- Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00795 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 and 11–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Lee or Zhao and Lee; the Board did not find claims unpatentable over Zhao or Yang alone.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 35–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not object to this assertion. PO Resp. 12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’822 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“1. Word line pre-pulse signal Patent Owner argues that such a signal “must increase in value and then decrease in value (or vice versa).” PO Resp. 13; PO Sur-Reply 1. Petitioner agrees with this construction. Pet. Reply. 3. Patent Owner further argues that the pre-pulse signal “prepares the word line before the programming step.” PO Resp. 13. We agree that Petitioner applies its teachings with the same understanding of “pre-pulse signal” as Patent Owner. See, e.g., Pet. 38–39 (asserting that Lee teaches, or that that Lee would make obvious, pre-bias signals applied as pulses). Because both parties agree that a pre-pulse signal “must increase in value and then decrease in value (or vice versa),” and apply this construction in their assertions and arguments, no dispute as to the meaning of this phrase exists in a manner that would affect the outcome of this decision. Therefore, we do not need to determine a particular construction. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“with the plain language of the claims, each claim states “disposed.” Patent Owner provides dictionary definitions for “disposed,” which is described as a verb. See, e.g., Ex. 2016, 3. When described as a verb in these definitions, “disposed” is the action of the actor; i.e., “the chief disposed his attendants in a circle” (Ex. 2019, 3); “She disposed of her estate among her heirs” (Ex. 2018, 3); “disposed of the matter efficiently” (Ex. 2017, 3); “troops disposed for withdrawal” (Ex. 2016, 3). Petitioner offers no contrary definition from either the Specification or any extrinsic source for that term. We agree with Patent Owner’s construction of “disposed” as “put in place” or “arranged in a particular position.” Nevertheless, the construction of “disposed” does not resolve the controversy over the language of claims 2, 3, 12, and 13. The claims recite “are disposed.” For example, claim 2 recites, “wherein the [first through third groups] of the plurality of word lines are disposed in an order of distance from the selected word line.” Under Patent Owner’s construction, this reads as, “wherein the [first through third groups] of the plurality of word lines are arranged in a particular position in an order of distance from the selected word line.” But claim 2 does not recite that the word lines are arranged “based on” the selected word line, or that the arrangement occurs only after a word line is selected, as argued by Patent Owner. We agree with Petitioner that the express language of claim 2 does not recite any limitation as to how or when the groups of word lines are disposed. Both parties point to the same language in the ’822 patent Specification in support of their position: “the word lines disposed between the selected word line and the top select gate TSG can be divided into multiple groups of the word lines.” PO Sur-Reply 2 (citing Pet. Reply 11 requires the recited arrangement to exist, at some point. But we determine that none of claims 2, 3, 12, or 13 require a step of arrangement, or an action to change the arrangement of grouped word lines.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable
“not based on the location of the source or bit lines. Instead, Petitioner relies upon the distance from the selected word line and the drain-side of the string. See Pet. 66 (“the channel length between the drain-side of the string and word line selected for programming would be quite long, resulting in a relatively high channel resistance” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 360)). Petitioner asserts that Lee’s application of higher pre-charge voltages to the drain-side word lines “offset the channel resistance effect.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 361). Lee and Zhao both admittedly have “typical memory strings, which are a ‘vertical column’ of memory cells arranged in series between a source side select transistor and a drain side transistor.” PO Resp. 53 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner asserts that applying pre-charging to mitigate program disturb (sought by both Lee and Zhao) relies on the creation of a potential difference to facilitate electron redistribution. Pet. Reply 17–18 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:52–56; Ex. 1005, 17:4–12; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 72–78). Petitioner asserts that the application of voltage can be performed from either end of the channel so long as it targets the portion of the channel desired to be pre- charged. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 77–78; Ex. 1010, 17:16–23). Although Patent Owner points to Yang as showing different “biasing schemes” based upon whether the bit line, source line, or both are used for pre-charging, each of the cited Figures 8–10 of Yang indicates that Vbypass (Yang’s uncontested pre-pulse signal) is applied to at least some word lines between the selected word line and the drain-side SGD0. Ex. 1010, Figs. 8C, 9C, 10C; see PO Resp. 25–28 (“a ‘bypass voltage’ (‘Vbypass’) is applied to ‘not yet programmed’ memory cells during the ‘pre-charge phase’” (citing Fig. 8C) (emphasis omitted)). We do not discern in Patent Owner’s arguments, or in the evidence provided during trial, sufficient reasons why applying voltage from either source or bit line disturbs Petitioner’s asserted advantage of offsetting the resistance of the channel between a selected word line and the drain side of the string. Patent Owner further argues that Lee discusses a “wholly disparate approach” for mitigating program disturb than Zhao and that a POSITA would not have been motivated to apply Lee’s teaching to Zhao. PO Resp. 56–58. Patent Owner contends that because Zhao does not conduct current when applying its bypass voltage to equalize charges, but Lee does conduct current when doing so, Lee need only compensate for insufficient charge boosting due to the increased resistance component between source and drain and does not need to compensate for “resistance” effects creating voltage differences along the length of the memory string channel. Id. at 56. Dr. Przybylski’s supporting testimony is based upon such differences in the resistance components. See, e.g., Ex. 2011 ¶ 128. However, we have credited Dr. Liu’s testimony that a chain of transistors in both systems creates a resistance effect regardless of current flow in the steady state. Supra § II.F.1.b.2. We further agree with Petitioner that applying pre- on the creation of a potential difference to facilitate electron redistribution. Pet. Reply 17–18 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:52–56; Ex. 1005, 17:4–12; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 72–78). We further credit Dr. Liu’s testimony that Zhao’s use of the same pre-charge voltages to not-yet-programmed word lines presents an issue of inadequate pre-charging that Lee addresses. Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 55–56; Pet. Reply 22–23. Consequently, we are persuaded by Petitioner that the chain resistance effects in Zhao and Lee permit the application of Lee’s method of pre-charging to mitigate program disturb to be applicable and desirable in Zhao’s method of applying pre-charging to mitigate program disturb. Consequently, we determine that Petitioner has shown persuasive motivation for its combination.” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 11,501,822 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,501,822 - Solus Advanced Materials Co., Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01461 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show that claims 1–10 were likely obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined “if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Arnold Partnership v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re 1 US 2013/0108922 A1, published May 2, 2013 (Ex. 1004, “Shinozaki”). 2 G. Khatibi, Temperature Dependent Elastic and Thermal Properties of Thin Copper Foils, Copper; Proceedings of the International Conference Copper ’06 (2006) (Ex. 1006, “Khatibi”). 3 Korean Patent Pub. No. 10-2012-0003485, published Jan. 10, 2012 (Ex. 1013; Ex. 1014 (English translation), “Toshio”). 4 US 2013/0108887 A1, published May 2, 2013 (Ex. 1012, “Kim”). 5 Griesi, M.B., Characterization of Electrodeposited Copper Foil Surface Roughness for Accurate Conductor Power Loss Modeling (2014) (Master’s Thesis, University of South Carolina) (Ex. 1015, “Griesi”). rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not shown unpatentable
“For example, Dr. Randall does not provide adequate explanation or objective evidence to support his opinion that Khatibi’s use of a laser speckle based dilatometer instead of the claimed thermomechanical analyzer “is unlikely to significantly impact the CTE[6] value” because “variations in equipment and a heating speed of 5° C/min would not significantly alter the results.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 58. In particular, Dr. Randall neither explains what constitutes a “significant” impact on CTE, nor provides objective evidence to support his contention that equipment variations and heating differences would not “significantly alter” the resulting measurements. And although Dr. Randall opines that “the heating rate (5°C per minute) is typical for certain devices” such as a thermomechanical analyzer or dilatometer, and “[t]ypically, these devices use temperature ramp rates between 2°C and 20°C per minutes, so the ‘5° C./min’ recited in [1d] is common and should not drastically affect the measurement results,” Dr. Randall fails to point us to any evidence showing that these temperatures are “typical” or that the claimed heating rate is “common.” Id. ¶ 59 (emphases added).” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner, however, does not adequately explain why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Kim’s copper foil surface to have a Pc value of 19.2 as reported in Griesi. In particular, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Randall points us to, nor do we discern, any teaching in Griesi that a peak count of 19.2 provides any particular benefits or properties that would have lead a POSITA to modify Kim’s copper foil surface as Petitioner proposes. Instead, Petitioner’s arguments that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Kim’s copper foil surface with Griesi’s peak count patent itself. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (stating that the fact finder must be aware “of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning”). It was Petitioner’s burden to establish that the combined teachings Kim and Griesi disclose limitation [1g] as proposed. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended Petitioner’s argument when we determined that Petitioner did not meet that burden.” slip op. at 8
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“It was Petitioner’s burden to establish the Khatibi, alone or in combination with Shinozaki, Toshio, and Kim, discloses limitation [1d]. We concluded that Petitioner failed to meet that burden for the reasons explained in our Decision. We are not persuaded that we overlooked or misapprehended Khatibi’s disclosures, or Petitioner’s evidence and explanation thereof, in doing so.7” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,811,689 - PTAB · Sep 19, 2025 · PGR2025-00025 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by the Gatorade Label.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’422 Patent is eligible for post-grant review and has shown it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’422 Patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’422 Patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would possess at least (1) a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or a related field, with (2) five years of experience in material identification and characterization using multiple analytical methods and field sampling, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 24). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for one of ordinary skill in the art nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“336. The applicant explained that not all combinations of shrink films and light blocking materials are recyclable. Id. at 335. The applicant explained that films can be compatible with PET recycling in two ways, (1) the film can float in water and be separated from PET that sinks in water or (2) the PET films crystallize and “can be recovered with the PET stream.” Id. at 336 (citing “A Resource Document by the Association of Plastic Recyclers (APR)”) (found at Ex. 1002, 323–332) (emphasis omitted). The applicant explained that “removing the label before or during the recycling process is not evidence of the recyclability of the label” and that “[r]emoving the label during the recycling process is not equivalent to actually recycling the label.” Id. at 335. As such, a POSITA reading the prosecution history would understand that a label is not recyclable with a PET container, as recited by the independent claims, by removing the label from the PET recycle stream before or during the recycling process.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“To determine how a person skill in the art would determine if a shrink label is “recyclable” as recited in the independent claims, we look to how the Specification of the ’422 Patent describes or defines recyclable shrink labels. For example, the ’422 Patent states that PET shrink films are generally considered recyclable if no inks are retained on the film after a caustic wash cycle typically used in PET reclaiming processes. Ex. 1001, 6:61–65. The ’422 Patent further states that labels are fully recyclable if the polymers used are clear, preferably clear PET, and the labels include inks that can be washed off in a “typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash).” Id. at 11:44– 49; see also id. at 11:49–54 (describing embodiments in which the labels are free or substantially free of inks that cannot be washed off in a caustic wash or where the labels are free or substantially free of color plastics that cannot be recycled). The ’422 Patent further discusses “industry standards” for determining whether various embodiments of shrink labels are recyclable. See, e.g., id. at 11:29–53. For example, the Specification states that the “Association for Plastic Recyclers (APR) Critical Guidance Protocol for Clear PET Articles with Labels and Closures (PET-CG-02)” (Ex. 1005) can certify that a film is fully recyclable with a container or bottle. Id. at 11:34– 38. Additionally, the Specification states that labels “are recyclable according to the Evaluation of the Near Infrared (NIR) Sorting Potential of a Whole Plastic Article (SORT-B-01)” (Ex. 1010) and/or the “Evaluation of Sorting Potential for Plastic Articles Utilizing Metal, Metalized, or Metallic Printed Components (SORT-B-03)” (Ex. 1011). Ex. 1001, 11:39–44. The ’422 Patent further states that embodiments of the labels “are fully recyclable. For example, the labels may include inks that can be washed off in a typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash) and the polymers” are preferably clear PET. Id. at 11:44–48. The ’422 Patent thus provides various descriptions or standards to determine the recyclability of shrink labels. For the purposes of addressing the anticipation and obviousness grounds, we determine that any of these standards can be used to determine if a shrink label is “recyclable.” We note that our construction is preliminary and is based on the present record. We invite the parties to further the address the construction of “wherein the recyclable shrink label is recyclable with a PET container” during trial.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,961,422 - Champion Laboratories, Inc. / First Brands Group, LLC v. Hengst SENo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00603 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 5, 8–11, 15–17, 19, 23–25, and 28–30 were not shown unpatentable over Yokoyama, Yokoyama and Cline, or Honermann and Cline.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Because the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in dispute, and because the parties’ definition is consistent with the disclosures in the ʼ203 patent, the prior art, and the declaration testimony of Mr. Nranian and Dr. Basirat, we view the prior art and arguments through this lens when determining whether the claims are unpatentable as obvious over the prior art.5 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (identifying “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art” as an underlying factual inquiry to be resolved in deciding obviousness, which is a question of law).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Although the parties spend significant portions of their briefing discussing the term “eccentric” and how it applies to certain figures from the ʼ203 patent and the relied-upon prior art, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe the term “eccentric” beyond the parties’ agreed-upon definition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“(opining that “Patent Owner’s construction of ‘having an axis no located in a geometric center’ is too narrow”). Mr. Nranian’s Declaration testimony in this respect is not persuasive for several reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent. Compare Ex. 1016 ¶ 3 (criticizing the “axis” language in Patent Owner’s definition), with id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (relying on that very language to support an argument). Also, Mr. Nranian’s proposed definition of “eccentric” to merely mean “not located at the center” begs the question of what, precisely, is “the center”? Mr. Nranian does not persuasively explain how far a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand she could travel from the exact center point of an object and still be in “the center” of that object. See Tr. 10:13–19 (Judge McGee asking whether the center is “a miniscule point in the middle of [the] disc”); see also id. at 10:25–12:26 (Judge Weatherly highlighting the significant ambiguity in referring to something as in “the center”). Also, Mr. Nranian’s opinion is inconsistent with how the ʼ203 patent compares something that is “central,” i.e., “at the center,” and something that is “eccentrically” located. Ex. 1001, 7:13–14 (describing pipe nozzle 15 as “central”); id. at 8:53–56 (describing a “through hole” as “located in the center of the front panel 22” depicted in Figures 7 and 8); id. at 10:23–31 (describing return 12 as “in the center” and outlet 13 as “eccentrically thereto” in Figure 17). Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated Figure 7 is reproduced below: Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated version of Figure 7 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates “central pipe nozzle 15” in yellow passing through the “through hole” located in “the center” of front panel 22. PO Resp. 20. Significantly, pipe nozzle 15 and the through hole in panel 22 are both described as “central” and in “the center” but must have different diameters; otherwise, “central pipe nozzle 15” would not be capable of traveling through “through hole 22.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 7. Thus, the ʼ203 patent intrinsically bases whether an element is “central” or “in the center” on whether its axis is located at the geometric center. This is also illustrated in Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent, reproduced below: Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates filter housing 10 with return 12 “in the center . . . and, eccentrically thereto, the outlet 13 with the seat 14 for the blocking element 24.” Ex. 1001, 10:23–30. Finally, Mr. Nranian’s narrow interpretation of “eccentric”––which excludes the “having the axis or support so located” in the geometric center language––is at odds with the arguments it was proffered to support. Cf. Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 9,023,203 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,023,203 - PTAB · Sep 3, 2025 · PGR2025-00021 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1, 3–7, and 12–20, finding it more likely than not that at least claim 1 would have been obvious over Kim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112- 29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes they are more likely than not to prevail with respect to the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of claims 1, 3–7, and 12–20 of the ’838 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) 3D memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further contends that a” slip op. at 5
- BurdenInstituted
“(c) Analysis We have reviewed and considered both parties’ arguments and evidence and determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Kim discloses or suggests the limitations of claim 1. We disagree with Patent an “island” shaped landing pad that is surrounded on all four sides by auxiliary layer 122. Based on the present record, we do not understand the Petition to rely solely on the “island” landing pad embodiment of Kim because the Petition also refers to an embodiment in Kim that is not island shaped. See, e.g., Pet. 34–35 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1005, Fig. 5). In this embodiment, the sides of protrusion pad PAD_P are “coplanar” with 2 of the edges of PAD_B (i.e., E3, E4). See, e.g., Ex. 1005, Fig. 5. We understand that, in this embodiment, PAD_P is not an “island” landing pad because the auxiliary layer would not surround the landing pad on the sides of the landing pad coplanar to edges E3 and E4. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, Fig. 5. Thus, in this embodiment, the asserted first material layer (i.e., insulating layer 110 and the portion of the auxiliary layer to the left of the landing pad) would not form one structure all the way around PAD_P, as contended by Patent Owner. Prelim. Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 61). Rather, the asserted first material layer would end as depicted by Petitioner. See, e.g., Pet. 34–35 (citing Ex. 1005, Fig. 4B).” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Patent Owner states that it does not believe any terms require construction. Prelim. Resp. 9. Based on the record before us, we determine that none of the claim terms discussed above require express construction for purposes of this Decision. To the extent the parties’ arguments raise additional claim construction issues, for efficiency, we address any such arguments in the context of our unpatentability analysis below.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 12,010,838 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00244 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not sufficiently show that Costa disclosed or suggested claim 11.H’s required arrangement, and the dependent claims did not cure that deficiency.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In view of these deficiencies, the Petition fails to identify the proposed grounds for review with particularity as required by 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) with respect to the limitations of independent claim [11.H]. Petitioner presents no arguments or evidence with respect to the dependent claims challenged under this ground that would remedy the defects noted above with respect to independent claim 11. See generally Pet. Thus, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the subject matter of claims 11, 12, or 14–19 would have been obvious over Costa.” slip op. at 23
- BurdenDenied
“3. Analysis A petition is required to identify “with particularity[ ] the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). The “petition . . . must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2). Our rules require that a petition include fully developed arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) (the “petition . . . must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). The petition must include both an adequate explanation of how the claims should be construed as well as how the construed claims are unpatentable over the asserted prior art. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), (b)(4). Additionally, the “petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). A petition should also “explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined elements from specific references in the way the claimed invention does.” ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Comm'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, based on our rules, we only consider fully developed arguments set forth in the petition.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANot reached
“arguments. See, e.g., id. at 34–35 (arguing that “on” does not require overlap in the Z direction but “includes both objects that are merely touching (in any dimension) and objects that are in proximity to each other but not touching” (citing Ex. 1078, 1; Ex. 1001, 8:3–12)); see also id. at 36–38 (arguing that if “on” is construed to mean “directly on or on with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween,” then Costa’s second stacked layer 232, 242 and third channel structure (173) are “directly on” each other, because their edges are directly touching each other). The Petition, however, does not clearly present any of the claim construction arguments set forth in the Opposition Brief. See Paper 22 (not clearly identifying where the Petition provides the proposed claim construction); see generally Pet.; see also Pet. 33, 43, 56 (arguing “on” does not require “directly on” and permits intermediate layers but not presenting any of the other claim construction arguments set forth in the Opposition Brief). Nor did the Petition provide any particularized argument as to how Costa discloses or suggests a second stacked layer disposed on the third channel structure applying any of the claim constructions proposed in the Opposition Brief. See generally Pet. (presenting no argument that Costa’s second stacked layer 232, 242 is “on” semiconduction portion layer 173 (the asserted third channel structure) because they touch each other as shown above in Petitioner’s annotation of Costa Figure 21A). We will not consider any arguments not sufficiently set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (“the petition must set forth . . . [h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“the petition must set forth . . . [h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable”).” slip op. at 19
- Parallel petitionsNot reached
“Because we determine that Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the merits, we do not address Patent Owner’s parallel petitions argument.” slip op. at 23
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,886,291 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00245 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 11, 13, and 15–17 would have been obvious over Costa or Costa and Oh.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“§ 42.4(a), we may only institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Based upon our review of the present record, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that none of the claims require express construction and the claims should receive their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 23. Patent Owner argues that no claim construction is necessary for the institution determination, and that the Petition “still fails if the claim term ‘on’ receives its plain and ordinary meaning -- e.g., physically in contact with or directly on top of with intervening objects therebetween.” Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 66). Although Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has construed “on” as including indirectly on; i.e., where there is no physical contact, the Petition addressed now-disclaimed claim 18, and the Petition does not advance any construction for the remaining claims. See id. at 16–17 (citing Pet. 92; Ex. 1003 ¶ 258). Consequently, we determine that no construction is required to resolve the issues for institution.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“we consider the level of ordinary skill at the time of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (discussing pre- AIA obviousness). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. The earliest claimed priority date for the ’241 patent is after the effective date of the applicable AIA amendment. See Ex. 1001, (63). Thus, we refer to the AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103. 2 Costa, US 2018/001282771 (filed Feb. 28, 2017, published June 28, 2018) (Ex. 1005, “Costa”). 3 Oh, US 2017/0154892 A1 (filed June 10, 2016, published June 1, 2017) (Ex. 1006, “Oh”). some of the professional experience). Pet. 23–24. Petitioner also asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–40). Patent Owner does not take a position on the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 11; see also Ex. 2006 ¶ 34 (applying Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA to the opinions set forth in the declaration but reserving the right to opine to an alternative level of a POSITA). At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA as it appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art that is reflected by the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to sufficiently show that Costa teaches a “second stacked layer disposed on the third channel structure” as required by apparatus claim element [11.E]. The Petition asserts that Costa’s second alternating stack 232, 242 is formed “on the top surface of joint-level material layers.” Pet. 64. However, Costa refers to the term “joint-level material layers” as representing layers 175–177, not the asserted third channel structure 173. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 166, 178, 184–85; see Ex. 2006 ¶ 77. Thus, under Petitioner’s characterization, which is consistent with Costa, Costa’s second alternating stack is not formed on the third channel structure, but instead, “on the top surface of the joint level material layers” that surround the third channel structure. Because Petitioner has not explained how a second alternating stack on the surface of the joint material layers teaches a second alternating stack disposed on the third channel structure, Petitioner has not met its obviousness burden for limitation [11.E].” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,482,532 - PTAB · Jul 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00228 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all challenged grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim based on the Kim grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” On June 25, 2025, Patent Owner’s Request for Discretionary Denial was denied. Paper 21. For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’276 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–18 of the ’276 patent under all grounds presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶42). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not provide any such assessment in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 7 (reserving the right to argue an alternative level if the Board institutes review). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’276 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes any express claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 25; Prelim. Resp. 8. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Other
“Patent Owner argues that Kim’s Figure 22A shows “[a gate stack] 161 to 168 (tan) disposed below a dielectric layer 111-118 (light purple)” rather than “disposing a sacrificial layer over a dielectric layer” as claimed. Prelim. Resp. 12. Petitioner’s assertions are supported by its assertions based upon Kim’s alternate embodiment, in which the bottom-most step has a lower dielectric layer 111 on which the gate stack 161 is disposed. Compare Ex. 1005, Fig. 22A (representing the embodiment of the dielectric layer at the top surface) with Pet. 37 (Petitioner’s altered Figure 17A representing the embodiment in which the dielectric layer is at the top surface). It is true that the gate stack 161 may also be below dielectric layer 112; however, Patent Owner’s alternate manner of viewing the arrangement of layers does not contradict Petitioner’s equally valid description based upon Kim’s dual embodiments. Petitioner sufficiently shows that Kim’s lower steps (or even a single step) teaches deposition of a sacrificial layer (e.g., SC1) over a dielectric layer (e.g., 111). Pet. 36–37. Consequently, we agree that Petitioner has sufficiently shown Kim to teach or suggest limitations [1.PRE]9 and [1.A].10” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,101,276 - PTAB · Jul 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00191 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review on all challenged grounds for non-disclaimed claims 3, 6, 8–20; it found a reasonable likelihood of success for claims 8–12 and 19.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail as to the unpatentability of claims 8–12 and 19 of the ’322 patent but has not sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail as to the unpatentability as to claims 3, 6, 13–17, and 20. Because Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that at” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“B. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 As indicated above, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 of the ’322 patent. See Ex. 2006. In view of Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer, we treat claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 as having never been part of the ’322 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because inter partes review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 are outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017- 00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 3, 6, and 8–20, the challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aDenied
“Patent Owner filed a Brief on Discretionary Denial, and Petitioner filed a brief in opposition. Papers 10 and 18. The Director considered the briefing and determined that discretionary denial was not warranted. Paper 21.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at the critical time “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does not provide any such assessment in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 8; Ex. 2007 ¶ 22 (reserving the right to opine as to an alternative level of a POSITA). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’322 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,581,322 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00190 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 5 would have been obvious over Dong.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“§ 42.4(a), we may only institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Based upon our review of the present record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 40–42). Petitioner also asserts that a POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure and fabrication, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 41). Patent Owner does not take a position on the level of ordinary skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 12–13; see also Ex. 2006 ¶ 35 (applying Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA to the opinions set forth in the declaration but reserving the right to opine to an alternative level of a POSITA). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA as it appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art that is reflected by the prior art of record.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“Because the preambles of independent claims 5 and 11 provide antecedent basis for the word line limitations recited in the body of their respective claim, we treat the preambles of claims 5 and 11 as limiting. See Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (stating “a preamble phrase that provides antecedent basis for a claim limitation generally limits the scope of the claim”). The parties are invited to address whether the preamble is limiting if they so choose, to the extent permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“one memory portion above or below another portion establishes a relative top and bottom. For example, claim 5 is directed to a “program method of memory” that requires a second portion formed above the first portion. A second memory portion that is formed above a first memory portion would be on top of the first portion. Given that the claims themselves identify relative vertical locations of the memory portions (i.e., second memory portion is above the first portion), it follows that claim terms referring to the top and bottom of word lines within the memory portions also refer to relative vertical locations of the word lines within the memory portions. Thus, we understand the plain and ordinary meaning of claim language referring to first and second memory portions that comprise word lines “from bottom to top” to mean that the word lines of the memory portions are arranged vertically from the bottom end of the memory portion toward the top of the memory portion (i.e., from bottom to top). Our understanding that the term “from bottom to top” refers to the vertical arrangement of word lines in the memory portions from bottom to top and not from source end to drain end is supported by the ’941 patent Specification, which does not refer to source or drain side of the word lines. See generally Ex. 1001. Rather, the ’941 patent illustrates and describes figures of memory devices having word lines arranged vertically from bottom to top. For example, Figures 1–11 each depict “a memory” having vertically arranged word lines. See id. at 2:37–55, Figs. 1–11. The Specification describes embodiments with first, second, and/or third memory portions as including various word lines “from bottom to top” and that the memory portions are formed above or below each other, thus supporting that the claim term “from bottom to top” is used according to its plain and ordinary meaning of from bottom to top and not from source side to drain side. See, e.g., id. at 1:45–50, 1:55–60, 2:1–7, 2:14–18, 2:64–3:3, 3:46–48.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,568,941
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.