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  • PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00709 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 8–10, 14–18, 21–23, 25, 27, and 29 based on reasonable likelihood of obviousness over Schneier and over Schneier with Okita.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner states that “[w]hile Patent Owner disagrees with the proposed level of skill, under any level of skill a POSITA would not understand the asserted Grounds to raise any unpatentability issue.” Prelim. Resp. 5. Patent Owner does not, at this point, propose a different level of skill. Id. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not contradicted and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’635 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “B. Claim Construction At this early stage of the proceeding, no claim terms are disputed and neither party offers any particular construction for any claim term. Pet. 12– 13; Prelim. Resp. 5. Having considered both parties arguments and evidence in light of the challenged claims, at this stage, we are not apprised of any reason to expressly construe any claim term for purposes of institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,650,635
  • PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00712 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 3–9, 13, 17, 18, 23, 25, 26, 28, and 29 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claim 1 over Walker.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2025). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon institution of inter partes review, the review proceeds “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Based on our consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the Challenged Claims of the ’279 patent on all grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedOther

      “application filed November 12, 2021, that asserts the benefit of a series of applications, the earliest of which was filed September 2, 2003. Ex. 1001, codes (22), (45), (60). Petitioner asserts that the Challenged Claims of the ’279 patent “are entitled to an effective filing date of no earlier than September 2, 2003,” consistent with the date of the earliest application identified by the ’279 patent.9 See Pet. 6. For purposes of our analysis on the current record, in this Decision we apply September 2, 2003, as the priority date of the Challenged Claims.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “independent claim 1. Pet. 32–63. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Mr. Crevelt in support of its contentions with respect to claim 1. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 234–286. Further, according to Petitioner, “[n]o findings regarding motivation to combine or reasonable expectation of success are necessary with a single reference ground,” but Walker “teaches that the features of the embodiments are options that can be combined.” Pet. 42 n.6 (citing Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At this stage, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered assertions about the” slip op. at 20

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,393,279
  • PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00708 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–5, 12, 13, 18–20, 22, 24–26, 29, 42, 44–47, and 50 are unpatentable over Walker and Schneier.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2025). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon institution of inter partes review, the review proceeds “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Based on our consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the Challenged Claims of the ’336 patent on all grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art At this stage of the proceeding, there is no evidentiary dispute about the level of ordinary skill in the art.8 Based on the testimony of Mr. Crevelt, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or computer engineering, with at least three years of experience in game development. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–65). Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience. Id. We determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art 7 Petitioner states that it is not aware of secondary considerations that affect the obviousness arguments it presents. Pet. 66. Patent Owner has not offered objective evidence of nonobviousness at this stage of the proceeding. 8 Patent Owner “disagrees with the proposed level of skill” but asserts that “under any level of skill a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not understand the asserted Grounds to raise any unpatentability issues.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Thus, Patent Owner does not present evidence or arguments in its Preliminary Response related to the level of ordinary skill in the art. competence reflected in the ’336 patent Specification and the asserted prior art references, based on our review of the limited record.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner argues that it is not necessary for us to provide an express construction for any claim term because the Petition “establishes the prior art meets each claim limitation under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner similarly submits that we “need not construe any terms at this stage, because under any reasonable construction of the claim terms, the prior art fails to disclose or suggest the claimed features.” Prelim. Resp. 8. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not need to expressly construe any claim terms to determine whether Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to its challenge of at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedOther

      “an application filed September 20, 2010, that asserts the benefit of an application filed September 2, 2003. Ex. 1001, codes (22), (45), (54), (62). Petitioner asserts that the Challenged Claims of the ’336 patent “are entitled to an effective filing date of no earlier than September 2, 2003,” consistent with the date of the earliest application identified by the ’336 patent.9 See Pet. 7. For purposes of our analysis on the current record, in this Decision we apply September 2, 2003, as the priority date of the Challenged Claims. Walker was filed on May 1, 2003, and refers back to a provisional application filed on May 6, 2002, but Walker was not published until January 1, 2004. Ex. 1006, codes (22), (43), (60). Thus, Petitioner fails to show on the current record how, under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), Walker discloses an invention that was described in a printed publication in this country before the invention thereof by the Patent Owner, because Walker was published after the applied priority date of the Challenged Claims of the’336 patent.” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,529,336
  • PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00653 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on all claims because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’504 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 72); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Ex. 1002 ¶ 47. As reflected above, Dr. Wooley’s testimony as to element [1.2] does not even assert that Cardamone discloses a tank, let alone one or more sensors disposed at a tank as recited in element [1.2]. Thus, Dr. Wooley’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s argument on this issue.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,726,504
  • PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

      “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,294,403
  • PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

      “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,175,680
  • Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution denied
    PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,488,871
  • PTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00636 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on claim 8 over Carter.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “On July 16, 2025, the Acting Director issued her decision, which denied Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial and referred this case to the Board. Paper 9, 3. The Decision stated “Petitioner provides persuasive reasoning, supported by evidence, that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged patents during patent examination, and, accordingly, discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is not appropriate.” Id. The Decision also stated “it is an appropriate use of Office resources to review the potential error.” Id. As stated in the Acting Director’s decision, “the Petitions [in IPR2025-00559; 00636] are referred to the Board to handle the cases in the normal course, including by issuing a decision on institution addressing the merits and other nondiscretionary considerations, as appropriate.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the scope of our delegated authority only extends to “the merits and other nondiscretionary considerations.” Accordingly, we do not address the discretionary denial issue raised in the Petition and in the Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response.” slip op. at 6

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’847 patent, and Dr. Henze’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.8” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation at this time. Our conclusion concerning instituting an inter partes review would be unaffected by a determination that the preambles of the claims are limiting. Accordingly, for this initial Decision to institute an inter partes review, the words “display” or “frame,” and the term “display case” will be given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,421,847
  • PTAB · Sep 17, 2025 · IPR2025-00700 · APJ Hung H Bui · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–4, 6, 9–14, and 17 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Yurt and Logan.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “Owner (1) presents several arguments directed solely to discretionary considerations under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), and (2) requests the Petition be denied based on those § 325(d) arguments. See generally Prelim. Resp. However, Patent Owner’s § 325(d) arguments are untimely under the Office’s “Interim Processes for PTAB Workload Management,” dated March 26, 2025, and, as such, will not be considered by the Board.” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of networked systems for distributing data files from one or more databases,” and that “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22). Patent Owner does not challenge the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner’s expert. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal as reasonable and consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’128 patent. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Here, neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes construction of any term. Pet. 13; see generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of institution, we need not explicitly construe any claim terms. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “patent: “(e) recording the digital audio files requested by said user and said user address in a data base,” Petitioner contends (1) Yurt’s request “contains the address of the user, the address of the item [e.g., audio file]”; (2) Yurt’s databases that track information about audio files at library 118, shown in Yurt’s annotated Figure 2b; (3) Logan’s “user data & usage log 143” [shown in Logan’s Figure 1] that stores or records information requested by a user making a selection of an audio file. Pet. 45–47 (citing Ex. 1005, 12:24–27, 7:50–55 “item database,” 8:45–47 “system item database”; Ex. 1006, 8:49– 58). Based on the teachings of Yurt and Logan, Petitioner (1) contends the combination of Yurt and Logan renders obvious limitation 1(a)(4)(e) recited in claim 1 of the ’128 patent, and (2) concludes, based upon the Declaration of Dr. Andrew B. Lippman (Ex. 1003), that: it would have been obvious to use Logan’s teaching of recording information about a user’s request in a database (usage log) for billing, logging, and adapting system settings based on actual usage, including to record Yurt’s user address information, with information about the requested audio files, in Logan’s usage log database.” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,182,128
  • PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00559 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, based on the analysis in this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. A decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition.” PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims and on all grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a comparable field and at least three to five years of experience related to heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and refrigeration (HVAC&R) systems.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 31–35). Dr. Henze’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 31–35). Dr. Henze testifies that, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 31. He also states that “[s]uch experience could be obtained through research and study in a graduate program or through comparable exposure through industry employment, and additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Id. Patent Owner does not assert a level of ordinary skill, nor does Patent Owner dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’181 patent, and Dr. of ordinary skill.9” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that nine terms are “mean-plus-function claim terms.” Pet. 4–10. As required by our rule, (37 C.F.R. § 104(b)(3)), for each of the mean-plus-function claim terms, Petitioner identifies the function as well as the specific portions of the ’181 patent’s specification that describe the corresponding structures. Id. Patent Owner does not comment on Petitioner’s proposed means-plus- function claim constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Thus, for purposes of this initial decision, we will adopt the means-plus-function constructions proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther

      “We do not perceive the need to construe any additional claim limitation. Our conclusion concerning instituting an inter partes review would be unaffected by a determination that the preambles of the claims are limiting. Accordingly, for this initial Decision to institute an inter partes review, the words “display” or “frame,” and the term “display case” will be given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,207,181

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.