrangement structure of an (OLED) [organic light emitting diode] display” (Ex. 1001, 1:22–23), whereas Patent Owner’s proposed experience is tied to “active-matrix displays.” PO Resp. 5. Given that the field of OLED displays includes both passive and active matrix designs (see generally Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 40–56), we see no reason to restrict the relevant experience to active matrix displays. For these reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner has failed to show that the cited art teaches or suggests a “pixel defining layer” as recited. Neither party in this proceeding or in the ITC Investigation argued that “pixel defining layer” as recited in the challenged claims required construction, and neither party presented any arguments regarding the construction or meaning of this term.6 Pet. 13; PO Resp. 4–5. 5 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) requires that a petition contain a statement identifying how a challenged claim is to be construed. 6 In our Decision instituting trial, we stated that “[i]f either party contends that explicit claim construction is necessary in order to make a final determination whether or not any challenged claim is unpatentable based on the arguments and evidence presented, it should clearly explain why during We give the term “pixel defining layer” as recited its plain and ordinary meaning. For purposes of this decision, we determine that no aspects of the challenged claims require explicit construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Petitioner Has Not Shown That the Cited Art Teaches or Suggests All the” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“or suggestion in Matthies of a pixel defining layer, because there is none.” PO Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 187); see also PO Sur-reply 15–17. Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA would have understood that Matthies employs (or at least could obviously employ) the claimed ‘pixel defining layer.’” Pet. 23. An allegation that a skilled artisan would have understood that the prior art “could obviously” be modified to include an element of the claimed invention does not establish that the prior art teaches or suggests such recited element. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“require for the same reasons set forth above.”). And, in discussing motivation to combine the teachings of Matthies and Yamada, Petitioner articulates no reasoning to support modifying Matthies’ structure based on Yamada to yield a “pixel defining layer.” See Pet. 69–75. Patent Owner argues that “[t]he Petition failed to identify any teaching or suggestion in Matthies of a pixel defining layer, because there is none.” PO Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 187); see also PO Sur-reply 15–17. Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA would have understood that Matthies employs (or at least could obviously employ) the claimed ‘pixel defining layer.’” Pet. 23. An allegation that a skilled artisan would have understood that the prior art “could obviously” be modified to include an element of the claimed invention does not establish that the prior art teaches or suggests such recited element. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,594,578 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,594,578 - Mianyang Boe Optoelectronics Technology Co., Ltd. / Wuhan China Star Optoelectronics Semiconductor Display Technology Co., Ltd. et al. v. Samsung Display Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 6, 2025 · IPR2023-00988 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4–10, 13, and 15 are unpatentable over Phan; claim 2 was not shown unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“experience or over 30 years of experience, for example. In addition, the ’683 patent is directed to “a pixel arrangement structure of an organic light emitting diode (OLED) display” (Ex. 1001, 1:19–21), whereas Patent Owner’s proposed experience is tied to “active-matrix displays.” PO Resp. 5. Given that the field of OLED displays includes both passive and active matrix designs (see generally Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 40–56), we see no reason to restrict the relevant experience to active matrix displays. For these reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed
“Invention” section, Phan states that “[t]he invention [of Phan] relates to a display comprising pixels and dots, including but not limited to” various “display technologies” including “Organic Light Emitting Diode (OLED).” Ex. 1005, 1:17–29 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we find that Phan fairly suggests that the pixel arrangements disclosed in Phan—which are part of Phan’s “invention”—may be applied to OLEDs. See Twitter, Inc. v. VidStream LLC, 825 F. App’x 844, 850 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Bradium Techs. LLC v. Iancu, 923 F.3d 1032, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2019)) (“[W]hen conducting an obviousness analysis, the Board must consider a prior art reference ‘not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.’”). In making this finding, we note that obviousness is determined from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art (see 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)), who in this case would have had “2 years of professional experience working with display design, including OLED displays.” See supra § II.B. In light of this specific experience, we find that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been inclined to link Phan’s disclosed pixel arrangements with OLEDs based on the plain statement about related “display technologies” in Phan’s “Field of the Invention” section. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 321, 410–414. For these reasons, we disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that “Phan does not teach about OLED displays.” PO Resp. 32.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“6 In its Opposition to Petitioner’s first motion to strike, which was filed after the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner implies that the teardown images in the Response speak for themselves and, as such, are entitled to a presumption of nexus. See 1st Strike Opp. 3–4; see also Tr. 102:19–103:15 (similar argument by Patent Owner’s counsel at the oral hearing). Petitioner argues that Patent Owner did not assert an entitlement to a presumption of nexus in the Response, and that Patent Owner’s Opposition is an improper vehicle to introduce such an argument. 1st Strike Reply 1. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner did not address in the Response whether the Samsung Galaxy S22 Ultra smartphone is coextensive with the claims of the ’683 patent. See id.; Pet. Reply 20. Accordingly, we decline to consider any argument that Patent Owner is entitled to a presumption of nexus.” slip op. at 34
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted in part
“6 In its Opposition to Petitioner’s first motion to strike, which was filed after the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner implies that the teardown images in the Response speak for themselves and, as such, are entitled to a presumption of nexus. See 1st Strike Opp. 3–4; see also Tr. 102:19–103:15 (similar argument by Patent Owner’s counsel at the oral hearing). Petitioner argues that Patent Owner did not assert an entitlement to a presumption of nexus in the Response, and that Patent Owner’s Opposition is an improper vehicle to introduce such an argument. 1st Strike Reply 1. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner did not address in the Response whether the Samsung Galaxy S22 Ultra smartphone is coextensive with the claims of the ’683 patent. See id.; Pet. Reply 20. Accordingly, we decline to consider any argument that Patent Owner is entitled to a presumption of nexus.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 10,854,683 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,854,683 - Mianyang Boe Optoelectronics Technology Co., Ltd. / Wuhan China Star Optoelectronics Semiconductor Display Technology Co., Ltd. et al. v. Samsung Display Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 6, 2025 · IPR2023-00987 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 5 was not shown unpatentable because the Phan-based challenge did not establish its limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). “[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“9 In its Opposition to Petitioner’s first motion to strike, which was filed after the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner implies that the teardown images in the Response speak for themselves and, as such, are entitled to a presumption of nexus. See 1st Strike Opp. 3–4; see also Tr. 102:19–103:15 (similar argument by Patent Owner’s counsel at the oral hearing). Petitioner argues that Patent Owner did not assert an entitlement to a presumption of nexus in the Response, and that Patent Owner’s Opposition is an improper vehicle to introduce such an argument. 1st Strike Reply 1. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner did not address in the Response whether the Samsung Galaxy S22 Ultra smartphone is coextensive with the claims of the ’803 patent. See id.; Reply 21. Accordingly, we decline to consider any argument that Patent Owner is entitled to a presumption of nexus.” slip op. at 63
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner
“For these reasons, we accord Patent Owner’s evidence of long-felt” slip op. at 70
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted in part
“9 In its Opposition to Petitioner’s first motion to strike, which was filed after the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner implies that the teardown images in the Response speak for themselves and, as such, are entitled to a presumption of nexus. See 1st Strike Opp. 3–4; see also Tr. 102:19–103:15 (similar argument by Patent Owner’s counsel at the oral hearing). Petitioner argues that Patent Owner did not assert an entitlement to a presumption of nexus in the Response, and that Patent Owner’s Opposition is an improper vehicle to introduce such an argument. 1st Strike Reply 1. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner did not address in the Response whether the Samsung Galaxy S22 Ultra smartphone is coextensive with the claims of the ’803 patent. See id.; Reply 21. Accordingly, we decline to consider any argument that Patent Owner is entitled to a presumption of nexus.” slip op. at 63
Patent outcomesUS 9,818,803 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,818,803 - Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless v. General Access Solutions, Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01147 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references did not establish that the claimed second transceiver routes information based on monitored signal characteristics.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the purported invention would have had either: (1) a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, electrical or computer engineering, or a related field, and at least 2 years of work or research experience in digital communications systems, such as wireless communications systems and networks, or equivalent, or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or similar field. Additional education could compensate for less practical experience and vice versa. Ex. 1002, ¶¶1-46. Pet. 10. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. Cf. Ex. 2007 ¶19 (Patent Owner’s declarant, after acknowledging Petitioner’s definition, stating: “Patent Owner has not offered a different understanding of a POSITA, and the PTAB accepted Petitioner’s submission. I accept and use Petitioner’s and the PTAB’s definition of a POSITA.”). Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“During oral argument, both parties confirmed their respective positions that the claim term “route” needs no construction. See, e.g., Tr. 11:7–9 (Petitioner’s counsel: “Frankly, it doesn’t make any difference to the analysis of the prior art. And so, we don’t believe that the PTAB needs to construe the term route, and so we have not proposed a construction.”); id. at 58:25–59:2 (Patent Owner’s counsel: “You know, I don’t think that you have to define routing in order to decide the case. I think you can do it, you know, just apply whatever plain and ordinary meaning is.”); cf. Tr. 40:14–18 (Patent Owner’s counsel at oral argument: “For the routing itself, you know, there is a District Court construction and that’s a construction that the other—the Petitioner did not ask for determination whether that’s appropriate or not appropriate here. We did not address that as well, so the parties aren’t arguing that that construction should be applied here.”). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art discloses or teaches, under Petitioner’s articulated theories, that a second transceiver routes information based on monitored characteristics. This is dispositive of the inter partes review. Accordingly, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of deciding the dispositive issues.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1004, 5:25–36 (emphasis added). Thus, Palmer discloses that the determination to roam to another cell may be done by the mobile worker’s wireless communication device 20 having a specifically-programmed processor or may be done centrally, with examples being the “network” or central host processor. We disagree that this constitutes a disclosure of the access point 40 performing the roaming determinations. Rather, we find to be persuasive and credible Dr. Chrissan’s testimony that “a POSITA recognizes that an access point does not qualify as ‘centrally, for example, by the network or a central host processor,’” and, “[i]nstead, this phrase refers to one of the centrally located devices such as network 14 or central host processor 12 (in Fig. 1), or a device in administration building 33 (in Fig. 2).” Ex. 2007 ¶ 71 (citing Ex. 1004, Figs. 1, 2). Dr. Chrissan’s opinion is consistent with Palmer’s disclosure, as we will now discuss.” slip op. at 23
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence its foundational assertion that Palmer discloses that “access point 40 determines whether roaming by a portable terminal 20 should take place and routes data packets accordingly.” Pet. 26–27; see Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Failure to prove the matter as required by the applicable standard means that the party with the burden of persuasion loses on that point—thus, if the fact trier of the issue is left uncertain, the party with the burden loses.”). As such, Petitioner has not met its burden to show that Palmer discloses, as recited in independent claim 1, a second transceiver that, “based on the first signal characteristics and the second characteristics, routes information to the first mobile station and the second mobile station, respectively,” or, as recited in independent claim 6, “based on the first signal characteristics and the second characteristics, routing, using the second transceiver, information to the first mobile station and the second mobile station, respectively.” Ex. 1001, 10:38–44, 11:19–22. The Petition does not contain a contention that this “route” aspect of the claims would have been obvious. Compare Pet. 25–26 (offering an alternative argument for the monitoring aspect; contending that, “to the extent the Board disagrees that Palmer’s access point 40 performs the monitoring, it would have nonetheless been obvious to a POSA to select the access point 40 to perform the monitoring since it directly communicates with the portable terminals 20.”), with id. at 26–27 (making the anticipationtype contention that “[t]he access point 40 routes information” without an alternative obviousness contention); see also Pet. Reply 12–13 (arguing, under the monitoring-and-routing heading, that monitoring by the access point would have been obvious, but not arguing the same for routing). Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claims 1 and 6 and dependent claims 2–4 are anticipated by or would have been obvious over Palmer.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 9,426,794 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,426,794 - PTAB · Dec 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00963 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–21 on all asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on each challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Patent Owner contends we should exercise discretion to deny institution because the court has not considered a motion to stay (Factor 1), jury selection in the District Court Litigation is scheduled to begin on February 17, 2026 (Factor 2), the parties have invested substantially in discovery by exchanging a high volume of documents and conducting extensive source code reviews (Factor 3), there is a high overlap between the challenged claims and those involved in the District Court Litigation (Factor 4), the parties are the same (Factor 5), and Petitioner’s arguments are meritless (Factor 6). Prelim. Resp. 35–36. Patent Owner acknowledges that jury selection in the District Court Litigation will not begin until two months after a Final Written Decision is scheduled to issue in this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 35. On October 17, 2024, Petitioner offered the following Sotera Stipulation: “VusionGroup will not pursue an invalidity defense in Hanshow Tech. Co., Ltd. et al. v. SES-imagotag SA et al., Case No. 2:23-cv-00617 (E.D. Tex.) that the patent claims subject to the instituted IPR are invalid based on the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Ex. 1031. In view of all the circumstances, including the scheduled trial date and Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“XI. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will succeed on each of its challenges to patentability and we institute inter partes review. XII. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) an inter partes review of the ’321 Patent is hereby instituted, commencing on the entry date of this Order, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial. FURTHER ORDERED that the trial is authorized on all grounds set forth in the Petition; and.” slip op. at 39
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for patent owner
“1999)); see also Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Petitioner asserts that “[n]o formal claim constructions are necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 6. Nevertheless, Petitioner also proposes constructions of certain “system” limitations, should the Board determine that the claims recite “means plus function” limitations, and argues that interpreted this way, such claims would be indefinite because they lack disclosure of sufficient algorithms for the claimed functions. Pet. 6–7. Petitioner acknowledges that, because the claims do not use the term “means,” there is a presumption against their being interpreted as means plus function limitations and that purported indefiniteness does not preclude the Board from addressing the patent patentability of the claims on sections 102 and 103 grounds. Id. (citing Sony Elecs. Inc. v. Jawbone Innovations, LLC, IPR2023-01352, Paper 7, 47 (PTAB Mar. 6, 2024); Ex. 1003 Houh Decl. ¶¶ 51–52); see also Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Patent Owner argues the claims do not recite means plus function limitations and agrees with Petitioner that no claim construction is required. Prelim. Resp. 7–8. The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by person of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. Williamson F.3d at 1349, Dyfan LLC v Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1365–1366 (Fed. Cir. 2022); see also Zeroclick LLC v. Apple Inc., 819 F.3d 1003, 1008–1009 (Fed. Cir 2018). Having reviewed the claims and the Specification, for purposes of institution, we determine that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood the subject matter that is claimed to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure so additional claim construction is required.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“VIII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner describes a person of ordinary skill (“POSITA” or “ordinarily skilled artisan”) as having “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and two or more years of work experience or research related to computer vision, image analytics or automated object recognition methods and systems. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003, Houh Decl. ¶¶ 18–19). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education in a relevant field or relevant industry experience may compensate for a deficit in one of the other aspects of the requirements stated above.” Id. For purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 7. 5 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the ’321 patent issued from an application filed after March 16, 2013, we apply the AIA statutory basis for unpatentability. 6 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2012/0195363 (Ex. 1005) 7 U.S. Patent No. 8,139,817 (Ex. 1006) 8 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2011/0113461 (Ex. 1007) 9 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2014/0044348 (Ex. 1009) 10 U.S. Patent No. 8,634,601 (Ex. 1008) references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s undisputed description of the level of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the scope of the subject matters claimed and the references, we apply Petitioner’s description in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,701,321 - Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless v. General Access Solutions, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00461 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 28 and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Vornefeld and Atsuta; the Board did not reach the four remaining grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenUnpatentable
“Having considered the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Vornefeld in combination with Atsuta discloses or suggests all of the limitations of dependent claim 28. We also determine that Petitioner has shown that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make the combination proposed by Petitioner and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” slip op. at 44
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. But see Ex. 2028 ¶ 19 (Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Chrissan, stating: “Patent Owner has not offered a different understanding of a POSITA [as set forth in the Petition], and the PTAB accepted Petitioner’s submission. . . . [F]or the purposes of the subject IPR proceedings, I accept and use Petitioner’s and the PTAB’s definition of a POSITA.”). Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“The parties, at oral argument, confirmed that a construction of “sector” is not necessary to decide this case. See Tr. 14:9–15:3 (Petitioner: “JUDGE MCMILLIN: Do we need to engage in claim construction in order to decide this case? MR. ROSENTHAL: I don't believe so, Your Honor.”); id. at 62:13–18 (Patent Owner: “That [prior IPR] proceeding was decided and did not turn on a definition of sector. In this case, this doesn’t need to turn on the definition of sector either.”). On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Even if Patent Owner is correct that Atsuta is an FDD system, that argument does not show a fatal flaw in Petitioner’s obviousness case. Petitioner is not, as Patent Owner implies, proposing to change Atsuta’s purportedly FDD system to a TDD system or to bodily incorporate Atsuta’s entire system into Vornefeld’s system or to make a system that attempts to use both FDD and TDD together. Rather, Petitioner is applying Atsuta’s frame structure—the organization, in the same portion of the same frame, of timeslots for users located in different sections—in Vornefeld’s downlink portion of a frame in a TDD system. See, e.g., Pet. 38 (“the combination would use one known frame structure in place of another—specifically, Atsuta’s design that includes transmissions to multiple sectors in one frame.”). Patent Owner does not persuasively argue that Atsuta’s teachings in that regard are uniquely applicable to an uplink portion in a FDD system such that they are not also applicable to Vornefeld’s system. Rather, Patent Owner, in response to Petitioner’s contention that Atsuta’s frames are compatible with a TDD frame, argues that, “[b]ecause Atsuta provides little explanation as to how its invention could be modified to apply to downlink transmissions at all, let alone in addition to uplink, a POSA would not have applied Atsuta’s invention to downlink transmissions in a TDD frame as Petitioner alleges without support.” PO Resp. 44 (citing Ex. 2028 ¶ 109). That is an argument that there is no reason to combine the references’ teachings because Atsuta lacks an explicit teaching to combine them. It is not an argument that Atsuta’s frame structure cannot work in Vornefeld’s system and therefore the teachings cannot be combined. Additionally, Patent Owner’s requirement of an explicit teaching to combine in the references themselves has been rejected. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415; see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 7,230,931 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,230,931 - Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless v. General Access Solutions, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00392 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 28 and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Vornefeld and Atsuta; the Board did not reach the four remaining grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“fundamentally incompatible.” PO Sur-reply 13 (citing Ex. 2028 ¶¶ 44, 148); see also id. at 11–19. The basis for Patent Owner’s argument is Dr. Chrissan’s testimony that FDD and TDD are mutually exclusive alternatives that cannot be combined in the same system and that one must select one or the other. See id. at 13–14 (citing Ex. 1024, 30:21–31:19; Ex. 2022, 4, 6; Ex. 2030, 9–10). This is not on point as Petitioner’s proposed combination does utilize one, namely Vornefeld’s TDD duplexing. Patent Owner does not address adequately the pertinent issue—whether Atsuta’s teaching of a portion of frame having timeslots for users in different sectors may be applied to Vornefeld’s TDD downlink frame. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony is credible and persuasive, and we find that Atsuta’s frame structure teachings are compatible with and applicable to the downlink portion of Vornefeld’s TDD frame. We do not find to be persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments and Dr. Chrissan’s associated testimony that the references are not combinable because they purportedly are different in certain ways.” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“In contrast, Petitioner persuasively presents argument and evidence that the pertinent teachings of Atsuta are compatible with Vornefeld’s system.8 Dr. Almeroth, in support of the Petition, testifies that “the frames 8 To the extent that Patent Owner asserts that the argument and evidence regarding compatibility in Petitioner’s Reply is untimely, we disagree. See, e.g., PO Sur-reply 16–17 (arguing that certain evidence “is support for Petitioner’s prima facie obviousness case, and so must have been provided in the Petition, if at all.”). The Petition contains the contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Atsuta’s frames “are in Atsuta are comprised of different timeslots reserved for data transmission (Ex. 1005, 6:35-58), just as a TDD frame is.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 105 (cited at Pet. 32 for the “compatible” proposition); see also id. ¶ 94 (“Vornefeld’s and Atsuta’s frame structures are consistent with each other. Both are directed to TDMA frame structured transmissions between a base station and subscribers.”). Dr. Almeroth also provided credible testimony in support of Petitioner’s contention (Pet. 28–29) that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 95–97; see, e.g., id. ¶ 96 (“A POSA would readily understand that combining Atsuta with Vornefeld would have been straightforward. Atsuta’s method for allocating time slots to subscribers in different sectors within a single TDMA frame matches Vornefeld’s MAC protocol, which allows transmission to a subscriber with the ‘granularity of a single time slot.’” (citing Ex. 1004, 54)). Dr. Almeroth further testifies that certain cited disclosures in Atsuta “is all the information a POSA would need to determine that it would be obvious that a single frame in Vornefeld could include downlink transmissions to different sectors,” and “[t]hat would be true regardless of Atsuta’s duplexing method (e.g., FDD or TDD).” Ex. 1025 ¶ 22 (citations omitted). Dr. Almeroth additionally opines that “a POSA would understand that Atsuta’s description of a TDMA frame would indicate to a POSA a methodology that would incorporate one or compatible with a TDD frame.” Pet. 32; see also id. at 27–29 (contentions regarding a reasonable likelihood of success in making the proposed combination). In the Response, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s compatibility contention is incorrect. PO Resp. 44. We find that Petitioner’s subsequent argument and accompanying evidence is an appropriate reply to Patent Owner’s argument of incompatibility.” slip op. at 37
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues “Atsuta teaches away from the objective of Vornefeld . . ., instead teaching that transmissions must be made sequentially so they never overlap in time.” PO Resp. 2–3; see also id. at 46. Even if Vornefeld’s purported purpose is simultaneous transmission and even if the proposed combination would not retain such, as Petitioner contends (Pet. Reply 14–15), Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive because the teaching of something different does not constitute a teaching away. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“the prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed”). Patent Owner points to Vornefeld’s disclosure of simultaneous transmissions and to Atsuta’s disclosure of transmitting in a manner such that the signals to the stations do not overlap, but does not explain why a person of ordinary skill in this art would be discouraged from combining the references teachings so as to arrive at claimed subject matter that does not require simultaneous transmissions. See PO Resp. 45–46.” slip op. at 40
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesUnpatentableDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner counters that there is no motivation to combine because “a POSA would have recognized that Atsuta’s design would have provided little to no benefit of reduced power or hardware complexity relative to the added costs of its implementation in Vornefeld.” PO Resp. 58 (citing Ex. 2028 ¶ 128); see also id. at 55–56. We do not agree with Patent Owner. Atsuta explains that, in the then-conventional TDMA method, each of three zones had an independent frame and used three independent apparatuses. See Ex. 1005, 1:53–60, 5:21–27, Fig. 1 (depicting three circuits of the prior art). Atsuta teaches using one apparatus and a single frame for three zones. See id. at 3:59–66; Figs. 2, 4 (depicting one combined circuit). Atsuta further teaches that, due to the use of a common frame, “regardless of the number of divided zones, the demodulating circuit and the TDMA control circuit can be shared,” and, “[t]hus, the size of the receiving apparatus can be reduced and thereby the power consumption can be decreased.” Id. at 3:59–66; see also id. at 2:60–63 (“An object of the present invention is to share the same functional circuit so as to simply the structure the entire apparatus and reduce the size and power consumption thereof.”). We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s complexity argument is incorrectly based on a comparison of only one of the three circuits of the conventional system to Atsuta’s system. See Pet. 18–19; PO Resp. 55–56 (arguing, for example, that Atsuta’s invention of Figure 2 has to handle three times the number of outputs and handle three times the number of mobile stations as the prior art device but failing to acknowledge that the prior art device required three circuits to do the same). Dr. Chrissan agreed on cross-examination that the TDMA control circuit itself in the combined system would not be three times as complex as one of the three in the conventional system. See Ex. 1024, 157:12–158:16. Dr. Almeroth credibly and persuasively testifies that “Atsuta’s system also simplifies the signal processing structure at the base station, reducing the required number of functional circuits (and computational requirements) to a single circuit.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 92 (citing Ex. 1005, 2:60–64). We agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would see a benefit in using a single-frame system, as taught by Atsuta, to reduce the number of functional circuits and the overall complexity of the device, and that provides a motivation for making the proposed combination. See Pet. 27. Patent Owner argues that Atsuta’s frame structure—combining into a single frame what before was three frames for three sector zones—will require more bandwidth and that the TDMA control circuit will have to run at a higher clock rate, thereby offsetting some of the power savings. See PO Resp. 56–58. We disagree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not make the combination because of this purported tradeoff, as Patent Owner urges. See id. at 58. “It’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it be a suitable option.’” Intel Corp., 21 F.4th at 800 (quoting PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); see also In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[J]ust because better alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination is inapt for obviousness purposes.”); Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[A] given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.”).” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 7,230,931 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,230,931 - Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless v. General Access Solutions, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00978 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 28 and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Vornefeld and Atsuta; the Board did not reach the four remaining grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. But see Ex. 2028 ¶ 19 (Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Chrissan, stating: “Patent Owner has not offered a different understanding of a POSITA [as set forth in the Petition], and the PTAB accepted Petitioner’s submission. . . . [F]or the purposes of the subject IPR proceedings, I accept and use Petitioner’s and the PTAB’s definition of a POSITA.”). Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties, at oral argument, confirmed that a construction of “sector” is not necessary to decide this case. See Tr. 14:9–15:3 (Petitioner: “JUDGE MCMILLIN: Do we need to engage in claim construction in order to decide this case? MR. ROSENTHAL: I don't believe so, Your Honor.”); id. at 62:13–18 (Patent Owner: “That [prior IPR] proceeding was decided and did not turn on a definition of sector. In this case, this doesn’t need to turn on the definition of sector either.”). On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Having considered the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Vornefeld in combination with Atsuta discloses or suggests all of the limitations of dependent claim 28. We also determine that Petitioner has shown that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make the combination proposed by Petitioner and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” slip op. at 44
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“in Atsuta are comprised of different timeslots reserved for data transmission (Ex. 1005, 6:35-58), just as a TDD frame is.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 105 (cited at Pet. 32 for the “compatible” proposition); see also id. ¶ 94 (“Vornefeld’s and Atsuta’s frame structures are consistent with each other. Both are directed to TDMA frame structured transmissions between a base station and subscribers.”). Dr. Almeroth also provided credible testimony in support of Petitioner’s contention (Pet. 28–29) that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 95–97; see, e.g., id. ¶ 96 (“A POSA would readily understand that combining Atsuta with Vornefeld would have been straightforward. Atsuta’s method for allocating time slots to subscribers in different sectors within a single TDMA frame matches Vornefeld’s MAC protocol, which allows transmission to a subscriber with the ‘granularity of a single time slot.’” (citing Ex. 1004, 54)). Dr. Almeroth further testifies that certain cited disclosures in Atsuta “is all the information a POSA would need to determine that it would be obvious that a single frame in Vornefeld could include downlink transmissions to different sectors,” and “[t]hat would be true regardless of Atsuta’s duplexing method (e.g., FDD or TDD).” Ex. 1025 ¶ 22 (citations omitted). Dr. Almeroth additionally opines that “a POSA would understand that Atsuta’s description of a TDMA frame would indicate to a POSA a methodology that would incorporate one or compatible with a TDD frame.” Pet. 32; see also id. at 27–29 (contentions regarding a reasonable likelihood of success in making the proposed combination). In the Response, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s compatibility contention is incorrect. PO Resp. 44. We find that Petitioner’s subsequent argument and accompanying evidence is an appropriate reply to Patent Owner’s argument of incompatibility.” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 7,230,931 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,230,931
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.