- Infineon Technologies AG v. Amatech Group LimitedRehearing grantedPTAB · Apr 3, 2024 · IPR2022-00951 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Rehearing
On rehearing, the Board held claim 3 unpatentable as obvious over Eray-WO799, revising the final written decision’s outcome for that claim.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“unrebutted expert testimony corroborated by two prior art patents describing RFID smart cards” and that this evidence “demonstrated that a conventional and obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799’s smart card was by forming a card antenna on a card body before adding the chip.” Req. Reh’g 2 (citing Pet. 39–40; Paper 20 (“Reply”) at 31). Thus, Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an obvious and conventional way of manufacturing the card body of Eray- WO799 would have had unconnected ends as required by our construction. Id. Paragraph 149 of Dr. van der Weide’s declaration states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that an obvious and conventional way to construct the smart card as shown in Eray-WO799 FIG. 12 would have been to form the turns S1, S2, SC3 and SC4 on or in the card body (e.g., by laying wire) before connecting the wire to (or forming) access terminals and connecting module M.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 149. In support of that because it was “directed to solving problems that occur during the manufacture of cards.” Dec. 42 (citing Ex. 1028, 1:25–2:53). Petitioner points out that “[w]hile Ryu discloses manufacturing techniques, Ryu also describes and claims a ‘communication system’ with a smart card and a reader.” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing Ex. 1028, code (57), claims 1–2). Petitioner is correct in noting that Ryu’s disclosures are not so narrow as we described in the Decision. As to Finn-089, we found that reference unhelpful because it was “directed to a process for the contacting of a wire conductor in the course of manufacture of a transponder unit.” Dec. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1015, 1:15–17). Petitioner asserts that we failed to acknowledge to the fact that Finn-089 was incorporated by reference in the ’240 patent noting that “[p]atents incorporated by reference ‘are effectively part of the host [patents] as if [they] were explicitly contained therein.’” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 757 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alterations in Rehearing Request)). On this record, we agree that we overlooked and misapprehended the import of Ryu and Finn-089 and if those references are given appropriate weight, they lend further credence to Dr. van der Weide’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that an obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799 would have created an intermediate product with requisite free ends. Further, we adopt the full reasoning stated in the Dissent as to the unpatentability of claim 3 (Dec. 53–57). Therefore, we GRANT Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“As stated in our Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art and found that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have possessed “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and 1–2 years of experience researching and developing antennas used in RFID applications.” Dec. 6–7 (citing Pet. 8; PO Resp. 18). Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Daniel van der Weide, supported Petitioner’s definition, which was adopted for this proceeding. Ex. 1003 ¶ 25. Dr. van der Weide defined himself as “a person of more than ordinary skill in the art during the relevant timeframe” because “[b]y 2010, [he] held a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, and [he] had at least” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“unrebutted expert testimony corroborated by two prior art patents describing RFID smart cards” and that this evidence “demonstrated that a conventional and obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799’s smart card was by forming a card antenna on a card body before adding the chip.” Req. Reh’g 2 (citing Pet. 39–40; Paper 20 (“Reply”) at 31). Thus, Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an obvious and conventional way of manufacturing the card body of Eray- WO799 would have had unconnected ends as required by our construction. Id. Paragraph 149 of Dr. van der Weide’s declaration states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that an obvious and conventional way to construct the smart card as shown in Eray-WO799 FIG. 12 would have been to form the turns S1, S2, SC3 and SC4 on or in the card body (e.g., by laying wire) before connecting the wire to (or forming) access terminals and connecting module M.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 149. In support of that because it was “directed to solving problems that occur during the manufacture of cards.” Dec. 42 (citing Ex. 1028, 1:25–2:53). Petitioner points out that “[w]hile Ryu discloses manufacturing techniques, Ryu also describes and claims a ‘communication system’ with a smart card and a reader.” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing Ex. 1028, code (57), claims 1–2). Petitioner is correct in noting that Ryu’s disclosures are not so narrow as we described in the Decision. As to Finn-089, we found that reference unhelpful because it was “directed to a process for the contacting of a wire conductor in the course of manufacture of a transponder unit.” Dec. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1015, 1:15–17). Petitioner asserts that we failed to acknowledge to the fact that Finn-089 was incorporated by reference in the ’240 patent noting that “[p]atents incorporated by reference ‘are effectively part of the host [patents] as if [they] were explicitly contained therein.’” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 757 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alterations in Rehearing Request)). On this record, we agree that we overlooked and misapprehended the import of Ryu and Finn-089 and if those references are given appropriate weight, they lend further credence to Dr. van der Weide’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that an obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799 would have created an intermediate product with requisite free ends. Further, we adopt the full reasoning stated in the Dissent as to the unpatentability of claim 3 (Dec. 53–57). Therefore, we GRANT Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,165,240 - PTAB · Mar 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00194 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 3–6 and 10 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 3 and 10 are obvious over Setton and Baker.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We determine that this factor weighs against discretionary denial. Some work has been completed, but the Texas litigation is in its early stages. Although infringement and invalidity contentions have been served (Ex. 1022, 5; Ex. 2002, 5), the majority of the work still remains to be completed, including the Markman briefing and order, fact discovery, and expert discovery (Ex. 2002, 3–5; accord Ex. 1022, 3).” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Conclusion For the reasons provided above, Petitioner has sufficiently shown (for purposes of institution) that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Setton and Baker as proposed, and that the combination teaches, suggests, or renders obvious each limitation of independent claim 3. We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments, but they are unavailing at this stage and on this record. Accordingly, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing that the subject matter of claim 3 would have been obvious over Setton and Baker.” slip op. at 34
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s definition generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’099 patent and the asserted prior art. This definition is also supported by the testimony of Dr. Reddy. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 19. In addition, Patent Owner appears to agree with Petitioner regarding the educational background and number of years of work experience. Compare Prelim. Resp. 32, with Pet. 9. At this stage, given the disclosure of the ’099 patent, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s contention that the ordinary artisan would have had experience with “data networks and video streaming systems” generally, rather than “video teleconferencing systems” specifically. However, the analysis in this Decision would not have changed if we had instead adopted Patent Owner’s proposal.10” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“At this stage, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s understanding of the claim’s plain language. Elements 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 require that the “plurality of endpoints” be “configured such that a film strip with frames containing reduced-size video feeds from the conference participants is displayed at the mesh endpoints.” This language does not require that each of the endpoints supply a video feed; rather, it requires that the conference participants supply the video feeds. Also, the claim does not appear to include language that requires any of “the conference participants” to be associated with the non-mesh connected endpoint. Patent Owner assumes that “the conference participants” are the individuals participating from any and every endpoint (see Prelim. Resp. 37), but it fails to sufficiently support this understanding. According to Patent Owner, the claim’s later reference to “‘the mesh-connected conference participants’ . . . show[s] that the scope of ‘the conference participants’ is broader than just ‘mesh-connected endpoints.’” Prelim. Resp. 37; see Ex. 1001, 18:36. We disagree. Even if that claim language demonstrates that some “conference participants” are associated with mesh- connected endpoints, it does not show that the set of “conference participants” is necessarily broader. In fact, the claim language cuts the other way—the claim refers to “the mesh-connected conference participants,” indicating that this term derives antecedent basis from (and is the same as) the “conference participants” referenced earlier in the claim. Moreover, the claim later refers to “a user located at the non-mesh connected endpoint” (Ex. 1001, 18:42–43), which further indicates that the “conference participants” need not include a person associated with the non-mesh connected endpoint. Although Patent Owner points to two passages from the Specification to support its position (see Ex. 1001, 5:13–17, 17:47–49), neither suggests a particular meaning for this claim phrase. One passage describes a particular embodiment in which conference participants receive video streams “from all other endpoints” (id. at 5:13–17),11 and the other simply states that the described system allows a non-mesh endpoint to participate “in much the same way” as mesh-connected endpoints (id. at 17:47–49). In addition, we have assigned little weight to Dr. Sharony’s testimony regarding the meaning of this phrase (see Ex. 2001 ¶ 94) because he reiterates Patent Owner’s legal arguments without either providing technical background or addressing the meaning of terms to an ordinarily skilled artisan. See Philips, 415 F.3d at 1318.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,204,099 - Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 21, 2024 · IPR2020-00511 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1–3, 5, 6, 10–12, 14, and 15 unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Chen and Grab-333 with Candelore or Kocher.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“I. INTRODUCTION This case is on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to address the patentability of claims 1–3, 5, 6, 10–12, 14, and 15 (“the Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,184,920 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’920 patent). Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, No. 2022-1043, 2023 WL 3115576 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023) (nonprecedential). For the reasons discussed herein, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Challenged Claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978)). As neither party challenges our preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, we see no reason to disturb that finding. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in video encryption and cryptography or . . . a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in video encryption and cryptography.” See Inst. Dec. 9–10 (finding the same).” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In the Response, Patent Owner does not propose a construction for any claim term or contest our preliminary findings regarding limitations 1[a] and 1[b]. See generally PO Resp. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm our preliminary determinations regarding the meaning of the recited “user encryption key” and “content encryption key.” [Inst.] Dec. 12– 15. Additionally, we need not construe other claim terms to resolve the present controversy before us.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the complete record before us, Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, and 15 of the ’920 patent would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 103
Patent outcomesUS 9,184,920 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,184,920 - Amphenol Corp. v. PPC Broadband, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01363 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, and 10–13 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim, including obviousness over Holmberg and Battey.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’483 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the Challenged Claims of the ’483 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends claim 1 should be construed to require that “the drop cable retain its external jacket as it is routed internally.” Pet. 10. Petitioner contends this construction differs from Patent Owner’s apparent construction in the district court, “which allows the external jacket to be removed as the drop cable enters the DIB and the fibers routed inside the box without the external jacket.” Id. at 10–11. Patent Owner contends Petitioner’s narrower construction requiring the “drop cable” retain its external jacket is incorrect, but contends “the Board need not resolve this claim construction dispute to deny institution because Petitioner’s proposed Grounds 1–5 are all insufficient under” either party’s construction. Prelim. Resp. 9. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the prior art of record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). We address below, however, whether the recited cable types themselves constitute claim limitations.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“slack fiber. Prelim. Resp. 33–37. These arguments are not persuasive. First, Petitioner does not propose a bodily incorporation of Battey’s shelf into the device of Holmberg. Rather, Petitioner’s proposed combination retains splice tray 230 of Holmberg and relies on Battey for its disclosure of using a hinge connection for the splice tray. Pet. 40 (asserting that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to modify Holmberg pursuant to Battey, resulting in splice tray 230 moveable relative to main body 216”), 43 (“Such a modification would have been a simple substitution of a hinged connection instead of a fastener.”). Second, although Battey utilizes a fixedly mounted slack basket to store excess cable, we are directed to no disclosure or teaching in Battey that teaches away from using other means of storing slack fiber.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“For the reasons set forth below, we determine that part two of the Advanced Bionics framework has not been satisfied. Thus, we need not address whether part one of the framework is satisfied in view of the alleged cumulative nature of Laporte and Battey.” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,008,483 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01275 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Clark and Manner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s argument that Industrial Design does not have a set definition is supported by Dr. Ben-Tzvi’s testimony. Nonetheless, we give little weight to his testimony on this point because he does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Ex. 2001 ¶ 22. Based on the present record, we do not exclude Industrial Design from the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, although the parties are free to address this issue further during trial. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’650 patent and the prior art. Our Decision would be not be affected if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“C. Mr. Kemnitzer’s Testimony Patent Owner contends that we should give little to no weight to Mr. Kemnitzer’s testimony because his “education and experience is in industrial design, rather than mechanical engineering.” Prelim. Resp. 57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4–6). According to Patent Owner, “[s]uch qualifications are directed more toward aesthetics than hard science,” while “[m]echanical engineering concerns are at the core of certain deficiencies in Mr. Kemnitzer’s analysis.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 58). Regardless of the precise contours of industrial design, Mr. Kemnitzer testifies that he has “substantial direct experience in designing products that utilize the manufacturing processes, components, and materials of the designs at issue in this matter” and “in designing fully adjustable products for the commercial furniture, computer, and healthcare industries.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 5. Thus, on the present record at this stage of the proceeding, we decline to minimize the weight given to his testimony for this reason. The parties, however, are free to address this issue further during trial.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner contends that “the ’650 patent is obvious under any reasonable construction of the claims.” Pet. 9. Petitioner points out that it contends in district court that the term “an actuator for controlling the driver” is indefinite for invoking means-plus-function claiming without providing corresponding structure. Id. (citing Ex. 1023, 36–40; Ex. 1024, 28–32). Petitioner, however, adopts Patent Owner’s construction of this term for the purposes of this proceeding—“a mechanism to activate or control equipment, e.g., by use of pneumatic, hydraulic, or electronic signals.” Id. at 10 (quoting Ex. 1012, 3–4). Petitioner also points out that in the district court, the parties’ proposed constructions of “work surface” also differ. Id. Specifically, Petitioner advocates that the term should be construed as “a curved surface at the top of a cart large enough to dispense medication or hold work papers,” while Petitioner characterizes Patent Owner’s position as advocating “for a broader ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ construction. Id. (citing Ex. 1012, 8–9). Petitioner, however, states that it “includes alternate grounds using Gillis to demonstrate how the claims are invalid under either Petitioner or Patent Owner’s construction.” Id. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner fails to expressly adopt or set forth any claim definitions aside from the term “work surface.” Prelim. Resp. 17. Patent Owner, however, contends that the claimed invention is valid under any reasonable construction. Id. Patent Owner also contends that the term “compartment” should be construed as “an enclosed space for containing an item” and that the construction of “work surface” is not dispositive here. Id. at 18–20. We agree with Patent Owner that it is not necessary to construe “work surface” at this stage of the proceeding because the construction of the term does not resolve the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,215,650 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01274 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 3 and 4 on all grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that claims 3 and 4 would be unpatentable as obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, Preliminary Reply, Preliminary Sur-reply as well as all supporting evidence, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one claim of the ’668 patent is unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’668 patent on all grounds stated in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42 (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the relevant statutory provisions, in light of SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018), to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s argument that Industrial Design does not have a set definition is supported by Dr. Ben-Tzvi’s testimony. Ex. 2001 ¶ 22. Nonetheless, we give little weight to his testimony on this point because it 9 Patent Owner is reminded that arguments may not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document. 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Based on the present record, we do not exclude Industrial Design from the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, although the parties are free to address this issue further during trial. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’668 patent and the prior art. Our Decision would not be affected if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Regardless of the precise contours of industrial design, Mr. Kemnitzer testifies that he has “substantial direct experience in designing products that utilize the manufacturing processes, components, and materials of the designs at issue in this matter” and “in designing fully adjustable products for the commercial furniture, computer, and healthcare industries.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 5. Thus, on the present record and at this stage of the proceeding, we decline to minimize the weight given to his testimony for this reason. The parties, however, are free to address this issue further during trial.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that it is not necessary to construe “work surface” expressly at this stage of the proceeding because the construction of the term does not resolve the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,594,668 - Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 22, 2024 · IPR2020-00558 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Remand
The majority determined claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable over Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst; the dissent would have found them obvious.
RulingsRemand decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We determine Patent Owner’s reading of the claim limitation is the better one. The limitation begins with the verb “locating,” and it therefore makes sense that the clause would recite what is located (i.e., encryption information) and where it is located (i.e., within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video). In other words, it is reasonable that the second and third clauses of the limitation both modify the first clause (for example, as could perhaps be expressed through the use of commas as “locating encryption information, that identifies encrypted portions of frames of video, within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video”).10 On the other hand, Petitioner’s reading of the limitation, 10 In general, we recognize that the use of commas to set off phrases in claim drafting is not consistent. We included commas above to illustrate Patent Owner’s understanding of the claim limitation. allowing only the second clause to modify the first, while not unreasonable, makes less sense. That is, the encrypted information identifies the encrypted portions of frames, which in turn are within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video. Reading the claim in its entirety, the encrypted portions of frames would be understood to be located within the requested portions of the stream; it does not seem necessary for the claim to expressly recite that aspect. For example, the very next limitation— limitation [m] of claim 1—refers to “each encrypted portion of the frames of video” but does not expressly recite “within the requested portions of the selected stream.” Ex. 1001, 27:58–60. Thus, when limitation [l] recites “within the requested portions of the selected stream,” it seems more likely that the clause refers to where that encrypted information is located rather than simply to indicate the obvious location of the encrypted portion of the frames of video. We therefore view Patent Owner’s reading of the claim language as the better one.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundMixed
“I am persuaded that the Petition demonstrates that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to combine Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst, as asserted by Petitioner. As the Federal Circuit found, the Petition pointed to and relied upon the portions in Chen describing pre-Chen art, without scalability or FEC features that were part of what Chen describes as aspects of its own inventive system. Netflix, slip op. at 9–10 (citing Pet. 17– 19, 69–70). I agree with Petitioner that “Chen-924 teaches several embodiments that adaptively stream alternative representations of a video using partially encrypted container files.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1010, 14:41– 15:60). I determine that Chen-924 provides support for the rationale provided in the Petition, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Chen and Lindahl in view of the disclosure of Chen-924. As discussed above, the Petition does not rely solely on privacy concerns and improvements to efficiency as its motivation to combine the references. See Pet. 18–19 (specifying piracy concerns, improvements to the efficiency of adaptive streaming, optimization of the balance between bitrate and bandwidth, and improvements to the end-user experience with fast startup and seek). With respect to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have” slip op. at 52
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“I agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s Remand Brief, specifically pages 1–7, attempt to address aspects of claim 1 for the first time on remand. I also agree that Patent Owner’s arguments attempt to recharacterize limitations [j] and [k] to raise issues that Patent Owner did not raise previously, in contravention of our Order that issues raised needed support from “where those issues were raised in previous briefings by the parties.” Paper 56, 2. I have addressed whether scalability and FEC are integral to how Chen operates above, as well as whether the Petition relies on those aspects, supra. The questions about how Chen operates and what portions of Chen are asserted in the ground of unpatentability were previously raised, but now are being considered or reconsidered, based on the Federal Circuit’s decision. In Patent Owner’s Remand Brief, pages 1–7, the citations to argument previously raised do not support the arguments now presented by Patent Owner on remand. As such, I determine Patent Owner’s new arguments fall outside the scope of remand, and I dismiss these arguments seeking to distinguish limitations [j] and [k] from the cited prior art combination.24” slip op. at 62
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMixed
“7 Patent Owner’s Brief on Remand recognizes that there are two arguments Patent Owner raised in its Patent Owner Response that were not addressed in the Final Written Decision. See PO Remand Br. 1 (citing PO Resp. 24–37 (the construction of “locating encrypted information . . . within requested portions”), 38–58 (referring to Patent Owner’s “common keys” argument)). 8 The Final Decision also addressed Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 42). See Final Dec. 28–37 (granting-in-part, denying-in-part, and dismissing-in-part Petitioner’s Motion). Our determinations on that Motion were part of Petitioner’s appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Paper 52. Because the Federal Circuit did not address this aspect of the Final Written Decision and the Federal Circuit’s decision does not impact our previous rulings on the Motion, we maintain those rulings here. Additionally, on remand, Petitioner requested authorization to file a motion for sanctions, which we held in abeyance until the parties’ briefing on remand was complete. See Ex. 3003, 1. Petitioner requests sanctions because of the impropriety of Patent Owner’s remand brief, including new claim construction arguments for limitations [1j] and [1k], and prejudice to Petitioner. Id. at 3, 5. Although we reserved further consideration of Petitioner’s request, we expanded both the time and pages allowed for Petitioner’s responsive brief, and also allowed Petitioner to address any related issues in its responsive brief. Id. at 1. Having considered the parties’ briefing on remand, and given that we do not reach the claim construction arguments that Petitioner objected to in its request for authorization to file a motion for sanctions, we deny Petitioner’s request.” slip op. at 5
Patent outcomesUS 10,225,588 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,225,588 - PTAB · Feb 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01235 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–6 on all petition grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success on obviousness over Szrek and did not reach the Llach–Szrek ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“We disagree. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the fact pattern presented here is not the typical situation in which the factors from General Plastic are considered. In particular, this proceeding challenges claims of a different patent than at issue in IPR2020-00084. Second, although the parties may have gained insight as to how the Board would handle challenges based on the same references asserted in the earlier proceeding, that insight (to the extent it gives an advantage) applies to both parties. Third, the first proceeding was a post-grant review that had a specific timing requirement (see 35 U.S.C. § 321(c)), in contrast to the present proceeding in which the filing of the Petition did not have the same or similar time constraint.6 In these circumstances, we find it appropriate to give less weight to factors based on the mere passage of time such as whether Petitioner knew of the prior art at the time of filing the petition in PGR2020- 00084 (clearly Petitioner did because two of the same references are asserted here) and whether Petitioner had received Patent Owner’s preliminary response from PGR2020-00084 at the time of filing the instant Petition. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we do not dive headfirst into these matters that are better addressed by the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party of interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13).7 Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’135 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner contends that we should follow the Board’s decision in PGR2020-00084 and construe “transaction processor” and “data package” in accordance with each term’s plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13; see id. at 13–19. Patent Owner does not take a position as to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. In PGR2020-00084, the Board construed “transaction processor”8 in accordance with its plain meaning as “a processor . . . that processes transactions between two devices” and specifically “decline[d] to limit processors . . . to ‘third party’ processors . . . because the intrinsic record does not justify such a modification and it would create uncertainty.” Ex. 1008, 22. And, as Petitioner indicates, the Board determined that “data package” also is understood in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 22–24; see id. at 24 n.10. At this stage of the proceeding 8 In that proceeding, the Board also construed “transaction processor system.” Ex. 1008, 13–22. and on the present record, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because none are in dispute. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,865,135 - Apple Inc. v. LBT IP I LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 15, 2023 · IPR2020-01189 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Remand
Claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 were not shown unpatentable because Sakamoto discloses only two battery power thresholds, which do not meet the construed multitude limitation.
RulingsRemand decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“threshold values” includes GPS signal level thresholds, we start with the words of claim 8. Claim 8 recites a “battery power level monitor” that (1) “measures a power level of the charging unit” and (2) “adjusts a power level applied to location tracking circuitry responsive to one or more signal levels.” Claim 8 further recites that “the power level compris[es] a multitude of threshold values determined by a user or system administrator.” The remainder of claim 8 states the purpose of the “multitude of threshold values,” which is “to intermittently activate or deactivate the location tracking circuitry to conserve power of the charging unit in response to the estimated charge level of the charging unit.” The natural reading of these recitations is that the “power level” associated with the “multitude of threshold values” is the battery power level that is (1) measured by the battery power level monitor and (2) adjusted by the battery power level monitor and applied to location tracking circuitry. We also note that the claim language already incorporates a limitation directed to “signal levels” insofar as the battery power level monitor “adjusts a power level applied to location tracking circuitry responsive to one or more signal levels” (emphasis added). As such, the limitation “one or more signal levels” is recited separately from the limitation “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” Given “[t]he general presumption that different terms have different meanings,” Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012), we ascribe different meanings to the recited “signal levels” and “power level.”” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“the battery power thresholds between (1) high and normal sensitivity positioning modes and (2) normal sensitivity positioning mode and turning off power to the GPS receiver) and Sakamoto’s two GPS signal level thresholds (i.e., K1 and K2) for teaching “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” Pet. 50–51; Pet. Reply 16–18. As discussed above, however, “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values” refers to battery power level thresholds. See supra § II.C.2. We also determine above that signal level threshold values are not within the scope of “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” See id. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Sakamoto’s GPS signal level thresholds K1 and K2 teach the recited power level threshold values. Although Petitioner is correct that “Sakamoto uses the same modes with both sets of thresholds” and that both sets of thresholds might ultimately relate to conserving battery power (see Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 27–29)), we are not persuaded that these different types of thresholds are interchangeable within the scope of “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” This is particularly true given that Petitioner already relies on Sakamoto’s GPS signal level thresholds K1 and K2 for teaching another aspect of claim 8, i.e., “responsive to one or more signal levels.” See Pet. 49–50. For these reasons, Petitioner has only established that Sakamoto teaches two battery power level thresholds within the scope of “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” Because two threshold values are not a “multitude” (see supra § II.C.1), we find that Petitioner has not established that Sakamoto teaches “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values,” as recited in claim 8. Thus, we determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 8 would have been obvious over Sakamoto. 3. Claims 10, 13, and 15 Claims 10, 13, and 15 each depend from claim 8. Ex. 1001, 17:4–10, 17:23–25, 17:29–33. Petitioner’s analysis for these claims does not cure the deficiencies discussed above with respect to claim 8. See Pet. 54–55. Thus, we determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claims 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over Sakamoto.” slip op. at 31
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“III. CONCLUSION Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the subject matter of claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over Sakamoto; (2) the subject matter of claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over the combination of Sakamoto and AAPA; or (3) the subject matter of claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over the combination of Sakamoto and Hayasaka.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 8,497,774 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,497,774 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2023 · IPR2023-00910 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–6 over all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing; denied joinder as moot.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an inter partes review, the petitioner must show with particularity why each challenged claim is unpatentable. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). The burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Patent Owner argues the Petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) because (1) “Petitioner’s inability to commit to non-duplicative efforts between the District Court Litigation and this proceeding weighs in favor of discretionary den[ial]” (Prelim. Resp. 59), and (2) Petitioner failed to request a conference call prior to filing its Motion for Joinder (Prelim. Resp. 59–60). Petitioner asserts that no trial date has been set in the parallel district court litigation, which Patent Owner does not dispute. Pet. 55; Prelim. Resp. 59–60. Additionally, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (CTPG) states that “[a] party who files a motion for joinder should arrange a conference call . . . within five business days of filing the motion.” CTPG 76 (Nov. 2019) (emphasis added).8 In light of the termination of the earlier proceeding, Petitioner’s failure to request a conference call is harmless error. Thus, we find Patent Owner’s arguments unpersuasive and decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under § 314(a).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Pet.”) requesting inter partes review of claims 1–6 of U.S. Patent No. 9,445,041 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’041 patent”). Petitioner also filed a Motion for Joinder requesting joinder with IPR2022-01548 (Paper 2), but IPR2022- 01548 has since terminated due to settlement (IPR2022-01548, Paper 18). Therefore, we deny the Motion as moot. Patent Owner Advanced Coding Technologies, LLC filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a [b]achelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, with 2–3 years of experience in digital video processing, or a related field, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). Patent Owner states that it applies Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for the purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 29. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill, with the exclusion of “at least” in defining the education 6 US 2011/0097059 A1, published Apr. 28, 2011. Ex. 1008. Petitioner refers to “Sekiguchi” as “Seikiguchi.” See, e.g., Pet. 3. level, which would render the definition open-ended and inclusive of persons of expert-level skill.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,445,041
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.