- ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 17, 2021 · IPR2019-01615 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Roku’s rehearing request, leaving intact its determination that claims 1, 3, 5, and 7 were not shown unpatentable over Chardon.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. DISCUSSION On request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, reply, or a sur-reply.” Id. We have reviewed Petitioner’s Request and carefully considered all of the arguments presented. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any arguments or evidence, and thus we decline to modify the Decision.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“first communication method” and “second communication method” recited in claim 1 with Chardon’s “CEC command codes” and “IR command codes,” respectively, where Chardon’s command codes are stored in a database linked to the Extended Display Identification Data (EDID) for target devices. Dec. 20–21. We thus evaluated whether command codes in an EDID-linked database teach or suggest the claimed listing comprised of at least a first communication method and a second communication method, and determined that “the record falls short of providing evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood stored command codes to act as an identification of communication methods to be used.” Id. at 21–22. slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,716,853 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · May 13, 2021 · IPR2019-01595 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing of its decision denying institution on claims 1 and 2, finding no abuse of discretion on priority entitlement or motivation to combine Darbee and Golender.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and the challenging party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a 1 Petitioner also filed a request for the Precedential Opinion Panel (“POP”) to review the Decision (Paper 13 (Notification of Receipt of POP Request)), which the POP denied (Paper 14 (Order)). paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Because Petitioner seeks rehearing of our Decision denying institution of trial based on the Petition, it must show an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.”). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence that could have been presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“issue upon which the priority determination turns—what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art—because Dr. Medvidovic did not provide any testimony on that issue. And we did not overlook or misapprehend any testimony of Dr. Medvidovic regarding what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art because we could not have overlooked or misapprehended any testimony that was not presented in the Medvidovic Declaration. As discussed above, Dr. Medvidovic’s testimony based on what is expressly disclosed in or necessarily follows from the disclosures of the priority applications was insufficient because Dr. Medvidovic did not explain adequately why the disclosures in the priority applications would not reasonably have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art the subject matter of the User Action Limitation. Thus, Dr. Medvidovic’s testimony was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Although Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Bear, provided detailed testimony and explanations regarding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the priority applications to describe the subject matter recited in the User Action Limitation (see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 111–122, 126–127), Dr. Medvidovic did not provide adequate testimony or explanations to the contrary on the issue (see Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 53–63).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“misapprehend or overlook 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). The mere fact that Dr. Medvidovic provided testimony different from the testimony of Mr. Bear does not by itself raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The mere existence in the record of dueling expert testimony does not necessarily raise a genuine issue of material fact.”). As the Request acknowledges, Dr. Medvidovic in his Declaration (Ex. 1010, “Medvidovic Declaration”) testified that the subject matter of the User Action Limitation is “neither expressly disclosed [in] nor necessarily follows from” the descriptions in the priority applications about event journal data. Req. 3 (emphases added) (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 57–62). As discussed above, however, the test for determining compliance with the written description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is whether the original disclosure of the earlier-filed application reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of the earlier-filed application. Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1351. The record shows that Dr. Medvidovic did not provide any testimony in his Declaration as to what the disclosures in the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 53–63. Nor did Dr. Medvidovic explain adequately in his Declaration why the disclosures in the priority applications would not reasonably have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art the subject matter of the User Action Limitation. See id.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Under Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, “less education can be remedied with additional work experience (e.g., 5–6 years).” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 64–67). As stated in the Bear Declaration, Mr. Bear’s work experience includes at least 9 years of computer software programming using a variety of coding languages, such as BASIC, Pascal, C, C++, and 68000 Assembly Language. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 10–12. Thus, Mr. Bear is qualified to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art under Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. As discussed in the Decision, although we did not find the parties’ proposals for the level of ordinary skill in the art to be materially different, to the extent the testimony from the parties’ declarants on the level of ordinary skill in the art raised a genuine issue of material fact, we adopted and applied Petitioner’s definition for purposes of the Decision, being mindful of the rule that “a genuine issue of material fact created by such testimonial evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner solely for purposes of deciding whether to institute an inter partes review.” Dec. 9 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c)). Thus, the record shows that, under Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in consideration of § 42.108(c), the Decision appropriately credited Mr. Bear’s testimony on what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 8,015,446 - PTAB · Sep 15, 2020 · IPR2020-00282 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Samsung’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“a party requests rehearing on a decision on whether to institute inter partes review, we “review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019). There is an abuse of discretion if we have made “a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or in basing [our] decision on an error of law or on clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 851 F.3d 1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In a request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in the record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We disagree. Nowhere in the cited passages in the Petition does Samsung argue that we should construe the term “row wrap-around connections” according to the explicit construction that Samsung now suggests for the plain and ordinary meaning. See Pet. 10–11, 25–30. Rather, Samsung argued that “Petitioners do not believe any term requires explicit construction.” Pet. 10–11. In the Reply, Samsung argued that all of the terms in the challenged claims should be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See Reply 1, 4–5. However, apart from arguing that Samsung had proposed construing limitation 1C in the co-pending district court proceeding according to its plain and ordinary meaning,3 Samsung did not propose any specific construction for the phrase “row wrap-around connection,” or point to any evidence as to what the ordinary and customary meaning of that phrase was to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, we decline to adopt Samsung’s new proposed construction on rehearing.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We determined that Samsung had not provided sufficient evidence of its proposed motivation to combine the two references. See Dec. 16 (“[N]either Samsung nor Dr. Wolfe supports this conclusion with any evidence on the preliminary record.” (citing In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3))). In particular, we found that “Dr. Wolfe does not explain how or why the combination of Barkan and Tagg would minimize RC delay or allow for the use of lengthier columns and rows of electrodes, or cite to any facts, data, or authorities to support that opinion.” Dec. 17. We stated that “there is no evidence in the record suggesting that RC delay was a recognized problem . . . or that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that a connection to both sides of a row of electrodes would be a solution to that problem.” Id. We also stated that Dr. Wolfe does not “provide any detail as to how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Barkan’s leads 160 to incorporate external connections such as those in Tagg.” Id. (citing Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,821,502 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 16, 2019 · IPR2019-00060 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing only to address the overlooked construction dispute, but again denied institution because Jensen did not teach “mobile protection code.”
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“(“Dec. on Inst.”). The panel concluded that Petitioner had not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in the asserted obviousness grounds because, for a particular ground, Petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficiently that Jensen1 teaches “mobile protection code.” Dec. on Inst. 11−12.2 Petitioner has filed a Request for Rehearing. Paper 8 (“Req. Reh’g”). Petitioner argues that the scope for the claim term “mobile protection code” was in dispute, and that we “failed to resolve the key claim construction dispute between the parties.” Id. at 1. According to Petitioner, rehearing is warranted to resolve the claim construction dispute and “fix the plain error in the Institution Decision.” Id. We are persuaded that in failing to address Petitioner’s construction, we overlooked the matter raised in Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed infra, after giving due consideration to Petitioner’s argument, we are persuaded that our decision to deny institution was correct, and therefore we deny the request insofar as it calls upon us to institute trial.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“(“Dec. on Inst.”). The panel concluded that Petitioner had not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in the asserted obviousness grounds because, for a particular ground, Petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficiently that Jensen1 teaches “mobile protection code.” Dec. on Inst. 11−12.2 Petitioner has filed a Request for Rehearing. Paper 8 (“Req. Reh’g”). Petitioner argues that the scope for the claim term “mobile protection code” was in dispute, and that we “failed to resolve the key claim construction dispute between the parties.” Id. at 1. According to Petitioner, rehearing is warranted to resolve the claim construction dispute and “fix the plain error in the Institution Decision.” Id. We are persuaded that in failing to address Petitioner’s construction, we overlooked the matter raised in Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed infra, after giving due consideration to Petitioner’s argument, we are persuaded that our decision to deny institution was correct, and therefore we deny the request insofar as it calls upon us to institute trial.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“1 Protection Wrappers: A Simple and Portable Sandbox for Untrusted Applications, Proceedings on the 8th ACM SIGOPS European Workshop on Support for Composing Distributed Applications, filed in the record as Exhibit 1006. 2 We also exercised our discretion under 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a) and 325(d) and denied institution. Petitioner does not challenge the exercise of discretion in this request for rehearing.” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“1 Protection Wrappers: A Simple and Portable Sandbox for Untrusted Applications, Proceedings on the 8th ACM SIGOPS European Workshop on Support for Composing Distributed Applications, filed in the record as Exhibit 1006. 2 We also exercised our discretion under 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a) and 325(d) and denied institution. Petitioner does not challenge the exercise of discretion in this request for rehearing.” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,647,633 - Infinera Corp. v. Core Optical Technologies, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 11, 2019 · IPR2018-01259 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Infinera’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the Petition inadequately addressed claim construction, prior-art combinations, and reasons to combine.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“This is not the first time that the ’211 patent has been before a tribunal. It cannot be said that Petitioner is unaware of the important claim construction matters that go to the heart of dispositive patentability issues. Petitioner, on the facts of this case,[] has failed to identify adequately its proposed construction applicable to its patentability challenges. Further, Petitioner cannot avoid its duty to comply with Rule 104(b)(3)[1] by merely inviting us to apply a means-plus-function interpretation rather than affirmatively advocating (in this forum) the application thereof. Petitioner has neither taken a definitive position nor provided complete briefing, and we decline to assume Petitioner’s task of fully analyzing the claim construction for XPIC. Petitioner’s failure in this regard is reason enough to deny the petition. Dec. 13–14 (footnote omitted). We further denied institution because Petitioner’s articulation of a single ground implicated the application of multiple potential constructions. See Dec. 16–17 (explaining—in the context of Petitioner’s challenge to claim 15 over Cusani 1992, Cusani 1997, and Kavehrad—“[t]he number of possible asserted combinations is further multiplied by the overlay of the multiple potential claim constructions discussed above.”).” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s analysis in many places is little more than an assertion that each particular element of a larger limitation was individually known in the prior art. Petitioner does not describe adequately a specific proposed combination of references. Because of this and in light of, at least, the massive number of possible proposed combinations, Petitioner has failed to identify adequately how each challenged claim is to be construed and how the construed claim is unpatentable. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), (4). Dec. 18. Petitioner does not identify any portion of the Petition where a specific proposed combination of references is adequately described. See Req. Reh’g 13. Rather, Petitioner impliedly argues that it need not do so. Id. (quoting, but not explaining the relevance to this case, a bodily-incorporation proposition from In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Petitioner makes the conclusory argument that “[i]n providing demonstrative illustrations of a combined system, coupled with a thorough analysis of the teachings of the prior art, Petitioner’s obviousness arguments directly addressed that question” of “what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those having ordinary skill in the art.” Id. (citing In re Mouttett, 686 F.3d at 1333). Petitioner’s argument is, in effect, merely an assertion of disagreement with our determination that the Petition was not persuasive. Petitioner has not identified anything we misunderstood or overlooked.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“combined the references’ teachings to arrive at the claimed subject matter” and that “Petitioner’s reasoning is an oversimplification and too conclusory to constitute the necessary articulated reasoning with rational underpinning.” Dec. 20, 21 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). That oversimplification was a reference to Petitioner’s arguments pertaining to the alleged similarity of signal transmission systems, whereas “the key issues involve the specific techniques used to cancel specific types of interference of received signals in optical systems versus radio frequency systems.” Id. at 23. In this regard, we stated: “Demonstrating obviousness in this case requires more than a showing that optical and RF [radio frequency] systems both utilize general techniques related to orthogonally polarized signals and had known interference problems.” Id.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,782,211 - Huawei Device Co., Ltd. v. Optis Wireless Technology, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 3, 2019 · IPR2018-00658 · APJ John P Pinkerton · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left in place the denial of institution on claim 1 because JVT-B045 did not teach or suggest the claimed periphery-based determining function.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place 1 In Ground 1, Petitioner asserts claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of H.324, H.263, and JVT-B045. Pet. 47–66. where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). With this in mind, we address the arguments presented by Petitioner.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“limitation [1i] that recites a “determining unit configured to determine a predictive value for the number of non-zero coefficients included in the current block based on the number of non-zero coefficients included in a decoded block located on a periphery of the current block.”2 We also examined Dr. Schonfeld’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill would understand that “the last coded 4x4 block” mentioned in the JVT-B045 proposal is a “neighboring block that is located on the periphery of the block being currently coded” in view of Patent Owner’s examples demonstrating that JVT-B045’s “last coded block” would oftentimes not be located on a “periphery of the current block.” Decision 18. We concluded that Patent Owner’s analysis persuasively rebuts Dr. Schonfeld’s testimony. Id. at 18– 19. We also found it is irrelevant that the last coded block of JVT-B045 would “sometimes” be “located on a periphery of the current block.” Id. at 19. In that regard, the Decision states that because claim 1 is an apparatus claim that is “configured to” determine a value based on information in a decoded block “located on a periphery of the current block,” an apparatus programmed to perform the algorithm disclosed by JVT-B045 would be configured to seek information from the “‘last coded block’ (a temporal relationship), which is different from the claimed apparatus configured to 2 This is the complete limitation, whereas a short-hand version was used on page 17 of the Decision that omitted the words “the number of” preceding each use of the term “non-zero coefficients.” provide information based on a spatial relationship—a decoded block ‘located on a periphery of the current block.’” Id. Thus, we determined that Petitioner had not shown a reasonable likelihood of success on Ground 1 because it did not reasonably demonstrate that configuring a determining unit based on the “last coded block” of JVT-B045 taught or suggested configuring a determining unit based on a decoded block “located on a periphery of the current block.”” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“limitation [1i] that recites a “determining unit configured to determine a predictive value for the number of non-zero coefficients included in the current block based on the number of non-zero coefficients included in a decoded block located on a periphery of the current block.”2 We also examined Dr. Schonfeld’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill would understand that “the last coded 4x4 block” mentioned in the JVT-B045 proposal is a “neighboring block that is located on the periphery of the block being currently coded” in view of Patent Owner’s examples demonstrating that JVT-B045’s “last coded block” would oftentimes not be located on a “periphery of the current block.” Decision 18. We concluded that Patent Owner’s analysis persuasively rebuts Dr. Schonfeld’s testimony. Id. at 18– 19. We also found it is irrelevant that the last coded block of JVT-B045 would “sometimes” be “located on a periphery of the current block.” Id. at 19. In that regard, the Decision states that because claim 1 is an apparatus claim that is “configured to” determine a value based on information in a decoded block “located on a periphery of the current block,” an apparatus programmed to perform the algorithm disclosed by JVT-B045 would be configured to seek information from the “‘last coded block’ (a temporal relationship), which is different from the claimed apparatus configured to 2 This is the complete limitation, whereas a short-hand version was used on page 17 of the Decision that omitted the words “the number of” preceding each use of the term “non-zero coefficients.” provide information based on a spatial relationship—a decoded block ‘located on a periphery of the current block.’” Id. Thus, we determined that Petitioner had not shown a reasonable likelihood of success on Ground 1 because it did not reasonably demonstrate that configuring a determining unit based on the “last coded block” of JVT-B045 taught or suggested configuring a determining unit based on a decoded block “located on a periphery of the current block.”” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,769,238 - Unified Patents Inc. v. Multimedia Content Management LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 25, 2019 · IPR2017-01934 · APJ Matthew J Mcneill · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing of its decision denying institution because Petitioner did not show Freund taught or suggested a service provider network under the proper construction.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“claims 1‒5, 9, 12, 19, 23‒27, and 33 as obvious over Freund. Req. Reh’g 1‒2. On request for rehearing, the burden of showing a decision on whether to institute trial should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). For reasons discussed below, we decline to modify the Decision. Thus, Petitioner’s Request is denied.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“the specification of the ’468 patent. However, the ’468 patent teaches “the Internet is composed of several components including, for example, content providers for generating content; service providers for delivering content; subscriber terminals for receiving, displaying and playing content; and various network elements between service providers and subscribers for aiding in the distribution of content.” Ex. 1001, 1:29‒35. “Service providers include, for example, telephone line carriers, enterprise data centers, and cable television providers.” Id. at 1:35‒37. The ’468 patent distinguishes between service providers and subscribers, noting that “[s]ubscriber terminals are located at subscriber premises and include, for example, personal computers [and] televisions configured with modems.”” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“any arguments or evidence in the Petition, or that our determinations based on the preliminary record were an abuse of discretion. First, Petitioner did not fully develop the argument it now makes, instead relying on conclusory statements and identifying portions or figures of the prior art without sufficient explanation. In particular, Petitioner cited three embodiments: the embodiment shown in Freund Figure 3A (see, e.g., Pet. 20‒22 (claim 1[b])), the embodiment shown in Freund Figure 3B (see, e.g., Pet. 39‒40 (claim 1[f])), and a hypothetical embodiment employing a widely dispersed network (see, e.g., Pet. 31 (claim 1[c])). For certain limitations, Petitioner cites only the embodiment shown in Figure 3A. See, e.g., claim 1[a], Pet. 20‒22. But Petitioner cites all three embodiments, including the hypothetical embodiment, in support of other limitations without explaining how these embodiments would be combined, if at all. See, e.g., claim 1[c], Pet. 27‒31. Petitioner did not sufficiently explain how to combine these three embodiments in a way that teaches or suggests all of the limitations of claim 1.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“provider network” for each of the limitations discussed above. See Pet. 18‒ 46. Even if Petitioner had explained how the three identified embodiments were being combined, Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of establishing that Freund teaches or suggests a “service provider network” under the broadest reasonable construction of that term. For these reasons, Petitioner has not persuaded us that we abused our discretion in our denial of the Petition.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,799,468 - Google LLC v. Cywee Group LtdRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 30, 2019 · IPR2018-01258 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution of review of claims 1 and 3–5 in place because no abuse of discretion was shown.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When a party requests rehearing on a decision instituting inter partes review, we “review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). There is an abuse of discretion if we have made “a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or in basing [our] decision on an error of law or on clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 851 F.3d 1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In a request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in the record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“factual issue, which we do not disturb on rehearing unless it was clearly erroneous. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Based on” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“with the second signal set whereby said resultant angles . . . are obtained under said dynamic environments.” Ex. 1001, 19:12–17 (emphasis added). We construed the term comparison as the ’438 patent explicitly defines it: “the calculating and obtaining of the actual deviation angles of the 3D pointing device . . . with respect to the first reference frame or spatial 3–5 of the ’438 patent, we need not address whether or not Bachmann is pertinent to the different problem that Patent Owner defines. Further, we do not consider the evidence in Appendix A, because Patent Owner does not point to any place where this evidence was addressed in the preliminary record. See 37 C.F.R. 42.71(d). pointing frame XP YP ZP utilizing signals generated by motion sensors while reducing or eliminating noises associated with said motion sensors.” Decision 14 (quoting id. at 2:28–32). We also determined that the ’438 patent uses the term consistently with that broad definition—for example, to describe a program or model for updating a state based on a previous state and a measured state. Id. at 13–14.” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“inquiries underpinning the legal conclusion of obviousness. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). On the preliminary record, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had, among other things, “knowledge of . . . quaternion mechanics.” Decision 19.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,441,438 - Google LLC v. Cywee Group Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 30, 2019 · IPR2018-01257 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no overlooked error in its analogous-art and skill-level analysis and declining to deny institution under § 325(d).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on whether to institute a trial, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burden of showing that our Decision should be modified lies with Patent Owner, the party challenging the decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). In addition, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“(1) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (2) the cumulative nature of the assert art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (3) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (4) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (5) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (6) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, Case IPR2017-01586, slip op. at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (Paper 8) (informative) (formatting added). These factors weigh against exercising our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution, particularly in view of the limited nature of Patent Owner’s allegations in its Preliminary Response.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the art would have had, inter alia, “knowledge of . . . quaternion mathematics.” Dec. 15. In doing so, we stated that “[t]he record provides support for Dr. Sarrafzadeh’s [Petitioner’s declarant] position that quaternion mathematics was well known in the relevant time frame.” Id. at 14. Patent Owner contends that, in doing so, we misapprehended the level of skill in the art “by conflating that ‘quaternion mathematics was well known in the relevant time frame’ with the issue of whether the application of quaternion mathematics was well known in the art of 3D pointing devices.” Req. Reh’g 12–13. But in describing its technical field as “methods and apparatus for tracking the orientation . . . of an object,” Bachmann specifically states that “the field of quaternion mathematics is known to those having ordinary skill in the art and is explained in detail in numerous mathematical texts.” Ex. 1004, 1:18–20, 7:25–28. As we noted in the Institution Decision, and reiterate above, “[s]uch tracking is also one of the concerns of the ’978 patent.” Dec. 14. It is thus apparent that we considered not only the isolated question of whether quaternion mathematics was known in the relevant time frame, but also the degree of its application to tracking the orientation of objects.2 We conclude that we did not misapprehend or overlook Patent Owner’s argument that the level of skill in the art should exclude knowledge of quaternion mathematics.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Even accepting, for purposes of this Decision, Patent Owner’s characterization of Bachmann, we are not persuaded that we erred in finding that Bachmann is at least reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the inventor of the ’978 patent was involved. The question of whether a reference is analogous art presents an issue of fact. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In considering this factual issue, Patent Owner’s focus on the display aspect of the problem confronting the inventor of the ’978 patent is too narrow. The bulk of the disclosure of the ’978 patent is concerned with determining the changes in angles that define an orientation of the 3D pointing device rather than with the geometrical task of mapping those determined angles onto a two-dimensional display. Compare, e.g., Ex. 1001, 13:60–19:60 (six columns of description for determining yaw, pitch, and roll angles of 3D pointing device in describing Figure 7), with 20:6–21:65 (two columns describing the geometry of mapping to a display with Figure 9). Regardless of the specific degree to which each of these aspects of the problem is treated by the ’978 patent, it is unambiguously apparent that a significant aspect of the problem addressed is the determination of the 3D pointing device’s orientation. The determination of a hand-held device’s orientation is exactly what Bachmann describes. Ex. 1004, 1:18–20 (“The invention described herein relates to methods and apparatus for tracking the orientation . . . of an object.”), 13:47–48 (“Examples include . . . hand-held devices”). Because of the close similarity of this principal aspect of the problem confronted by the inventor of the ’978 patent, Bachmann reasonably would have commended itself to the inventor’s attention, and is therefore analogous art. We conclude that we did not misapprehend or overlook Patent Owner’s argument that Bachmann is not analogous art.” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,552,978 - Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 11, 2018 · IPR2017-01979 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Huawei’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution on grounds 4–6 because the Petition did not adequately explain how to harmonize the references’ conflicting teachings.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). We “review [our] decision for an abuse of discretion.” Id. § 42.71(c). The request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. § 42.71(d). After considering the Request for Rehearing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused our discretion in denying institution. We deny the Request for Rehearing for the reasons that follow. slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Id. Figure 1 of R1-071000 identifies the scope of its contribution as limited to transmission of control information together with data information. Id. Thus, R1-071000, on its face, is directed to the opposite scenario of R1- 072122, which is directed to transmitting control information without data. Id.; see also Dec. 14–15 citing (Ex. 1008, 1 (Title: “Data non-associated control signal transmission with UL data.”)). Even if we were to accept arguendo Petitioner’s first argument that R1-071000 invites skilled artisans to expand and apply the data mapping scheme of R1-072122, such an invitation does not remedy Petitioner’s failure to explain sufficiently how one with ordinary skill in the art would have modified the system of R1- 072122 to transmit control signals with data, contrary to the express teachings of that reference. See Reh’g Req. 4; Pet. 85–86. For instance, Petitioner does not address how one would reconcile the two references’ diametrically opposed teachings regarding placement of the ACK/NAK. As we stated: Finally, although the cited portions of R1-071000 teach placing data in the symbols directly adjacent to the symbol containing the reference signal, R1-071000 depicts placing the ACK/NAK in the symbols farthest from the symbol containing the reference signal––directly opposite to the cited teachings of R1-072122 describing placing the ACK/NAK in the symbols directly adjacent to the reference signal. Ex. 1008, Figs. 4, 5. Here too, Petitioner and Dr. Akl do not address how or why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have harmonized the disparate teachings of these two references. Dec. 15 (bold emphasis added; italics original). Absent sufficient evidence and explanation, Petitioner’s argument amounts to impermissible hindsight reconstruction of the challenged claims. See, e.g., In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (cautioning against the use of hindsight).” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Rehearing. Reh’g Req. 4–6. A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. § 42.71(d). Petitioner identifies a single page of its Petition as “the place where [that argument] was previously addressed.” Reh’g Req. 4–6 (citing Pet. 86). The cited page of the Petition, recites only a single sentence and string citation related to this argument: “Further, a number of 3GPP contributions, including both R1- 071000 and R1-072122, expressly disclose and teach that it is advantageous to limit the number of different transmission formats due to complexity of UE design.” Pet. 86 (citing Ex. 1008, 2, 5; Ex. 1006, 2; Ex. 1009, 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 225). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); see also, e.g., Captioncall, Inc. v. Ultratec, Inc., IPR2014-00780, Paper No. 40 (PTAB May 19, 2016) (discussing that a rehearing request is “not intended as a vehicle simply to disagree with [the] outcome or to provide new arguments”). Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions on rehearing, the cited portion of the Petition does not provide sufficient explanation for the following statements made in the Request for Rehearing: that “R1-072122 also expressly teaches that a single mapping scheme for control information is preferred”; that “R1-070998, another contemporaneous 3GPP contribution, provides a similar statement”; or that “skilled artisans would have been motivated to apply the same control mapping scheme regardless of the presence of data.” Compare Reh’g Req. 4–6 with Pet. 86. Indeed, the cited page of the Petition does not discuss R1-070777or R1-070998. See Pet. 86. Because Petitioner’s second argument was not presented in its Petition, we do not consider it on rehearing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). To the extent Petitioner contends its declarant Dr. Akl presented the extensive argument that Petitioner now puts forth in its Request for Rehearing, our rules particularly require identification of “the place where [that argument] was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. (emphasis added); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(3) (prohibiting incorporation of arguments by reference).” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,761,130
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.