• Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00705 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–9 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet; proposed substitute claim 21 is denied as indefinite.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 5. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “The record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration, as asserted in Petitioner’s overall argument. See Pet. Reply 1–2. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited general discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1; see also Pet. Reply 2 (arguing that “Dr. Micklow’s declaration is premised on understandings of claim scope that are inconsistent with the constructions advanced by both of the parties” (emphasis added)). Instead, we read the cited portions of Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also Pet. Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1046, 112:4–12, 113:13–20, 115:15–18). Next, we turn to each of the four specific claim terms that Petitioner highlights in its further arguments.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “B. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 10–11; PO Resp. 5. Based on the complete record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Florida Litigation a Joint Claim Construction statement that included stipulated claim constructions and disputed claim constructions for terms in the challenged patent as well as the ’449 patent and the ’918 patent. See Ex. 1018, Exhibit A (Stipulated Claim Constructions), Exhibit B (Disputed Claim Constructions). The parties stipulated to the construction of the terms “fluid dispersion” and “baffle” as recited in the challenged claim. See id., Exhibit A.10 10 When staying the Florida Litigation, the District Court cancelled the scheduled claim construction hearing. See ECF No. 67 (April 8, 2025) (granting joint motion to stay); ECF No. 68 (April 8, 2025) (cancelling the The stipulated construction of “fluid dispersion” merely restates the express definition of “fluid dispersion” from the challenged patent (although the definition is not cited or discussed in the parties’ filing). Compare Ex. 1018, Exhibit A, with Ex. 1001, 3:8–20. Similarly, the stipulated construction of “baffle” essentially parrots one sentence in the challenged patent (again, not cited or discussed in the parties’ filing). Compare Ex. 1018, Exhibit A, with Ex. 1001, 7:57–59. To the extent necessary, we determine that the complete record supports the parties’ stipulated constructions of “fluid dispersion” and “baffle,” and we apply those constructions below.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 9,527,094 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 9,527,094
• Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting / Ledvance LLC et al. v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2025-00260 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held all challenged claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–14, 16–21, 25, 26, and 29 unpatentable as obvious and granted the motion to amend for substitute claims 30–49.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “E. Credibility of Dr. Doolittle Patent Owner argues that we should give no weight to Dr. Doolittle’s testimony because, “[o]n cross examination, Prof. Doolittle repeatedly contradicted himself, dodged questions, and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions.” PO Resp. 25. Patent Owner raises two major complaints about Dr. Doolittle. First, Patent Owner argues that he took inconsistent positions by asserting in these IPR proceedings that the claims were entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning, while in the parallel district court proceeding, asserting that certain claim terms were indefinite. Id. at 26–28. Second, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Doolittle “repeatedly dodged questions and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions,” and that “[d]uring cross examination Patent Owner was forced to object to Prof. Doolittle’s nonresponsive answers no less than eighteen times.” Id. at 28. We strongly disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of Dr. Doolittle’s testimony. We have reviewed the entirety of both of Dr. Doolittle’s depositions. We are impressed with his forthrightness, candor, and good humor in the face of Patent Owner’s counsel’s aggressive questioning. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, we find that his testimony was well-reasoned, forthright, honest, and entitled to significant weight. Dr. Doolittle explained the different claim construction positions We also strongly disagree that Dr. Doolittle’s answers were nonresponsive or “evasive” as Patent Owner argues. Patent Owner’s numerous attempts to “strike” portions of his testimony belie Dr. Doolittle’s efforts to honestly and in good faith respond to Patent Owner’s counsel’s questions. Ex. 2025, 22:10–23:15, 25:9–26:14, 30:14–22, 40:3-9, 58:12–59:1, 60:18–61:13, 65:1–10, 83:15–84:16, 92:15–95:20, 96:18–99:9, 102:22–106:16, 135:3–136:22. An answer is not “non-responsive” simply because it does not conform to the conclusion you want or undermines the logic underlying your questioning. Dr. Doolittle explained his answers and addressed the issues Patent Owner asked about. Accordingly, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to give Dr. Doolittle’s testimony no weight. Instead, we assess Dr. Doolittle’s testimony on a case-by-case basis as discussed below.” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted ground of unpatentability in view of the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “POSA”). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d Relying on the declaration testimony of its expert, Dr. Doolittle, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’678 patent “would have had an undergraduate degree (i.e., B.S., B.S.E. or the equivalent) in electrical engineering, materials science, physics, or a similar discipline” and “would also have one to two years of experience in the field of LED packaging design.” Pet. 5–6. Petitioner additionally contends that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner further contends that “[t]his person would have been capable of understanding and applying the teachings of the ’678 patent and the prior-art references discussed herein,” and “[m]oreover, the prior art reflects the level of skill at the time of the claimed invention.” Id. (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 38–42). Patent Owner states that “solely for the purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner and its technical expert employ the same level of skill in the art as Petitioners.” PO Resp. 24–25. Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’678 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysis below.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “lower wavelength might offer, there were other drawbacks that a person of ordinary skill would have to balance. But “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indeed, Petitioner has shown several references—including, Basin-2005, Shimizu, and Stokes—that made this tradeoff. Moreover, “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We find that the prior art of record demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have such an expectation in making the combination of Basin-2007 and Basin-2005. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been motivation to combine Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 with a reasonable expectation of success. 4. Summary We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions regarding claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 (Pet. 19–53), and find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 teach the limitations of those claims, and that there would have been a motivation to combine the references in the manner suggested with a reasonable considerations does not outweigh the strong showing of obviousness. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 would have been obvious over Basin-2007 and Basin-2005.” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “1. Nexus In order for secondary considerations to be awarded “substantial” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,604,678 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,604,678
• Par Health, Inc. v. Inforlife, S.A.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 20, 2026 · PGR2026-00036 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Institution

  The Director denied institution because the petition did not show that Biomed was publicly accessible as prior art, so it failed to show any challenged claim was unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16.” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16. In this case, Petitioner merely cites a “date of revision” appearing within Biomed. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1005, 11). Yet, a revision date alone does not establish that Biomed was disseminated or made publicly available. And, although indicia appearing within a reference can sometimes support the printed publication status of the reference, I find the record to be devoid of any such indicia, or other evidence, supporting that Biomed was publicly disseminated or accessible by the June 15, 2021 “date of revision.” See Hulu, Paper 29 at 16–18. Thus, Petitioner fails to show that it is more likely” slip op. at 3

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached

    “sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16. In this case, Petitioner merely cites a “date of revision” appearing within Biomed. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1005, 11). Yet, a revision date alone does not establish that Biomed was disseminated or made publicly available. And, although indicia appearing within a reference can sometimes support the printed publication status of the reference, I find the record to be devoid of any such indicia, or other evidence, supporting that Biomed was publicly disseminated or accessible by the June 15, 2021 “date of revision.” See Hulu, Paper 29 at 16–18. Thus, Petitioner fails to show that it is more likely” slip op. at 3

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 12,370,153
• Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Abtis Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00283 · APJ Lilan Ren · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board cancelled claim 11 and granted substitute claims 14–16, finding Petitioner had not shown those claims unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “must determine whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4. In that regard, Patent Owner bears the burden of persuasion to show that: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter;” slip op. at 9

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In this case, Patent Owner’s expert “Dr. Zhou signed the second declaration, stood behind its contents, and was available for cross-examination.” Paper 35, 4. Petitioner does not dispute this statement. Paper 39, 1. Petitioner does not identify any specific undue prejudice caused by Exhibit 2008. For example, Petitioner argues that “the failure to impress upon a witness that a statement is under oath goes to the heart of its reliability as evidence” and that “as the Board has recognized, hearsay is inherently unreliable” without specifying what statement in Exhibit 2008 lacks reliability. Paper 39, 4. Because Petitioner does not provide specific evidence of undue prejudice, we find Petitioner has suffered no such undue prejudice in this case. See Liquidia, 2021 WL 4860773 at *25. We therefore deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude on the basis of lack of authenticity. With regard to the assertion that Exhibit 2008 is hearsay, Petitioner objects to the exhibit because the testimony is based “on other informal and unpublished documents that are hearsay under FRE 802.” Paper 29, 1. Petitioner does not specify what such “informal and unpublished documents” are. See id. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 expressly states, “[a]n expert may base an opinion on fact or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.” The facts or data “need not be deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude on the basis of hearsay.” slip op. at 50

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive. Paragraph 59 of the ’503 application describes formula 8-1 but does not support Petitioner’s argument that other unknown formulas may be included in the recited modified heavy chains. Ex. 2003 ¶ 59. Petitioner’s hypothesis that the recited heavy chains may (or may not) encompass unknown formulas is also inapposite to the written description inquiry before us — that is, whether the inventor was in possession of the subject matter recited in claims 14–16 based on the disclosure including formulas 8-1, 8-2, and 8-3. See PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306.” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledNot shown unpatentable

    “These arguments in the Sur-Reply are unpersuasive to show a lack of enablement first and foremost because the arguments do not specifically provide evidence showing that any purported experimentation is undue. See Sur-Reply 2–8 (asserting, but without providing evidence under any specific Wands factors, that the examples and guidance in the specification do not extend to the broad scope of all antibodies); see Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. We again emphasize that the analysis of undue experimentation does not necessarily require every Wands factor to be explicitly addressed but the analysis must be based on “weighing many factual considerations” depending on the nature of the invention and underlying art. Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The assertion that the claim scope is broad alone does not suffice to show a lack of enablement based on the record before us. Moreover, as we note supra, Petitioner’s claim scope argument is based on the false premise that the scope of claims 14–16 is as broad as the claim term “antibody” without taking into account all other claim elements. For example, Petitioner does not disagree with Patent Owner’s statement that “[t]he ’675 Patent’s specification discloses the structural modification site, the chemistry used to modify that residue, and working examples demonstrating the modification” (Reply 2), but asserts only that “[t]he disclosure of SSFI that only binds to IgG1 Fc domains (SEQ ID NO:1) is . . . . inconsistent with the expansive scope of the claims.” Sur-Reply 5. Petitioner’s argument that the claims encompass proteins that lack a lysine reside at a 248 position improperly excludes from the claim language the “lysine residue at 248 position . . . [as] determined by the EU numbering system” that claims 14–16 require. As Dr. Zhou testifies, “each proposed lysine residue at position 248 (EU numbering) is covalently modified with a specific attachment with a terminal bio-orthogonal click-chemistry functional group. The specification describes targeted transfer of a chemical functional group to lysine 248” and when claims 14–16 are considered in their entirety, which includes all claim elements, “[a] POSA would understand the claim itself to limit the modified antibodies to those with lysine at position 248.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 48; Ex. 2008 ¶ 47. We also note that Patent Owner states “a POSA would understand that the phrase ‘one or more modified heavy chain’ encompasses antibodies within typical DAR distributions (i.e., fractional numbers) rather than requiring a distinct process for producing antibodies bearing modified heavy chains in exact integers.” Reply 2–3. Moreover, Patent Owner states that PepTalk Presentation demonstrates that “a POSA would understand antibody conjugation products to exist as mixtures rather than discrete whole number species” because PepTalk Presentation “presents DAR values as non-integer measurements, i.e. DARs of 1.8 and 1.9 reflecting such distributions.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1007, 28). According to Patent Owner, “preparations having an average DAR of approximately 1.8 (commonly referred to in practice as ‘DAR2’) may reflect typical reaction distributions in which some antibodies contain two modified heavy chains while others contain fewer.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 46). Petitioner does not rebut these statements. See Sur-Reply 2–8. Based on the foregoing, the evidence before us does not show any” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,896,675 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,896,675
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Ouraring, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00147 · APJ Linda E Horner · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board found claims 1–6 and 8–20 not shown unpatentable under three obviousness grounds, principally because the proposed combinations did not establish a feasible curved battery or transparent potting encapsulating the components.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, optical engineering, or related field of study, or equivalent experience, and at least two years’ experience in academia or industry studying or developing physiological monitoring devices such as non-invasive biosensors. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 29). Petitioner also contends that a person of ordinary skill would have been “familiar with, e.g., sensor system design, including inertial and other motion sensor system design, and signal processing” and that “[a] higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Resp. 25. We adopt this uncontested definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. This definition is supported by the record and consistent with the disclosure in the ’124 patent and the references cited in the Petition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We need not reach the issue of whether the preamble is limiting for purposes of determining patentability of the challenged claims. Even were we to agree with Patent Owner that the preamble is limiting and the claims are limited to a finger-worn ring wearable computer device, Petitioner has relied on Schröder in each ground to disclose a “wearable computing device configured to be worn around a finger of a wearer.” Pet. 22 (Ground 1), 45 (Ground 2, relying on Yuen for adding the functionality of light sources with a photodetector, temperature sensors, and varying the sampling frequency of sensor data acquisition), 56 (Ground 3). We agree with Petitioner that Schröder discloses such a device. Thus, no explicit claim construction is necessary for this decision.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and find that Patent Owner has the better position for several reasons. First, the record supports Patent Owner’s argument that Mestas’s batteries are much too large to fit within a ring form factor, and “would have to be reduced in size on the 6 There is no Exhibit 2022 in the record of this case. magnitude of 5-10x from its current size to fit in a ring of Schröder.” Resp. 38 (citing Dr. Anthony’s cross-examination testimony at Ex. 2021, 313:12). Second, Petitioner relies on evidence in the Reply that Petitioner failed to specifically identify in the Petition. Compare Reply 3–5 (citing Ex. 1369 ¶¶ 7–14; Ex. 1079 ¶¶ 47, 71; Ex. 2022, 138:7–143:1; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 96, 337; Ex. 2021, 12–13, 307:7–17; Ex. 2020, 212:6–214:13; Ex. 1081, 130:18–131:14; Ex. 1010 ¶ 168), 9 (referring back to Section § II.B.2) with Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 193–99; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 157, 163, 168, 201, Fig. 6). More specifically, while the portion of Dr. Anthony’s Declaration cited in the Petition (see Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 193–99)) mentions the Technology Background Section V of his Declaration (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 42–147), neither Petitioner nor Dr. Anthony sufficiently explains what evidence supports his opinion that it was feasible to incorporate batteries or battery-like devices into finger-rings, or how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have miniaturized a curved battery for incorporation into Schröder’s ring. Ex. 1002 ¶ 196 (describing that rechargeable batteries powering wearable electronic devices were “well-known by 2013” and “had also undergone significant advances in terms of miniaturization and energy density [that] made it feasible to incorporate batteries or battery-like devices such as supercapacitors into smaller form factors, such as finger rings, without sacrificing functionality” such as “lithium-polymer (Li-Po) batteries and solid-state batteries.”). Moreover, some of Petitioner’s citations in the Reply appear to be incorrect as there is no Exhibit 2022 of record in this case, as noted above. These issues undermine the strength of Petitioner’s showing by making it difficult to follow its reasoning, much less identify where in the record that reasoning finds support. See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”). Third, even considering Petitioner’s new Reply arguments and” slip op. at 27

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We credit Dr. Mercier’s testimony over Dr. Anthony’s and agree that Dr. Anthony’s testimony fails to account for the constraints of a substantially smaller form factor in Schröder’s finger-ring as compared to Mestas’s wrist device. Ex. 2018 ¶ 140. Although large curved batteries suitable for use in a wrist band or other larger wearable device, such as shown in Mestas, were known at the time of the ’124 patent, we also have evidence that prior art “finger ring wearables up to the ’124 patent had used ‘coin’ type batteries.” Resp. 40 (citing Ex. 2018 ¶ 140). We credit Dr. Mercier’s testimony that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked to a coin type battery for the necessary power requirements of Schröder’s device. Ex. 2018 ¶ 141. Indeed, this testimony is consistent with the other art of record that consistently shows the use of flat batteries in finger-ring devices, often stacked above and protruding from the general ring shape of the device. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 (Niwa), Figs. 22, 28; Ex. 2025 (Asada ’701 patent), Fig. 4; Ex. 1035 (Rhee), Figs. 7-1, 8-1, 8-2; Ex. 1037 (Asada article), Fig. 9; Ex. 1034 (Asada ’199 patent), Fig. 2; Ex. 1028 (Kimura patent), Fig. 24; Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 74–84. In fact, Oura’s first-generation ring design, released in 2015, used a Superbowl ring type design, with the battery and other components mounted on top of the ring. Ex. 2034; Ex. 2018 ¶ 85. We also agree with Dr. Mercier that Dr. Anthony’s testimony lacks evidence or a technical analysis of the power requirements for the various sensors he suggests including in a wearable device and the capacity of the proposed GMBPow battery. See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 94, 210, 214–17; Ex. 2018 ¶ 97. Moreover, Dr. Anthony does not address the issues with the batteries that are identified in the references he discusses. For example, Dr. Anthony does not address Lee’s disclosure that “direct coating of electrode slurry onto plain paper led to the occasional internal-shorting of the device due to the leakage of the electrode material through a large-sized hole in the paper.” Ex. 1019, 2415. In contrast, Dr. Mercier discusses the pitfalls the skilled artisan faced in developing finger-ring devices. See, e.g., Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 77–79 (discussing the issues Rhee’s and Asada’s large rings), 83 (identifying power requirements as a design constraint). For example, Dr. Mercier explains that “flexible or curved batteries include flexible packaging materials such as aluminum laminated films that house the electrodes and electrolyte” such that “once the battery packaging is added to a battery such as GMBPow and then placed within a housing (e.g., external housing shell and internal potting), the resulting device would have dimensions that are not suitable for a finger-worn ring.” Id. ¶ 96 (citing Ex. 2026).” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 11,188,124 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,188,124
• Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sitnet LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jul 2, 2026 · IPR2026-00112 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

  Institution was denied for claims 1–12 because the petition did not show that the cited search results taught the claimed “data feed.”

  RulingsDirector review decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Although Petitioner asserts that the ’463 patent “does not limit the form of a data feed,” Petitioner does not explain what the ordinary and customary meaning of “data feed” was at the time of the claimed invention or otherwise propose an express construction of “data feed.” Pet. 6–7, 23. Nor does Petitioner point to any prosecution history that bears on the meaning of “data feed.” Id.; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.100. Accordingly, Petitioner does not provide sufficient evidence showing that Kraft’s or Wong’s disclosure of search results in response to a user-entered search query teaches a “data feed,” as recited in each challenged claim of the ’463 patent. As such, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing at least one claim is unpatentable, as 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) requires.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “I agree with Patent Owner. Neither Kraft nor Wong uses the term “data feed” or characterizes its listing of Web pages (Kraft) or nodes (Wong) provided in response to a user-provided query as a “data feed.” See Ex. 1005, 5:8–12, 6:52–59, 16:52–59, 18:31–54, 18:61–19:23; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22, 28, 35. Petitioner points to a disclosure in the ’463 patent of a user requesting a personal information aggregator (PIA) to “receive a data feed.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:52–64). But Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how this disclosure provides support for broadly construing “browsing a data feed” to encompass a user entering criteria for a search (and not specifically requesting a “data feed”) and receiving a listing of Web pages or nodes in response. See Pet. 23, 58–59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 102, 201–202; Ex. 1005, 6:57–59 (describing users searching a data store for models that match “user-specified criteria”), 18:41–54 (describing a user submitting a query); Ex. 1007 ¶ 28 (describing “searching and selecting from keyword identifiers or other search terms”). Petitioner’s reliance on a separate disclosure in the ’463 patent of the PIA “searching . . . the network for information about the situation or event” also is not persuasive, because the ’463 patent does not describe that embodiment as involving a data feed or browsing a data feed. See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1001, 20:46–51) (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1001, 20:46–51.” slip op. at 3

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 12,256,463
• Apple, Inc. v. Wecrevention, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 24, 2026 · IPR2026-00242 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

  The Director denied the petitions and instituted no trial, exercising discretion based on Petitioner’s unexplained inconsistent claim-construction positions before the Board and district court.

  RulingsDirector review decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “As I have indicated previously, petitioners should be presenting a single construction and applying that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic and raises concerns of strategic litigation behavior spill-over into the PTAB inconsistent with Congress’s intent to provide a quick and cost-effective alternative to district court litigation. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4; see H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48 (2011). Here, Petitioner offers no explanation for its divergent positions.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “As I have indicated previously, petitioners should be presenting a single construction and applying that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic and raises concerns of strategic litigation behavior spill-over into the PTAB inconsistent with Congress’s intent to provide a quick and cost-effective alternative to district court litigation. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4; see H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48 (2011). Here, Petitioner offers no explanation for its divergent positions.” slip op. at 3

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 11,894,098
• Apple, Inc. v. Wecrevention, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 24, 2026 · IPR2026-00240 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

  The Director denied Apple’s petitions and instituted no trial, exercising discretion based on Apple’s unexplained inconsistent claim-construction positions before the Board and district court.

  RulingsDirector review decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “As I have indicated previously, petitioners should be presenting a single construction and applying that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic and raises concerns of strategic litigation behavior spill-over into the PTAB inconsistent with Congress’s intent to provide a quick and cost-effective alternative to district court litigation. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4; see H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48 (2011). Here, Petitioner offers no explanation for its divergent positions.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notOther

    “that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to their ordinary and customary meaning,” and that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Paper 2, 4 (emphasis added). Petitioner also states, as part of its analysis of the challenged claims, that “Petitioner does not concede that the preambles of the Challenged Claims are limiting.” Id. at 9 n.5 (emphasis added). In district court, however, Petitioner tells a different story, arguing there that the preamble is limiting. Ex. 2016, 6, 7, 9, 12. Indeed, Petitioner specifically denotes that “[r]eview of ‘the entirety of the patent’ makes clear that the preamble phrase ‘high speed memory chip module’ contains the core of what the inventors ‘actually invented and intended to encompass by the claims,’ . . . and so the preamble should be limiting.” Id. at 7 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Other

    “IPR2026-00243 are similarly problematic. In its Petitions, Petitioner identifies “input/output unit” as a means-plus-function limitation and identifies the corresponding structure as input/output unit 106 in the challenged patent. See, e.g., IPR2026-00241, Paper 2, 4. Petitioner also asserts “the applied prior art anticipates or renders obvious the Challenged Claims, regardless of whether ‘input/output unit’ is construed as a §112(f) means-plus-function limitation,” and that “Petitioner is not conceding . . . that the ’017 Patent provides adequate structure for the ‘input/output unit.’” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). In District Court, however, Petitioner once again takes a different position, arguing that the claim term “input/output unit” should be construed as a means-plus-function limitation, identifying the function as “performing input and/or output functions with respect to memory,” and asserting that the challenged patent “[l]acks sufficient structure (indefinite).” IPR2026-00241, Ex. 2016, 12. According to Petitioner, “[t]he specification fails to disclose sufficient corresponding structure for performing input and output operations with respect to memory, much less for performing those operations within any particular voltage range.” Id. at 19. Petitioner fails to adequately explain its different positions here before the Board and those it propounds in district court. See, e.g., IPR2026-00241, Paper 9. Patent Owner well states the issue; that “[t]o the extent § 112(f) governs, then either input/output unit 106 is sufficient corresponding structure (in which case [Petitioner’s] district-court indefiniteness argument fails), or it is not (in which case [Petitioner’s] IPR mapping relies on a structure [Petitioner] itself maintains is inadequate).” IPR2026-00241, Paper 8, 8–9. I agree. Petitioner’s statement that it does not concede the challenged patent provides adequate structure for the “input/output unit” thus only compounds the problem.” slip op. at 3

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,201,834
• Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corp. v. Railware, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 15, 2026 · IPR2026-00133 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

  The Director denied the petitions and instituted no trial, exercising discretion based on the complete record and the petitioner’s failure to present a consistent claim construction position.

  RulingsDirector review decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “As I have indicated previously, a petitioner should present a single construction and apply that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. 1 Citations are to papers in IPR2026-00133. The parties filed similar papers in IPR2026-00134 and IPR2026-00135. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4. A petitioner may not avoid presenting its own claim construction position in a proceeding before the Office by presenting an analysis based on claim construction positions taken by other parties in a different proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (requiring that the petition must “set forth . . . [h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed”); Trial Practice Guide2 §§ II.B.(3) and (6). Permitting such conduct would allow a petitioner to avoid taking a consistent claim construction position. Such conduct would undermine the purpose of inter partes review proceedings and detract from the Office’s goal of “providing greater predictability and certainty in the patent system.” Revvo, Paper 20 at 4–5. While certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on the complete record and a holistic assessment of all of the evidence in light of the arguments presented.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “As I have indicated previously, a petitioner should present a single construction and apply that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. 1 Citations are to papers in IPR2026-00133. The parties filed similar papers in IPR2026-00134 and IPR2026-00135. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4. A petitioner may not avoid presenting its own claim construction position in a proceeding before the Office by presenting an analysis based on claim construction positions taken by other parties in a different proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (requiring that the petition must “set forth . . . [h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed”); Trial Practice Guide2 §§ II.B.(3) and (6). Permitting such conduct would allow a petitioner to avoid taking a consistent claim construction position. Such conduct would undermine the purpose of inter partes review proceedings and detract from the Office’s goal of “providing greater predictability and certainty in the patent system.” Revvo, Paper 20 at 4–5.” slip op. at 2

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,517,782
• Tableau Software, LLC v. Icharts LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01387 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under the instituted obviousness grounds, including Becerra, the QlikView Manuals, and combinations with other references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “why it is trustworthy and how it archives dates by which the webpages were accessible, as this is an information resource on which librarians reasonably rely. See FED. R. EVID. 703. We agree with Petitioner that Dr. Hall-Ellis does have personal knowledge of the facts stated in the remaining testimony (e.g., what she actually downloaded from websites), and that FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 602 is inapplicable to her testimony offered as an expert. See Pet. Opp. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 26, 29–32, 35, 37–39). We find her testimony to be relevant to the issues presented and specifically to whether the QlikView documents were publicly accessible. We also find no danger that the testimony would confuse the issues or mislead the Board or present unfair prejudice to Patent Owner. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as to the remaining portion of Dr. Hall-Ellis’s declaration.” slip op. at 92

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted

    “FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Strike portions of Patent Owner’s Reply on its Motion to Exclude (Paper 32) is granted; and” slip op. at 102

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “1. Motivation to Combine Becerra and Couckuyt Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Becerra and Couckuyt because such a person would have recognized that Couckuyt discloses useful techniques of assigning data to Becerra’s charts, including assigning data to each axis. Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19, 52, Fig. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 224). Petitioner contends that Couckuyt discloses associating data from a “spreadsheet document” with a chart, such as a “bar graph.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1006, 6:1–37; Figs. 3a, 3c). below. Petitioner’s annotations to Figure 4 identify “Drop Zones” in red and “Data Fields” in Blue. Id. at 36. Petitioner contends Couckuyt discloses a “drag-and-drop user interface (DDUI) . . . associated with a data source, such as the two-dimensional data source 300,” and Figure 4 illustrates the DDUI permitting “value data fields and the characteristic data fields . . . to be dragged and dropped into drop zones.” Id. at 35–36 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:10–13). Petitioner contends that a “primary benefit of the charting DDUI is that the user can quickly change the data that is being presented in the chart,” and using Couckuyt’s techniques, a user can “quickly change the data” and see the desired effects. Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:18–19; Ex. 1003 ¶ 228). Petitioner contends that when Becerra’s control panel includes multiple charts, Couckuyt’s techniques would allow dragging-anddropping data from a data source to multiple charts, and would simplify the process of assigning data to multiple control panel components. Id. at 36–37 skill in the art would have also had a reasonable expectation of success combining Becerra with Couckuyt because the combination would amount to nothing more than incorporating Couckuyt’s well-known drag-and-drop techniques into Becerra’s system. Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 229–231). Patent Owner responds that Couckuyt focuses on selecting a data icon that corresponds to dragging and dropping data fields, not dragging and dropping data, while Becerra teaches that selecting various data ranges from the spreadsheet is desirable. PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1004 7:48–52; Ex. 2001 ¶ 146). According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to merely select data fields that do not limit the selected data in any way. Id. Patent Owner further argues Becerra’s method of binding components to a spreadsheet range and extracting formulas from a spreadsheet teaches away from the multiple chart generation scheme of Couckuyt that uses drag and dropping of data fields. Id. at 37. According to Patent Owner, Couckuyt is directed to the need for a charting DDUI that can generate multiple charts at the same time and such a need does not exist in Becerra which in turn is focused on creating a control panel that is an interactive graphics simulation. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 1:66–67, 2:5–8; Ex. 1005 ¶ 11; Ex. 2001 ¶ 148). Based on our review of the complete record, we determine that” slip op. at 31

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “2. Whether QlikView Manuals Qualify as Prior Art Petitioner argues that “the QlikView Manuals describe a well-known system and are printed publications available to the public at least by July 8, 2008.” Pet. 7–9. Petitioner offers ample evidence to demonstrate the QlikView Manuals were publicly accessible by July 8, 2008. See id. (citing Ex. 1008; Ex. 1009; Ex. 1014–1023; Ex. 1003 ¶ 129–140; Ex. 1030;11 Ex. 1068 ¶¶ 4–7; Ex. 1032; Ex. 1033). Petitioner contends in 2008, QlikView was a well-known software product sold by QlikTech International AB (“QlikTech”). Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 129; Ex. 1030 ¶ 23; Ex. 1068 ¶¶ 4–7). Petitioner asserts that QlikTech announced that QlikView version 8.50 was scheduled for release on June 30, 2008, and QlikTech’s website added the “QlikView 8.50” hyperlink by July 8, 2008. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 129–131; Ex. 1022, 1; Ex. 1068 ¶ 7). Petitioner contends that, as of July 8, 2008, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that they could view the QlikView Manuals in the installation package. Id. (citing Exs. 1014–1017; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 131–132; Ex. 1068 ¶ 7). Petitioner further contends that the QlikView Manuals were also available on QlikTech’s website as of this 11 As discussed below (see infra § IV.A), we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to certain portions of Exhibit 1030 and do not give them any weight. However, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as to the remaining portions of Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony as well as Ms. Lofton’s testimony and various other exhibits proffered by Petitioner to show public accessibility of the QlikView manuals as of July 8, 2008. QlikView 8.50 was published on July 8, 2008. Id. at 8–9 (citing Exs. 1008, 1009, 1017, 1059, 1060; Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 29, 37). In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner does not contest that the QlikView Manuals were published and publicly available by July 8, 2008. PO Resp. 50 n.2 (noting only that Patent Owner intends to move to exclude evidence Petitioner relies on to establish the publication date for QlikView Manuals); Tr. 45:3–19. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the QlikView Manuals were publicly available as of July 8, 2008.12” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 8,271,892 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,271,892

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.