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  • PTAB · Jun 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00240 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–42 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining discretionary denial under §§ 314(a) and 325(d).

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “The Director may not authorize an inter partes review “unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We determine whether to institute a post grant review on behalf of the Director. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated there is a reasonable likelihood that the petition would prevail in showing that at least one challenged is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “patient is MSI-H after enrollment in a study in which pembrolizumab is to be administered is not within the scope of the claim step “in response to determining that the colorectal cancer is microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient, treating the patient with a therapeutically effective amount of pembrolizumab.” At this point in the proceeding, though, we do not interpret the claim step as meaning anything other than the treatment of colorectal cancer patients after they have been determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient. Although the term “in response to” in claim 1 requires that treatment of the patient occur after the determination that the colorectal cancer is MSI-H, we do not interpret the term to mean that other patients are not treated or that the recruitment and enrollment of patients for a clinical trial has any bearing on the steps recited in claim 1. We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Patent Owner has not directed us to evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood treating a patient “in response to” the determination that the patient has a condition excludes treatment of other patients without the condition, although it does require that treatment of the patient occur after the determination that the colorectal cancer is MSI-H. The language of claim 1 refers only to patients that are determined to have microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient colorectal cancer, not to other patients. (See Ex. 1001, 25:40–50.) At this point in the proceeding, the record does not indicate that the treatment of patients determined not to be MSI-H is be factored into whether the teaching of treating patients determined to be MSI-H anticipates the method of claim 1. At this point in the proceeding, we construe the “in response to” limitation of claim 1 to mean that pembrolizumab is administered to a patient after the patient has been determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient, regardless of whether pembrolizumab is also administered to other patients.” slip op. at 17

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “H Study Record teaches treating colorectal cancer patients after they were determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient with pembrolizumab. (See MSI-H Study Record, Ex, 1005, 4 (Arms and Interventions); see also id., 2 (Study Identification), 3 (Study Description), 4–5 (Outcome Measures), 5–6 (Eligibility); see Neugut Decl., Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 58–62.) At this point in the proceeding, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that there is a reasonable likelihood of a causal relationship in the MSI-H Study Record between treatment of colorectal cancer patients and the determination of their MSI status — all colorectal cancer patients determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient were treated. Whether or not other patients were treated or enrolled in the study does not detract from this teaching.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Furthermore, to the extent the MSI-H Study Record does not disclose the limitation of “in response to determining that the colorectal cancer is microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient, treating the patient with a therapeutically effective amount of pembrolizumab,” the record before us supports this limitation being rendered obvious by Pernot and the MSI-H Study Record. Specifically, because Pernot teaches that colorectal cancer patients are good candidates for immunotherapy, the evidence of the current record shows that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to use to PD-1 inhibitors to treat colorectal cancers. (See Ex. 1006, 3741.) Additionally, the focus in the MSI-H Study Record on a clinical study treating colorectal cancer patients who had been determined to be MSI-H with prembrolizumab indicates that it would have been obvious to test for this condition before treatment. The additional references discussed by Petitioner contribute further to a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail. For example, Libson reports the successful treatment of a colorectal cancer patient having MSI-H status with a PD- 1 inhibitor (see Ex. 1057, 463-64) and Champiat discusses evaluating the clinical activity of PD-1 agents in DNA mismatch repair, such as MSI+, colorectal cancer (see Ex. 1032, e27817-5). (See Pet. 44.) Thus, based on the entire record before us, Petitioner presents a reasonable likelihood that the method of claim 1 would have been considered obvious by one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,591,393
  • PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01602 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–14 are unpatentable: claims 1–3 and 8–10 are anticipated by Weiman, and claims 4–7 and 11–14 are obvious over Weiman and Mozeleski; the revised motion to amend is denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 (Drewry Decl.) ¶¶ 76–79). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. See generally Response. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “We find persuasive, and credit, Mr. Drewry’s testimony that (1) a POSITA would have appreciated that the proposed modification to replace Weiman’s screw/socket with Waugh’s angled version provides benefits including “avoiding selected muscular and abdominal anatomical structures,” and (2) such “benefits would have been desirable for certain applications, such as those where the patient’s anatomy dictates that OLIF would provide the patient with the best medical outcome.” Ex. 1044 (Drewry Second Supp. Decl.) ¶¶ 23–26; see also Ex. 1043 (Waugh), ¶¶ 54, 87–90 (describing use of angled screw holes to, e.g., “receive a fastener via a surgical pathway” and configured “to penetrate endplate tissue of a vertebral body”). We find the weight of evidence supports Petitioner’s articulation of a POSITA’s understanding of how to use angles to avoid anatomical features” slip op. at 61

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that no terms require construction “because they are shown to be anticipated and/or obvious regardless of construction.” Pet. 12. Patent Owner did not propose any terms for construction. See generally Response. We determine that no claim terms require express construction to render this Decision.” slip op. at 18

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “j. Conclusion on Claim 1 For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Weiman discloses each and every limitation of claim 1, and therefore anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 28

    Patent outcomesUS 9,956,087 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,956,087
  • PTAB · Jun 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00173 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–2 over Stanesic, Rothkop, and Cicotte; claims 3–6 over that combination with Lee, Fisker, Gruenwald, or Fu, respectively.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

      “tray is “deeply concave” but fails to direct us to any part of the Specification using the term “deeply concave” let alone a clearly stated definition of “deeply concave” in the context of a vehicle floor tray. The response to office action, cited by Patent Owner, refers to the tray as concave not deeply concave and thus, does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Ex. 2097, 11. For these reasons, to the extent that Patent Owner relies on the prosecution history as a disclaimer of the full scope of claims, we find that the cited response to the office action does not constitute “a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of claim scope.” Uship, 714 F. 3d at 1315.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “As explained below in our conclusion on motivation to combine, we” slip op. at 56

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “argument that Fu is not analogous art. PO Resp. 51. Dr. Kurfess first testifies that an ordinarily skilled artisan “never would have looked to Fu, or anything related to those fields, let alone micro-devices such as hearing aid shells to solve problems related to the automotive industry.” Ex. 2023 ¶ 144. Dr. Kurfess then testifies that “Fu is a disclosure for a hearing aid shell . . . and a [person of ordinary skill in the art] . . . would not consider the art of medical devices when trying to solve problems with vehicle floor mats.” Id. ¶ 188. Lastly, Dr. Kurfess testifies that “I completely disagree with Mr. Perreault’s conclusion that ‘a [person of ordinary skill in the art]” slip op. at 97

    Patent outcomesUS 9,138,917 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,138,917
  • PTAB · Jun 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00172 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations of Stanesic, Rothkop, and the respective additional references.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or a closely related field, or equivalent formal training, education, or practical experience in a field relating to product design, CAD, or manufacturing.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28). Petitioner further contends that the person of ordinary skill in the art “would also have a minimum of three to five years of experience in plastics engineering, CAD, manufacturing, plastic product design, or a related industry,” but that “a higher level of training or practical experience might make up for less education, and vice-versa.” Id. Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or a closely related field, or equivalent formal training education or practical experience in a field relating to product design, CAD, or manufacturing.” PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner further contends that such an ordinarily skilled artisan “would also have two or more years of manufacturing/industrial experience in the automotive aftermarket art.” Id. Petitioner replies that its “level of skill is more appropriate given the claims’ focus on three-dimensional scanning and modeling (which apply to many industries).” Pet. Reply 9 (citing Ex. 1001, claim 1; Ex. 1055 ¶¶ 7– 13). According to Petitioner, however, “the claims would have been obvious even under [Patent Owner]’s proposed skill level.” Id. (citing Ex. 1055 ¶ 13). Petitioner refers to Dr. Kurfess’s declaration testimony as admitting that three-dimensional scanning and modeling are pertinent to the ’655 patent. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 2023 ¶ 18). In the Sur-reply, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s definition of” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “[A] conclusion of obviousness requires a reasonable expectation of success.” Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). Further, “the ‘predictable result’ discussed in KSR refers not only to the expectation that prior art elements are capable of being physically combined, but also that the combination would have worked for its intended purpose.” DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1326 (citations omitted). “Obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success . . . all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–904 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). With these principles in mind, we evaluate the parties’ respective contentions. Patent Owner’s argument that there is no reasonable expectation of success in the proposed combination revolve around the scanning of a vehicle footwell. The ’655 patent describes that “points on the vehicle foot well for which the floor tray is to be manufactured are digitally measured and captured. Preferably this step uses a coordinate measuring machine (CMM).” Ex. 1001, 16:41–44. Further, the “FARO® Arm has been efficacious in obtaining these data using a contact method.” Id. at 16:47–48. The company manufacturing the FARO Arm was “[f]ounded in 1982 to provide portable CMMs in the medical industry” and “transitioned to the worldwide industrial market in 1993.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 49. Patent Owner does slip op. at 49

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “argument that Fu is not analogous art. PO Resp. 51. Dr. Kurfess first testifies that an ordinarily skilled artisan “never would have looked to Fu, or anything related to those fields, let alone micro-devices such as hearing aid shells to solve problems related to the automotive industry.” Ex. 2023 ¶ 144. Dr. Kurfess then testifies that “Fu is a disclosure for a hearing aid shell . . . and a [person of ordinary skill in the art] . . . would not consider the art of medical devices when trying to solve problems with vehicle floor mats.” Id. ¶ 188. Lastly, Dr. Kurfess testifies that “I completely disagree with Mr. Perreault’s conclusion that ‘a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to turn to Fu as an effective way to implement Stanesic’s reservoir’” and “[c]ommon sense dictates that a prior art disclosure for a custom hearing-aid would not inform a [person of ordinary” slip op. at 98

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating an issue when: (1) a prior action presents an identical issue; (2) the prior action actually litigated and adjudged that issue; (3) the judgment in the prior action necessarily required determination of the identical issue; and (4) the prior action featured full representation of the estopped party.” slip op. at 109

    Patent outcomesUS 8,899,655 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,899,655
  • PTAB · Jun 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00234 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claims 1–28 not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish simultaneous delivery of overlapping and non-overlapping laser beams.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 19; Ex. 1002 ¶ 77. Patent Owner does not dispute this proposed level of skill, but offers that a “POSA may have alternatively held a degree in electrical engineering.” PO Resp. 10; Ex. 4–10, 13, 15–17. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, and also consider Patent Owner’s additional proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “In this case, the Specification is devoted to the teaching simultaneous delivery of multiple laser beams. The Specification begins by stating that “[t]here are no lasers or laser handpieces on the market today that can simultaneously deliver two or more wavelengths of laser energy in spacial, fractional form.” Ex. 1001, 1:12–14. The Specification explains that “laser treatment usually requires different modalities of energy in order [to] successfully treat the pathologies to which they are applied,” but that “the sequential application of multiple wavelengths of laser energy compromises the treatment.” Id. at 1:16–25. The Specification then continues to explain various problems associated with the sequential application of multiple wavelengths. Id. at 1:25–52. The Specification concludes its introduction as follows: What is needed in the art therefore is an effective laser therapy system that can simultaneously deliver multiple wavelengths of laser energy through the use of a single laser unit without producing interference between the wavelengths within the treated tissue.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “summarized above, we find Patent Owner to have the better position. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner that the combination of Hsia and Black fail to teach or suggest simultaneously delivering non-overlapping beams. The combination also fails to teach or suggest producing beam patterns that include both overlapping and non-overlapping beams. PO Resp. 34. To begin, while we recognize that Hsia discloses overlapping and non-overlapping treatment patterns, those patterns are achieved by the sequential delivery of laser beams as a user physically moves a single handpiece that delivers a single beam across the skin of a patient. Ex. 1004 ¶ 68, Figs. 8 and 9; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 73–74. Black does not cure that deficiency as Black does not disclose treatment with non-overlapping beams. Ex. 2001 ¶ 99. Black discloses using a “refractive optics, mirror-based optical delivery device” for the simultaneous delivery of multiple overlapping laser beams. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 12– 13. The beams align on an optical path and, using different laser beam parameters, deliver treatment at various depths within a combined beam path. Id. ¶¶ 54, 58–59. Thus, while Black may be characterized as creating overlapping beams, we do not find sufficient support for a finding that Black teaches or suggests creating non-overlapping beams for simultaneous delivery, and the claims require both. We also do not find sufficient support for Petitioner’s claim that a POSA would have found it obvious to combine Black and Hsia to simultaneously produce both overlapping beams and nonoverlapping beams, based on the disclosures in these references. See, e.g.,” slip op. at 31

    • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Claims Claims Not 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Claims Shown Shown Basis Unpatentable Unpatentable 1–28 103 Hsia, Black 1–28 Hsia, Black, 23 103 23 Negus Hsia, Black, 27, 28 103 27, 28 Altshuler Altshuler, 1–28 103 1–28 Black Altshuler, 23 103 23 Black, Negus Overall Outcome 1–28 IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–28 of the ’481 patent are unpatentable; and” slip op. at 41

    Patent outcomesUS 10,675,481 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,675,481
  • PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00085 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’659 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “We disagree with Patent Owner. Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation.”8 The Director’s Memorandum explains that, when a petitioner makes a Sotera-type stipulation, “it mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB” and “[w]ith such a stipulation, if an IPR or PGR is instituted, the grounds the PTAB resolves will differ from those present in 8 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretio nary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (“Director’s Memorandum”). the parallel district court litigation.” Director’s Memorandum 7 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19). Pursuant to the Director’s Memorandum, we “will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Id. Because Petitioner provides a Sotera-type stipulation, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Petitioner’s proposed definition appears overly restrictive, as it requires a graduate degree in a narrow field of engineering or equivalent experience. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’659 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 19. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree with Patent Owner’s claim construction. By using the word “or,” the plain and ordinary meaning of “prone, kneeling, or standing” is that only one must be satisfied to meet the claim. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Furthermore, and although claims are read in light of the specification, limitations in a specification are not read into a claim. In re van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Even if the Specification describes embodiments in which the user can begin in a prone position and then transition to a kneeling or standing position, as Patent Owner points out (see Prelim. Resp. 20), the claim does not recite the term “transitioning,” and we do not read the terms “each of” or “substantially flat surface” into this claim limitation. For example, the claim does not recite a “substantially flat” top surface and Patent Owner’s attempt to infer this structure into the claim is not supported under the law. See id. at 29–30. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner and construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,586,659
  • PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00086 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5-8, 10-15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining Fintiv denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “1. “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position” With respect to the claim term “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” Patent Owner points to passages of the Specification, arguing that all three positions are possible. Prelim. Resp. 19–21 (citing Ex. 1001, Abstr., 4:13–17, 4:33–40; Ex. 2006 ¶ 18). We do not agree with Patent’s Owner proposed construction because even if the Specification discloses that all three positions are possible, that is not what the plain language of the claim requires. Claim 1 recites “or,” which means that a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in any one of the three positions. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Patent Owner does not identify any definition or disclaimer that would modify this plain meaning. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, we agree with Petitioner and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” to construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Neither party explains how or why its particular proposal impacts the issues before us in this proceeding. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’044 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 10. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted

      “As the Board has held in a precedential decision, “at the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,359,044
  • PTAB · Apr 18, 2024 · IPR2022-01435 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–11 are unpatentable: Chung anticipates claim 10, and the Olmos-based obviousness grounds establish unpatentability of claims 1–11.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 11

    • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied

      “9 Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner’s Reply brief “presents copious new evidence and theories that exceed the scope of proper reply” and “[t]he Board should refuse to consider” it. Sur-reply 7–9. This generic objection to the entire Reply fails to provide adequate notice regarding which of Petitioner’s theories and arguments Patent Owner contends are allegedly new and improper. See, e.g., Rembrandt Diagnostics, LP v. Alere, Inc., 76 F.4th 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (rejecting generic objection to alleged new theories in reply as failing to provide adequate notice of which theories are allegedly new). Accordingly, we reject Patent Owner’s request that we “refuse to consider” the entirety of the Reply. Where Patent Owner’s Sur-reply raises more particularized complaints regarding Petitioner’s allegedly improper new arguments, we address those complaints as appropriate below.” slip op. at 20

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningOther
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “Accordingly, we find Petitioner has not shown that claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Chung.” slip op. at 65

    Patent outcomesUS 10,137,001 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,137,001
  • PTAB · Apr 15, 2024 · IPR2022-01599 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 7–13, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the cited prior art.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proposed construction improperly reads in limitations from example embodiments in the Specification. See Inst. Dec. 20. We noted that the Specification uses the term “extension” to refer to a variety of additions to a main structure having a variety of shapes, not all of which “increase the length” of the main structure. Id. at 21. Accordingly, we construed the term “central ramp extension” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., “an addition to the central ramp.” Id.” slip op. at 25

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

      “5. Conclusion—Obviousness Based on Chung with Boehm and/or Song On this record, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a” slip op. at 64

    Patent outcomesUS 8,845,732 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,845,732
  • PTAB · Apr 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00029 · APJ Amee A Shah · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 3–5, 7–8, 10–14, and 16–25 on all grounds in the Petition, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “It is not disputed that Sim, Doi, and Herz were not previously presented to the Office. And, the prosecution record indicates that Sim and Doi were not listed on an Information Disclosure Statement by Application nor in a List of References or in an Office Action by the Examiner. See Ex. 1002, 9–10, 20–25, 69–74, 196–197, 346–347. Petitioner’s asserted Grounds 1 and 2 rely substantially on Sim and Doi to teach the steps of the claimed system and method. Petitioner’s asserted Grounds 4, 5, and 6 substantially rely on Herz. Sim, Doi, and Herz are meaningful to the prior art combinations set forth in the Petition. Therefore, the asserted combinations regarding Sim and Doi, Sim, Doi, and Waytena, and Waytena and Herz were not previously presented to the Office. It is also not disputed that Waytena was previously presented to the Office and considered by the Examiner. The prosecution history shows that throughout prosecution, the Examiner heavily considered and relied on Waytena for rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§102 and 103 in evaluating the application of the ՚983 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1002, 9–10, 20–24, 69–73. At this point and based on the present record, we do not discretionarily deny under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because Petitioner has 7 The terms “POSITA,” “PHOSITA” or “skilled artisan” refer to a person of ordinary sill in the art. reasonable likelihood that at least one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. PGS Geophysical, 891 F.3d at 1360. However, based on the record before us, and because we reach the same conclusion as the Examiner regarding Waytena’s teachings, we find that Patent Owner has, on this record, sufficient support for its contentions that Waytena was previously presented to the Office and the Examiner’s evaluation on the merits regarding Waytena’s teachings was not in error.” slip op. at 14

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that, at this stage based on the evidence presented, Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims and on all grounds asserted in the Petition. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not contest or comment on Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art or offer Patent Owner’s own definition of the level of ordinary skill. Prelim. Resp. 2. that the ’983 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’983 patent is consistent with the level of skill proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends the claimed “presentation means” is a means-plus- function term under § 112, ¶ 6, that “can perform the function of (a) ‘receiv[ing] said itinerary from said computer’ and (b) ‘present[ing] said itinerary to said party.’” Pet. 8–9. Petitioner further contends the corresponding structure for performing the recited functions is display screen 130. Pet. 9. Patent Owner presents no argument against this contention. We agree that “presentation means” is a means-plus-function claim term. Because it is necessary to know what the structure and function are encompassed by the claim term in order to make a determination that the disagreement, we adopt Petitioner’s construction. Should either party believe that a different construction should apply in the instituted trial, it should explain the proposed construction, how the construction is supported by the record, and how the construction affects our unpatentability analysis.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,212,983

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.